Speech by Senior Minister of State for Defence, Mr Heng Chee How, at the 24th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers (APPSMO) on "Refreshing the Regional Security Architecture in a Fragmented World"

Senior Minister of State for Defence Mr Heng Chee How delivering his keynote address at the 24th Asia-Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers.

Ambassador Ong Keng Yong, distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen. Before I begin, I would like to thank the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies for organising this programme and inviting me to speak at the 24th APPSMO. It is an absolute privilege.

24th APPSMO

APPSMO started as a brainchild of Singapore’s late President S.R. Nathan. He wanted to bring together promising defence and military officials like yourselves to have candid discussions on pertinent, pressing issues. Beyond that, he had envisioned APPSMO as a "summer camp" for participants to forge friendships in the process. I am heartened to see that this year’s APPSMO has drawn a big cohort of aspiring officers from more than 20 countries. Platforms like APPSMO take on particular importance in today’s context. As Ambassador Ong had argued very cogently, your participation matters greatly.

This is the second time I am speaking at APPSMO. The first time was in 2021 – in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic and it was done remotely. The wonders of technology allowed us to connect even in times of inconvenience. It is particularly important to connect in times of inconvenience because that is where it matters. Nonetheless, meeting over Zoom is not a substitute for face-to-face engagements like this. Therefore, it is very important that we are able to fully gather together in person like this, and I think there will be great value in doing so.

Competition and Conflict in a Fragmented World

Back in 2021, APPSMO had delved into the "Evolving Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific and its Challenges". This year, the theme is "Competition and Conflict in a Fragmented World". It is a darker, bleaker picture.

The world we live in is increasingly characterised by intense geopolitical competition and most consequentially that between the US and China. US-China competition is playing out across multiple domains as both countries pursue their own economic, technological, and military interests. While leaders on both sides have resumed a number of official dialogues at the economic and foreign affairs track, in the defence domain, they are not quite making that same progress yet.

Without frank dialogue, military leaders on both sides may not be able to communicate their intentions to each other directly and clearly. This lack of communication breeds distrust and raises the risk of miscalculation, especially when an unplanned incident occurs. What may have been an entirely careless and benign accident could end up lighting the fuse for military conflict. For the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for 75 percent of global trade, a war would be catastrophic.

 Marred by competition and conflicts, the world has seen confidence in the multilateral system erode. As the world becomes more polarised, countries will have less and less space and interest to cooperate with one another. This narrowing space is manifested, for example, in the persistent deadlock that one sees within the United Nations (UN) Security Council amidst violations of the UN Charter and of international law, as we saw in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The erosion of confidence in multilateralism comes at a time when the world is confronted with many global challenges that no one country can solve on its own. A recent UN report indicated that of the Sustainable Development Goals that were targeted to be met by 2030, 80 percent had either "stalled" or "gone into reverse". For example, the world is sliding back to hunger levels unseen since 2005.^[1] The world is also significantly off track to meet emission targets necessary to contain climate change.^[2]

Looking into the future, technological advancements, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), could easily spiral uncontrollably to everyone’s detriment. This scenario could happen if we do not together develop global norms to ensure their responsible use and development.

Enduring Value of Multilateralism

Spurred by the developments that I have highlighted, questions have been raised about the relevance of traditional multilateral institutions or of multilateralism itself in general. In this region, questions have similarly been raised over the effectiveness of ASEAN, and with it our regional security architecture.

In divisive times, one seemingly "easy" way out of diplomatic gridlock in multilateral fora may be seen as to abandon existing institutions altogether. Countries may be tempted to instead rely on opportunistic arrangements with other countries when interests align, even for the moment. There is nothing wrong per se with such arrangements. However, I would like to put forth a case for the enduring value of multilateralism – of open and inclusive platforms upon which countries can continue to tackle shared challenges despite their differences.

For one, our open and inclusive regional security architecture, with ASEAN at its centre, has contributed to decades of relative peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. It has encouraged countries in and around the region to engage with one another constructively. It has also facilitated dialogue and cooperation, even when individual countries are going through their own diplomatic ups and downs in their bilateral relationships with one another.

Amidst major power competition, the ASEAN Defence Ministers'Meeting (ADMM)-Plus remains the only regional defence grouping where both the US and China are active dialogue partners, and engage in practical security cooperation. For example, the ADMM-Plus has Experts'Working Groups (EWGs) where member militaries work together on topics from maritime security to humanitarian mine action.

