Madam, with your permission, MINDEF has two related Bills today on the Order Paper. I would like to propose that the debate on both Bills take place together, as the two Bills deal with the same substantive matter of the new SAF service to be stood up. If the first Bill is passed, the second and third reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Amendment No. 2) Bill will follow.

Introduction

Madam and Members of this House, the legislation that governs militaries around the World is not often amended, so I do not stand on this podium very often, and for good reasons. The mandate and powers provided to the military are clear and focused, and necessarily scoped by Parliament to keep within this remit. In peace, that legislation is usually adequate for the Armed Forces' crucial task of national defence, to organise themselves to build capabilities and protect the sovereignty and security of her country. For militaries that are often at war, or operating in period of tension, legislative changes are more frequent, as varied conditions require timely adaptations. But during peace, one does not expect frequent changes to legal provisions. So too the SAF. The last time the SAF Act was amended was in 2009 to introduce the Military Domain Experts Scheme for the SAF. We are thankful that Singapore has enjoyed a period of prolonged peace since our Independence.

Nonetheless, the amendments put to this House today represent a significant change militarily to establish a new fourth service, the Digital and Intelligence Service, or DIS in short, alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force services which the SAF Act of 1972 brought into existence.

There will be other amendments which I will go through with Members, and they are related to discipline and administrative processes to update and to ensure the smooth functioning of the SAF.

Strategic Imperatives

The SAF, incepted 57 years ago in 1965, has been a military constantly on the move. And that transformation is visible. All of you would have witnessed it through the years growing up; NSmen lived through it and some here are actually responsible for pieces of transformation. From 13-ton AMX-13 light tanks to 70-ton Leopard main battle tanks; wooden hull ships to stealth frigates; Hawker Hunters to F16s, F15s and in a few years F35s, the SAF today is a modernised military, capable of prosecuting missions across the spectrum of security threats. Singaporeans too have seen this SAF journey every year, through the National Day Parades (NDPs) when we allow the SAF to play on the Floating Platform, Padang or National Stadium and into the heartlands. That display will take place in a few days' time on August 9 – I hope the Members will enjoy the dynamic display. We in this House and Singaporeans out there are not the only ones who have noticed this impressive and progressive march. The Asian Military Review described the SAF as "one of the most well-trained and equipped forces in Asia Pacific". That others notice the SAF's competency and growing ability is good, and the core of deterrence.

Today's amendment, if approved by this House, will set up under the SAF Act a formal fourth service – DIS – and should be seen in the continuum of improvements for the SAF over the past 57 years.

For SAF commanders and troops, the DIS affects primarily the intelligence community – and we call it the C4I community, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence – so let me shift focus there to explain what needs to be done and why, by the DIS. To protect Singapore, the Army, Navy and Air Force have built up capabilities in their respective domains on the land, sea and air. But it is not enough for each service to do so. Command and control are essential to maximise effects by orchestrating joint efforts, so that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Pari passu, intelligence capabilities had to grow in tandem, to keep pace.

The C4I community has been growing alongside the three kinetic services – less visible but no less progressive. C4I operations have grown over the years too, for example, in counter-terrorism from our monitoring operations, during our NDPs to key high-security multilateral events like the Trump-Kim Summit and ASEAN Summit in 2018. C4I soldiers were deployed for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations in Kuwait and Afghanistan. Our imagery analysis teams were part of the Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters in Kuwait from 2014 to 2016. Then-US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed his appreciation for their contributions which helped stop ISIS' terror campaign.

Even despite these impressive developments and achievements, hitherto the C4I community's role has been largely that of a supporting agency, akin to combat support, logistics and maintenance. They enable the Army, Navy and Air Force to achieve their missions by providing actionable timely intelligence and ensuring that communications are secure to execute plans. And these responsibilities will still be part of the DIS.

So, what then has changed to require the DIS to be a fully-fledged military service arm? Simply put, the battleground. The digital domain – just like air, land and sea – has become a battle terrain which, if left unguarded, can impact the security and sovereignty of any country. And over the years, I have updated members in this House about these security threats.

In 2015, I spoke about "hybrid warfare" – "an orchestrated campaign" which "integrates the use of conventional and unconventional tools of warfare" to "fracture the solidarity of the target nation". I quoted former Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation, General Veleriy Gerasimov, who said, "The very rules of war have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness." Reflect on this statement – we are all familiar with the dictum, "the political power grows out of the barrel of the gun", but the "Gerasimov Doctrine" upends it. And he says in many cases, the non-military means of achieving political and strategic goals have exceeded the power of the force of weapons. I described this concept as the exact antagonist of our Total Defence concept. To respond to the growing prevalence of hybrid warfare back then, I pointed out that, "the SAF will have to contend with cyber threats and the growing use of disinformation in warfare".

