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CREATING THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

28

THREE

ongoing in peninsular Malaysia and the Borneo territories after Singapore separated. The

2

nd

Battalion, Singapore Infantry Regiment (2 SIR), renamed Malaysian Infantry Regiment

4

,

then under 4 MIB and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Abdul Latiff bin Hussein from

the Royal Malay Regiment, had suffered the most casualties to date when, on 28

th

February,

1965, a patrol had been ambushed at Bukit Lebam, Kota Tinggi by Indonesian infiltrators,

who killed 9 servicemen and wounded 5 others.

5

Later, 2 SIR reciprocated in two separate

incidents. There had also been terror bomb attacks in Singapore in which civilians had

been killed and two of the Indonesians responsible had been captured and sentenced to

death. But technically, after 9

th

August, Singapore was no longer a target of Konfrontasi.

Besides, on 30

th

September, 1965, an attempted coup by the Indonesian Communist Party,

PKI, to take over the government of President Sukarno had been foiled by Major General

Mohamed Suharto, commander of the army’s strategic reserve. In the aftermath of the failed

PKI coup, Major General Soharto eventually assumed power and subsequently decided to

end the Konfrontasi campaign. For Singapore, resumption of bilateral trade with Indonesia

would be a vital economic boost. On 10

th

April, 1966, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam

Malik announced that Indonesia would recognised Singapore as an independent state.

But, Malaysia objected to Singapore accepting the recognition on the technically valid

grounds that it contravened the mutual defence terms of the Separation Agreement and

the Tunku demanded that Singapore choose between Malaysia and Indonesia.

6

On 19

th

April, security checks were enforced on movements between Malaysia and Singapore at the

Causeway, while an agreement on common visas for the two territories was allowed to lapse.

Singapore thereupon took the position that it would discuss Indonesian recognition with

Malaysia. In the event, Malaysia also negotiated an end to Konfrontasi with the Indonesian

leadership and on 1

st

June, 1966 signed a bi-lateral agreement that was formalised on

12

th

August.

5 RMR in Holland Road Camp.

The same hardboiled attitude was evident in the Malaysian

Armed Forces responses to Singapore’s own defence imperatives. Their approach to vacating

Holland Road Camp, 2 SIR’s home base, on the unit’s return from operational deployment was

probably a defining moment in the two countries’ post-separation ties. 5 RMR was temporarily

housed in Holland Road Camp. Regular Singapore troops were still under the operational

command of 4 MIB and 2 SIR had remained on deployment against Indonesian forces in

Sebatik Island, off Sabah, despite the separation. When it was due to return in February, it

had to be housed under canvas in Farrer Park because the Malaysian Government refused

to vacate Holland Road Camp. The Malaysians argued that Malaysia was responsible for the

defence of Singapore and that the defence of the two territories was inseparable. For these

reasons, Malaysia had the right to station troops in Singapore. The Royal Malaysian Navy was

based in Woodlands (and would remain there until 1994 without objection from Singapore),

and no specific deadline had been given to 4 MIB to decamp Singapore. This was in line with

the underlying concept of the Joint Defence Council and the terms of the Anglo-Malaysian

Defence Agreement and reinforced by the fact that officially, Indonesia was still in a state

of armed confrontation with Malaysia. But the concern arose from the insistence that it was