Speech by Minister for Defence Teo Chee Hean, at Committee of Supply Debate 2009

Implications of the Financial Crisis

Ms Indranee Rajah, Mr Arthur Fong and Mr Ang Mong Seng asked about the security implications of the global economic crisis. This House has extensively discussed its economic and social impact. Now, from the security perspective, there are three implications of the crisis that MINDEF is concerned. First, it will accelerate global geopolitical shifts. Second, during a recession, social stresses may lead to increased instability. Third, the threat of terrorism overlays these first two concerns.

Global geo-political changes are accelerated

Mr Hawazi Daipi and Mr Zainudin Nordin asked how we can ensure peace and stability in our region in these uncertain times. Ms Indranee Rajah asked about the regional security architecture.

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has been the pre-eminent economic and military power. Other countries such as China and India were emerging both economically and militarily. The economic crisis has accelerated this process. While the G7 used to shape the global financial and economic framework, it no longer has the means to resolve the economic crisis by itself. Wider concerted action is required, as illustrated by the hasty convening of a G20 meeting last November. This shift in global economic weight, and the rise of other powers, will lead to a faster transition to a multi-polar world where no single power can steer global developments. The US will remain the world's most powerful nation. Its leadership will be necessary to address key economic and security issues, but it cannot work alone.

This shift will also impact regional security, where the interests of the major powers - energy sources, sea lines of communication, markets - intersect, and overlay the region's traditional diversity and rivalries. It is not coincidental that tensions abound in the countries bordering the Caspian Sea and in Central Asia, where pipeline politics, energy and historical animosities provide a volatile mix.

In our region, it is thus even more important that we continue to build an open, stable and inclusive regional security architecture that will help sustain peace and stability, for the longer term. ASEAN has a key role to play in this.

ASEAN facilitates and shapes multilateral fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting or ADMM, is an important part of this architecture, where ASEAN defence ministers come together to build a more cohesive ASEAN security community that can help shape the wider security architecture of our region. The ADMM has agreed on the principles for the ADMM-Plus, where ASEAN countries can engage our partners in the larger Asia-Pacific to address common security challenges. Other multilateral and bilateral security arrangements also play a useful role. One example is the Five Power Defence Arrangements, which bring together Malaysia and Singapore and anchor its extra-regional partners Australia, New Zealand, and the UK in our region.

The annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is the only forum where defence ministers, senior officials, and academics from the region and beyond gather for an informal and frank exchange of views. This key event, which will be held for the eighth time this year, has played a useful and unique role in sharing security perspectives, promoting confidence and transparency, and evolving new modalities for cooperation and norms of behaviour amongst countries in our region. Last year, the Ministers discussed principles for cooperation, particularly for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

MINDEF contributes to the building of this regional security architecture in two ways. By contributing ideas and concepts to help crystallize the security architecture, and by having a capable SAF which can engage meaningfully with our ASEAN friends and partner countries, and contribute useful capabilities towards regional cooperative activities. Without either of these, Singapore would play a much more diminished role and we would not have the same voice at the table.

Our multilateral engagements within the region are supported by a strong network of bilateral defence relations, particularly with Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei. Every year, the SAF takes part in numerous bilateral exercises with each of these neighbours. These interactions also add breadth and depth to our relationships, and contribute to regional stability.

Singapore has also been actively engaging key countries from beyond our immediate region because they play a useful and constructive role in our region.

We have a strong and longstanding relationship with the US. We welcome a US presence in our region. The sustained US presence is an important stabilising influence in the Asia-Pacific region. We have demonstrated our support through the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding, and its 1998 Addendum which allows US ships and aircraft to use Singapore's facilities. In 2005, we concluded the Strategic Framework Agreement and Defence Cooperation Agreement. The high tempo of defence exchanges benefits both armed forces professionally. In addition to the three existing F-16, Chinook and Apache training detachments in the US, our Air Force will establish a new F-15SG training detachment in Mountain Home, Idaho this year.

With China, the signing of the Agreement on Defence Exchanges and Security Cooperation last year was a milestone in our bilateral defence relationship. We also inaugurated the annual China-Singapore Defence Policy Dialogue, and have continued with high-level defence visits, professional exchanges, cross-attendance of courses, and port calls.

