Speeches
Speech by Minister for Defence, Mr Chan Chun Sing, at The Committee of Supply Debate 2026 on 27 February 2026
27 February 2026
Introduction
Chair, let me first thank Members for your interest and support for MINDEF and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). Chair, we live in unprecedented and increasingly dangerous times. Yet, Singapore has enjoyed another year of relative peace and economic prosperity. We do not, should not, and must not take this for granted. Even if we had been lucky, luck favours only the prepared. We must be prepared.
The world, as Members have said, is undergoing rapid and disruptive structural changes. Many of our old assumptions about the world and how it works are less or no longer relevant. To secure our place in the world, we must anticipate, adapt, and develop capabilities ahead of time to pre-empt the new threats and developments, even as we continue to manage the existing and enduring ones. If we fail, we risk irrelevance and heightened insecurity.
Enduring, Emergent, and Evolving Challenges
What are our security challenges? Let me group them into three kinds: the enduring, the emergent, and the evolving.
First, our enduring challenges. Singapore’s strategic realities are our geography, manpower, and constrained resources. These immutable truths have set the foundations for our approach to defence.
Geographically, we are a small country. We have no hinterland for early warning. We do not have the option of falling back and regrouping to come back from an attack. We are also air- and sea-locked. Our lifelines go through other countries’ air and sea space to reach international space to connect with the world. We cannot allow ourselves to be physically and digitally cut off from the rest of the world. Therefore, we have built the SAF and developed operational concepts to overturn these vulnerabilities.
Our lack of domestic resources also makes us susceptible to external disruptions, because we rely on international trade to sustain ourselves. To overcome this limitation, we must strengthen our resilience to withstand and outlast any pressure from external forces. This is not just an SAF responsibility, but a whole-of-society effort through Total Defence.
Manpower is our third constraint. With our small population size, we can never rely on a fully Regular or volunteer force large enough for our defence needs. We need National Service. Beyond numbers, we must also be able to harness and deploy our whole-of-nation talent effectively.
Next, our emergent challenges. It has become clear that the long-standing norms that have governed international relations have reached a turning point. Singapore and much of the world have benefitted from the multilateral rules-based order. This order prioritises collective problem-solving and rules of behaviour in the global commons, as well as serving as guardrails against military escalation.
However, we can no longer expect countries to work within international laws and norms as a default. Rules that once restrained behaviours are being tested and, in some cases, deliberately ignored. When norms erode, behaviours become unpredictable, leading to greater insecurity in the global environment. Indeed, countries everywhere are re-evaluating their relationships to see who they can work with in this new environment.
These developments accelerate a return to a “might makes right” world. For small countries like Singapore, this shift puts pressure on our autonomy and sovereignty. It is in such times more than ever that we need a strong and capable defence force to secure our national interests. On the international stage, Singapore must also make clear our value proposition so that we can remain a relevant and valued partner.
Third, our evolving challenges. While conventional conflict has not gone away, what continues to change is how else conflict can be conducted. There are two dimensions to this evolution.
The first dimension is the ongoing technological disruption, which has transformed the speed, scale and cost of conventional conflict. Take drones as an example, which many Members have raised. The rapid tech development cycle today has ramped up the pace of innovation in drone technology, making them more accessible and faster to operationalise as a capability for offence. What once required advanced and costly military platforms can now sometimes be achieved more quickly and at lower cost by integrating commercial off-the-shelf drone systems with Artificial Intelligence (AI). In Ukraine, we have already seen how drones are scaled and weaponised to inflict disproportionate damage on a bigger and stronger aggressor. While these technologies present challenges, they also present opportunities for resource-deficient countries to use them to complement conventional platforms and sensors.
The second dimension is the spectrum on which conflict occurs. Threat actors no longer need to resort to war to achieve their outcomes. Instead, we are seeing more hostile actions taken along the entire spectrum from peace to war. As we have said before, we are not exactly at peace, neither are we at war.
