Minister’s Speech at the SAF Leadership and Learning Seminar on 11 Nov 2026

A very good afternoon to all of you. 

Introduction

Today I was told to come and tell you something you should know: the importance of learning. This sounds rather simple, right? But why is it that many individuals and organisations fail to learn?

Importance of Learning and Adapting in Modern Warfare

Now, every military, including ours, we all learn. The question is whether we learn fast enough, we learn deeply enough, and we learn widely enough before the next challenge arrives. Because ultimately in our profession, the outcome of any conflict is not determined only by what we have on Day One. 

Of course, our initial capabilities – our weapon systems, our readiness, they all matter. But once conflict begins, assumptions are tested. Tactics are countered. Vulnerabilities are exposed. And technologies evolve. What worked yesterday may no longer work today or even tomorrow. And from that point onwards, the contest is increasingly about this: Who can learn faster and who can apply the learning faster?

We see this vividly in recent conflicts. In Ukraine, militaries have had to continuously adapt their tactics, organisation and technology as the battlefield changes, and as the enemy evolves. Recent military studies have therefore described modern warfare increasingly as a contest of adaptation and learning. But to everyone in this hall, this should not be a new concept. Throughout history, warfare has always been a contest of who can learn faster, who can disseminate faster, and who can apply the new lessons learnt faster, and the cycle repeats itself.

The side that never stops learning is the side that will win. The side that stops learning is the side that will lose, and the side that learns slower than others will also be the side that will lose.  And indeed, within the SAF, we have emphasised that adaptation and agility must be built into our DNA. Because standing still means falling behind.

Why do Organisations and Individuals not Learn?

Then the question for all of us is this: If it is so obvious, then we should ask a harder question. Why is it that individuals and organisations still fail to learn? And what do we mean when we say we fail to learn?

I think there are at least three reasons for us to not learn properly. First, the obvious one – complacency.

The lesson might have been learnt before. But over time, the lesson is forgotten or not taken seriously anymore. This could be because the generation that experienced the problem moved on. This could also be because the new generation thinks that because the circumstances have changed, the context has changed, and therefore the lessons no longer apply. Or as they say, "That was then, and this is now." After a while, processes become routine. And gradually, something that was learnt through painful experiences becomes something written in a document that fewer and fewer people remember. This is one of the great dangers of peace. Every day of peace is a blessing for us. But every day of peace also puts distance between us and the realities of conflict. We cannot allow peace to dull our senses and our instincts.

Second, sometimes we think we have learnt, but there was never really deep learning. Very often, we are focused on the teaching and learning "what" and the “how”. But very seldom do we understand the "why".

For instance, if we teach someone how we solved yesterday's problem, he may become very proficient at solving yesterday's problem. But if he understands the “why”, then when tomorrow's circumstances change or evolve, he can find a new "what" and a new "how". That is what deep learning means. Every generation must understand the enduring "why” and then have the confidence to discover the new "what" and the new "how", and this is something many of us would have been taught and have to learn over and over again. 

You all remember my story of the German 'Auftragstaktik'. In Germany, two centuries ago, this term 'Auftragstaktik' – You don’t teach the soldier the “what” and the “how”. You tell the soldier not just what he is doing, but why he is doing it with understanding of the commander's intent two levels up. When you understand the commander's intent two levels up, then even when circumstances evolve, you will be able to change and adapt accordingly. 

By now, you will also know my familiar story of an exercise almost 20 years ago. We took the pain to explain not just the plan of what we were going to do but also took the time to explain to the last man possible why we were doing what we were doing. What was the intent of the plan? And then yours truly, the commander, after not sleeping for four days, finally had a much-needed rest. While I was resting, my subordinate came to report that instead of reaching the first line after six hours, they had reached the third line.

