MERGER AND SEPARATION
22
TWO
be ignored, especially since anti-colonialism was the rallying point of rampant communism
in the region.
Under the Colonial Office, Singapore, Penang and Malacca had been one administrative entity
as the Straits Settlements, but with seamless interaction with the peninsular Malay states. With
the abortive implementation of the proposal to create the Malayan Union on 1
st
April, 1946,
Penang and Malacca were relinquished to Malaya. But the Malayan Union scheme had been
decisively rejected by the Malay community because it offered political and constitutional
equality with indigenous Malays for Chinese, Indian and other immigrants who had settled
in Malaya. So, the scheme was abandoned three months after inauguration. In its stead, the
Federation of Malaya was created on 1
st
February, 1948, with Penang and Malacca as member
states, under British rule until the Federation was granted full independence in 1957. The
Federation of Malaya constitution provided for Islam to be the state religion and for Malays
to be regarded as ‘princes of the soil’ or ‘bumiputra’ with exclusive special privileges. In the
meantime, Singapore had been left a separate British colony. By 1959, Singapore had been
granted internal self-government and was on track for independence from Britain. Under the
circumstances, merger with the Federation of Malaya was a logical proposition. But, logical
or not, the main objection which had led to the creation of the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) and derailed the Malayan Union—namely the British initiative to
promote constitutional equality for all citizens of Malaya—should have been revisited more
diligently by all concerned before the merger was mooted, let alone implemented.
Ironically, by 1961, both Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of self-governing Singapore
and Tunku Abdul Rahman, founding Prime Minister of Malaya and later of Malaysia, had
concluded—for different reasons—that Singapore should merge with Malaya. For Mr. Lee,
the division of Singapore from Malaya was an arbitrary technicality. At the time, to him,
Singapore had no future by itself. It needed the Malayan hinterland and common market,
while Malaya had much to gain from the strategic location of Singapore and its outstanding
natural harbour. The Tunku, on the other hand, had concluded that the British would exit
the scene soon, leaving a separately independent Singapore, thereby presenting a base for the
further communist subversion of the Malay Peninsula, where armed communist insurgency
had barely been crushed. Neither was he blind to the economic benefits of incorporating
Singapore into the Federation. However, he was extremely uncomfortable with the robust
politics of the colony, more so with its predominantly Chinese population. In addition to
their de facto economic domination, Singapore’s one million Chinese combined with Malaya’s
2.3 million Chinese would pose a threat to the political dominance of Malaya’s 3.4 million
Malays.
1
For the Tunku, it was a case of damned if he did and damned if he didn’t. In the
end, he acquiesced to Malaysia because the Borneo territories and Singapore’s own Malay
population of about 150,000 would contribute additional Malay and indigenous populations
to maintain Malay domination, while the Borneo territories would more than double Malaya’s
territorial assets and access to natural resources. In August 1961, agreement in principle was
reached between Singapore and Malaya on the merger and discussions were held in London in