Bilateral relations with India have taken significant strides since the signing of the Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2003, reflecting the wide-ranging and growing Singapore-India bilateral defence relationship. We signed a Bilateral Agreement with India for Joint Army training and exercises last year, and the Bilateral Agreement on Air Force training in 2007.

Our relations with Australia and New Zealand remain warm and strong. Through bilateral exercises, exchanges and common deployments previously to East Timor and now to Afghanistan, we have developed a deep understanding with both countries.

Singapore also enjoys good defence relations with Japan and Korea, and has good defence cooperation with France, Germany, Sweden, and South Africa.

Stresses increase in a recession

Regional stability is crucial, particularly against the backdrop of today's interconnected world. Nations face a spectrum of multi-faceted, complex, and trans-border security challenges. They include terrorism, piracy, sectarianism, competition for resources, natural disasters, pandemics, and cross-border movements of people. There are also unexpected threats that we have not yet foreseen. The unknown unknowns.

Amidst these emerging challenges, we must not lose sight of the need for small states like Singapore to always be prepared to safeguard our security and sovereignty. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is a constant reminder. A country which does not provide for its own defence leaves its future and its fate in the hands of others.

I just returned from the Munich Security conference. In Munich each year, I meet many defence and foreign ministers from countries born out of the break up of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia - small countries mostly. They value their independence all the more because it is so recent, and so hard won; and in some cases, so tenuous. They worry about their security. But not all have been able to provide for it - they either have not had enough time, or they do not have the resources. Just in the past two years, several of these new countries have faced dire security threats ranging from ethnic strife, to territorial and energy disputes, which have resulted in armed conflict, loss of life and territory, interruption of energy supplies, and cyber attacks. These have caused severe damage, and in some cases break-up, of the countries affected.

A deepening economic crisis will compound existing security challenges, making them more acute. Countries that are seriously affected could face social and possibly political instability and turmoil. In Britain, France, Greece, strikes and demonstrations have already broken out. As the economic slowdown bites, sources of stress and tension will increase. We saw this in our own region in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis.

Indeed, the security challenges we face today come from all directions, "360-degrees" and have the potential to undermine our security - and our region's security. Piracy is one of these.

Mr Ang Mong Seng and Mr Michael Palmer have asked about piracy in the Malacca Strait and the Gulf of Aden. By threatening the freedom of navigation and the safety of international shipping, piracy adversely impacts the global economy and regional security.

The Straits of Singapore and Malacca, and the Gulf of Aden, are vital waterways connecting Asia and Europe.

In the Malacca Strait, the three littoral states - Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia - started the Malacca Strait Patrols in 2004 to combat piracy. This grouping has now expanded to include Thailand. The number of piracy incidents in the Malacca Strait has declined significantly, from a high of 21 in 2004, to 6 in 2008. These are figures from ReCAAP. But some analysts have predicted that the economic crisis may cause piracy to rise. For example, last November, Indonesian Navy spokesman Sagom Tamboem told journalists, and I quote, "we predict that with the global crisis, there will be more pirates and illegal activities taking place in the Malacca Strait". This is a realistic assessment. Therefore, we will have to maintain our efforts in the Malacca Strait. User states can also share information through the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery or ReCAAP, which I had mentioned earlier.

In the Gulf of Aden, there has been a recent upsurge of piracy attacks. In the past year, over 100 ships have been attacked by pirates, who have raked in an estimated ransom of US$120 million dollars.

In recent months, NATO, the European Union, the US, as well as countries such as China, India, Malaysia and Russia, have contributed to anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Other countries, including Japan and Turkey, have announced their intention to send naval vessels.

Singapore will be joining these efforts by deploying a Landing Ship Tank, with two Super Puma helicopters embarked, for a period of three months this year. The ship will work with the newly-formed Combined Task Force 151 to protect shipping in the Gulf of Aden. She will deploy once the operational arrangements have been made.

Why are we doing this? As a maritime nation, Singapore shares the concerns of the international community regarding piracy, and is committed to supporting international efforts to keep the sea lanes safe and secure. It is not possible for any country, Singapore included, to protect its own shipping, on its own, in all the key sea lanes of the world. All countries therefore have to depend on international cooperation to secure the sea lanes for everyone's use. Littoral states, user states, and the international community all have a role to play.