That was a lesson seared into my mind because when each and every man and woman in uniform understands the “why”, even when the commander is not there and when circumstances have changed, they will be able to continue to execute not just the plan, but to execute the intent of the plan. So the “what” and the “how” certainly change, but the “why” never. And that is something I hope every SAF serviceman and servicewoman will always remember that when we teach our people, don't just focus on the “what” and the “how”, but also focus more importantly on the “why”. Otherwise, we will end up being performative. We will end up only understanding what to do, how to do, but when circumstances change, we do not understand what needs to be changed.

Third, the lessons are often learnt but not proliferated across the entire organisation.

We are very famous for doing our AARs. We can write lessons down. We can produce reports. We can create databases. But the question is whether we have built a system that moves learning across the organisation at speed and at scale, especially for tomorrow’s challenges. Research on lessons learnt from conflicts in Ukraine to Israel and Iran has highlighted precisely the challenge of converting battlefield adaptation into institutional learning, rather than relying mainly on informal networks or isolated pockets of experiences, or only when we move or rotate the Commanders around. We need to do much better than this.

How to Overcome the Challenges of Learning

Then the question now: How do we overcome some of these challenges? How do we guard against complacency, ensure deep learning and proliferate at scale? Because lessons not learnt, or lessons forgotten, will eventually have to be relearnt. And sometimes painfully. There are no easy solutions because ultimately these are not just organisational problems. They arise from human frailty. 

First, vigilance and the mindset to anticipate future challenges. This is the first step to learning. 

Learning for all of us begins with the desire to improve and the humility to recognise that what we know today may not be sufficient tomorrow. What we must do is to cultivate the instinct to ask: What has changed? What might change next? And what are we assuming that may no longer be true? Every day, we must wake up, and the first thing we ask ourselves is what has changed and what will change?

We must always have that sense of a burning platform. Not because we want to manufacture anxiety. But because, for a small country like Singapore, we can never afford to be complacent about our security or our future. Our sovereignty, our security and our continued success cannot be taken as givens, and no one owes us a living.

Therefore, our instinct must always be to look ahead. What might disrupt us? What might render today's capabilities obsolete? What must we start learning or relearning today, before circumstances force us to learn tomorrow? We must not develop capabilities merely for the last conflict nor be fundamentally surprised by developments we should have anticipated.  

Second, how to learn deeply?

We must internalise the lessons from our own history – from our own exercises, operations, successes and failures. One way to do this much better is what I call forcing the pace of our own evolution. If warfare is a contest in the speed of evolution, then we have to ask ourselves: how do we force ourselves to evolve faster and better than the adversary? 

This is why I am a strong proponent of two-sided exercises at every level. Only when we fight a thinking enemy can we sharpen our instincts and come up with new ways of doing things. Always remember, in all our proficiency tests, we are not trying to show the assessors how good we are in keeping to our SOPs and trainings. We are fighting a live enemy that is also thinking and innovating as we speak.

And this is why we must cast our sights wide. Learn from other militaries. Learn from the industries. Learn from beyond the SAF, and more importantly, learn from those who are different from us. Never dismiss other people's way of doing things just because they are different. Perhaps they can tell us something new. And as I always say, as I was taught by my commander, that I am never completely useless. Minimally, I can be a negative example. So, when we look at everything else, just remember we can learn from others what to do, and we can also learn from others what not to do. both are important lessons that we must have the humility and the sharpness of mind to be able to pick up.

So let me tell you this: You are allowed to make mistakes. Because if I want you to innovate and experiment, I must accept that not every first attempt will succeed. But let me also say this: You can make mistakes, just don’t make the same mistake twice.  And don’t make the same mistake that other people have made. Then the rest, you can make mistake. Because if we make the same mistake twice, it just shows that we have not learn. If we make the same mistake that other people have made, it just shows that we have also not learnt, nor have we shared. 

