THE US-SINGAPORE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE NEW CENTURY

Introduction

Let me thank Ms Michèle Flournoy for those very kind words and thank you to the Center for a New American Security for organising this session. We have signed the enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement which reaffirms our belief in the US' presence in the region. I am extremely delighted that Flournoy is here to introduce me. We have gotten to know each other since her days in Pentagon. I must tell you that when I speak with her, I get so reassured. We speak to many people in our capacity as defence ministers and leaders of our various countries. But she possesses the clarity of vision and beyond that, a very practical sense of wisdom of how to move things forward.  I wish her the very best in her future careers - I am sure she will be very successful in all she does. I am glad to be here, to be in Washington D.C. again, to meet with close friends and to engage with leaders and thinkers.

Singapore celebrates 50 years of independence this year. As our founding Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew recounted in his memoirs "From Third World to First", Singapore's early years of nationhood were tumultuous. For those of you who know us, we are a polyglot people whose ancestors came from the larger hinterlands of China, India and the Malayan Archipelago and brought with them different cultures and religions - this polyglot people gave no certainty that Singapore as a new nation would congeal, let alone thrive. And into this potentially-combustible melting pot of different races and religions were added the forces of Communism and Communalism in the region. Konfrontasi, the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War further unsettled fledgling nations in the region. From within and without, these divisive forces fuelled fractious, and with it violent, politics. In Singapore and around the region, blood has been spilled to win the rights we enjoy today.

Singaporeans today are grateful that our fortunes have turned for the better. Singapore is one of the most prosperous and thriving nations in Asia and the world. Singapore's GDP per capita was around US$500 at its founding - it has since grown a hundredfold. But beyond economic progress, even as we transformed Singapore into a global metropolis, we have kept our Asian heritage. Singaporeans have succeeded in forging a multi-religious and multi-racial society working in unison to achieve social progress. In today's age, this national harmony and consensus is a rarity. For these salubrious conditions, the present generation of Singaporeans thank our founding leaders and pioneers for their vision and steadfast commitment in laying firm foundations and high standards of governance.

But it would be remiss if we did not also acknowledge the strong and consistent support of our country friends and partners who have stood beside us in our journey. In this, the US-Singapore relationship has been one of the most durable and beneficial over the past decades. Our defence ties are excellent and the SAF is very thankful. As Flournoy talked about, I'm going to Arizona. We are very thankful that our F-15s, our F-16s, our Apaches and our Chinook aircraft are here, and our helicopter pilots and our fighter pilots train here in wide spaces many times the size of our island home. And as I speak, hundreds of troops together with fighter aircraft and attack helicopters are training at Exercise Forging Sabre in Phoenix, Arizona, which I will be visiting later.

The ties between our two countries extend well beyond defence. Today, more than 3000 US companies are in Singapore. In fact, US MNCs, such as Texas Instruments and McGraw-Hill, were among the very first corporations to set up shop and invest in Singapore in the 1960s, soon after our independence. They created jobs and provided much-needed confidence in Singapore's fledging economy. Over the years, other US firms such as Procter and Gamble, Lucasfilm, IBM, Dell and Microsoft have set up their regional headquarters in Singapore. And boosted by the US-Singapore FTA, bilateral trade and investment have also grown - with more than US$80 billion in bilateral trade, and US investments in Singapore amounting to US$150 billion.

The academic and scientific exchanges between our people are rich and broad. Leading US universities like Yale, MIT and Duke have also jointly started campuses with our local universities in Singapore. Each year, thousands of Singaporean undergraduate and postgraduate students, some of them who are here today this morning, attend US universities. They go on to become leaders - movers and shakers - in our society, in the government, business, professional and social sectors. These multifaceted partnerships between institutions of both countries reflect our deeply shared goal to build societies where individuals can pursue their aspirations and achieve their full potential for the betterment of others and the greater good.

Singapore is not the only country that has benefitted from the US' presence and support. To quote former Indonesian Defence Minister Dr Juwono Sudarsono, America's "forward presence" provided "vital strategic assurance, guaranteeing regional and financial growth" in the Asia-Pacific. The US, as an enabler, provided the necessary pre-conditions for the reconstruction of Japan and South Korea after the ravages of war, and for the other emerging regional economies, such as the four Asian dragons, to prosper and thrive.