Our priority will still be on ensuring the security of the Straits of Singapore and Malacca, but we are also playing our part, through this small but meaningful contribution, as part of a multinational force to protect international shipping in the Gulf of Aden. Such international cooperative measures will help all shipping, including Singapore ships, which should also take the necessary self-protection measures such as the appropriate routes, speed and timing for their passage to minimise their likelihood of being attacked.

Terrorism still constitutes a threat

Mr Ang Mong Seng and Mr Michael Palmer asked how we can prevent a terrorist attack. Ms Rajah, Dr Mohamad Maliki, and Mr Michael Palmer asked what lessons the SAF can learn from the attacks in Mumbai.

The Mumbai attacks are the latest in a string of global attacks. They are a grim reminder that terrorism remains a common and persistent threat to all nations, and that the costs stemming from a failure to be vigilant are great.

Singapore continues to be a target, and we have to remain on our guard. Initial studies of the Mumbai attacks have underscored the critical need for intelligence, early warning and prevention capabilities to discover, detect, and deter these threats. Close interagency teamwork is essential to counter the threat. The SAF therefore works closely with home-front agencies to support our national counter-terrorism strategy of "prevent, protect and respond". Following the August 2007 Amendments to the SAF Act passed by this
House, SAF troops have been deployed to assist the Singapore Police Force in a number of major security operations last year, and to continue with the protection of key installations. The Air Force and Navy conduct air and maritime security operations in close coordination with their respective civilian counterparts. The SAF also maintains high-end capabilities, on high readiness, such as the Special Operations Force for intervention and hostage rescue, and units for chemical and biological defence.

Sir, the terrorists entered Mumbai via the sea. The SAF has invested significantly to deter and respond to transnational terrorist threats in the Singapore Strait which is used by more than one thousand vessels each day. Our Navy works closely with the Port Authority and the Coast Guard to improve our radar and electro-optical sensor network. Navy ships conduct round-the-clock patrols and last year escorted 1,900 merchant ships carrying sensitive cargo in the Singapore Strait. Accompanying Sea Security Teams, comprising Navy and Coast Guard armed sea marshals, last year boarded and accompanied 1,100 selected vessels using Singapore's ports. To further strengthen inter-agency collaboration, the SAF annually conducts Exercise APEX, for all maritime agencies to validate and review their operational plans. In fact, Exercise APEX 2009 commenced earlier this week. The SAF has also restructured the Navy's Coastal Command as the Maritime Security Task Force, which I will speak on a little later.

However, Singapore's security cannot just be the concern of Governmet agencies. Security is a national responsibility as several members have pointed out, and all of us must offer additional eyes and ears to enhance our vigilance. Every Singaporean must develop strong communal ties and mutual trust with fellow Singaporeans, so that if we are ever hit, our people will remain cohesive, and have the resilience to quickly bounce back. Every citizen has a role to play. This is the crux of Total Defence, which is an important topic that Associate Professor Koo will speak on later.

Sir, terrorism respects no boundaries, and cannot be resolved by any one nation acting alone.

Mr Michael Palmer asked about Singapore's contributions to international security operations. Singapore remains committed to doing its part for the multinational stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Since 2001, we have contributed SAF deployments, assistance-in-kind, and training courses for Afghan personnel. In 2008, we continued our SAF deployments with the New Zealand Defence Force's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamiyan that we had started in 2007, by deploying a construction engineering team there for two rotations, totalling six months. During their deployment, the teams supervised the construction of a Regional Health Training Centre and a Security Wall around the Bamiyan University Dormitory. We expect to make a similar contribution of a construction engineering team to Bamiyan this year. In addition, since November 2008, the SAF has deployed a 20-man medical team to Oruzgan Province, for two rotations totalling six months, to provide primary health-care and ward capabilities in support of the Dutch and
Australian forces deployed there.