And I have this famous command philosophy ever since I was CO, 2 SIR, and the theory goes something like this: You all line up and walk, and everybody walks together. When there is a break contact, whose fault is it? The guy in front or the guy behind? Both are at fault. Why are both at fault? The guy in front did not turn back and check. The guy behind did not call out for help, right? So then you have a break contact. The guy who never turns around to check is the guy who never passes on the lessons learnt. So, you are at fault. The guy who sees the person going further and further away and never shout out for help or never signal for help. You are also at fault. But in the infantry, we have a simpler rule. It is not 50-50. It is 51-49. The guy who is in front and you never pass on the lesson; you are more at fault. 

For those of us who have learnt the lesson the hard way, it is incumbent upon us to make sure that we pass on the lesson. We spend time, effort, money, and everything else in our available resources to help you grow, so no one can be selfish. Those who have learnt must pass it on. Those who have learnt have a responsibility to proliferate the lessons learnt, so that no one, especially our juniors, will make the same mistake as us. People ask me when I come back to MINDEF and SAF, what is my greatest aim? I only have one: that I will be able to groom a generation that will be even better than me.

Because if every one of us remembers that it is our responsibility to pass on the lessons learnt and make sure that the new generation can make new mistakes and not old mistakes, then I am confident that the SAF will continue to grow from strength to strength. So do not make the same mistake twice, and do not make other people's mistake. And the person who has learnt, it is incumbent upon you to make sure that the juniors don't make the same mistakes. It gives me no joy to hear any commander come up to me and say that “Don't worry, when I was your age, I also made the same mistake.” Because if you have made the same mistake, I am going to ask you why is your junior still making the same mistake? 

Third, how do we proliferate learning at scale and at speed?

A lesson learnt by an individual is not a lesson understood by the unit. A lesson understood by one unit is not yet an SAF lesson. So, the question for us is: how quickly can an insight discovered by one become an advantage for everyone, not just in peacetime, but across the entire battlefield? Learning without proliferation is useless to the SAF and MINDEF. Learning with proliferation can multiply the SAF capabilities much faster.

This is how technology can help us. Today, we have tools such as CUBE that can organise vast quantities of information, identify patterns, distil the key points and deliver relevant knowledge to people far more quickly than before. We must make full use of them.

But let us not confuse better technology with better learning. Ultimately, it is human judgment, curiosity and creativity that must decide: What matters? Why does it matter? And what we should do differently?

Today’s technology also provides us with yet another opportunity, and this is a lesson I learnt from history and from my time in MOE. Once upon a time, there was a Major Chan Chun Sing who wrote a speech for an Army Workplan Seminar. I pointed out one dilemma, which was delivered during the seminar. I asked: What is our philosophy? Do we standardise the individual or individualise the standards?

Militaries throughout the world, across history, try to standardise the individual. We have one set of things that we will teach, and then that is how we will do. And this is also the way the education system has worked throughout history, because that is the cheapest, most efficient way to scale up mass access to education: standardise the curriculum, standardise the individual. 

When I was in MOE, I always jokingly told my MOE colleagues that if you standardise the curriculum, you are 100% wrong. 50% of the class will find it too easy, (and) 50% will find it too hard, so we're 100% off. But if you do not standardise the individual, then do you individualise the standards? And for a military organisation, what does it mean to individualise the standards? It is very difficult to individualise the standard, but arguably the most effective way of learning. 

Today, when you look at our NSFs and NSmen, who come from all walks of life, none of them wants to be standardised. None of them wants to go through a standard curriculum. They all want a just-in-time curriculum that caters to their needs. Then the question for us in the SAF, as it was for me in MOE previously, is this: Are we able to individualise the standards? 

In MOE, everybody talked about class size. I challenge MOE and I challenge ourselves. Can you reach a class size of one, where effectively everyone has a curriculum customised to the individual? In the past, this mission would be mission impossible because it is just too expensive. 

