Transcript of Question and Answer Session at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

Question: I have a few questions. Everyone seems to be in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Do you think the ARF is a toothless tiger? How can we tackle the problem of global warming? Your comments on nuclear proliferation?

Minister: I want to be very sensitive in terms of describing the usefulness or lack thereof of regional fora. Coming from a defence track, we must always be vigil to our state counterparts and I take your comments about the ARF being too big. Size is an issue but nevertheless there have been good instances where productive aspects have come out even from large meetings. I agree with you that in our fora, we should be more directed so let me confine my remarks to ADMM-plus. We did not want a configuration that was so large that it basically ended up being unwieldy. That was the reason as I said, for ten plus 8. We are very happy that India decided to play a substantive role in the ten plus 8. But beyond the annual meetings for the ADMM, we decided that we would meet with plus partners. We started out being less ambitious, and we said that we wanted to meet them once in three years. I think it was a good sign that recently, the plus partners said that once in three years is too long. I am happy to say that after next year's second ADMM-plus in Brunei, it will be once in two years. This was unanimously agreed by the plus partners.

It goes beyond just meetings. I mentioned a very unique feature of Experts Working Groups. In the five areas, which also encompasses some of the areas you talked about, such as global warming, we have, HADR, military medicine, peacekeeping, counter terrorism, maritime security. On all five fronts, there have been movements and developments. When I say developments, what I mean is that amongst the 18 countries, some as full participants, and others as observers have met for table-top exercises, and as I said in Brunei next year, there will be a 18-nation full-troop exercise. Various countries will commit assets and teams, India has indicated that it will be sending a ship and military medicine team. Singapore is committing a number of assets. China has agreed to it, US has agreed to it and I think that that is a concrete outcome. I said that in our quest to create these mechanisms, the first order of the day is to create trust and confidence. That needs time to build. I would say that we would need patience, we would need commitment and political will. But also initiatives that are practical, that allow us to practically cooperate and build that confidence.

For global warming, yes, indeed there is great concern. As an island state for Singapore, those of you who visit Singapore, we have 700 square kilometres. If sea-levels rise, we will have to build dykes completely around Singapore. It is a issue of concern but it is a complex issue but there are platforms on various levels. My own position is that if you really want to move the issue of global warming, some form of carbon tax will have to come in. But it is a very inopportune time, it really is. Australia moved on it, kudos to them. But it probably exacted a political price and not a economic one. It's a difficult issue.

For nuclear, as you know, ASEAN is declared a nuclear-weapon free zone and we want to keep it that way. Prior to Fukushima, I would tell you that a number of ASEAN states were actually openly articulating the possibility of nuclear power. Indonesia and Malaysia included. And it made economic sense.

I think overall the idea of having various regional foras discussing nuclear safety is very sensible.

Question: Singapore-India economic relations seem to be moving satisfactory, but there is still potential for greater cooperation on the political front. What are your views on deeper India-Singapore cooperation leading to greater political input from India towards the objective of strengthening ASEAN?

Minister: I could not agree with you more. That is Singapore's hope, that India plays a greater role in ASEAN. Singapore is very happy to assist. But we have a clear realisation - a very practical and objective view of how small we are. You mentioned the CECA, which was the first FTA that India signed. Japan did the same with us, for reasons probably because we are sticklers to detail so they decided that if they could do one with Singapore it would be easier to do it with others. My point in this is that India’s greater engagement is one of political will and effort.

There are many areas that I can see India playing a greater role. So for example, in the security issue of ADMM-Plus, Singapore will welcome India's greater participation and leadership role. A number of platforms exists, including the Experts Working Groups. As I said, Experts Working Groups now are chaired by two countries each so for example in maritime security it is now chaired by Malaysia and Australia. There is no reason why India cannot choose to lead Experts Working Groups because it is very much in the interest for India to do so.

On the economic front, can India do more? I think certainly. There is a mechanism now called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which is basically ASEAN Plus Six Free Trade Agreement. And my point in illustrating what CECA did was that it opened trade both ways. And we would know that the ASEAN FTA with India is outstanding. The services and investment agreement.