In 2016, I shared about the unidentified hackers attacking Ukraine's power grid and disrupting electricity. In 2017, the Financial Times wrote on cyber warfare. In 2019, we introduced Digital Defence as our sixth pillar of Total Defence. Looking back over those years, this generation is witnessing – real-time and personally – the changing face of warfare.

Even as the public experiences it first-hand, this realisation by militaries of vulnerabilities and opportunities within the digital domain has not been uniform. Some militaries adapted earlier than others to the "Gerasimov doctrine" and have steadily been building capabilities in many fronts, including the digital domain, for example, like the Germany military that incorporated a new service – as we are proposing today – in 2017 to defend the digital domain. The Baltic States I visited recently have also beefed up their capabilities, in their military and civilian organisations, against digital threats.

Apart from states, non-state actors have also recognised that they can use the digital domain to achieve their ends, particularly terroristcells. Whether to recruit vulnerable inductees, spread false propaganda, supply funds, procure weapons, sabotage or bypass state security systems, these areas have become standard fare for terrorist networks.

From a security perspective, we should ask "what will be the scale of these digital threats going forward, and can they threaten the well-being of citizens and even the entire country?" The questions are of course, rhetorical and I think every member here knows and agrees that these threats can only grow and have a very real physical impact on any country that is unprepared.

We are all convinced because we have seen for ourselves the many forms of cyber intrusions that develop quickly, even within the past few years. Cyber intrusions can affect many critical systems. Last year, we saw the Colonial Pipeline cyber-attack that cut off gas supplies to many South and East coast states in the United States, and disrupted the lives of countless people. Earlier this year in February, a cyber-attack on the European telco, Vodafone, which restricted cellular communications for millions of people in Portugal. It will be horrendous, but not unthinkable, about the potential fallout from attacks on water systems, hospitals, air traffic, trains, financial systems, pension systems – the list goes on.

In fact, cyber threats, disparate in form and source, occur in the thousands, even millions each day. However, they should be differentiated from the ones that have the most pernicious intent and seek to undermine our nation's sovereignty or security.

For the SAF, it has asked itself this simple question, just as it does if the threat came from air, land or sea. How does it detect, mitigate or repel any potential aggressor – an orchestrated cyber-attack by state and non-state actors – that mean to do Singapore and Singaporeans harm? The first response – just like the Army, Navy and Air Force – is that it will need a dedicated service to raise, train and sustain cyber troops and capabilities to defend our digital borders. In the digital domain, the fourth service is the force on the frontline, as it should be.

We are thankful that hitherto, our intelligence agencies have not detected any campaign against Singapore of that nature in the digital domain. But we should not wait for one and it would be prudent to start and build up the fourth service now. That alone would serve as a deterrent.

As with the mission of the three existing services, the DIS will ensure Singapore is defended against the full spectrum of threats against potential aggressors. The digital environment is more porous than the physical one, but the DIS will be responsible to guard against these aggressors in that domain.

For the SAF, the DIS will protect its networks and systems and strengthen our soldiers' commitment and resilience in operations. It will also continue to provide accurate, relevant and timely intelligence to support SAF operations, and capitalise on cutting-edge digital technologies to advance the SAF's digitalisation as a networked force.

For threats to Singapore's internal environment and this I am referring to the digital environment, similar to the SAF's support to the Whole-of-Government for counter-terrorism, the DIS will work closely with the Home Team, CSA and other national agencies to leverage one another's strengths in protecting Singapore's network and profiling a strong digital defence.

Key Provisions of the Bill (DIS)

Let me now touch on the key provisions which relate to the DIS and its leadership.

Sections 7(1) and 2(2)(c) are amended to include DIS as a Service under the SAF. This also requires related changes to other Acts to ensure that the legal statutes can be properly applied to DIS soldiers as well. Therefore, Section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act 1965 and Section 27(5) of the Wills Act 1838 are amended to respectively include DIS in the definition of "military" when used in relation to Singapore's military, and to include in the definition of "soldier" a reference to a DIS serviceman. Section 21(2) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act 1906 is amended to include DIS within the scope of that provision.

The DIS will be led by a Service Chief – the Chief of Digital and Intelligence Service, or CDI in short. Like the Service Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the CDI will be a member of the Armed Forces Council and have legal powers to discharge his or her duties and authority to lead the DIS in times of conflict. Sections 2(1), 8(1), and 8B(2) are amended to effect these changes.

Based on the SAF Act and Constitution, the Chief of Defence Force and Service Chiefs are appointed by the President acting in her discretion. Section 10A of the SAF Act, and Article 22(k) of the Constitution are amended to include the CDI as an appointment made by the President acting in her discretion.

Key Provisions of the Bill (Disciplinary Provisions and Administrative Processes)

Madam, I have spoken on the key change to this Bill but there are quite a number of other amendments relate to disciplinary, administrative processes and training arrangements, which I will address now.

Amendments to Disciplinary Provisions

Let me deal with disciplinary provisions.

Limitation Period for Trials

Section 111 is amended to allow the three-year limitation period for the trial of offences in military courts to commence later in certain situations. Let me explain. The SAF Act 1972 currently requires a serviceman to be tried within three years from the date of commission of the offence, or the date of reporting of the offence to a disciplinary officer or military policeman, whichever is later, after which he can no longer be dealt with under the SAF Act. This is referred to as the default limitation period.

However, in some cases where both military and civilian offences have been committed by the same offender, time is required for police investigations or related civil court proceedings to conclude, so as to allow MINDEF to assess all available and relevant information, before deciding whether to charge a serviceman for a related military offence.

To provide this flexibility, the amendments provide for four additional dates from which the three-year limitation period starts to run.

First, where police investigations have commenced for a related civil offence before the end of the default limitation period, therefore the three-year limitation period will commence from the date those investigations end.

Second, if court proceedings for a related civil offence are instituted in a civil court before the end of the default limitation period, the three-year limitation period will commence from the date that those proceedings end. If the person is sentenced to imprisonment, detention or reformative training, the limitation period will commence from the date on which the person completes the sentence.

Third, if the person is sentenced to imprisonment, detention or reformative training before the end of the default limitation period for any unrelated civil offence, the three-year limitation period will commence from the date on which the person completes the sentence.

Fourth, if an arrest warrant was issued before the end of the default limitation period and could not be executed within that period, despite all reasonable efforts as the whereabouts of the accused were unknown, the three-year limitation period will commence only on the date the person is arrested.

Let me clarify that, a serviceman will not be charged in the civil court and military court for the same offence. Any charges in the military court would be for discrete and separate military offences to be dealt with in the military courts, after the conclusion of the civil court proceedings.

These new time limits for military court trials will also apply to summary trials, in accordance with Section 78(3), as the considerations are similar.

Composition Fines

Let me now move on to Composition Fines. Currently, all military offences under the SAF Act have to be dealt with either by summary trial or the military courts. There is no option for MINDEF to offer composition for minor military offences. The proposed amendments allow for composition fines up to a limit of $5,000, or half of the maximum fine prescribed for the offence, or half the maximum fine that may be imposed for the offence at summary trial (whichever is lowest), to resolve minor offences efficaciously while maintaining deterrence. Designated officers will be authorised by the Armed Forces Council to offer composition to such offenders.

To effect these changes, a new Section 79A will be created to provide for the composition of military offences. Sections 60 and 62(1) will also be amended to define an "authorised composition officer", and to provide for the disciplinary option to refer an accused serviceman to an authorised composition officer to compound the offence.

The new Section 79A will provide that the authorised composition officer is not to be in the same chain of command as the accused serviceman. And this will ensure that an independent officer assesses the circumstances of the case before making an offer of composition.

Presently, service offences committed under the Civil Defence Act 1986 are dealt by the disciplinary officer or the civilian courts, while disciplinary offences committed under the Police Force Act 2004 are dealt by disciplinary proceedings or the civilian courts. Similar to the SAF, there is no option for the SCDF or SPF, respectively, to offer composition for minor service or disciplinary offences. Similar to the SAF, the SCDF and SPF propose to allow composition of minor service or disciplinary offences, by paying a composition fine up to a cap of $5,000 or half the maximum fine that is authorised to be imposed by a disciplinary officer (whichever is lower). Designated officers will be authorised by Commissioner SCDF or the Commissioner of Police, respectively, to offer composition to offenders who meet the criteria.

To effect these changes in the Civil Defence Act 1986, a new Section 85A will be inserted to provide for the composition of service offences committed by full-time National Servicemen, volunteer ex-NSmen and auxiliary members. Section 70(1) will be amended to provide for the above-mentioned officers to be referred to an authorised composition officer for composition of the offence.

Similarly, in the Police Force Act 2004, a new Section 84A will be inserted to provide for the composition of disciplinary offences committed by special police officers, which refer to full-time National Servicemen, NSmen, volunteer ex-NSmen and volunteers serving under the Special Constabulary. It also provides for special police officers to be referred to an authorised composition officer for composition of the offence.

Just like in the SAF Act, the amendments to the Civil Defence Act 1986 (new Section 85A) and Police Force Act 2004 (new Section 84A) will provide that the authorised composition officer is not to be in the same chain of command as the accused serviceman, and will ensure that an independent officer assesses the circumstances of the case before making an offer of composition.

Increase in Maximum Fines

It is an accepted principle for financial penalties to keep pace with inflation and increases in wages and allowances for adequate deterrence. The fine limits imposable by the Subordinate Military Court under Section 118(7) will be increased. The last increase was in 2006. For officers, the maximum fine will increase from $10,000 to $30,000. For soldiers, it will increase from $5,000 to $15,000. The fine limit for a Senior Disciplinary Committee under Section 72(6)(b)(ii) will similarly be increased from $10,000 to $30,000. These increases take reference from civilian courts, and is similar to the District Courts fine limit, which is currently set at $30,000 in the Criminal Procedure Code.

The maximum fines imposable by Disciplinary Officers in the SAF who deal with minor offences by Summary Trial will also be increased correspondingly. At the lowest tier, a Junior Disciplinary Officer will be able to impose on a soldier of third sergeant rank and below a maximum fine of $600, up from $300. The most senior Disciplinary Officer is the Chief of Defence Force, who will be able to impose a maximum fine of $10,000, up from $6,000. These proposed fine limits do not exceed the Magistrates' Courts' fine limit, which is currently set at $10,000.

Sections 68, 69, 70, 70A, 70B, 72(6) and 118(7) are amended to effect the above changes.

Increase in the Maximum Imprisonment

Section 19 is amended to increase the maximum imprisonment term for the offence of insubordinate behaviour by assaulting a superior officer from five to seven years. The SAF Act currently provides for a maximum five-year imprisonment sentence for any insubordinate behaviour, including the act of assaulting a superior officer. In contrast, the Penal Code provides for a maximum imprisonment sentence of seven years for someone who abets an SAF serviceman in assaulting his superior. Therefore, an inconsistency exists, as the abettor can be punished more harshly than the actual offender.

The proposal therefore increases the maximum imprisonment sentence for the act of assaulting a superior officer from five to seven years, if the act was committed during active service. The maximum imprisonment sentence for the same offence committed during peacetime will be increased from two to four years. These changes remove the disparity with the punishment for abetment in the Penal Code. There will be no changes to the penalties for other acts of insubordination.

Aligning Punishment of Military and Civil Courts

The amendment in Section 112(1) is to maintain consistency of punishment powers of the military and civil courts for the same civil offence.

Maximum punishments that may be imposed by a military court for a civil offence tried under Section 112 are aligned with those which may be awarded by a civil court subsequent to changes in the relevant legislation.

For civil offences for which caning can be imposed by a civil court, the military court would be able to impose caning for these same offences.

Disciplinary Action Against Senior Military Expert of a New Pinnacle Rank in the Military Domain Expert Scheme

The proposed amendments to Section 72(1) on power of a Senior Disciplinary Committee will provide that a senior military expert of or above the rank of ME8, when created, will be subject to the same disciplinary processes as an officer of or above the rank of Brigadier-General.

Amendments to Administrative Processes

Next, proposed amendments are made to the administrative processes within the SAF Act.

Section 129 is amended to allow the Military Court of Appeal to serve court appeal documents via other means, including sending to an electronic mail address designated by the appellant in the notice of appeal. This is already the practice in civil courts – we are just catching up.

Section 167 is amended to clarify that suspected deserters arrested by the SPF may be released instead of being brought before a civil court. Currently, an SAF serviceman arrested by the Police for Absence Without Official Leave or Desertion shall be taken as soon as possible before a civil court – there is no option for the police to take any other course of action. The present amendment now gives the police the option to release such arrested persons instead of bringing them before the civil court. This thus aligns the SAF Act with Article 9(4) of the Constitution which requires that an arrested person be either released or brought before a Magistrate within 48 hours.

Amendments are proposed to Section 205A to provide that the regulations made under Section 205A(1) may provide for the Armed Forces Council to determine rates and contributions of various superannuation benefits by issuing General Orders. These superannuation benefits refer to the SAVER Plan or Premium Plan for our uniformed Officers, Warrant Officers and Specialists.

Section 205C is amended to remove the requirement for a periodic examination of the SAVER-Premium Fund. The SAF Act currently requires an actuarial examination of the SAVER-Premium Fund to be conducted at least once in five years because the fund had a "Defined Benefit" portion. However, with the removal of this portion in 2006, there is no longer such a need.

Amendments for Training Arrangements

Finally, amendments to enhance training arrangements for the SAF. Since the 1970s, there has been an arrangement between the SAF and the Public Utilities Board, for the conduct of military training in certain water catchment areas. We are regularising this and the Military Manoeuvres Act is amended to reflect this.

Conclusion

Singapore and Singaporeans have enjoyed peace and progress these past six decades since our Independence. From an improbable nation, we have defied the odds time and again, to maintain our sovereignty and way of life to become one of the leading cities in Asia. These impressive strides were achieved because of a strong national defence and united people. These amendments to the SAF Act to establish a fourth service – the Digital Intelligence Service – will further strengthen our national defence, to build for the next generation, an even better and stronger Singapore.

Madam Deputy Speaker, I beg to move.