On 22 November this year, ASEAN leaders formally declared the formation of the ASEAN Community. The ASEAN Community is now home to 625 million people, with a combined GDP of US$2.6 trillion, and is anticipated to become the world's fourth-largest economic zone by 2030.

Indeed, Singapore and ASEAN have progressed far, post-decolonisation. As independent states, we are determined to avoid the region ever being one where proxy wars are conducted by larger powers, as it had during the Cold War in Asia. Given this historical context, ASEAN centrality remains a core tenet in its dealings with others.

But despite these great strides, we should remind ourselves that ASEAN is still a region of young independent nations. The process of decolonisation in Southeast Asia was a recent one that began around 50 years ago. In fact, Brunei - the last country that gained independence - only gained independence in 1984. Current partnerships and alliances were forged in the ideological struggles in the aftermath of WWII. But this new century brings new challenges and context. Self-determination, the establishment of democratic institutions and above all, geopolitics in this region, are still evolving.

Today, the entire Asia-Pacific region is certainly more integrated and globalised. China is no longer an autarky, plugged in to the rest of the world, and indeed, vital to global trade and finance. India's economy is no longer marginalised, and is poised to reap its demographic dividends and more foreign investments. However, despite this greater integration, the national and security interests of individual countries are not cast in stone or cemented. And this is where we need to pay heed, as we seek to build an inclusive security architecture for the Asia-Pacific region, and as we enter into a new millennium with different forces that will shape and direct the region over the next two decades.

A. Trade

First, global trade patterns have changed substantially over the last two decades. Asia now accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world output, and contributes to two-thirds of global growth. Within a decade, Asia is expected to overtake Western Europe as the world’s largest trade region, with China, Japan, South Korea and Hong Kong already among the ten largest exporters in the world. Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are also among the top 30 exporters in world merchandise trade.

In trade, China's heft is indisputable. China is already the world's biggest trading nation and the leading trade partner for ASEAN and Australasia. Soon, China's exports to Europe, at over a trillion dollars, will be double that of the US.

Overall, these trends point to greater global dependence on Asia's trade and greater intra-ASEAN trade and will motivate alliances and partnerships. For Southeast and East Asia, kept buoyant by Chinese demand, this has been good news, at least in the last decade, where various countries achieved five to six percent of growth per year. In comparison, the US and the EU grew one-and-a-half to two percent. While slower growth has been forecasted globally, including for China, it is clear that China's heft will continue to dominate global trade.

Further, new institutions and bold initiatives will be the new engines to drive development in the Asia-Pacific region. China has taken the lead to establish the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with an initial start-up capital of US$100 billion, as well as the "One-Belt, One-Road" (OBOR) initiative, with a projected investment of over a trillion dollars. These initiatives will spur infrastructure development and capital in the region - in fact, some estimates have put Asia's infrastructure gap at eight trillion dollars through 2020 - and these initiatives are estimated to impact more than four billion people in 65 countries. In particular, they will benefit areas in Asia which are in need of capital and infrastructure investment.

It is in this context, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), if passed, will be a strategic enabler to keep pace with the AIIB and the OBOR initiative. As the centre of gravity of global trade shifts to this region, the TPP will allow countries outside Asia to participate in and shape trade and investments there.

B. Energy

Second, there have also been shifts in energy dependencies. US domestic production now meets about nearly 90 percent of the country's total energy needs. In contrast, China is now the world's largest energy consumer and net importer of petroleum, and is increasingly dependent on the Middle East, Africa and Russia for oil. These disruptive trends will surely shape, and inevitably influence, both countries' foreign policy.

But unlike the US, the Chinese have never believed in the Wilsonian principles that define American exceptionalism and consequently, the US foreign policy, which premise on the necessity of democratic ideals and values in bringing about societal progress and preserving global commons. Instead, the history of Chinese expansionism centred on its tributary state system. China often reminds outsiders that it has never sought hegemony or interfered with the matters of other states. At present, its interests are still largely shaped by its domestic needs. Similarly, the PLA's DNA - its revolutionary spirit, what they call the 井冈山 精神(jinggangshan jingshen) - is likewise shaped by a history deeply rooted in strategies to liberate its own masses from "internal contradictions" and foreign occupiers.