Today, with technology, data science and AI, we can actually customise to a class size of one. Take a leaf from MOE’s approach to how it conducts some of the math and science classes. Someone who is much better at math and can work at a higher level will be stretched to a higher level. It is almost like the gamification of learning. When you have overcome one set of challenges, you move on to the next. For someone who is stuck, you can repeat at your own pace. 

The challenge for the SAF is this: Are we prepared to challenge our own thinking and build our systems whereby, be it an individual, a section, a platoon or a company, that you can customise the training according to the needs of that particular subunit? Today, with data science, I think you can. 

Look at what the Air Force has achieved in its own training. Every pilot is different. They come with different backgrounds and attributes. They have different skill sets, and they have different potential. How do we stretch every pilot and allow them to reach the required standards? It is not about having all of them go through exactly the same syllabus at the same pace. In the flying school, some people take a bit longer and some take a bit less time. They all go through the same curriculum, but at different paces, and ultimately, they all reach the same requisite standard that's necessary to become RSAF pilots. 

Then the question for us, whether in the Army, the DIS, or the Navy and the Air Force, is: Are we prepared to challenge our own thinking of how we can mass customise our teaching and learning to (move towards) an asymptotical class size of one?  If we can do that, then we will combine the best of both worlds, whereby you can engage the new generation of NSFs and NSmen who come in with their different skill sets and background knowledge, and build them up. 

Once upon a time in the U.S. Marines training, their first step was to break down the individual, (then) after you break down the individual, you build them all up systematically. Today that system will never work for the SAF or Singapore. Instead of breaking down the individual, we build up the individual and the team from where they are. 

In order to do that, we must change our mindset of how we do teaching and learning. And this is where we should adopt the latest technology possible to challenge ourselves on how to deliver these mass customisations. If we can do that, it will be a much more effective and efficient way of doing things. But this is not something easy. We can start small, even in the smaller classes that we are conducting, and slowly proliferating this to larger units. And then, when you combine that with the two-sided exercises at every level, then you will force the evolution of the SAF much faster. 

But ultimately, do not make a mistake. Technology alone will not help us to disseminate all the lessons learnt. That still requires a lot of human networks that provide the tacit and implicit knowledge that is required in learning. Learning cannot be entirely codified, with everybody simply watching a YouTube video, especially in our line of work. 

The human touch and the ability to distil the key essence of what needs to be learnt, must still be a human and commander instinct. Without that commander instinct or responsibility, learning cannot proliferate across the organisation. The greatest danger for us is not that we fail to study the past. The greatest danger for us is that we are so good at studying the past that we fail to see the future coming.

Conclusion

Finally, I would like to conclude by reminding one very important thing, and I hope that MINDEF and the SAF will forever remember this. What is SOP? SOP, since I was a cadet, was never about standard operating procedure. There is nothing that should be standard or standardised. It is not about standards or standardising the SAF way of operations. There are only standing operational procedures.

My instructor taught us this as a cadet: SOP is standing operational procedure. Standing means that what is valid today may need to evolve tomorrow as circumstances change. 

I want everybody to remember this because I do not want MINDEF and the SAF to get into this habit of thinking that there are things that remain unchanging and are called standard operating procedure. Circumstances will change, enemy tactics will change, so there is nothing to standardise about these things. The only thing in the SAF that will never change is its values. The rest of the tactics will have to evolve.

And finally, to all the commanders and the trainers in this room and beyond, let me say a special word of thank you to all of you. You are not just here to teach a syllabus. You are not just here to execute the curriculum. You are here to pass on the cumulative experience of previous generations, and very importantly, to always challenge the next generation to understand the “why”. 

We must always challenge ourselves and set an example for the next generation to challenge the “what” and the “how” but never forget the “why”. Most importantly, we must give the next generation the confidence to challenge the norms, so that we keep evolving what we do, stay one step ahead of the adversary, and keep Singapore safe and secure till SG100 and beyond. 

On that note, thank you all very much, and I wish you all an enjoyable learning seminar ahead. Thank you.