Opening Address by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Mr Teo Chee Hean at the Opening Ceremony of Exercise Deep Sabre II

Excellencies, senior officers and participants from PSI and observer countries, ladies and gentlemen, good morning.

Singapore is pleased to be hosting our second multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise Exercise Deep Sabre II. While we had 12 PSI partner countries present during Deep Sabre I in 2005, I am pleased to welcome to this year's exercise representatives from 18 PSI partners - Argentina, Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and the United States. I am also pleased to welcome representatives from a number of observer countries. Your presence reflects the continued commitment of our countries to combating the global threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).The Threat of WMD ProliferationSix years have passed since the inauguration of the PSI. Nevertheless, this global effort to stop the trafficking of WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials to and from States and non-state actors of proliferation concern continues to gather momentum and purpose.

We welcome recent expressions of a vision for a world free of nuclear weapons. But this remains at best, a long term vision. In the meantime the fight against WMD proliferation needs to carry on as the threat of the spread of WMD to state and non-state actors of proliferation concern is real.

It is well-known that Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups have sought to develop or acquire WMD capabilities to wreak death and destruction on a staggering scale. In September 2006, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, called on "nuclear scientists and explosive engineers", to produce "unconventional bombs, of the germ or dirty variety", for use against coalition forces. In our own region, Southeast Asia, a rudimentary chemical and biological weapons manual was discovered in a safe-house of the Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist network in the Philippines in 2003.

As a result of the high volume of trade and information flows circulating the globe, proliferators today have greater flexibility and options as they use these legitimate channels to mask their illicit trade and make detection and prevention more difficult. Proliferators are also increasingly sophisticated in their approach. To circumvent national controls and avoid detection, they often rely on the use of front companies and brokers, falsify documents, and route their shipments through States with lax strategic goods controls. Need for International CooperationAs the threat of proliferation grows more complex, the international community will also have to evolve innovative and effective methods to tackle it. Over the latter half of the last century, the international community has embraced a suite of non-proliferation tools, including treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). These treaties enjoy near universal support today. But, as we have seen, on their own, these treaties alone are unable to fully prevent WMD proliferation. Further tools are needed to supplement these treaties to combat this ever-evolving threat, especially with respect to non-state actors.

The UN Security Council, recognizing the serious threat posed by terrorism and the risk of non-state actors acquiring WMDs, adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004. This Resolution requires States to establish effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery, and encourages enhanced international cooperation in this regard. Just a few weeks ago, the Security Council's 1540 Committee held an open meeting to comprehensively review the status of the implementation of Resolution 1540. A large cross-section of UN member States participated in this open meeting, reflecting the level of concern over the proliferation threat.

As intended by Resolution 1540, cooperative action backed by strong international will is required to deal with a complex threat like the trafficking of WMD, particularly where non-state actors are involved. No one State will have the resources and ability to effectively address the practical challenges posed by this transnational and multifaceted threat - where the proliferators may operate from multiple countries and where the entire proliferation supply chain may involve a myriad of different players, ranging from legitimate shippers to rogue brokers. This is where PSI can come in.

The PSIPSI plays an important and necessary role in complementing these efforts. PSI partners commit to developing and maintaining effective measures for interdicting the illicit transfer of WMDs, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from States and non-state actors of proliferation concern. These voluntary actions are to be consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks.

PSI takes a pragmatic and action-oriented approach to multilateral cooperation. It allows participants to contribute in accordance with their unique capabilities, legal thresholds and in their geographical location, while remaining united by a common commitment to countering the proliferation threat. Furthermore, by joining the PSI network and taking part in PSI activities, States can work together to build up national capacities for counter-proliferation, and develop practical ways for coordinating enforcement actions against the proliferators.

Six years on from its inception, PSI has a proven track record of success. PSI membership has grown from an initial 11 endorsees to more than 90 endorsing States today. PSI partners have worked together to review and strengthen legal frameworks, to share law enforcement and export control best practices, and to improve the inter-operability of multi-agency enforcement forces. To date, more than 70 countries have participated in the PSI exercises and table-top discussions. Observers from non-PSI countries have also attended these activities.

In the last six years, PSI partners have worked closely together to interdict illegal proliferation cargoes, before they reach their intended end-users. Of course, more remains to be done. One key area for improvement is to expand the PSI network to include more partner countries. Hence, as for the first Deep Sabre exercise, Singapore has invited a number of observers from our region to Deep Sabre II. We hope that the outreach activities will help our guests to better understand the importance and value of PSI, and encourage them to join and strengthen this counter-proliferation effort.

Singapore's ContributionsAs a small country located at the juncture of key sea lines of communication, we recognize that we have an important role to play in the common fight against WMD proliferation. We take these responsibilities seriously. Besides giving strong support to treaty regimes such as the NPT, CWC and BWC and active involvement in non-proliferation issues at multilateral fora like the UN and the ASEAN Regional Forum, we also place particular emphasis on two key areas. Firstly, at the national level, Singapore continually seeks to improve our own legislative and enforcement measures. Since 2003, Singapore has implemented an enhanced export control system to regulate transfers of strategic goods and technology that could have potential WMD applications. Our control measures are regularly updated in line with the best international practices for preventing the proliferation of WMDs. To ensure effective enforcement, we adopt a "whole of government" approach to coordinate action across all relevant government agencies at both policy and operational levels.

Secondly, Singapore actively contributes to counter-proliferation efforts through the PSI. As a committed PSI member, we do so by hosting PSI activities like the Deep Sabre exercises. As with Deep Sabre I, Deep Sabre II is designed to enhance both national and international inter-agency co-ordination and interoperability across PSI partner countries. This year’s exercise brings together a wide range of multi-national participants from not only the military forces, but also legal, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, port and civil aviation authorities and industry. Here, I would like to thank all of you, and all my colleagues from various Singapore agencies for their strong support for Exercise Deep Sabre II.

Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen,We all share a common interest in preventing the proliferation of WMDs. Your participation in this exercise demonstrates our collective commitment and vigilance towards this goal. In this era of increasing interconnectivity and interdependence, it is vital that we work together to safeguard our countries and people.It now leaves me to extend a warm welcome to all participants and observers, and to wish everyone a fruitful exercise ahead

.Thank you.