- Home
- News and events
- Latest Releases
- Remarks by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at The Munich Security Conference (MSC) 2023 Maritime Security Roundtable on "Bridging Troubled Waters – Mapping Escalation Potential in the Indo-Pacific Region" on 18 February 2023
Remarks by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen at The Munich Security Conference (MSC) 2023 Maritime Security Roundtable on "Bridging Troubled Waters – Mapping Escalation Potential in the Indo-Pacific Region" on 18 February 2023
18 February 2023
This article has been migrated from an earlier version of the site and may display formatting inconsistencies.
I am reminded before I spend a few minutes framing our discussion, what President Zelensky said when he addressed us at the last Shangri-La Dialogue. This was via video conference. It resonated because it was a crie du coeur, a cry from the heart. This was a president in the midst of war and he was talking about pre-emption.
Conflict
I will keep my speech short and focused, and address two questions that are at the top of our minds:
Is a physical conflict between the US and China inevitable in the next decade?
When it occurs, what would be the likely casus belli?
The First Question
Is a physical conflict inevitable in the next 10 years? Both US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping have said in various ways that their countries do not seek conflict. Recently, after the downing of the balloon, President Biden said the US "is not looking for conflict". Likewise for those who have been following President Xi's speech at the recent G20 Summit in Bali, it was carefully chosen, and I quote, "China and the US need to have a sense of responsibility for history, for the world and the people. They have to explore the right way to get along with each other in the new era, and put the relationship on the right course."
Reassuring from these two leaders, but US military leaders have not been so circumspect. Just recently, former Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Commander ADM(Rtd) Phillip S. Davidson, when he was testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, thought it would occur in the next six years, citing Taiwan as the precipitating factor. Last month, US Air Force Commander of the Air Mobility Command Mike Minihan wrote in an internal memo to his staff, "I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025." Chinese top military leader, former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission GEN Xu Qiliang, claims that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is an arrow, pulled and ready to go – this was in the book of official commentaries on the 20th Party Congress report.
Beyond these words, is there evidence of preparatory moves? Remember last year when we were gathered here, there were about 100,000 Russian troops at the border with Ukraine, and three days later they launched. We do not see these similar movements, but there have been other pre-positioning. The formation of Quad, AUKUS, the recent US access to northern Philippines bases, the build-up of counterstrike capabilities in Japan, missile defence drills in South Korea, could all be read as preparation by the Chinese. For the PLA, defence spending has gone up – the defence budget last year was USD$229.5 billion, about a 7% increase, and the seventh year of continuous growth. The recent massive display of armaments at the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s 70th anniversary military parade was meant to signal and display their significant progress.
China has also actively increased their military presence in the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan Straits. Chinese-controlled features in the Spratly Islands - Mischief Reef, Subi Reef and Fiery Cross have been outfitted with military infrastructure, including anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles, lasers and jamming equipment. Almost daily patrols by the Chinese Coast Guard occur at key disputed features across the South China Sea. Chinese fighter jets regularly cross the "median line" in the Taiwan Strait.
So in sum, to answer my own question, where are we? I think yes, pre-positioning for deterrence is alive and well, but even then, the war drums have not started beating audibly.
The Second Question
What might precipitate a physical conflict, even if both sides do not want one? Taiwan can certainly be a precipitating factor. One narrative puts Taiwan as the bellwether of contest between autocracies and democracies. Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte vowed to "defend those fighting for freedom around the world, from Belarus to Taiwan". A second narrative is over strategic resources, in the same way that countries fought over spices and oil. We are all familiar with the history - the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish fought to control the spice trade in the Far East in the 16th and 17th century. Japan's Greater Prosperity Doctrine in World War II precipitated its attacks on China, Australia and Southeast Asia. Now, high-end chips that Taiwan produces 90-plus percent of, has been added to that list of strategic resources.
The move towards Taiwanese independence will trigger a conflict. For the last six decades, the PRC has been accepted by all of us as the only representative to the United Nations, since 1971. The status quo of Taiwan in the present situation has served us well and kept the peace. Quite obviously, China will act or be forced to act, if that is changed. Why? Because it will be seen as another chapter of unequal treaties forced upon China, and no Chinese leader can stand accepting that.
Accidents or incidents can occur. For example, we all remember the Hainan Island incident in 2001, where a US Navy EP-3 plane crashed into a PLA Navy fighter jet, resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot and the US crew being detained for 11 days. Or the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999. There have been close calls recently. Last December, a PLA Navy Jet came within 3 metres of a USAF surveillance aircraft over the South China Sea, and just last week, the US identified and shot down a high-altitude surveillance balloon operating over US territory.
I have listed all these factors, and I will conclude with one remark and another similar example. This is a quote I really like from then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in a speech to the West Point graduands in 2011, and I quote him, "When it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Vietnam, the US' record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from Mayaguez, to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq and more – we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we would be so engaged." This just tells us that it is unpredictable. Many of us remember the book "The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914" by Christopher Clark, which reminds us that small events can precipitate calamitous outcomes, willy-nilly.
Let me conclude. We are not in a comfortable place. The temperature is not boiling, but certainly rising. We must do all we can to cool it. War in Asia will be devastating, not only for Asia but globally. The reasons for war do not justify any in Asia. The stakes are not worth it, the consequences are disastrous and viable alternatives do exist.
More Resources
Dr Ng: Disastrous Consequences for War in Asia; De-escalation is Key