For example, cyber and digital tools are increasingly preferred by state and non-state actors to exert pressure just short of full-scale war. As a highly digital country, we have a large surface area of attack as our systems are tightly coupled. This deep integration also means that the lines between civilian and military targets are blurred, and we are no strangers to such tactics being deployed against us.
Such tactics are designed to induce pressure on their targets while mitigating the chances of triggering full-scale military responses, and it is always difficult to attribute responsibility. They also exploit legal and operational ambiguities that could delay responses. Ultimately, these attacks create uncertainty and seek to undermine confidence and disrupt our society’s ways of life.
Our Responses to the Changing Environment
In the face of these wide-ranging challenges, how can we continue to defend Singapore and protect our way of life? One thing remains clear – the world does not owe us a living or our survival. We can rely only on ourselves and not on the security guarantees of anyone else. We must therefore devote attention and resources to our security and relevance, and to stand on our own feet.
To Mr Yip Hon Weng’s question, let me highlight our four-pronged approach to tackle the challenges we face: Capabilities, Commitment, Contributions, and Connections.
Strengthening our Capabilities
The first C is capabilities for the SAF to be a credible armed force. A well-equipped SAF is one that can defend Singapore against a spectrum of threats. As the ultimate backstop for war, the SAF must have robust conventional capabilities, but the SAF must also have other calibrated options in response to an expanded range of scenarios beyond and below the threshold of war. That is why MINDEF/SAF will build up a suite of capabilities comprising conventional, cheap-asymmetric, cyber and classified capabilities.
Having robust conventional capabilities remains core to a strong and credible deterrence. We must continue to modernise and upgrade them to keep pace with the threats around us. For example, the Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) will acquire three Gulfstream G550-Maritime Surveillance Aircraft to complement the Boeing P-8A Maritime Patrol Aircraft. This supports the SAF’s mission in safeguarding Singapore’s Sea Lines of Communication as part of Singapore’s maritime security surveillance network.
The SAF will also continue to scale the use of unmanned platforms for new concepts of operations and pair them with manned platforms. If I may just make a point here: many Members have talked about “unmanned platforms”. “Unmanned platforms” does not mean they do not require manpower. I always thought that a more appropriate term is called “remotely piloted platforms”, whether in scale or individually. They need different types of manpower.
The Navy’s Victory-class Multi-Role Combat Vessel (MRCV) will be equipped with the combat capability of a modern frigate, and it will also be a “mothership” for unmanned systems. The second MRCV is on track to be launched in the third quarter of 2026.
On Ms Joan Pereira’s and Ms Poh Li San’s point, beyond the conventional, the rise of cheap-asymmetric capabilities, including drones, will present both threats and opportunities. The SAF will develop a “high-low” mix of capabilities, complementing high-end conventional systems with cheap, dual-use systems available in the commercial market, especially in the drone and digital areas.
We will also be focusing our effort to integrate both manned and unmanned operations as a system. As to the mix between manned and unmanned, that will be a dynamic equilibrium determined by the rate of technology progress. For example, we can use low-cost drones for maritime security. This builds agility in our processes so that we can rapidly adapt to the changing battlefield and technological landscape.
As we speak today, we already have unmanned surface vessels patrolling the Singapore Strait together with our manned or crewed vessels. We are also cognisant that beyond manned and unmanned systems, modern warfare is also a contest of resilience, and this is where we will also increase our efforts to make sure that our systems are resilient as a whole.
We will also respond to threats emanating from cheaper unmanned platforms in a way that does not pose significant cost asymmetry. In other words, we cannot use a missile to take down every drone that comes at us.
Ms Yeo Wan Ling asked about beyond the physical “hardware”, what else must we do? We agree and we must also continue focusing on building our capabilities in the cyber domain. We must keep pace with the rapidly evolving technology and threats that we encounter daily. To do so, we must continue to experiment and innovate our cyber training practices.
The Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS, will thus reposition the Cyber Defence Test and Evaluation Centre, or CyTEC, as a Cyber Defence Test and Experimentation Centre. Beyond training our cyber defenders, CyTEC will be equipped with cutting edge technologies to facilitate innovation and strengthen our cybersecurity.
Like other professional armed forces around the world, the SAF does not disclose every capability we develop or deploy. What I can say is that the SAF will continue to invest in capabilities ahead of future threats. This will give us the decisive edge and allow us to overcome our security challenges. The SAF will continue to announce our acquisitions at a time of our choosing, when such disclosures are operationally useful.
So far, I have spoken about technology and hard capabilities, which are critical force multipliers for the SAF. Yet beyond and behind each capability is our people, and it is equally important that the SAF trains our people for a much more complex environment. For example, we will strengthen our soldiering fundamentals of live-firing and better prepare them against future threats and wider range of operational scenarios.
Since 2013, the Multi-Mission Range Complex, or MMRC, at Pasir Laba has been used by generations of National Servicemen (NSmen) to hone their marksmanship. For more of our soldiers to use such facilities, the Army will build a second MMRC at Bedok Camp. Beyond just increased capacity, MMRC 2 will allow our soldiers to train more realistically and precisely across more scenarios and different domains via the new Video Targetry System. MMRC 2 will also allow our soldiers to hone their counter-drone techniques.
MMRC 2 will free up land currently occupied by six baffled ranges, which can be repurposed for our other training needs. It will also be easier for our soldiers to train at MMRC 2. NSmen can simply book ranges for training conveniently through the OneNS app, without having to go through their parent unit. It has always been my own personal vision that our NSmen can go into a range to hone their skill just as they go to a bowling alley.
I will make another point on capabilities. We have, and we will continue to invest steadily in conventional, cheap-asymmetric, cyber, and classified capabilities. We will train our people well to maximise their capabilities. We will focus not only on the “teeth” in terms of inducting new weapon systems, but also on the “tail” in terms of improving resilience of our supply chains.
However, we must guard against complacency. We must strive to develop capabilities for the next bound instead of the last conflict. Adaptation and agility must be built into the SAF’s DNA, and we do not want to be caught in a situation where we are fundamentally surprised by developments that we should have seen coming.
The task of building up the SAF is never-ending. We must continue to stay ahead of the changing threat landscape. If we stand still, we fall behind. If we become complacent, we become irrelevant.
I am happy to report to the House that when I returned to MINDEF last year, I continued to see this spirit. In 1997, then, a Major Chan Chun Sing was writing about the use of unmanned drones in swarms. We were talking about computer viruses, because for those of you who remember WordPerfect, some of you will know that you can play aircraft simulation if you know the correct code behind WordPerfect. This has already told us what could come many years later.
In 2000, before I left the SAF, we were talking about classified projects that today are coming to fruition when I returned to MINDEF. Defence is a long-term business, and I am glad that today, when I return to the SAF, I am seeing the men and women of the SAF not just talking and thinking about the challenges today, but also the challenges that could emerge in 10, 20 years’ time. That is, and that must be the spirit of the SAF.
Our defence capability, in my mind, must be manifested in six arms. Beyond the Army, Air Force, Navy and DIS, it must also include our defence technology community and defence industries. We have judiciously invested in the DSO National Laboratories (DSO) and Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) over the years, building a corps of scientists and engineers with expertise that money cannot buy.
In our quest for resilience and to strengthen our ability to scale at speed, we must also have a strong and reliable local defence industry. This is especially for classified capabilities. Our local defence industry gives us resilience, the ability to scale and, most importantly, the ability to develop capabilities that we cannot buy. Their credible capabilities also allow us to be a partner of choice for others to want to work with us. That strengthens our relevance and value proposition.
Further Engendering Commitment to Defence
The second C – let me touch on the commitment to Singapore’s defence. This commitment by our political leadership and whole-of-society is expressed in various forms.
