Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, at 11th Shangri-La Dialogue

Dr John Chipman, my fellow plenary speakers Minister Coleman and Minister Le Drian, distinguished colleagues and friends, first let me say how delighted I am to be able to address this distinguished crowd. Singapore is honoured to be able to host this 11th Shangri-La Dialogue. Many of you have been kind enough to convey your admiration, your thanks, for this Shangri-La Dialogue, for the many bilateral meetings that you have had, for the many good meals and exchange of information during the course of this forum. Let me thank you for those kind remarks. My co-host Minister of State Lawrence Wong, Permanent Secretary Chiang Chie Foo and Chief of Defence Force LG Neo Kian Hong will do our part to continue to make this dialogue efficient and effective.

We have often said that the Shangri-La Dialogue is an open platform, and the value that you derive from it as a users' platform is directly proportional to your contributions. I want to thank my fellow ministers who have taken time to come to this Dialogue, various heads of delegations and participants for your valuable contributions, and I hope that you will continue to support this.

Geopolitical Shifts and Emerging Risks

I have been asked to talk on this panel on emerging risks to global and Asia-Pacific security. Such a topic invites, almost tempts you, to look into the future, to gaze into the crystal ball and make predictions - it is a dangerous temptation. I approach this with great humility recognizing that, if you look at the past decade, the cataclysmic risks, whether it was 9/11, the global financial crisis, the SARS pandemic, were unforecasted and we were unprepared for it. But let me start with this observation: all things considered, Asia performed relatively well over the past three decades. China and India's entry into the global economy after 1980 resulted in astronomical gains. Real GDP per capita more than tripled in India and increased a remarkable 12-fold in China. ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand too experienced significant growth - real GDP per capita nearly tripling in ASEAN and for Australia and New Zealand 1.5 times over the same period. As a result, more than 190 million people in the Asia-Pacific region were lifted above the poverty line. It decreased from 80% of the region's population to 55% in 2008 over a 20 year period. Here, I want to make a qualification. It was not as if there was a global tide lifting the entire world or the populations above the poverty line, and a comparison suffices to illustrate - for example, East Asia had more than 400 million people lifted above the poverty line, whereas South Asia had 250 million more people below the poverty line.

Asia's startling economic development rode on a stable security environment and clear workable rules that governed global systems of finance and trade. These salutary conditions in turn depended on stable institutions such as the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, WTO and global leadership by the G-8. In the security arena, US and its allies or partners fought and won the Cold War and put in systems that advanced capitalism and globalisation.

Asia grew, bolstered by strong demand and complementary investment from the US and Europe. For example, in the decade to 2010, total US Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in China increased by more than five-fold. For India, total US FDI stock increased by more than 10-fold over the same period. Similarly in Southeast Asia, US FDI has increased three-fold since 2000. This resulted in a virtuous web of interdependencies within Asia and beyond, driven mainly by shared stability, economic growth, trade and investments. Vested interests to maintain as well as derive benefits from the global operating systems were aligned.

However, global conditions moving forward are expected to change and emerging risks are inherent to any transition. The balance of economic weight had already been shifting to Asia but the global financial crisis in 2008 accelerated this trend. According to one IMF projection, Asia's economy will account for more than 40 per cent of the global output by 2030. Some project that China's economy could overtake the US' economy in nominal terms by then.

The political, economic and cultural ramifications of a newly-empowered Asia are bound to impact existing security and economic relationships. One stark present example illustrates this: China is currently the largest trading partner of ASEAN, Australia, Japan and South Korea, while the United States remains the dominant resident security power in this region. This divergence of economic partnerships and defence relationships will challenge existing alignments among nations.

Other emerging risks have also been touched on in this Shangri-La Dialogue and are largely transnational, both in reach and impact. I will mention them but I will not go into detail because they have already been alluded to - maritime security and piracy, climatic change, food and water security, illegal trafficking of drugs and humans, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and cyber and satellite security. These are no longer theoretical but are present challenges that have expanded the responsibilities in non-traditional areas of our defence forces, both individually and as regional groupings.

