Oral Reply by Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen to Parliamentary Question on Preventing Potential Drone Attacks in Singapore

Mr Christopher de Souza: To ask the Minister for Defence what lessons can Singapore learn from the recent drone attack in Saudi Arabia and what is the Government doing to prevent and counter a similar potential attack in Singapore.

Minister for Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen: Thank you Mr Speaker. To ensure that Singapore's air defences are robust to deal with drone attacks, we must draw important lessons from the recent drone attack on Saudi oil facilities and any such related incidents. Indeed, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) monitors closely the development of these drone incidents, so that we can assess the adequacy of our defence systems and to plug gaps when identified. Over the past decade, the SAF has enhanced our air defence systems against possible drone attacks.

The recent "Saudi attack" reflects the growing and evolving capabilities of drones that are available to both state and non-state actors who mean to do us harm. Let me provide first the spectrum of these drone capabilities that we need to protect ourselves against, before elaborating on specific defence responses.  Let me start with the Saudi attack. While reports still need to be confirmed, that attack shows clearly that the range and manoeuvrability of drones have increased, depending on the reports you read, from 700 to 1,500 km. These medium and long range drones are able to avoid radar detection and also hit their targets with great precision. I think many of you would have seen pictures after the attacks and how precise those attacks were.

The Saudi attack was conducted by sophisticated weaponised drones and that represents one extreme (example) of sophistication in terms of drone capabilities. If we take the other extreme, where you have simple drones that can be bought in retail stores and intrude into restricted airspace, even though they are very simple, they can still disrupt civilian or military air traffic because they pose safety hazards. And the impact is not trivial, as the past incidents in Gatwick and Changi Airport showed. In both incidents, planes were diverted, grounded, and that resulted in both real and opportunity costs, mounting to millions, to airport regulators, airlines and passengers. These simple off-the-shelf drones can be modified with some know-how to avoid detection by conventional means that most commercial airports employ. So on one hand very sophisticated weaponised drones that can go up to 1,500km and on the other extreme, toy drones that you can buy off the stores that create great impact. And between these two extremes are the class of drones that can carry simple munitions such as grenades and small arms. For example, ISIS had been successful in modifying and weaponising small drones with explosives to attack ground forces and facilities, documented. In Aug 2018, drones carrying explosives were used in an attempted attack on the President of Venezuela. 

So taken as a whole, the security threats posed by drones are therefore real and the impact can be damaging, even devastating, depending on the platform used. Against this wide spectrum of threats, there can be no single counter-response. So, it would neither be proportionate nor sustainable to employ sophisticated assets worth hundreds of millions to take down hobbyist drones that can be bought for less than a thousand dollars. For these threats, other tools would be required, such as regulations, deterrent fines and penalties, education, and working with relevant stakeholders including drone-hobbyist communities themselves. And I think the Ministry of Transport (MOT) has been very busy doing that and we are passing some bills to enhance penalties. For Changi Airport, MOT and Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore deal with possible intrusions from drones. The Ministry of Home Affairs and the Singapore Police Force take the lead in defending against drones in specific areas of security concern and during major events. The SAF will assist them when called upon and when needed.

Beyond these specific responsibilities by various agencies against drones in their geographic domains, the SAF remains responsible for drone attacks against Singapore by would-be aggressors, especially towards key installations. For example, the SAF recognises that terrorists can use drones as a form of attack. Within our region, an ISIS-linked individual had planned to use commercial drones to conduct bomb attacks in Malaysia. Singapore continues to be a target for regional terrorist groups, as demonstrated by the foiled terrorist attack that was planned for Marina Bay Sands in 2016. These incidents are sober reminders that the risks are not theoretical and we must remain vigilant.

Let me go through specific enhancements that the SAF has put in place over the past decade to buttress our air defences against drone attacks. First, early-warning systems. The RSAF has enhanced its early warning capability with more capable sensors like the G550 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft and Multi-Mission Radars. The assets we have in place now would have been able to detect the alleged drones used in the attack on oil facilities in Saudi Arabia. 

After identification, these drones would be taken down by our Ground-Based Air Defence systems, which have been upgraded with new platforms. The SPYDER system has replaced the older RAPIER system and the ASTER 30 missile system will replace the I-HAWK system. Some of you as NSmen and Ground-Based Air Defence must be familiar with the old system. The SAF is confident that these systems can protect Singapore against aerial threats from both manned and unmanned aircraft. Our air defence system is live, 24/7.

I also mentioned about drones in the middle part of that threat spectrum. What do we do against these? These threats are rapidly evolving and while they may not cause large scale damage, can cause bodily harm, undermine confidence and disrupt our society. Just imagine if grenades were dropped or suicide attacks with minor explosives were used. Against such threats, as we did during the National Day Parade or during the Trump-Kim Summit held in Singapore, the SAF puts up additional sensors and counter-offensive capabilities when required during high signature events, or when intelligence assessments indicate specific risks.  

The SAF will continue to monitor threat developments and learn from all incidents that occur globally to provide appropriate responses to the spectrum of potential drone attacks that are commensurate with the level of threat, sustainable and cost-effective.