To Mr Wan Rizal’s point, our first commitment is a steady, consistent and disciplined way that we approach our defence expenditure. Various Members have asked about how we apply our resources judiciously and in a disciplined way. This was supposed to be an answer that I will give to Ms Valerie Lim, who has posed a Parliamentary Question (PQ), but I thought it is perhaps useful for me to share my seven golden rules of defence expenditure and how we spend money.
Rule number one: Operational needs, first and last. Our top priority always goes to our operational needs, both current and emerging. All other considerations are secondary.
Second, we must be clear-eyed on our life-cycle cost. We plan our investment with full consideration of life-cycle cost and long-term sustainability, taking into account the financial and manpower resources needed in acquiring, establishing, developing and maintaining that capability.
Three, we take an integrated system view. We acquire and develop capabilities not in isolation, but with a view towards them being part of the larger integrated system within the SAF. This ensures that the SAF’s capability is more than the sum of its individual parts.
Rule number four: Consistency is key. As developing integrated systems and real capabilities take time and consistent effort, we invest steadily in technology and our people’s skills and competencies over the long term. We eschew a feast-and-famine approach to defence spending.
Rule number five: Resilience matters. It is important for the SAF to build resilience against disruptions. We achieve these through means such as the ability to adapt to our unique needs, ensuring adequate stockpile and having alternative sources of supplies.
Rule number six: Best solution mindset. We acquire the most cost-effective system to meet our operational needs, guided by robust professional assessment, rather than being tied to any single source or solution. Where we need to achieve greater resilience or customise to our own unique needs, we may develop our own unique systems.
Rule number seven, last but not least, goes back to the first: Operational needs, always. Our operational needs remain our foremost and utmost consideration so that we can build a strong SAF and equip our warfighters with the best systems available against today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.
Going forward, I expect the growth in defence spending to keep pace with GDP, barring major shocks. However, if the need arises, we are prepared to spend more.
Next is our commitment to National Service, which is essential for generating the force required to meet our critical needs for national security and survival. The service and support of our Full-time National Servicemen (NSFs) and NSmen are vital to this effort. Our people are at the core of what we do, and the fighting spirit of our people determines how successful we are.
MINDEF and SAF do not take the commitment of our NSmen and NSFs lightly. We are invested in making the most out of their time in NS and during their Operationally Ready National Service (ORNS) cycle. We strive to bring out the best in every serviceman so that they can contribute more meaningfully and effectively with their abilities.
This is especially so since today, the SAF has a greater variety of roles to deal with an expanded spectrum of operations. Many of these new roles no longer depend solely on traditional notions of physical or operational fitness. This will require a mindset shift on how we think about the abilities of our servicemen.
Combat categorisation in the past tended to stream our servicemen based on what people could not do, but we can unlock our people’s potential if we shift our focus to what they can do. To this end, MINDEF will review our Medical Classification System (MCS) to be more precise. This will allow better characterisation of the medical fitness of our servicemen, and how that affects their ability to undertake various tasks.
Coupled with continuous efforts to redesign roles and vocations, the MCS will enable our servicemen to be more meaningfully and effectively deployed. Some may also be deployed to vocations that they were previously not eligible for.
The review of the MCS is being done in consultation with public medical specialists and members of our specialist advisory boards. With greater precision, this ensures that our servicemen are deployed only to vocations that they are medically assessed to be suited for. The robust safety and training system in MINDEF/SAF will continue to ensure that our servicemen in redesigned roles can train and operate safely.
We also want to better harness the talents of our NSmen with specific expertise. Mr Tiong asked about the talent pipeline into the DIS to tackle threats on our critical information infrastructure (CII). MINDEF recognises that many of our NSmen have honed their skills in the fast-changing cyber and tech domains through their private sector careers. They have valuable experiences we can tap on to augment the defence of Singapore’s critical networks.