Will this change as China increases its investments and recognises its dependence on the stability of other regions? If so, what implications would this have for the force structuring of the PLA? Last month, the PLA announced the restructuring of its seven hitherto geographically-based Military Regions, what they call the 大军区(dajun qu), into Battle Zones, 战区(zhan qu), which modelled on the command structure of modern militaries, will allow the PLA to react to a more diverse range of security threats and better project its forces. As China seeks to make physical and diplomatic inroads into its surrounding land neighbours through Central Asia and Europe under its OBOR initiative, how might this impact the PLA's hitherto non-interventionist stance?

C. Religion

The third factor I would cite that would shape the next few decades is extremist terrorism. We are now 14 years post-9/11. However, the war against jihadi extremism continues unabated.

ISIS is the latest manifestation of extremist terrorism, and is influenced by a fundamentalist interpretation of Wahhabism. Similar to al-Qaeda and the Jemaah Islamiyah, an al-Qaeda linked terrorist group in Southeast Asia, ISIS' insidious ideology taps onto a narrative of injustice against Muslims and their way of life. This has resonated globally and has attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters to join ISIS. The attacks in Paris last month were a reminder to the world of the threat terrorism poses to innocent civilians everywhere. But as we deal with its aftermath, we must be careful not to let the attacks accentuate the religious divide within and across nations.

Moderate Muslims all over the world have denounced terrorist groups like ISIS. However, ultimately, the war against extremism cannot be fought or won without the critical involvement of the Islamic clergy and moderate Islamic countries.

In a speech celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said this to religious leaders:

"Does this mean that 1.6 billion people (Muslims) should want to kill the rest of the world's inhabitants -- that is 7 billion -- so that they themselves may live? Impossible!​

I say and repeat again that we are in need of a religious revolution. You imams are responsible before Allah. The entire world is waiting on you. The entire world is waiting for your word… because the Islamic world is being torn, it is being destroyed, it is being lost. And it is being lost by our own hands."

Recently, more moderate Muslim groups have taken it upon themselves to fight against the perversion of Islam by extremists. Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama, a group of about 50 million followers, has released a film that counters the ideology of ISIS and other extremists. This is a positive development, which we need to see more of - for it is only when the ideological battle is won can extremist groups be neutralised.

D. Global Leadership

The fourth and last factor I would like to cite is global leadership, which is shifting. For 70 years, the US was the pre-eminent global power, and as many have acknowledged, provided a security umbrella for the Asia-Pacific region, giving the region the stability needed for its emerging economies to thrive.

However, a new accommodation needs to be found with rising powers such as China and India, as well as with the national aspirations of ASEAN member states. Over the past decade, China has constantly referenced its century of "national humiliation" and emphasised the need for a "new historical starting point". Perhaps China feels that post-WWII constructs cemented a system in which China does not have full entitlements or leeway to fulfil fully its national aspirations. Whatever the merits of these claims, the world cannot ignore the rise and influence of China and other growing powers. The search for inclusivity and for common rules that will bind us all is necessary, even urgent, as we are now dealing with a more militarised Asia. Over the last decade, military spending in Asia and Oceania increased by about 62 percent. This was ten times more than the increase in military spending in Europe. In fact, in absolute terms, military spending in Asia alone, at around US$400 billion, exceeded that of Europe last year.

Towards a Stable Post-WWII Architecture

What is the way forward to ensure continued peace and progress, which the Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed for the last 70 years? Singapore has consistently believed that the US, whose presence in the Asia-Pacific is a force for regional peace and stability, plays a critical role in the security architecture of the region. This belief is the reason why following the closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the Philippines, Singapore signed the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the US, which facilitated the US' access to our air bases and naval bases.

In an interview in 1991, Mr. Lee explained the reasons for the 1990 MOU - "the American presence, in my view, is essential for the continuation of international law and order in East Asia… An Asia in which cooperation and competition increases everyone's well-being, peacefully and without recourse to arms, has been the norm. This kind of Asia, this kind of Pacific, cannot exist without America being a major economic and security presence."