We are also exploring additional operationally useful contributions, within our capabilities and resources, to the UN-mandated, NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (or ISAF) in Afghanistan. We are working on the details of a 3-month deployment of a KC-135 tanker aircraft in the later part of this year to support coalition operations over Afghanistan. We also know that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities are a priority need in Afghanistan. We are thus exploring the deployment of such assets, for example the deployment of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Task Group to Afghanistan to enhance ISAF's situational awareness and security.

Mr Palmer also asked about the risks faced by our soldiers in Afghanistan. Our deployments do involve risks to our servicemen, which can be significant. Attacks from rockets and Improvised Explosive Devices, are common in Oruzgan. In Bamiyan, such attacks are less frequent. The SAF has to undertake these missions even though they do entail risks. Where there is important work to be done, there will be risks. To mitigate the risks, we make sure that our servicemen are well equipped and trained, and receive additional training specific to their mission and area of operation. For instance, our medical team in Oruzgan underwent rigorous pre-deployment training which included modules to sharpen their weapon handling skills, identify and mitigate IED threats, as well as to react to hostile elements. Our servicemen have to be vigilant at all times to respond to unexpected situations that may arise.

Sir, our missions in Afghanistan have a direct link to Singapore's security. Members will recall that key members of the JI cell in Singapore received training in Afghanistan, including its leader Ibrahim Maidin. The JI had hatched plans to attack various targets in Singapore even before the 11 September 2001 attack in the US, and before coalition forces went into Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. Honourable Members will also recall that a copy of a video-tape of the JI reconnaissance of Yishun MRT station was found in the rubble of the house of the Al Qaeda leader Mohd Atef in Kabul in 2001. In February 2007, a 28-year-old self-radicalised Singaporean lawyer was arrested and detained after attempting to pursue militant jihad in Afghanistan.

Sir, Singapore is making these deployments to show our support and assist in a meaningful way in the stabilisation and reconstruction efforts, so as to prevent extremists from using Afghanistan to export terrorism.

Last Sunday in Munich, I spoke with the Afghan National Security Adviser Dr Zalmai Rassoul, and listened to Afghan President Hamid Karzai speak about his hopes and plans for the future of his country amidst the many challenges that they face. Our servicemen can also contribute, in a small way, to make a long-term difference to the lives of the Afghan people, while enhancing Singapore's overall security.

Mr Palmer also asked whether National Service personnel are also deployed for these missions. In the case of Afghanistan, we have only deployed regular servicemen. If suitable Full-time or Operationally-Ready National Servicemen wish to volunteer, they may do so, and we will treat their period of service with the mission as regular service.

Besides Afghanistan, Singapore has been contributing to multinational reconstruction efforts in Iraq since 2003. The SAF has made five deployments of Landing Ships Tank, five deployments of KC-135 tanker aircraft and one deployment of C-130 transport aircraft in support of coalition operations in Iraq. Significant progress has been made in Iraq after these five years. The Iraqi security forces are now prepared to take over the responsibility of providing security for the Iraqi people. As such, coalition forces are now in a position to begin their phased withdrawals. Singapore's commitments to stabilisation operations in Iraq will therefore also come to an end. I am sure that the Members of the House will join me in acknowledging the contributions of our 998 SAF Servicemen, some of whom have served multiple tours, to the multinational reconstruction efforts in Iraq over the past five years.

A Ready, Capable and Flexible SAF

Sir, even as we contribute to international and regional security, the SAF's primary mission is to defend Singapore. Today, Singapore relies on an SAF that possesses a full spectrum of capabilities to deter aggression, and respond flexibly from peacetime operations to full-scale combat operations.

Ms Indranee Rajah and Mr Zainudin Nordin asked about the 3rd Generation SAF. The SAF's transformation is on track. The first of four Gulfstream 550 Airborne Early Warning aircraft will arrive later this month to replace the E-2C Hawkeye that has served us well for over 20 years. Last November, our first F-15SG fighter plane, which replaces the A4 Skyhawks, rolled off the Boeing factory production line. Both aircraft will add new dimensions to Singapore's air defence capabilities. Last month, the final two of the Navy's six frigates were commissioned, replacing the Missile Gunboats, which have served Singapore well since the 1970s. The frigates are now fully operational and have taken part in highly demanding exercises in the Indian Ocean and off Hawaii. We have inducted the Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tanks and more crews will be sent for training in Germany next month.

