Thank you very much Mr Bill Hayton, and let me thank Rear Admiral Jan Kaack, as well as my fellow panellists Mr Zhou Bo and Mr Reinhard Bütikofer.

Since we last met two years ago, there have been a number of significant developments in the Asia-Pacific region. First, more countries, as you mentioned, even distant ones, have deployed their military assets to the region. Just to recount, the US sent two carrier strike groups at the same time in 2020, and held large-scale exercises with other countries. From France, a carrier strike group in 2019 and an amphibious ready group in 2021; from the United Kingdom, a carrier strike group, accompanied by a Dutch frigate; and from Germany too, a frigate for its first mission in decades to the Indo-Pacific, last year. Japan and India were also among those who deployed more warships to the region in 2021 while China most recently deployed two aircraft carriers in December for live- firing drills. Our ports and Changi Naval Base are facilities that are used by the foreign militaries, and just counting military vessels that travelled through the Singapore Straits, the numbers have gone up from 217 in 2020 to 273 in 2021 – representing about a 26% increase.

Second, existing alliances or new partnerships are being stepped up – including the Quad – the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – and establishment of the Australia-UK-US Trilateral Security Pact (AUKUS) in September in 2021. Meanwhile, China conducted its third joint naval drill with Russia and Iran in the Northern Indian Ocean. China has also deepened its relationship with ASEAN, elevating that status to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in November 2021.

The third big area, even in the midst of the pandemic, we have seen large infrastructure projects continuing or launched. Under China's Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, a high-speed railway connecting Vientiane, Laos to Kunming, China, was completed and became operational in December 2021. There are hopes to eventually connect that railway from Laos, through Thailand, down to Malaysia. In Myanmar, part of China's BRI projects, the $2.5 billion Mee Lin Chaing power plant project, are proceeding. Japan too has invested in similar power plant projects in Vietnam and Thailand.

I summarised these various developments without commentary and as mere observations. But my bet is that even as I recounted them, most of us here would have come to their own conclusion that some 21st century "Great Game" is afoot. If one does exist, where are the strategic crossroads that could trigger or precipitate big shifts?

Here is where predictions can get tricky – some might point to Taiwan or an actual physical altercation in the disputed South China Sea in the near term. Others might predict competing trade and technology blocs, where tariffs or in extreme, economic and financial exclusions are applied depending on which camp that country belonged to.

Can things go awry in this context? History teaches us that proximate events, may have little to do with core concerns. World War I was precipitated by a tangential event that brought alliances into collisions and led to the collapse of the incumbent Habsburg, Tsarist, German and Ottoman empires. Might something similar push us to the edge?

Even now, more than 100,000 soldiers gathered around Ukraine, and the World watches anxiously over future movements there. That itself will be a disruptive event for all of us. In the medium term, climate change is an existential challenge. Even if carbon emissions drop to zero today, it will take another 80 years before global temperatures return back close to pre-industrial levels. As leaders, we all know that known and unknown unknowns can tip the balance. What can we do?

For Singapore, at the tip of the Asian continent, astride the South China Sea and Straits of Malacca, we sit at the crossroads of Asia and the rest of the World – one of the busiest global maritime routes and over 50% of the world's catch of fish. For us, it is vital for stability that international laws like the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are upheld. Together with like-minded ASEAN countries, we do our part such as in the Malacca Straits Patrol and support efforts like the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement in the Sulu-Celebes seas to address common security threats like terrorism and piracy.

Singapore also welcomes big and middle powers that want to add to the stability of the Indo- Pacific region. For that reason, Changi Naval Base facilitates the presence of foreign militaries from countries like the US, the UK, China, Japan, Germany, France and India, among many others.

We also encourage military partnerships that are inclusive, like the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) and the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Combined, the ADMM-Plus militaries make up close to 90% of the world's military forces. ADMM-Plus has an Experts' Working Group on Maritime Security (EWG-MS) to promote the practice of confidence- building, and measures to reduce the risk of miscalculation. One key example is the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), which all ADMM-Plus navies adopted in 2017. CUES has been practised by the ADMM-Plus militaries since 2019 - most recently at the ASEAN-Russia Naval Exercise last December.

Closer to home, Singapore had established centres such as the Information Fusion Centre, the Changi Regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Coordination Centre, and the Counter-Terrorism Information Facility to facilitate information sharing, strengthen military-to- military coordination and enhance domain awareness for the Indo-Pacific region. We are grateful for the partnerships and contributions of many countries in these initiatives.

Are these multinational efforts adequate to provide peace and stability for our region? Only time and collective political will, will tell.

Thank you.