Is there more to be done in terms of political engagements? Very much so. So I am completely on your side.

Question: How does the effort to use ASEAN as the focal point for the security architecture work if there are strains already existing within ASEAN?

Minister: Well, we are all adults and the issues on the South China Sea will not be the first contentious issue neither will it be the last. But that was the very reason why we constructed a Ten Plus Eight configuration for regional security architecture, so that the stakeholders could weigh in. I would have thought for certain aspects of common interests - freedom of navigation, dispute settlement by international law, peaceful resolution - that other stakeholders of the Plus Eight partners, including the US, China, Australia, India will have their views. So I think, and I do not want to belabour the point but just to repeat it, but I think India can play a greater role.

Question: India has ideologically been non-aligned and maintained it for many decades, and we are grateful to Singapore for showing us how to do so. Would you like to see how India can still be non-aligned? What are your views on Singapore having to balance China and India?

Minister: First, to ask Singapore to advise India how to be non-aligned strikes me as a preposterous proposition. We have a slightly more difficult task than you - we are slightly smaller than you. It is to the interest of smalls states that we are never asked to choose sides. And we have said so, we have said to the US and China that we do not want to choose sides, we do not want to be in the position to choose sides. We do not have to be in a position to choose sides because what are you fighting over? And I think the US and China understands that, and the replies from both Secretary of States and I think both the top leadership is that we do not expect our friends and partners to choose sides. And as you know, I think it is particularly sensitive because many ASEAN countries were favourite grounds for proxy wars and I think we want to avoid that - everyone loses. So I am not even going to attempt to advise India how to stay non-aligned. But I will say this. We have said that the principles for our architecture is really one of mutual interest and partnerships and inclusivity. I think we recognise the political realities there is. There will be some affiliations, and stronger to certain countries than others. But I think there are very few areas where it is completely mutually exclusive, no matter how small or large a country, where we cannot see... where we feel ourselves that we have to be completely aligned with one country or the other. And I do not think that there are many instances where one country needs to choose better relations with one over another. So we will continue to act on this, and part of it I think, is tied up with what I mentioned earlier in terms of the understanding and mutual cooperation, and I think here is where, for the defence aspects, the military-to-military engagements is certainly something that we can work at. Both Secretary Panetta and Defence Minister Liang Guanglie have agreed on that path. They agree that we need to have better military-to-military relations, and I think that is the reason why both ascribe full support for the ADMM-Plus exercise next year.

Question: Observers see India's slow movement in political engagement with ASEAN as addressing China's concerns and not wanting to be seen by China as joining a grouping that is sublimely anti-China, at least in some way given the recent events in South China Sea. From Singapore's perspective, is this seen as excessive caution? Would you like India to be less cautious?

Minister: Not so much less cautious, but more forward projecting. If you look at the ADMM-Plus configuration, and I think you can reference to whether there is enough space for India, both China and the US have said, in various forms, that the Asia-Pacific region is big enough for the US and China included. Surely it must be big enough for the US, China and India.

I think India, as I said, has always had a role in ASEAN, If you look at the configuration of the Plus Eight countries, the US, China, Australia, Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Russia. I have said that India's greater engagement of Southeast Asia protects advances, promotes its own economic interest in Asia-Pacific, in ASEAN. I think it is intricately linked.

Let me reverse the question and ask, if conditions in ASEAN or the South China Sea or in the Asia-Pacific region or in Asia turn for the worse, will India be impacted? The answer must surely be yes. So I think it is in India's interest to have a place which already has, in the various fora - the EAS, the ARF, the ADMM - but beyond presence, I think leadership for India is welcomed and will be counted.

Question: In terms of military built-up, which also includes naval built up, do you think we can ever balance China? I think it will take us about ten years to have a nice navy. I don't think we can ever play a role to balance China, as some countries think. Your comments, please.