The SAF constantly hones its readiness and validates new fighting concepts through realistic exercises. Last May, I visited the Division Exercise, Lightning Warrior, in South Africa. This exercise validated the Division's ability to integrate the SAF's air and land capabilities to see first and strike first, in order to decisively influence the battle's outcome. The Air-Land Tactical Control Centre was also exercised during Exercise Wallaby in Australia last November. This exercise involved 3,600 full-time National Servicemen and NSmen, and platforms such as F-16s, Pegasus lightweight artillery howitzers and, for the first time, the Leopard Tanks.

The SAF is also restructuring to better respond to current and future security challenges. Last year, the Air Force completed its major reorganisation into five mission-oriented functional commands. The Army's 2nd People's Defence Force Headquarters was restructured as the Island Defence Headquarters and has since been working with Home Team agencies to monitor and respond to security threats. This year, the Navy's Coastal Command will be restructured as another SAF-level task force - the Maritime Security Task Force - which will work closely with the Police Coast Guard, Maritime Port Authority, the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority and Singapore Customs to ensure national coordination in maritime security.

Mr Hawazi asked if our personnel are ready for the SAF's restructuring, and Ms Rajah as well. Today's recruit is very different from his predecessor. He is better-educated and technologically-savvy. The SAF's new training concepts seek to develop innovative and adaptable soldiers. To maximise each soldier's potential, the SAF believes in equipping him well. We have introduced the Advanced Combat Man System or ACMS - a computerised system worn by the soldier that comprises communication, image-gathering and navigational technologies. So this 3rd Generation SAF is going down to the section and soldier level. ACMS allows the basic infantry section to tap on a wider range of combat resources such as fire support from other units. We are equipping our key training schools and several battalions with the ACMS, and will continue to make improvements and upgrades in future. Members would have received a notebook with the print of the new pixelised combat uniform. The new uniform has improved functional design, dissipates heat better, and enhances combat survivability. Dr Ng will elaborate on how our People Development initiatives will bring out the best in our personnel.

Ms Rajah also asked about the preparedness of the SAF for other types of warfare, like urban warfare. The new Murai Urban Training Facility was built to resemble a typical town and offers realistic urban training and validation of new equipment, tactics and doctrines.

Sir, the SAF is ready to confront current and future operational challenges because we have embarked on the transformation to the 3rd Generation SAF. Such investments have enabled the SAF to restructure and streamline its training and operational requirements, leading to more effective use of our National Servicemen. Members would recall that this transition to the 3rd Generation SAF is what has allowed us to reduce the duration of National Service in 2004, while maintaining the operational readiness and fighting edge of the SAF. So our investment in technology and new equipment has allowed us to reduce the duration of National Service. Full-time NS duration is now 2 years, down from 2½ years, while the NS In-Camp-Training cycle is reduced from 13 years to 10 years.

Defence Spending During an Economic Downturn

Ms Irene Ng, Mr Arthur Fong, Mr Hawazi Daipi, Mr Low Thia Khiang during the main budget debate, and Ms Ho Geok Choo asked about our defence expenditure. Today's independent and secure Singapore, is made possible by a capable SAF which is the direct product of our steady and prudent investments in defence over the years.

The government's policy is to invest steadily on defence - like an insurance policy. While the government is prepared to spend up to 6% of GDP on defence, we have not always used this full amount, and indeed invest only what is needed. So, this is the operating principle. Investing only what we need. The long-term defence needs are appraised, and the long-term resources to meet these needs are determined. Hence, from 1997 to 2002, defence expenditure was about 5.0% to 5.5% of GDP. Since 2002 the defence expenditure has typically been between 4.5% and 5% of GDP. We expect that on average the defence budget will be within this GDP range over the next few years. This is in line with the overall budget, and the budgets of other ministries. Within this range, the defence budget will move up and down, along with the GDP and overall Government budget. We do not sharply increase spending during an economic upturn just because more money can be made available, and we do not sharply cut spending when the economy slows. Instead of a feast and famine approach, we put in consistent investments in defence. This is the prudent approach.

