260 / 409
OFFICER CADET TRAINING
244
ELEVEN
XIX. ANTI-GUERILLA WARFARE
Often thought of interchangeably by the cadets as Jungle Warfare, anti-guerrilla warfare
was very much in fashion with local forces. Shortly after the end of WWII, the Malayan
Communist Party had taken to armed struggle in Malaya. British, Australian and New
Zealand forces and British-commanded local units in peninsular Malaya had engaged
in bloody operations against ‘Communist Terrorists’ (CT) as they were called. But with
the appointment of Lieutenant-General, later Field Marshall Sir Gerald Templer as High
Commissioner and concurrently head of operations in Kuala Lumpur (effectively assuming
the role of ‘supremo’), the CT were defeated in the field and Malaya was given independence
in 1957, denying the communists their main propaganda weapon of anti-colonialism. In
fact, active CT cells continued to conduct sporadic attacks on soft targets till 1975/76.
But, for the SMF, the more compelling interest in anti-guerrilla warfare had arisen from
the experience of 2 SIR in February 1965 when Indonesian guerrillas had killed nine and
wounded five men of 2 SIR in Kota Tinggi. 2 SIR had managed to even the score in March
and CPT Daljeet Singh, 2I/C of ‘A’ Company, SAFTI for the first intake officer cadet course,
had been the hero of the search and destroy mission. Not surprisingly, to most servicemen
in the 1960s, the operational mind set was anti-guerrilla warfare.
Strongly rooted in the war against the CT, anti-guerrilla warfare was mostly close terrain
warfare against pockets of armed insurgents and ideological dissidents, whose objective
was to challenge the current political leadership, increase their ideological support among
the public, bring down the civil administration and take over the country. The theatre of
operations could shift to any opportune target, provided they could withdraw to secure
base camps after each strike. They maintained surreptitious logistics lifelines and used their
sympathisers known as Min Yuen, as couriers. Terror tactics discouraged the population in
outlying areas from co-operating with the authorities. To win a war against guerrillas, the
sympathiser support network had to be destroyed, the hearts and minds of one’s own side
had to be won and the enemy had to be tactically defeated in detail in the field. Because of
the close terrain, the full force of conventional support elements could not be brought to
bear, though aerial reconnaissance, aerial bombardment, helicopter mobility and even limited
artillery support could be integrated into ground operations. But the ground operation was
the critical leg of the anti-guerrilla strategy—to kill the CT and reduce their assault groups
in combat in the jungle terrain of their choice. Government forces had to dominate the area
of operations, knock out base camps, keep the CT off-balance so that they could not plan
deliberate operations, and prove that the Government had the upper hand. Information
was vital and an effective, pervasive Special Branch was a top priority. There was a lot of
psychological warfare involved on both sides.
The training programme for the officer cadet course was, however, based almost entirely on
ground operations at and below company level. It dealt with small unit tactics in movement,