The DIS will thus better organise our NSmen with relevant cyber expertise into Sectoral Cyber Defence Teams. These teams are aligned to our CII sectors and will aim to strengthen the resilience of our CIIs. Senior Minister of State (SMS) Zaqy will elaborate more on these NS Cyber units in his speech.
Third is our commitment to the share of talent that MINDEF/SAF receives. I am thankful that the public service continues to allocate top talents to MINDEF/SAF so that they can lead the SAF to be ready for today’s and tomorrow’s challenges. I am also grateful to parents for continuing to entrust their sons and daughters to the SAF and to schools for grooming the next generation of leaders.
Altogether, these expressions of commitment send a powerful signal of strong whole-of-nation support for Singapore’s defence to potential adversaries.
Recognising and Strengthening Contributions
The third C is contributions from our wider community that lend strength to the SAF. This strength can be seen through a model of concentric circles.
At the centre of the SAF is the high-readiness core of active-duty personnel who will respond first in any contingency. The second ring is the SAF’s full-force potential, comprising 250,000 NSmen who can be mobilised when required. Thus far, we have talked about how we will better support the first two rings.
The third ring of support is the wider NS community, comprising some 750,000 former NSmen, as well as the 2.5 million families and employers supporting them. The importance of the third ring cannot be understated. The extent of support they offer to our second ring directly affects the commitment of our full fighting force.
The final ring represents our entire society. We must remember that a strong SAF cannot fight alone if our society has already crumbled under pressure. It is also important that we continue to build the resilience of our population to external forces and disruptions.
MINDEF will therefore step up engagements with these broader segments of society to cultivate an entire population that is committed and prepared to defend Singapore as part of wider Total Defence efforts. In support of this objective, SAFRA will review its mission to extend its engagement beyond active NSmen. We will reimagine SAFRA as a platform for defence engagement to include our former NSmen and their families. Minister of State (MOS) Choo will speak about this later.
Dr Neo Kok Beng asked if we should redefine National Service to include voluntary services in all uniformed groups and to allow new citizens to participate. While National Service is the bedrock of our defence and will remain so, we can do more to encourage a culture of participation in defence through volunteerism. Everyone has a part to play, and everyone who lives in Singapore should have opportunities to volunteer in some way.
Volunteers play a key role in supporting the SAF and Singapore’s defence by taking on meaningful roles that complement the work of Regular personnel. Today, the defence volunteer base is more diverse and dynamic than ever. Many of our volunteers, some of whom are also our ORNSmen, have valuable real-world experiences and industry expertise.
Having a strong volunteer core also adds to our deterrence. Potential adversaries would think twice if they knew they would face a populace that is committed, skilled and prepared to defend Singapore. The more Singaporeans who volunteer with their time and service, the more powerful our deterrence will be.
That is why MINDEF will strengthen the Defence Volunteer Ecosystem through the SG Defence Volunteer Network and the SAF Volunteer Corps. SMS Zaqy will speak about this in greater detail on how we intend to expand the size and scope of the SAF Volunteer Corps.
Reinforcing our Connections Amid Change
The fourth C has to do with connections: our diversified portfolio of international partnerships which have advanced Singapore’s and the SAF’s interests in crucial ways. Our fundamental ability to build connections and partnerships rests on a capable and credible SAF. No one will want to partner someone who is unable or unwilling to pull their own weight and make a contribution.
Thus far, our partnerships have provided valuable opportunities such as opening up new training areas overseas. This has allowed us to overcome our space constraints for complex, large-scale exercises. These partnerships also provide access to advanced defence technologies to equip our warfighters.
Mr Vikram Nair and Mr Shawn Huang asked about MINDEF’s approach to building defence relations in a more volatile and complex landscape. My response is that we cannot take our connections and value to others for granted. We must strengthen our value proposition to others as their needs will also shift, and for that, we must keep evolving our approaches with them for us to remain relevant.
First and fundamentally, we must develop a clear-eyed perspective of their challenges and their needs for us to be able to come up with compelling value propositions to partner them.