Sir, security threats do not disappear during an economic downturn. On the contrary, as I have pointed out earlier, social and political frictions increase during difficult economic times. Or as Ms Indranee Rajah said earlier, the world does not appear to be a very safe place - quite an understatement. Having a credible SAF to defend Singapore's sovereignty and vital interests is even more crucial under these circumstances. A steady defence budget through both good and difficult economic times sends a strong signal of our resolve to defend ourselves.

Building effective defence capabilities takes many years. It would be too late to start buying weapons and raising capabilities only when an obvious threat confronts us. Defence programmes have long gestation periods, and it is more effective to plan and invest for the long term. Major programmes like the frigate typically take a decade from inception to full operational status. It takes even longer for our people - SAF servicemen, scientists and engineers - to master their respective expertise. Sharply reducing the budget during a downturn means that certain capabilities, people and expertise that took many years to build may be lost. And these capabilities cannot be easily rebuilt just by short-term spending increases. MINDEF's multi-year plans ensure that the SAF is built up as a coherent and effective fighting force. A stable defence budget allows us to make long-term decisions in order to obtain the best value for our investment, whether it is in building up our capability in people, or in weapon systems.

And I would like to assure Mr Fong that this steady approach to defence spending ensures that the SAF is always well-prepared to confront security challenges.

Ms Ng has asked about MINDEF's major items of expenditure. Our defence budget has three main parts. I will describe them only in broad terms. First, through our investment in people, we develop well-trained soldiers, sailors and airmen, and also engineers and scientists. Second, through our operating expenditure, we carry out operations both locally and in support of our international commitments, and maintain a high state of operational readiness through rigorous training. Third, through our capital expenditure, we equip our servicemen with the most appropriate equipment so that they can carry out their mission with confidence and success. We are also spending a little more this year on construction in line with the Government's resilience package.

As a policy, MINDEF only buys what we need, and what is most cost-effective. We extend the life of our equipment by maintaining them well and upgrading, where possible. The 18 year-old Missile Corvettes will embark on a Life Extension Programme so that they can continue to contribute effectively for many more years. When we do need to make a purchase, we do not always buy the latest model. Our AMX-13 tanks were bought secondhand 40 years ago and upgraded to SM-1s 20 years ago. Now that the SM-1s can no longer
be further upgraded to meet our needs, we have bought second-hand Leopard tanks to replace them. In fact, quite a number of major equipment is second-hand, although Members may not recognise them. Our KC-135 aerial tankers, some of our C-130s, and submarines were also bought second-hand. And these are periodically upgraded with modern systems.

We do buy new equipment only when necessary, and particularly to keep our fighting edge sharp, such as the F-15s, UAVs, and frigates. And we also build our own unique solutions to meet our requirements when it is more cost-effective to do so, such as the Bronco All Terrain Tracked Carrier and our Landing Ship Tank. I would like to inform Ms Rajah that we are able to do this because MINDEF consistently spends about four percent of our defence budget on R&D. Our cost-effective equipment is well-regarded internationally. And ST Engineering was recently awarded a contract to supply the Bronco to the UK Armed Forces. Our Landing Ship Tank has also found buyers in other countries.

The current economic crisis has altered the security landscape, and compounds the "360 degree" security threats facing Singapore and the region. A strong SAF underpins the peace and stability that will allow Singapore to ride out the economic slowdown, and protect our vital interests. I thank the House and all Singaporeans for your commitment to defence. And with your strong support, MINDEF and the SAF will continue to ensure a safe and secure Singapore, which gives us the confidence to forge ahead to chart our own future.

Our People are our Key Asset

Ultimately, though, the security of our nation does not rest on equipment and technology, but on our men and women. The SAF must continue to attract and retain people with the right values, motivation and abilities, and ready them to confront the current and future security challenges. And Singaporeans must have the resolve and determination to defend what is theirs.

Mr Chairman, Sir, I will now ask Dr Ng to elaborate on our initiatives to bring out the best in our personnel. And Prof Koo Tsai Kee will elaborate on Total Defence.

More Resources

Speech by Dr Ng Eng Hen, Second Minister for Defence, at Committee of Supply Debate 2009

Speech by Assoc Prof Koo Tsai Kee, Minister of State For Defence, at Committee of Supply Debate 2009