Question: I have a question for Singapore Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen. In your speech, you talked about how ASEAN and China had significantly contributed to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. However, at the same time, we have also noted the new challenges that the Asia-Pacific region face. The US is establishing mechanisms based on alliances such as the Quad, AUKUS, Five Eyes and so on. These small alliances are exclusive and confrontational in nature. China’s Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Nong Rong provided a detailed description of the Global Security Initiative. I also noted the three suggestions for China that you had provided in your speech. My question is whether you have more comprehensive suggestions for how we can construct the regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific.

Minister: The question of course deals with the central conundrum that we talked about - the US-China strategic rivalry - so there are no easy answers. She asked whether we had any more initiatives. I do not think it is a problem of an absence of or insufficient initiatives, I think there are plenty, whether it is the Global Security Initiative, whether it is the Indo-Pacific architecture, whether it is the ADMM-Plus.

And if you listen to my learned panellists, we are in essence all saying, the broad themes are alike – trust and strategic partnership. Vice Chairman General Zhang Youxia said as much, that without trust there can be no advancement. So it isn’t an absence of initiatives – I do not think we need more.

The point I was trying to make was that, I think if I can sum it up, is that we have to deal with the world as it is, not as we wish it to be. That would be perhaps a more sensible starting point, that from the perspective of US-China, neither will go away. The G2 scenario where China dominates in one sphere of the world and the US dominates in the other, neither will occur.

Now if you accept that, that neither US or China, in the foreseeable future, and by that I mean in the next one or two decades, that each will have its own economic and military strengths. Neither will go away and both will exist. Then how do you accommodate and that is the central issue. Some will say well, there needs to be change in the world order.

Well, that is well and very good but in the change of world order, there will be a new pecking hierarchy and somebody will want to be on top. There is not a situation in global affairs where nobody wanted that space on top. Everybody wants to be a hegemon if they can be and I think that is the reality. So I think that the US-China relationship is vital for all countries.

I think a very good start is the recent, or good progress is the recent advancements. I am very glad your Foreign Minister went to the US and that he had a call with US President Biden. I hope that the summit between China President Xi and US President Biden will come to pass. I think there are some low hanging fruits that are possible. If there is one initiative that I can think of at the top of my mind that would help – US and China are large complex countries with many organisations and if you look at the across the US administration in the past 10 to 15 years, the Chinese leadership does not change as much as the US leadership. That is not a criticism, that is just a description of the systems.

I think there is probably a place for stability, for a special envoy on each side because you have initiatives and then you have the balloon incident and then you have the Alaskan incident and it disrupts the whole process. Each time it occurs, the US Secretary of Defense has said to me, that the military-to-military talks are stalled and you cannot make progress. Similarly for economic or other aspects. So perhaps a special envoy of sorts would help but that is just one small suggestion in a very large sea of existing initiatives.

Question: There are lessons to be learnt and experiences to be drawn. Of course, in the interest of time, I am not going to elaborate. My question to our panellists is that, just now you all talked about the new challenges and the new potential conflicts such as potential proxy conflicts and new cold war mentality. And also, Dr Ng, as one of the most senior national defence ministers has clearly said that we should not allow proxy conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to ruin our security in the region. What kind of future Asia-Pacific security architecture should be established to completely rule out the possibility of such conflicts in our region, to continue to maintain peace and prosperity that we have maintained for over 40 years for the common security and lasting peace of our region?

Minister: That assertion, that East Asia found peace, I would like to think it is true, but historically I think some may not completely agree. One – that it found peace on its own, history will tell you that it is not quite exactly the case. Two – I suppose if you look at the Americas, North America, that they have not been at war and they would say that they have found lasting peace. But I do not think that is your key point. I think the gentleman from the People’s Liberation Army made a very good point – What is for our region, how do we maintain peace?

I think we all accept that it would be a horrendous occurrence if we had a conflict in Asia, on top of Europe, on top of the Middle East. And that is, I think, exactly my point. There is no absence of common principles, shared principles that we talked about. If you look at your Global Security Initiative, I think many of the Western European countries, the US would agree with them in terms of principles.

So what is the essence for peace, for peaceful architecture in Asia? I think it is just that – the US-China relationship. And I say that, coming back to your point about peace in East Asia, the central question to ask, we took a position on this some time ago, whether the US is a stabilising force or not. In the 1990s, when the US had to come out of Clark and Subic, we took a position that the US was a stabilising force, and that we would offer their ships and planes access to our ports and bases. We still take the view that the US is a stabilising force.

I understand that there might be a difference of opinion. But consider this – if the US, for any reason, whether it is unwilling or unable to maintain a military or a dominant influence in Asia, what are the scenarios that might ensue? At very least, the Northeast Asia peninsula will see an increase in security threats. That is the very least. So I think the US continues to play a positive role. We have encouraged it to increase its economic presence but there are issues that need to be resolved. We have put on record that for Taiwan, it is a deep red line for China and that countries should facilitate status quo and should not push for independence. For the South China Sea, I think there is a lot of scope for fisheries agreement between disputant states and hydrocarbon exploration. There is a need to de-escalate the tensions in Asia, but we continue to believe that both US and China are central for the stability of China – For Asia, their relationship with the countries within Asia, and the relationship with each other.