Remarks by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean at the 6th Plenary Session on ''Renewing the Regional Security Architecture'' Shangri-La Dialogue 2010

My colleagues, Minister Phang Quang Thanh, Minister Purnomo, friends, colleagues. It has been a great delight for us to be able to welcome you to Singapore over these last few days. I hope you have had good discussions.

Reviewing the Strategic EnvironmentLast year, when we met, we were in the midst of the global financial crisis. The financial crisis has receded, but global economic recovery remains fundamentally fragile. The European debt crisis has hit international financial markets, and the world watches with bated breath, to see if global economic recovery will be sustained.

Asian economic powers like China and India continue to grow much faster than the US or Europe. These powers have weathered the global financial crisis relatively well, maintaining positive growth as the developed countries went into recession. The shift in the balance of global economic weight towards Asia, set in motion in the last decade of the 20th century, has clearly been accelerated by the financial crisis. Intra-Asian trade too has grown in tandem, with final demand in Asia absorbing an increasing proportion of output. The strategic weight of Asian powers, especially China and India, has also grown. With the shift in the balance of economic weight comes a shift in the balance of geostrategic weight.

With such geostrategic shifts inevitably comes strategic uncertainty. Questions are asked about whether new powers will assert themselves to protect their growing economic and security interests and pose a challenge to existing powers, and the stability of the regional order. In the Asia-Pacific, this strategic uncertainty is compounded by various security challenges facing the region - the access and security of sea lanes, overlapping maritime claims, terrorism, WMD proliferation, and other transnational threats.

But traditional challenges remain too. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula, which has dominated our discussions at this year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, is now highly precarious. It provides a grim reminder that there are still traditional flashpoints that, in the "blink of an eye", can potentially destabilise the entire region. The existence of these flashpoints compounds the already complex security challenges facing our region.

In the face of these developments, we are seeing a renewal of commitment to multilateral cooperation. We welcome this, and our structures have to evolve. For example, the G-20, evolved out of an urgent need to deal with the global financial crisis. This recognises the inability of then existing arrangements such as the G8 to deal with the problem, as well as the new realities of global financial and economic power, which were inadequately reflected in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. In April, we also saw the convening of the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, where leaders of 47 countries came together to tackle one of the most critical threats to global security.

Therefore, in the midst of this strategic flux, what kind of security architecture should we be evolving in the Asia-Pacific to meet the challenges before us? An inclusive ASEAN-centred ArchitectureThe current ASEAN-centred regional architecture has served the region well. It will come as no surprise to you that the three speakers of this panel support such an ASEAN-centred structure. But I was also happy to see that, over the course of discussions in the last two days, various countries, in fact, almost all countries that I listened to, supported such an ASEAN-centred architecture and these include the US, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. Over the years, ASEAN has played an important role in bringing together the major players for dialogue on security, economic and other issues, even when it was not convenient for some of them to meet bilaterally. It is at ASEAN-centred forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit - the ARF and the EAS - that all the key players in the region come together.

Going forward, ASEAN will continue to serve an important role as the fulcrum of the regional security architecture, for a number of reasons. ASEAN is neutral, consultative and open to engagement. The ASEAN way - patient consensus-building based on consultations and mutual respect - has been criticised by some for being slow and ineffectual. But it is also this very spirit that has enabled ASEAN to do certain things very well, such as facilitating dialogue, building trust and confidence, and fostering consensus. Sometimes, the slow way gets us to our destination faster. Through this process, ASEAN helps to ensure that mistrust or disagreements do not lead to tensions, and tensions do not spiral into confrontation and conflict.

The ASEAN-centred regional architecture continues to evolve, to take into account the geopolitical shifts in the region. At the ASEAN Summit in April 2010, ASEAN leaders had a substantive discussion on evolving the architecture, to further engage two key players in the region - the US and Russia. They discussed various modalities for doing so, including having the US and Russia in the EAS, or as part of an ASEAN+8 mechanism that meets every two to three years. In the meantime, in May 2010, after thorough discussions over the past four years, ASEAN is establishing the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus, or ADMM-Plus, in an ASEAN+8 format. ASEAN is welcoming eight countries - Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the US - to join the inaugural ADMM-Plus meeting to be held this October in Vietnam. In some ways, the defence sectoral is leading ASEAN, and has broken away from the current numerology of ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 or ASEAN+6, and found a way of including Russia and the US, two main countries, in our security discussions.

So overall, the regional security architecture is being put together - pragmatically rather than dogmatically - based on the needs of the region, with an eye towards inclusiveness and effectiveness. Cooperation based on Shared InterestsCertainly, more can and needs to be done. In particular, a shift is needed in the way we view multilateral security cooperation, and the regional security architecture. Many countries still approach multilateral security cooperation with some caution, perhaps because they are looking through old spectacles where they see mutually opposed blocs and alliances. This is despite widespread recognition that multilateral cooperation is essential for dealing with the complex challenges that we face.

We need to embrace a new cooperative paradigm, where countries want to work together towards positive, cooperative relationships on issues of shared interests and despite differences in other areas. In such a paradigm, the regional security architecture would provide a framework where national, regional and even global interests can be concurrently served. We already see such a paradigm at work in the international counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, where navies from around the world are working together. They may operate under different multi-national or national commands, but they have been able to coordinate their actions remarkably well, each doing what they are able and willing to do, to make a strategic international sea-lane safer for the entire international maritime community.

In the Asia-Pacific region, there is a growing web of complex interdependence and shared interests that can provide the foundation and impetus for such a cooperative paradigm. There is already a strong degree of economic interdependence in terms of trade, commerce and resource flows. This will be further amplified as global trade continues to rise. There are also significant shared interests in preserving the security of, and freedom of access to the strategic sea lanes of the Asia-Pacific. These are after all vital arteries, through which the trade and commerce that underpin global economic growth flow. Shared interests also exist in other areas like counter-proliferation, supply chain security, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism.