Minister: I wouldn't cast involvement and engagement in any of the countries. Let me restrict my comments to ADMM-plus so that it allows to wrap our minds around the concept but it would extend to other fora or architecture. That necessarily engagement and involvement in any regional grouping is, whether sublimely or overtly anti-China and that is a loser’s game. How can any one contain China? It has 1.3 billion people and the second largest economy in the world and it will continue to grow economically and militarily. I think it it's a fait accompli so that can’t be the starting point. The starting point must be, as China grows, when do stakeholder countries in any one region decide that its time to start engagement? To talk about issues, about what is the framework in which China too wants to protect the international system. I have put it to my Chinese counterparts and I said that China needs to have a voice. China needs to come to Shangri-La Dialogue and state your view and tell us what is China's perspective of a productive relationship among all countries and I think that is a better starting point.

That has never been a position in terms of assembling a group. I think there is a balance of interest but it is not against any specific country.

Question: How do you think in the medium term, whether the ASEAN mechanisms need to be further tweaked or evolved so that they can facilitate the managing of tensions?

Minister: Well we if we are talking specifically about territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, I would say that new leadership change in China allows an opportunity to reset. That is my view but I cannot imagine any new leader wanting territorial disputes to define his leadership. At some point, all countries would have to move to a more productive, less contentious, de-escalatory posture. There are possibilities. The declaration of conduct ten years ago is a good start. The code of conduct is certainly, until the territorial disputes flared up, was a right cause. I don’t think that has become undoable. I think it is very much on track but it will take a longer time. I think there has to be more productive ways in which claimant states, to resolve their differences, whether its to join development, whether it is mutual understanding in terms of dispute resolution through peaceful means or international law. These things are complex, each time there is one dispute, we are refreshed on our history lessons that go further and further back. I don’t think anyone expects quick resolution on any one of these disputes but I think also that there are opportunities to de-escalate, and really to look for other paths in terms of economic cooperation in terms of exchanges. I would see the leadership change in China as an opportunity to reset this cause and I know that ASEAN member states, our foreign ministers are working hard, talking to China, in terms of forging that path, based on the Code of Conduct.

Question: Do you think the security concerns 40 years ago, have been addressed and if so to what extent? And in that context, what do you think is a major strategic challenge facing the region now? Is ASEAN reasonably confident of meeting the security challenges as they exist?

Minister: None of us are pretending that ASEAN is a homogenous group. If you look at distribution, the demography, the capita per GDP, the profiles, I think suffice to say, all of us are happier that ASEAN is together than 10 separate nations.

It is still a work in progress but the very diversity, in fact, motivates us to have a common umbrella. Let me just cite one example. For example, many of you would remember piracy was a problem in the Straits of Malacca. It got to a point where it was classified by Llyod's as a war zone risk. Basically, shippers had to pay premium insurance premiums as a war risk zone. It was really the littoral states- Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, talking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, that we ought to do something. That we ought to have a set of principles that allows the piracy situation to be dealt with. It wasn't some glorified statement. It was two or three very simple principles. One, was that the littoral states should be primarily involved in tackling piracy. Two, that the user states could contribute. Three, that the sovereignty of the littoral states, in all its efforts should never be contravened in these efforts against piracy. Quite no-brainers if you ask me! Three useful principles articulated in Shangri-La Dialogue, together with the other stakeholders.

As a result, we evolved a common maritime patrol. Then, "eyes in the sky" patrols. It was a very interesting configuration where if an Indonesian plane flies, it had Singapore and Malaysian observers in the same plane and vice versa. Piracy came down; Llyod's took off the Straits of Malacca as a piracy risk zone. I think it is a very instructive lesson on what cooperation can do. I think that there are hopeful anecdotes that tell us cooperation is always better. Consensus and dialogue, while things are good, need to be there, before we can tackle issues. I am confident that with ASEAN and the ADMM - Plus, will need to deal with issue on HADR, transnational threats, nuclear proliferation, so on and so forth. I am optimistic.

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