As a small country, we cannot simply be “neutral”. Staying neutral will induce greater pressure on us from others to take their side, narrowing our strategic space. We do not want to “choose sides” either, which makes us a proxy for others, takes away our agency and renders us irrelevant.
The only way is to develop an approach based on consistent principles that we believe in and are good for Singapore. We must convince others that our view of the world serves their interests too, so that they will want to work with us. In a more unpredictable environment, it is all the more important for our views to be principled and consistent. They signal to others that we will be steady and reliable partners despite changing circumstances.
Second, we must capitalise on Singapore’s unique value proposition. For instance, it has become even more important now for countries to communicate and share their concerns candidly. We have been able to convene dialogue and encourage common understanding on issues, often away from the public glare. Where we can be useful, Singapore is glad to play our part in providing a space for open and meaningful discussions amongst other powers. But key to our value proposition here is that we must maintain our reputation as a trusted and reliable partner.
On Mr Gerald Giam’s point, the new threats on the horizon also present new opportunities to find common ground with non-traditional partners and open up new areas for collaboration. The threats that AI and cyber tools can pose are almost universal to every country. The problem today is that many of these technologies are being militarised and deployed faster than norms can be developed to guide their use. But this also means that we can collaborate with new partners from anywhere in the world, so long as they share the same views as us and want to shape the norms responsibly.
There are several other examples of shared interests, such as counter-information campaigns and the protection of critical underwater infrastructure, or CUI. These are areas where we can work with other like-minded states to learn from their experiences and for us to share ours for our mutual benefit.
On CUI specifically, we are tapping the expertise of newer partners like Finland, Estonia and the Netherlands to develop principles and best practices for defence cooperation that can be adapted to our region.
Another area where we can work with new partners is in defence technology. MINDEF has been diversifying our global partnerships to mitigate single-point supply chain failures. Indeed, the more uncertain geostrategic environment has also raised the risk of supply chain disruptions, but it has also presented new opportunities for us to be able to work with partners that previously may not have considered us as their partner of choice.
Other countries recognise the same challenge, and that is why, in this environment, we will also see a more diverse global defence industry. Advanced science and tech innovation is now pursued by a wider range of countries, as well as companies – not just traditional defence companies, but also start-up firms and tech giants, especially for dual-use technologies. These developments present new opportunities for MINDEF to work with them.
For instance, we have expanded our defence tech partnerships with various countries. Recently, we have seen increased interest by various countries to partner Singapore through initiatives like the Defence Industry Day, where we bring together the defence industries of different countries. These developments show how we have found new opportunities to work with new partners to shore up and strengthen our resilience in areas that meet our needs.
To do all these, we need to ensure our people deeply understand the world as it is, and are able to pinpoint the concerns and aspirations of others. This is so that we can develop value propositions to work with them in the evolving context.
Conclusion
In conclusion, MINDEF and the SAF will continue to transform itself to defend Singapore against tomorrow’s threats. But as I have stated earlier, defence cannot be achieved by MINDEF/SAF alone. National defence is a national endeavour. It belongs to the whole of society – to every Singaporean, in every sector, in every community.
We can train with the most advanced capabilities, invest billions in our defence infrastructure. But all of that will count for nothing if we are not vigilant, if we allow ourselves to be fundamentally surprised because we have been lulled into complacency.
The recent conflicts have presented many examples where, even when confronted with clear intelligence of threats, capable and technologically advanced militaries failed to respond because they convinced themselves that it would not happen to them or that it could not happen to them. They did not fail in technology, equipping or training. They failed to challenge their mindsets. They failed to guard against complacency, and they fell into denial of the harsh possibilities of conflict. These are all warning lessons for us.
Every day of peace is another day where the dangers of complacency heighten, as Mr Alex Yam mentioned. We must never let this happen under our watch.
Thank you, Chair and Members of the House, for your continued support for MINDEF and the SAF.
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