One good example is the US-China relationship, arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the region and the world right now. This has evolved into a relationship of complex interdependence. Cooperation and disagreements co-exist, as we have certainly seen over the past year, and indeed the past few days. But more often than not, both sides do recognise the need to manage their disagreements, and engage cooperatively, given that each has a stake in the other's well-being. The recently held US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue is a good example of this. Regional Architecture as Construct for CooperationThe regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific already has a good mix of institutions of different configurations and formats - both formal and informal, which provide flexible opportunities for this new cooperative paradigm. The architecture is open and inclusive, allowing stakeholders, big or small, to "plug in and play", to have the opportunity to have their "voice" heard, and to work together to resolve issues of concern. It is a multi-layered regional architecture, with each layer playing a distinct but complementary role to another.

One layer comprises pan-regional, dialogue-focused groupings, and the Shangri-La Dialogue is one example, and the ARF too. These groupings build trust and confidence by promoting dialogue on issues of common interest. They also provide opportunities for translating dialogue into action. The Shangri-La Dialogue, in particular, fills a unique niche. Though it is an informal Track 1.5 platform, key personalities and countries are here, and the discussion is enriched by academics and other experienced people who come and share their views At Shangri-La, countries can have a free and frank exchange of views, and have greater license to explore novel approaches to enhancing security. It was at the Shangri-La Dialogue that innovative initiatives, such as the "Eyes-in-the-Sky" air patrols mooted by the then Defence Minister and now Prime Minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak, saw first light. This year, a number of speakers have already touched on the dangerous situation we currently have on the Korean Peninsula. It was also a matter of intense interest and discussion at the Ministerial Luncheon I hosted yesterday, and I am sure, at many of the bilateral meetings held on the sidelines. These discussions will help key decision makers understand the situation better, appreciate the concerns and views of the various countries, and help them clarify their thoughts as they make key decisions in the days ahead.

More focused formal regional groupings like ASEAN and the EAS form another layer. These forums can address more focused cooperative agendas and take ideas through to action. In yet another layer are functional groupings like the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia, and the Malacca Strait Patrols. These groupings have niche roles and allow member countries to more nimbly work together in a practical way to address specific challenges.

Complementing these layers is the web of bilateral defence relationships between Asia-Pacific countries. When seen in the context of the wider regional aspiration for cooperation, such bilateral relationships, which include the US' bilateral alliances, as well as the web of bilateral defence relations between ASEAN countries, also serve to foster trust, understanding and cooperation.

Encouraging Practical CooperationOpen and inclusive multilateral dialogue and exchanges - at multiple levels and in different forums - remain the best avenue for the comprehensive awareness and appreciation of shared interests. As more areas of shared interests are identified, countries will find new and broader bases for cooperation. However, this is only the first step. The next step is for countries to move towards cooperation in practical ways in more of these areas.

For only through working together can one truly understand each other's viewpoints and constraints, reducing suspicions while increasing comfort levels to work better together. And the momentum gained from cooperating on one area may then spill over to other areas where there may be differences, spawning positive externalities. Practical forms of defence cooperation among countries, such as military exercises and exchanges, complement the role of dialogue in enhancing transparency, reducing the chances of misunderstanding or miscalculations, and building confidence and trust in each other.

The track record of the region is quite encouraging. Armed forces already share a longstanding history of conducting joint exercises through various frameworks, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Five Power Defence Arrangements. They are even coming together for discussions and exercises in traditionally sensitive areas like intelligence and submarine operations. The Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference or APICC, for instance, provides an informal forum for Asia-Pacific military intelligence chiefs to discuss common intelligence challenges and opportunities. The APICC was first convened in 2007 in Kuala Lumpur. The second APICC was held last year in Singapore with 25 countries present, including the military intelligence chiefs of Australia, China, Indonesia and the US. The triennial submarine rescue exercise, Exercise Pacific Reach, last held in 2007 saw eight countries participating, with nine sending observers. Singapore will be hosting the next exercise in this series this year with over 20 countries including Australia, China, Japan, ROK, UK and the US, expected to be present. Such multilateral exchanges and exercises are particularly valuable, as they provide opportunities for countries that would not normally interact or exercise together to do so.

We are also seeing some "green shoots" in practical cooperation to address real regional challenges. Maritime security is one example where countries have started to cooperate closely. The littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand conduct sea and air patrols together. And at the Singapore Navy's Information Fusion Centre inaugurated in April 2009, international liaison officers from seven countries currently work together to fuse, analyse and disseminate the sea situation picture. This enables the early detection of potential maritime threats, as well as more timely and effective responses to these threats. And today, we have been discussing other areas such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

With the inauguration of the ADMM+8 this year, another platform for practical cooperation between militaries will be available. The ADMM+8 provides an inclusive yet focused configuration, bringing together, for the first time, the defence establishments of all the key players in the region. The ADMM+8 has great potential to bridge both dialogue and practical cooperation. It will over time provide a platform for us to enhance defence cooperation across the whole spectrum of security issues, through the conduct of exchanges, capacity building through joint training and exercises, within a multilateral framework. ConclusionDistinguished colleagues and friends. The regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific is multi-layered and flexible, and continues to evolve. Asia-Pacific countries need to embrace a new cooperative paradigm that enables us to discover shared interests and tackle the security challenges that confront us. As it evolves, the regional security architecture should remain inclusive, bringing together countries big and small who have significant security interests in the region, so that they can work together to build understanding and trust, and a cooperative framework that will provide the foundation for peace and security in our region in the future.

Thank you very much.