One of a Kind (2nd Edition)

A HISTORY LESSON THE FIRST BATCH DID NOT GET

ONE

Singapore and peninsular Malaysia were inextricably linked. Moreover, Britain’s commitment

to AMDA remained and on separation, Britain, to all intents and purposes, still expected

to occupy its military installations in Singapore as its base of operations for AMDA as well

as other regional security interests. Also, Malaysia had its naval base in Singapore with no

prospect of re-location in the immediate future. And, to complicate matters, Konfrontasi

was still ongoing.

On separation, Singapore was left vulnerable in nearly every field. Political sentiments being

what they were at the time, Singapore’s sovereign independence was tenuous. It was heavily

dependent on the presence of the British bases and continued dominance of the political

scene in Malaysia of Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malaysian Prime Minister, who had mooted

the separation (as opposed to enforced federation sans the current Singapore political

leadership). The practical aspects of de-linking Singapore from Malaysia would take time

and one of the thorniest areas would be in military matters, given that these had been under

direct Federal Government purview.

Under Article V of the Separation Agreement of 7

August, 1965 Singapore and Malaysia

were to enter into a treaty of external defence and mutual assistance, subject to the

establishment of a Joint Defence Council. The Malaysian Government would give the

Singapore Government assistance such as it considered reasonable and adequate for external

defence. The Malaysian Government would have the right to continue to maintain the bases

and facilities used by its military forces in Singapore and to use them as the Malaysian

Government saw fit for external defence. Additionally, neither party would sign treaties with

others that would be detrimental to the independence and territorial defence of the other.

Apart from the two regular infantry battalions (less those Malaysian nationals who wanted to

remain with Malaysia) and the volunteer infantry units, all military elements currently under

the Malaysian Armed Forces that had belonged to Singapore before merger would revert to

Singapore.

At the time of separation, the two SIR battalions were still under operational control of

4 MIB. As had been agreed prior to separation, 2 SIR had been sent to Sebatik Island

(off Sabah) for a six-month operational deployment against ‘Konfrontasi’, while 1 SIR

was barracked at Ulu Pandan Camp. Meanwhile the 5

Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment (5

RMR), was occupying Holland Road Camp, 2 SIR’s home. The issues that were raised in the

course of resolving this problem were to contribute to the priority the Singapore leadership

assigned to the creation of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).