Speech by Senior Minister of State for Defence Mr Zaqy Mohamad Manama Dialogue 2026, 1 Nov 2026 in Bahrain

Excellencies,

Distinguished guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

INTRODUCTION: WE MUST NOT NORMALISE MARITIME INSECURITY

Let me first thank the IISS and the Government of Bahrain for organising this dialogue and for inviting me to speak once again.

Last year, I highlighted the growing threats to maritime security and the importance of networks of cooperation. A year on, developments in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab Al Mandeb Strait have brought these concerns into sharper focus. 

The disruptions have exposed vulnerabilities in our global maritime system, with ramifications for energy supplies, trade, food supplies, as well as supply chains extending far beyond the Middle East, including here in Asia and even in the West.

The fact that shipping continues masks the true costs of insecurity and these are borne by seafarers who face greater risks, businesses grappling with uncertainty, and ultimately, ordinary citizens.

We risk normalising insecurity if we accept higher risks, longer shipping routes, and rising costs as simply the cost of doing business. 

We must not mistake the resilience of global trade for the security of trade: the fact that commerce adapts does not mean that the system is secure. 

Our challenge is not merely to keep ships away during a crisis, but to prevent maritime insecurity from becoming a permanent feature of international trade. 

So, allow me to share three reflections, coming from afar, from Asia, and viewing from the outside what is happening in the Middle East.

GEOGRAPHY MUST NOT BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF COERCION 

First, geography must not become an instrument of coercion. 

Strategic waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab Al Mandeb Strait, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are critical arteries of the global economy. 

Yet, geography is a double-edged sword: the strategic importance of these waterways also makes them vulnerable to exploitation. Their security cannot be viewed in isolation, as disruptions in one waterway will have far-reaching consequences to other waterways and other economies too. 

For Southeast Asian states like Singapore, open and secure sea lanes are our economic lifelines. 

While our security circumstances may differ, the principles governing maritime passage must be consistent. 

What happens in Hormuz or in the Bab Al Mandeb matters far beyond the Gulf. We must not allow attempts to restrict transit passage there to undermine navigational rights in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, or any other strategic waterway. 

So we must uphold international law, including the right of transit passage under UNCLOS, to ensure these waterways remain conduits for trade and not instruments of leverage. 

MUTUAL DEPENDENCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE MARITIME SECURITY 

Second, mutual dependence does not guarantee maritime security. 

Globalisation brought about an expectation that shared economic interests would keep conflicts at bay because disruption would be too costly on both sides and on multiple parties. 

However, the reality is that countries can be economically interconnected, while remaining strategically divided. 

How then can we safeguard our common interests? Mutual dependence is an economic reality; but building mutual trust must be a strategic priority. 

International law establishes the rules governing maritime passage, of which all countries must respect. 

Mutual trust is engendered when countries consistently uphold international law, communicate to ease tensions, and cooperate during times of crisis. 

Last year, I spoke about building bridges that bring stakeholders together and these bridges remain essential. 

International law establishes the rules. 

Defence cooperation, conducted in accordance of  these rules, serves as a bridge that builds the practical capabilities to strengthen maritime security.

TRANSLATING MUTUAL TRUST INTO COLLECTIVE CAPABILITY

This brings me to my third point. Mutual trust must be translated into collective responsibility.

No single country can secure the global maritime commons alone. 

Littoral States must play a central role in safeguarding regional waterways, while User States should supplement them.  

Allow me to suggest three areas of cooperation, including amongst defence establishments that can be strengthened. 

One, seeing threats together. 

The first step towards effective maritime security cooperation is shared awareness. We cannot respond together to threats without all of us having a common operating picture.

 Maritime threats transcend boundaries, making timely information therefore essential. 

Singapore's Information Fusion Centre brings together 58 international partners to share maritime security information across 163 linkages, and these strengthen collective maritime domain awareness across many of our countries and many of our navies. 

Such cooperation helps countries identify threats earlier, reduce uncertainty, and coordinate more effective responses. 

Two, being prepared to act together. 

Information alone is not sufficient. Countries must develop established relationships, operational familiarity, and the ability to coordinate responses. These cannot be built overnight. 

In our region, Singapore works with our neighbours, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, through the Malacca Straits Patrol to strengthen and safeguard our sea lanes and the trade that flows through them. 

Beyond our waters, the Singapore Armed Forces has contributed to CTF 151 in the Gulf of Aden and CTF 153 in the Red Sea. These reflect our dedication to safeguarding maritime security beyond our region in Asia, alongside international partners, as far as the Middle East.

Cooperation cannot begin only when a crisis breaks out. The trust and habits of working together must be built long before they are tested. 

Three, securing what we cannot always see.

Maritime security challenges are evolving beyond conventional threats to surface vessels. 

Drones and missile attacks on shipping, alongside cyber threats and vulnerabilities affecting critical underwater infrastructure, adds to the complexity of the situation. 

Maritime security is no longer just about the things that we see, protecting the ships that we see. It is also about safeguarding the infrastructure beneath the seas on which our connected world depends on.

As technology advances, defence establishments must work together to understand emerging risks and develop collective responses. 

That is why Singapore spearheaded the Guiding Principles for Underwater Infrastructure Defence Exchanges, or what we call GUIDE in short, launched in May earlier this year with 16 other countries, including Qatar, from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and Oceania. Germany just joined last week as well.

GUIDE establishes shared principles and identifies practical areas for defence cooperation, including information sharing, technical exchanges and crisis response, in support of civilian authorities and industry. 

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Middle East and Southeast Asia may be distant, but our economic and security interests are deeply intertwined. 

As I said last year, our waters connect us, and we must treat them as a shared trust. 

Safeguarding this trust requires deeper defence cooperation, not just a retreat into fragmented approaches. 

The lesson from Hormuz is not that our world has become too interconnected. It is that our security cooperation has not always kept pace with our interdependence. 

We cannot eliminate every maritime threat. But we can strengthen our collective ability to anticipate, respond and to recover from disruptions. 

We must not allow insecurity to become the new normal. The seas that connect our economies must remain pathways for opportunity and not instruments of coercion. 

Thank you. 

More Resources

Senior Minister of State for Defence Zaqy Mohamad Attends the 22nd Manama Dialogue