Successive governments continue to hold this view firmly. The 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement, signed by our current Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and then-US President George W. Bush, reaffirmed this belief. This was also why in 2012, my ministry agreed to then-US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's request for the US to rotationally deploy up to four Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore. I would like to announce that in response to US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter's request, Singapore has similarly agreed to support the rotational deployments of the US' P-8 aircraft to Singapore.

On its part, the US must continue to provide clear and consistent signals and commit physically to remain engaged in this region. I am glad that the US Secretaries of Defence have attended the Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) annually since 2004 and used it as a platform to state unambiguously the US' determination to remain a Pacific power. In 2012, then-US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the US' commitment to increase its deployment to the region to 60 percent of its naval and overseas air assets by 2020. More recently, Secretary Carter reiterated the US' commitment to the "next phase" of the US' rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and to promote a regional security architecture “where everybody rises and everybody wins".

The US' resolve to continue its role as a dominant and stable force for the Pacific region is critical. This region - ASEAN-centrality, notwithstanding - is far from having the mature alliances and partnerships that Europe has formed, such as the EU and NATO. Our region can ill afford the uncertainties that Europe faced after the Libyan crisis in 2011 and the Ukraine crisis in 2014. It would be too unsettling and could cascade a series of undesirable and unthought-of outcomes for the Asia-Pacific region.

Building Strategic Trust in the Asia-Pacific

As critical as the US' continued presence in the Asia-Pacific is, the US alone cannot ensure continued peace and stability. To do so, we need to build greater strategic trust among all stakeholders in the Asia-Pacific. Three key challenges continue to confront us.

First, unresolved historical animosities arising from the last century, especially among countries in Northeast Asia.

Second, the US-China relationship, which is central to peace and stability in the region. No country in our region wants to be forced to choose between both countries or need to, or for the Asia-Pacific to back-slide into a region for proxy contests.

Third, of immediate concern, the SCS disputes. The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS (DOC) commits signatories - China and ASEAN member states - to respecting the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the SCS, to avoiding threat or the use of force in resolving the disputes, and to restrain from actions that could escalate disputes and affect peace and stability, including the inhabitation of presently uninhabited features in the SCS. Countries need to adhere to what they have committed to in the DOC. It is hard to conceive of trust in the Code of Conduct in the SCS when the DOC, which has already been signed, is not observed. Prolonged and unresolved SCS disputes will weaken strategic trust in the region.

We will need new and more relevant platforms to address these challenges. And over the past two decades, regional stakeholders have institutionalised new platforms such as the ADMM-Plus, the East Asia Summit (EAS) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). ASEAN has played a key role in establishing a network among their front-line law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism and enhance intelligence exchange.

Our defence establishments are coming together to deal with non-traditional security threats. For example, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand conduct joint patrols to counter piracy and sea robbery in the Strait of Malacca. Singapore's Information Fusion Centre and its network of Operations Centre linkages across 35 countries and International Liaison Officers across 15 countries.

Similarly, in 2010, ADMM-Plus partners agreed to explore five areas of practical cooperation - maritime security, counter-terrorism, HADR, peacekeeping operations and military medicine (MM). This led to an exercise in 2013, involving 3200 personnel, seven ships and 15 helicopters from 18 militaries. The ADMM-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism exercise next year will involve the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and will provide another opportunity for the 18 militaries to come together, to reduce the risk of mishap at sea and at the same time, build trust.

Conclusion

Let me conclude. The Asia-Pacific region is changing as it enters the new millennium with different forces shaping the future from its past. To maintain stability and allow regional nations to continue their progress, we will need to be inclusive and accommodate rising powers and the aspirations of individual countries. In addition, adherence to internationally accepted norms and signed agreements, and strategic trust between stakeholders, must continue to form the bedrock of our shared stability and prosperity. In these endeavours, the US will continue to play a vital role in the region, as it has, not just in the military sphere but just as importantly, in the economic domain.

Singapore's belief that the US' presence in the Asia-Pacific is a force for peace and stability remains a key tenet of the US-Singapore bilateral relationship. The enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement which Secretary Carter and I signed a few days earlier reaffirms this belief. The US-Singapore relationship is one that is durable, virtuous for both countries and the region, and relevant for the challenges we face in this new century.

I want to thank you very much for your attention.