Speech by Mr Teo Chee Hean, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, at SLD 2009 Plenary 4: Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

"Military Transparency in the Asia Pacific"IntroductionI am glad that the title of this plenary session is "Military Transparency and Defence Cooperation", and not just "Military Transparency"."Military transparency" is not an end in itself. It serves a larger objective. During the Cold War, military transparency served to avoid accidents. In an era when the opposing sides were poised, with fingers on hair-triggers, the objective then was to avoid misunderstandings and mistakes - to avoid accidentally sending the world into oblivion in a matter of minutes. Hence the famous hot-line between Washington and Moscow was established. And even when agreements were reached to limit strategic arms, the purpose of transparency was to reduce the chances of miscalculation - to ensure, for example, that satellites on each side were able to observe what the other side was doing to a degree sufficient to avoid surprises and reduce the chance of either side cheating in between mutual inspections.

It would not be appropriate to transpose the "MAD" world of the Cold War transparency regime onto present day circumstances in the Asia-Pacific. The strategic circumstances are not the same, and the objectives and outcomes we desire are different.

The Cold War was a time of strategic certainty. Both sides were implacably opposed to each other - ideologically, geo-strategically. Each side was convinced about the superiority of its socio-political system - and "wished" it, or wished to apply it, on the other side. Each side was also competing for geo-strategic influence in a zero-sum game, in North-East Asia, South-East Asia, West Asia, the Middle East and Latin America.

The purpose of transparency was not to build trust or cooperation for mutual benefit. In fact, the assumption was that trust and cooperation were not possible.

In the Asia Pacific, this is not the starting assumption, or at least it should not be, as such an assumption could easily become self-fulfilling. We are at the cusp of an Asia Pacific century. The focal point of global geopolitics in the coming decades will be the Asia Pacific, a region that is home to the major powers, both present and rising. We are in a state of flux, which brings with it a degree of strategic uncertainty. With more states rapidly increasing the size and sophistication of their economies, there will be more players with burgeoning trade interests, and energy and resource needs. New points of friction can arise as more states seek to secure access to sea-lanes and resources, or to protect new claims to maritime zones, such as the Continental Shelf.

As the powers realise that their spectrum of strategic interests has grown, they may increase their military capability to safeguard these interests. With economic growth, states have more resources to spend on defence, and also more to defend. Of particular concern for the region are the overlapping and disputed claims to the Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China Sea. The potential for incidents to occur between the claimants is high, especially as the value of these territories is elevated by their strategic location adjacent to key sea-lanes, and reports of valuable deposits in their seabed.

However, amidst this strategic uncertainty, there is no desire to see relationships polarised into conflict. Each of the major powers has stated, repeatedly, their desire for peace, stability and cooperation. Just yesterday, Secretary Gates and LG Ma, among others, have reiterated these aspirations. The region's objectives are thus peace and stability - not the "cold peace" of the Cold War, but a cooperative relationship where we can work together to tackle security challenges and enhance prosperity. But each of the powers is also aware that there are uncertainties, and the greater the uncertainty, the greater the tendency to want to hedge against it. This is where transparency plays a crucial role to avoid misunderstandings and to increase trust and confidence.

Three Levels of TransparencyFirst Level - Armaments and Military ProgrammesMilitary transparency for the Asia Pacific needs to operate at three levels.

At the first level is a disclosure of one's armaments and arsenals. Providing information about one's military programmes, military expenditure, arms exports and imports, can reduce the likelihood that such programmes would be destabilising. We can rely on existing mechanisms and enhance them where necessary.

In the Asia Pacific, there has been a degree of such disclosure. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has supported the UN Register on Conventional Arms since 1994. The ARF Annual Security Outlook reports seek to enhance the level of information sharing. The more recent Voluntary Briefings at the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meetings (ADMM) complement this process. States that have yet to avail themselves of these opportunities should be encouraged to do so, making such transparency a norm in the region. States also contribute to this first level of transparency by arranging for visits to military facilities and making regular public statements about military procurements, plans and activities.

In today's interconnected world, first level transparency can be easily augmented through official defence websites, with regular updates on military activities and programmes through reports, pictures and videos.

Second Level - Security Concerns and Strategic IntentHowever, the first level of transparency is not adequate. We want to go beyond the Cold War where the situation was one of irreconcilable and opposing ideologies. For the Asia Pacific, we want to encourage cooperative behaviour among states in order to strengthen defence cooperation and enhance security.

To achieve this, we need to operate at a higher level of transparency. Transparency today is not merely about "bean-counting" what others have in their arsenals, nor is it merely about knowing others' capabilities either.

Take a scenario where a state has decided to increase its military spending and the capability of its military because it decides that its defence needs have grown. This could be because the pattern of its trade and energy supply routes has altered fundamentally, or that new areas have been developed, or shifts in population have occurred. Or another scenario where a few states decide to cooperate to increase their ability to improve security, for example, in the sea lanes. Although that state or these states may consider this self-defence or cooperative security, others may perceive it differently, and this may lead to doubts, suspicion and insecurity.

