Opening Remarks by Minister for Defence, Mr Chan Chun Sing, at the Middle East Institute Annual Conference on 23 June 2026

A very good morning.

Many of you are experts in this field, and I hope that for the next hour, in the spirit of dialogue, you also get to share your views and not just hear mine. But before I begin, I should start with two obvious caveats.

First, as we say, there is a difference between a secret and a mystery. A secret is something people know, and we try very hard to find out. A mystery is something people do not know, and we cannot find out. The Middle East, perhaps more than many other places, has more mysteries than secrets – especially now, and especially pertaining to the outcome of this war. I think that should put things in context, and we should have some humility when trying to predict what is going to happen.

Second, as I was preparing for this conference, I thought very hard about its theme. I think all of us in this room are hopeful that we can say clearly the first part of today’s theme. If you notice, today’s theme is called “After the Iran War”. I am not sure any one of us can decisively say at which point in the spectrum we are now. Is this the beginning of the end, as some optimists would like to believe? Or is this the end of the beginning, as some who are more cautious would like to say? Or is this neither the beginning nor the end, as people from the School of Hard Knocks would say – because history in many parts of the world seldom travels in a linear direction, and perhaps more so in the Middle East than elsewhere, it travels in a spiral?

I leave it to you to decide which of these three markers we are closer to: the beginning of the end, the end of the beginning, or neither the beginning nor the end. I think many of you would probably agree with me that the third is more probable than the first.

With those caveats out of the way, allow me to lay out a simple framework for discussion across three levels of impact. These three levels need not be determined by the end of the war, because the impact is already here and now. Let me also say that this framework helps us think through the impact not only of the Iran war but also of other ongoing conflicts – in Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Gaza.

First, we can look at the impact on economics, supply chains, and investments. Second, we can look at the implications for international norms and rules. Third, we can look at the longer-term and wider consequences for the global order.

Impact on Economics, Supply Chains, and Investment

The most obvious and immediate impact has been on the global economy, prices, and supply chains. We are all familiar with the price shocks across a range of commodities, from fuel to various downstream products. I will not belabour this point today. Prices may revert to pre-war levels, but certainly not likely in the short term. Much depends on any agreement that may come about, and if these agreements can hold. Even if prices gradually revert to pre-war ranges, I think the world will know that we now need to factor in a new risk premium that cannot be unwound or ignored.

Beyond the short-term price changes, of greater concern will be the medium-term shifts in investment sentiment for the global economy. The heightened uncertainties will deal another negative blow to global investor confidence, which will have medium- to long-term consequences for our global economy, job creation, and wage growth.

Beyond the growth and size of the global economy, we should also consider its shape and form as global businesses reassess their risk appetite and investment strategies – and more importantly, how they will reorganise their supply chains and production layout. There will be new winners and losers, as is to be expected in all such shifts. For the Gulf region in particular, much depends on its ability to restore confidence in the global investment community.

For the global economy as a whole, however, these are not insurmountable adjustments. There will be difficult transitions, and some adjustments will be harder than others. Some countries will be more impacted than others. But governments and businesses will adapt and adjust. This alone is unlikely to be fatal in the long term, if the issue is largely price-driven.

Implications for International Norms and Rules

What must be of greater concern is the conflict’s impact on the global rules that we collectively abide by. This includes respect for international law, such as UNCLOS – or the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – and its binding provisions for transit passage through straits used for international navigation, including the Strait of Hormuz.

Keeping our sea lanes open is not simply a matter of principle or adherence to international law. It is in the enlightened self-interest of all stakeholders to do so, given that these waterways carry critical flows of trade, energy, and data.

More than UNCLOS, the recent conflicts also impact global rules and norms beyond the maritime domain. They raise broader questions about the justification for war and the threshold for initiating one. The impulse to resort to force to resolve disputes reflects a worrying trend of breakdown in diplomacy. If the world moves towards a fractured global order where might increasingly becomes right, the remnants of the rules-based order could be further eroded – to all our detriment. All states will pay the price, even those who have done the least to cause it.

As I said at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, it is always dangerous to throw the baby out with the bathwater, when international rules and norms do not work perfectly, or do not always work in our favour. But a world without rules and norms is the same as the traffic in a city without rules — chaos reigns, and we are all less safe, having to expend our own resources individually to secure our own security rather than benefit from the collective good. Ultimately, growth, investment, and jobs are all impacted negatively.

Longer-Term Consequences for the Global Order

That brings me to the third set of implications: the longer-term implications for geopolitics in the Middle East and for the global order.

For decades, the international rules-based order was undergirded by major powers projecting their power and influence for the common good. However, in the recent conflicts including the ones in the Middle East, supposedly weaker actors have shown that they can hold up conventionally stronger ones through the use of asymmetric warfare, including new, affordable, and scalable technologies such as armed drones. We have also seen the weaponisation of our hyperconnected economic supply chains, and even the weaponisation of geography to hold the world to ransom.

Many states and non-state actors, including those outside the Middle East, will be watching and taking note. Those who seek to capitalise on uncertainty to foment further instability and disruption to achieve their own objectives will certainly be cheered. If strategic deterrence by major powers is eroded, others may be tempted towards greater adventurism. Such a transition is dangerous and challenging for everyone, including big, medium, and small states.

Conclusion

With those sobering thoughts, I look forward to our discussion and to hearing your views and perspectives. Thank you very much.