Re-thinking our Approaches to Global Governance

The dynamics as pole positions change and the expanded envelope of operations other than war that militaries must undertake call for more effective institutions and/or mechanisms to deal with these challenges. Our goal must be to maintain if not improve the global commons that have allowed Asia to grow amidst peace and stability. Indeed, questions have been repeatedly asked about the ability of existing institutions, and if they are up to the task. One author cites how major powers remain inward looking at this time of economic crisis - and coined the phrase, a "G-Zero world". And I think many of the catchphrases that have been uttered from this podium, phrases like "new partnerships", "cooperative engagement", "multilateralism" and many of your own questions that follow the speeches by the speakers reflect that we have a need to refresh and upgrade existing institutions. We are in search of more effective means, whether through institutions or mechanisms, to respond effectively to emerging risks. However, in this quest, whether through old or new institutions, key principles should continue to apply. I will touch on these principles as they relate to the security aspects.

First, institutions and mechanisms to address security challenges must be inclusive and work for the common good. Second, to be credible, they must result in effective outcomes and third, mutual trust must be engendered through transparency, equitable rules and practical cooperation.

Inclusiveness as a hallmark would ensure that key stakeholders, especially those who are in a position to contribute, whether in terms of leadership, ideas, expertise or resources, are able to do so. In this respect, it is important for us to ensure that the interests and aspirations of all stakeholders - big and small states, existing and new - are accommodated as we seek effective solutions to our challenges.

Here in Asia, member states have indeed spent considerable efforts in evolving new responses to our changing region. We are making progress. Of note, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was strengthened last year when the United States and Russia formally participated for the first time. Similarly, the inaugural ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 brought together the defence establishments of all ten ASEAN Member States, and eight "Plus" countries - the US, China, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Russia. At the recently concluded 6th ADMM in Phnom Penh, it was agreed that the first ever combined 18-nation ADMM-Plus Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Military Medicine exercise - both table top and full troop - would be held in Brunei next year when Brunei is Chair and host of the 2nd ADMM-Plus meetings. This is a bold and significant initiative to strengthen practical cooperation amongst the militaries of the ADMM-Plus partners, and in the process enhancing comfort levels, build trust and confidence.

Whatever the evolving institutions and mechanisms, real results count. There have been a few positive examples to emulate in the defence arena. My co-plenary speaker Minister Le Drian has alluded to them but it bears reminder and repeating. He mentioned the Malacca Strait Patrols (MSP) initiative, which is a multilateral collaborative arrangement between Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. It includes the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" combined maritime air patrols, which was then proposed by Malaysian PM, who was then the Defence Minister, Najib Tun Razak at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2005. Many of you who attended the Dialogue will remember that in 2005, the Strait of Malacca was graded by the Joint War Committee of Lloyd's Market Association as a war risk zone. It was because of these combined maritime patrols that the risk was reduced, and Lloyd's subsequently dropped its war risk designation. A second evolving example is the international counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, where an ad-hoc, "plug-and-play" collaboration model is at work. International navies across various multinational task forces and independently-deployed navies have successfully coordinated their counter-piracy operations.

Mutual trust takes time and effort to develop. For security partners, understanding if not trust can be forged when militaries work together. For this purpose, Experts' Working Groups (EWGs) under the framework of the ADMM-Plus have also been established to foster practical cooperation and engagement between ASEAN and its Plus partners. The exercises to be held in the areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, military medicine, maritime security and counter-terrorism are a bottom-up approach to enhance military to military relationships.

Our common security challenges are often transnational and as we have witnessed can overwhelm resources occasionally. No single country has the resources or ability to provide lasting solutions. We will have to pool resources and synergise efforts. This was the motivation behind the Republic of Singapore Navy's Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which is physically located at the Changi C2 Centre. This IFC stitches together information-sharing linkages from 29 countries worldwide. Through its advanced sense-making system, it provides a common maritime picture that allows users to identify anomalies and potential threats. The International Liaison Officer framework is again an inclusive framework. Presently, liaison officers from nine regional and extra-regional countries are based at the IFC.

Distinguished delegates, let me conclude. This generation is witnessing significant change in the global order and the new security challenges that come with it. We will need more effective institutions and mechanisms that provide both clear rules and leadership for the common good. In this vein, we must commit to working together to building stronger international institutions and constructive partnerships at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, based on shared interests, aspirations and principles.

I look forward to hearing your views on the directions and collective decisions that are needed to achieve these goals. Thank you very much.