On our part, Singapore has always been a staunch advocate of the multilateral rules-based order. Multilateral cooperation is not only important for small states like Singapore, but it also has value for bigger countries. This is because all of us face global challenges, including threats from non-state actors. We therefore host in Singapore various Centres of Excellence in Singapore to facilitate information sharing, and promote multilateral cooperation to tackle common challenges.

I would like to cite two examples. First, the Republic of Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre organised the 8th Maritime Information Sharing Exercise in May this year and we had participants from 29 countries. Through this exercise, participants strengthened their operational linkages, and exchange best practices on how to handle maritime security incidents. Second, the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence recently organised the inaugural Digital Defence Symposium for ASEAN participants in the defence sectoral to exchange views and better understand cyber and information threats in the digital domain.

Refreshing the Regional Security Architecture

Now that said, we must acknowledge that our regional security architecture is facing stresses both externally and internally. ASEAN has come under some criticism for its consensus-based "ASEAN way". In particular, how the "ASEAN way" might have limited ASEAN to operating on the basis of the lowest common denominator, and how this has acted to lengthen ASEAN processes.

For instance, to promote a peaceful and stable environment in the South China Sea, ASEAN Member States and China had issued the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in 2002. They subsequently agreed on the Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC in 2011, and continue to be engaged in negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC).

As the pace of change accelerates, it is easy for countries to become impatient with such multilateral processes. Such processes often take a long time, especially if discussions concern difficult issues on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Countries may lose faith along the way, and look towards other forms of engagements instead.

 We must thus work together to ensure that our regional security architecture remains relevant, adaptable and effective amidst the evolving geopolitical realities of our times. I would like to share a couple of ideas to promote discussion.

First, ASEAN, and with it our regional security architecture, will need to keep up with the times and be ready to address current security challenges. A case in point is how the ADMM-Plus EWG framework has expanded to encompass seven EWGs. The EWGs now include emerging threats like cybersecurity, and non-traditional security issues like climate change. As new challenges arise, we must be ready to adapt existing institutions accordingly.

At the same time, we should recognise that not all security interests can be addressed through existing institutions. Therefore, a second way is to imbue a degree of flexibility within our regional security architecture, such that collaboration through new partnerships is possible.

There is an African proverb that says "if you want to go fast, you go alone; if you want to go far, you go together". To "go far" in this context towards preserving regional peace and security, would require all of us to "go together". But at times, we could also "go fast", as long as we do not undermine the existing regional security architecture. This is particularly pertinent in the context of what some have called "minilaterals".

The Asia-Pacific is home to longstanding partnerships among smaller group of countries, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements. It is not unusual for countries to enter into such forms of partnerships. After all, smaller sub-regional groupings have proven effective at pooling resources together more quickly to respond to common threats. For example, the Malacca Straits Patrol and the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement amongst subsets of ASEAN Member States have jointly contributed to maritime security in our waters.

Smaller groupings can move faster, and countries have found this to be of value in an increasingly volatile security environment. We do not need to shun these minilaterals. We can be flexible to collaborating with different partners through new configurations, as long as we continue to uphold an open and inclusive regional security architecture with ASEAN at its centre.

Conclusion

Dear participants, I hope that you take these remarks of mine as an invitation in the next few days to consider and discuss different ways in which we can work together to refresh our regional security architecture, in order to better meet the challenges of our times, namely, the challenges presented by a more fragmented world.

I hope that you also take advantage of this time in Singapore to build strong and lasting friendships, where we can understand one another better and see each other as friends and partners. That would be great value-creation on the part of APPSMO.

And may the friendships and networks you build with your peers over the next few days be an invaluable asset for you individually and as a group in the years ahead.

 With that, I wish all of you a fruitful and engaging APPSMO, and a wonderful time here in Singapore. Thank you.

^{[1] The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2023: Special Edition, published on 10 Jul 2023 by UN DESA, provides a comprehensive midpoint assessment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.} 

^{[2] In addition to the Sustainable Goals Report 2023: Special Edition, the Technical Dialogue of the First Global Stocktake: Synthesis Report by the Co-Facilitators of the Technical Dialogue, published on 8 Sep 2023, reported that “the world is not on track to meet the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement” and the window to reach climate goals is "rapidly closing".}