Therefore, transparency must encompass statements of strategic intent. States need to articulate their security concerns and strategic intent in clear and convincing ways that can reassure others. Countries that understand each others' strategic intent and security concerns are more likely to avoid miscalculations. When we better understand the concerns that we might have about each other, we can more confidently find ways to take these concerns into account and reassure each other. Where we have common concerns, we can find ways to cooperate meaningfully. This second level of transparency can be done through the publication of White Papers, government statements or interviews, and dialogues between states.

Formal commitments to peace, such as the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, are helpful in fostering confidence about states' intentions. Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia is another helpful expression of peaceful and cooperative intent. Such formal commitments and declarations not only provide transparency about a state’s intentions, but also provide a useful benchmark against which a state's future actions can be assessed.

Commitments to international norms and legal frameworks can further bolster regional trust by providing predictability about states' actions when there are differences in views. I would like to place particular emphasis on the need for states to commit themselves to the peaceful resolution of disputes based on dialogue and international law, and not on the basis of whose military is stronger. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is especially relevant in ensuring peace and stability in the maritime domain. In 1982, UNCLOS was concluded after a long process of negotiation. UNCLOS managed to arrive at a crucial and important balance between the claims of coastal states for more rights over adjacent seas, and the rights that user states and other states historically had over the use of the seas. We would be wise to maintain this balance, which UNCLOS arrived at because it benefits both coastal and user states. Indeed, most states are both coastal and user states. As the economies in the world become open and integrated and as trade flows increase, countries that used to think in terms of protecting their interests as coastal states will find that they have significant and growing interests as user states as well, and hence even for individual countries, this balance of issues shifts.

Security dialogues also contribute to transparency by providing deeper insights into the thinking behind states' actions, beyond declarations. The Shangri-La Dialogue provides a platform for states to share information and have an open exchange of views so that others understand their actions better. It also serves as a platform for states to voice their concerns and raise questions and make clarifications. You might ask yourself: why is he responding in this way to what I am saying or doing; was that what I meant or intended; is that achieving my purpose? This serves as an invaluable avenue for clarifying one's intentions, adjusting one's actions, and accommodating differences in perspective.

Third Level - Cooperative and Inclusive ActionThe third level of military transparency refers to the cooperative action that contributes more directly to regional security. This level of cooperative and inclusive action is especially important for the Asia Pacific region in two ways. First, the region faces multi-faceted and transnational security challenges that require international cooperation to resolve. Examples of such challenges include the proliferation of WMD, terrorism and maritime security. The current cooperation in the Gulf of Aden is a good example of this. Second, the Asia Pacific is a region that is politically and economically diverse, and where regional security dialogue and cooperation are still works in progress. Concrete action and cooperation among all the regional stakeholders are necessary for stable relations and for the region to work together to tackle common threats.

In recent decades, the region has achieved a healthy level of defence cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels, establishing a shared commitment to stability and a respect for consensus-based mechanisms and international law. Let me elaborate.

The ARF's confidence building measures boost preventive diplomacy with dialogues and moving towards concrete mechanisms for cooperation. Most recently, the standby arrangement for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) will facilitate the efficient conduct of such missions in member countries.

There is also a web of multilateral and bilateral exchanges and exercises between militaries and government agencies, such as the ARF maritime security shore exercise, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium exercises. Operational cooperative mechanisms, such as the Malacca Strait Patrols, have had a positive effect on regional security and enhanced trust between the participating states Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand. Looking ahead, Singapore is working to build a multilateral framework for maritime information sharing and cooperation which is open and inclusive. Interested countries can participate by linking their maritime operations centres, sharing information, and having liaison officers to utilise the Information Fusion Centre at the new Changi Command and Control Centre which is being completed this year.

Territorial disputes have been settled peacefully through negotiations or by reference to third party adjudication. For instance, Indonesia and Singapore concluded a maritime boundary agreement in March this year, through bilateral negotiation. The sovereignty of Pedra Branca island was settled peacefully and amicably between Malaysia and Singapore at the International Court of Justice in 2008. This followed a similar resolution in 2002 on the sovereignty of Sipadan and Ligitan islands by Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia and Singapore also successfully resolved issues over land reclamation in 2003 at the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, in accordance with UNCLOS.

Conclusion: A Regional Architecture Based on Cooperation and International LawLet me conclude. Military transparency is not an end in itself but a means to peace and stability.

Given the strategic circumstances in our region, and despite its diversity and the potential for tensions, the increasing acceptance and practice of the three levels of transparency have enabled the Asia Pacific region thus far to gradually foster a norm of dialogue, a culture of defence cooperation, and the acceptance of international legal mechanisms to resolve disputes peacefully. This has built the foundation for a regional security architecture that is (a) inclusive of regional stakeholders, (b) transparent about capabilities and intentions, and (c) serious about cooperation based on dialogue and the rule of international law.

States in the Asia Pacific have real opportunities to build trust and enhance cooperation, for the benefit of all. If we get it right, the region can harness its cooperative energies to mitigate differences that may arise from time to time, and achieve our objective of enduring stability and cooperation. We need to do this not just to overcome security challenges and secure our homelands, but also to work together to build a new prosperity and secure better lives for our people.