Speeches
Opening Remarks by Permanent Secretary (Defence), Mr Joseph Leong, at the 4th Digital Defence Symposium Official Dinner on 20 Jul 2026 at 1900H
21 July 2026
Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, Executive Deputy Chairman, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS);
Ms Yeo Seow Peng, Executive Director, ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (ACICE)
General Sir Robert Magowan, Commander of the Cyber and Specialist Operations Command, United Kingdom;
His Excellency Mr Yun Byung-se, Chairman of the Seoul International Law Academy, also the former Chairman of the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain;
Members of the ACICE Advisory Board[1] and ACICE Experts Panel[2];
Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,
Good evening and a warm welcome to the 4th Digital Defence Symposium (DDS). To our foreign guests, welcome to Singapore.
The digital domain we all can agree has fundamentally been changing. It is no longer a support function — it has become a strategic domain in its own right, where advantage is built, trust is contested, and decisive actions can be taken before a single shot is fired.
The stakes are high. The contested terrain in this digital realm includes our critical digital infrastructure, and the very hearts and minds that hold our nations and societies together.
Two drivers are shaping this terrain. First, technology is moving increasingly from just a tool, to an actor in its own right.
a. Agentic AI in particular, has introduced synthetic actors into the conduct of operations — systems that evaluate, decide and execute at machine speed and scale.
b. AI agents are already hunting malware, monitoring network endpoints, and analysing millions of log entries autonomously. Anthropic's Mythos and OpenAI's GPT-5 are just some examples of frontier models driving this shift.
c. The threat to us all is that the barriers to entry for sophisticated cyber and information attacks and the time-to-exploit have been significantly lowered and reduced. What once took months and teams can now be done in minutes by a single individual with access to these models. Defenders who cannot leverage the same technologies will be severely exposed.
Second, the geopolitical environment is becoming more contested and uncertain.
a. Conflict is increasingly waged below the threshold of armed conflict — across digital systems, critical infrastructure, and information ecosystems.
b. Falsehoods are weaponised to mislead voters, erode trust in institutions, and fracture communities. Information warfare has become a permanently operating front. It is slow-drip and its cumulative effect on a population can be more significant than conventional force.
c. The lines between peace and conflict, military and civilian, state and non-state, are blurring.
So we are heading in a direction of ever more powerful digital weapons, in a time of ever more uncertainty and contestation.
Against this backdrop, I would like to pose three fundamental questions that defence professionals like us will need to consider. First, can we adapt fast enough in an environment where digital capabilities are redefining the character of military operations.
a. AI, cyber capabilities and autonomous systems offer speed, reach and operational advantage — but they also compress decision timelines and expand the attack surface.
b. Anthropic's Mythos model was reportedly able to identify vulnerabilities in classified systems within hours, while the PROMPTFLUX malware leveraged a live AI model that could rewrite portions of its own code in real-time to evade detection.
The key question here is how our defence organisations and forces will adapt. Because we are not just talking about adopting new tools, but fundamentally re-designing our operating models as well as the institutions and capabilities underlying them. Defence establishments must stay ahead of fast-evolving threats, grow new capabilities, re-design policies and processes, and institutionalise continuous change and innovation.
Second, who is accountable, and how do we design for accountability, as we automate more and more? AI will compress decision cycles, support commanders with analysis, and increasingly act through autonomous systems. All of us will want to leverage such capabilities. But this increased capability and autonomy of machines creates new questions for what human accountability means and how it applies. This is especially salient in a military setting where agents have access to sensitive data and the ability to execute highly consequential actions, including lethal tasks.
It is therefore important to master not only the immense capabilities, but also the risks involved. Machines cannot carry responsibility — people and institutions must. In the military domain, if we lose control, we risk chaos.
The roles and interactions between senior defence officials and military commanders like yourselves are integral to this endeavour — this cannot be delegated to IT teams or treated as a purely technical problem.
a. This is why we need platforms such as the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain[3] and the Global Mechanism on Information and Communication Technology (ICT)[4] in the context of international security.
b. I am glad that Mr Yun, who is the former Chairman of the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain, will share his thoughts with us later during the Fireside Chat.
Third, how do we avoid the worst outcomes? Cyber and information capabilities create a strategic dilemma. Each side has incentives to develop and employ them to the greatest advantage, but unconstrained competition risks escalation, proliferation and mutual harm. We have to find ways to reduce the risk of escalation and miscalculation, which can only be built with dialogue, confidence-building and shared norms. In the digital domain, the absence of rules and norms does not create freedom. It creates danger.
This is why Singapore convenes the Digital Defence Symposium (DDS). While competition is a reality, we need to communicate and engage enough.
a. The DDS must not just be a talk-shop — we want it to be a platform where militaries, defence officials, academia and industry come together to share challenges, ideate solutions and build trust.
We also need to achieve consensus on shared rules and norms, and translate them from paper to practice.
a. The 11 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace established a critical foundation. ASEAN showed early leadership by subscribing to these norms in 2018 at the 3rd ASEAN Ministerial Conference on Cybersecurity (AMCC).
b. Our digital ministers have since made meaningful strides— including endorsing the ASEAN Norms Implementation Checklist at the 5th ASEAN Digital Ministers’ Meeting (ADGMIN).
c. The next step is implementation by the defence sector.
As ADMM Chairman in 2027, Singapore will do its part. Singapore will work with ASEAN defence establishments on a consensus to collectively implement the 11 UN GGE cyber norms. ACICE has partnered with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to run cyber norms workshops for ASEAN Member States — one completed in April, and the next in August. Singapore will build on these efforts and work with ASEAN Member States to translate these outcomes into a set of implementation guidelines, as a tangible demonstration of how the ASEAN defence sector can put norms into practice.
Singapore will also host the inaugural ASEAN Regional Cyber Exercise, which will advance efforts in practical cooperation, moving beyond strategic dialogue and norms. The Exercise will be organised on the sidelines of the 5th DDS, and will be co-organised by ACICE and Singapore's Digital and Intelligence Service for all ASEAN Member States.
Finally, Singapore will strengthen ACICE as ASEAN's open and inclusive cyber and information node. We welcome partners to work with ACICE, building on the success of the inaugural ACICE-US Cyber Capacity Building Course. We will also continue to foster synergies between ACICE and other institutions within the ADMM-Plus framework. This includes Malaysia's ASEAN Cyber Defence Network and the Experts Working Group on Cybersecurity, currently co-chaired by Cambodia and Australia. We want ACICE to be a bridge for practical cooperation that will be open, inclusive and impactful.
The digital future will not wait for us to be ready. We will need to adapt quickly, uphold human accountability, and keep escalation under control. DDS gives us the platform to build the shared understanding, norms and partnerships that our collective digital security will depend on. We cannot slow the future. But together, we can secure it.
Thank you and wishing you a fruitful time at this 4th Digital Defence Symposium over the next two days.
More Resources
[1] The ACICE Advisory Board was set up to provide advice to ACICE on its activities. The Advisory Board is chaired by the incumbent ADMM Chair. ASEAN Member States have nominated a mix of ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting (ADSOM) Working Group leaders and senior Cyber officers (at COL and above-level) to the Advisory Board.
[2] The ACICE Experts Panel was set up as ACICE’s key resource to provide perspectives on relevant topics of interest.
[3] The Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (GC REAIM), led by the Netherlands and Republic of Korea, aims to develop practical recommendations for the responsible governance of AI in the military, ensuring its use is safe, accountable, and consistent with international law while fostering international cooperation.
[4] The Global Mechanism is a UN framework established to provide a permanent, inclusive platform for dialogue, confidence-building, capacity-building, and the implementation of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.