One of a Kind (2nd Edition)

CREATING THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

THREE

I. A SENSE OF VULNERABILITY

II. FURTHER AGGRAVATIONS

One of the first things that the Singapore Government addressed after separation was the

creation of an indigenous military capability. The obvious reasons were that as a sovereign

state, Singapore would have to safeguard its independence in a turbulent, geopolitical region

and take on its collective defence obligations. But, there was also concern that Malaysia would

seek to dominate Singapore using its substantial military capabilities. The atmospherics of

separation, though they had been maturely handled, still continued to generate a lot of static

just below the surface on both sides. For one thing, the Malaysian military had a very large

presence in Singapore, not only with its naval base in Woodlands, but also the headquarters

of the 4

Malaysian Infantry Brigade (4 MIB) and the 5

Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment

(5RMR) in Fort Canning and Holland Road Camp, respectively. In theory, from 9

August,

1965, Commander 4 MIB was to take instructions from the Singapore Government but in

practice, he made his presence felt most intrusively when the first independent Singapore

Parliament opened in December 1965.

Brigadier Syed Mohamed bin Syed Ahmad Alsagoff

called on Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and “insisted that his motorcycle outriders escort (Mr. Lee) to

Parliament.” As foreign dignitaries would be present at the occasion, Mr. Lee concluded that

Tunku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, was sending a reminder to all that “Malaysia

was still in charge in Singapore.”

There were other sensitive issues abroad as well, more so

because the wounds of separation were still raw, with every negative perspective taking on

sinister significance. Perhaps chief among these was that while the Singapore Cabinet had no

fear that the Tunku would change his mind, “other powerful Malay leaders, like Syed Ja’afar

Hassan Albar who so strongly opposed separation that he had resigned as Secretary-General

of UMNO, might persuade Brigadier Alsagoff it was his patriotic duty to reverse separation.”

There were further aggravations in the following months to reinforce Mr. Lee’s concerns.

Malaysia’s proclivities in interpreting the terms and the spirit of the Separation Agreement in

two important issues—the first with regard to foreign policy and the second, defence—were

cautionary tales.

Normalisation of Relations with Indonesia.

The creation of Malaysia had frustrated a

grandiose proposal by the government of President Sukarno of Indonesia to establish a larger

federation to be called ‘Maphilindo’ which would have included all of the territories within

Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. Even before Malaysia was formed, in January 1963

Indonesia launched an armed guerrilla campaign in the Borneo territories against Malaysian

forces supported by British and Commonwealth troops. Guerrilla operations were still

CREATING THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES