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STAFF AND TRAINEE DYNAMICS
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THIRTEEN
III. MINOR HICCUPS
After all, they had had direct links with British forces. But, it begs the question why the
local officers did not immediately recognise the common source. The answer can only be
speculative. The British had a different approach to officer cadet training. According to
LTC (RET) Kesavan Soon, who became the Chief Instructor, SAFTI in August, 1967 and
had done the full course in FMC, the emphasis was on a broad syllabus which covered
an understanding of the armed forces, grooming for life as an officer, the essentials of
the military craft, emphasis on character-building and in the FMC, academic classes to
pass the School Certificate examinations. The Advisors, back home, on the other hand,
were preparing conscripts for the command of small units (initially) actively involved in
securing their territory. Accordingly, they were combat-oriented and their training methods
were highly codified into battle drills that were reiterated until the principles and processes
became second nature. They also standardised training material for commonality and mass
production, whereas the British left it to the respective trainer to expand on the basic
concepts as presented in the field manuals. For obvious reasons, Singapore adopted the
Advisors’ approach.
But, at the time, the local instructors were chafing under their helplessness. They could
neither project mastery of operational techniques or personal military skills in their very
human need to demonstrate psychological dominance over their charges. Subconsciously,
the barrack room, personnel administration, the still-relevant technical areas of the old order
and that old stand-by, military ‘bull’ must have been irresistible venues to exercise their
dwindling authority. Some may have even had a worrisome glimpse of the implications of
the first intake: that in raising the first intake, they were creating those earmarked to displace
them in rather short order.
A classic case of Freudian slip was evident in the approach of one Lieutenant (later Captain,
now deceased). He was not martial or physical in his outlook but very forthcoming of
information, approachable, urbane and contemplative. He was probably pessimistic about
his own future in the service and was subliminally discouraging the first intake, which he saw
as a threat. He would never tire of questioning the purpose of training 140 officer cadets
(‘A’ Company strength), with possibly another 150 to follow. His prior experience with new
infusions of officers had been cohorts of five to six per year from the FMC. To be fair, until
February 1967, just five months before the First Batch was commissioned, the only inkling
of the introduction of National Service had been a brief announcement by Dr. Goh Keng
Swee in November, 1966. Nor was the scale of it evident until several years after it was
introduced. So, he was not to know that a paradigm shift was being shaped for the SAF even
as he grappled with his own future prospects.
Then, there was the curious case of a WO2 with much higher aspirations. With good reason
too, considering his obvious intelligence and the fact that he was descended from an Arab