Introduction

A very good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Wonderful to see all of you here this morning.

Thank you for joining us and for your strong support for Exercise Deep Sabre 2021 (XDS21). XDS21 is part of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Asia-Pacific Exercise Rotation (APER) series and Singapore is glad to have the opportunity to host an APER exercise this year, albeit in a hybrid format.

Current Counter-Proliferation Landscape

The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, has come a long way since its inception in 2003. Established as a multilateral response to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or WMDs, their delivery systems and related materials. The level of support for the PSI has grown from the 11 endorsee countries to 107 endorsee countries today. The PSI, along with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), and diplomacy, are complementary tools that help us to advance our common goal of countering the proliferation of WMDs.

However, fast forward almost 20 years, the illicit proliferation of WMD – ranging from chemical, biological, radiological, explosive weapons to nuclear materials – continues globally, contributing to violence and instability which in turn undermines human security and welfare. Chemical, biological, radiological, and explosives (CBRE) attacks by both state and non-state actors have increased over the years. This can be seen from the sarin gas attacks at a Tokyo subway station in 1995 and the 2017 assassination of Kim Jong Nam using the nerve gas VX.

The global COVID-19 pandemic of the past two years has exacerbated the challenges that countries face in counter-proliferation. As the international community turned their attention to dealing with the very public concerns, there has been a lack of opportunities and touchpoints, particularly face-to-face interactions, so I am glad I think many of us are meeting today, to build both capability and commitment. You can see members here from various armed forces around the world coming together to share your expertise as well as capabilities.

Terrorism is another factor that continues to fuel and exacerbate the proliferation of WMDs. Terrorism, which often goes hand in hand with WMD proliferation, remains a clear and present security concern to the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. Non-state actors, such as terrorist and insurgency groups, contribute to the proliferation of WMDs.

Our uncertain security environment is compounded by the recent Taliban takeover in Afghanistan. With the fall of the last stronghold of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2019, terrorists and returning foreign fighters have entered Southeast Asia in recent years, rendering it a terrorism hotspot.

Terrorist organisations such as ISIS have been known to launch chemical attacks in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017. These terrorists exploit dual-use materials such as chlorine, phosphine and mustard gas which are widely available for industrial use. As a result, many of these returning fighters are experienced fighters with the required know-how to carry out sophisticated and complex chemical attacks. In fact, a recent study highlighted that Southeast Asia could become a potential target for chemical weapon attacks by 2024. Now the gap between the extremists' intent to use chemical weapons and their ability to acquire such weapons has narrowed in recent years.^[1]

Emerging Challenges

On top of these persistent challenges, the world is facing emerging challenges in counter-proliferation. Proliferation networks have embraced technological advancements that have transformed both proliferation financing and the creation of WMDs themselves.

Actors now mount finance campaigns in cyberspace using cryptocurrency and conduct sophisticated cyberattacks to steal money to fund their proliferation efforts. For example, a draft UN report stated that North Korean hackers stole more than $300 million USD to fund its WMD programmes. Islamic State-linked terror groups were also reported to have conducted their first transactions in cryptocurrencies in 2020, which were later used to finance terror networks operating in the Philippines. With the increased ease and effectiveness of proliferation financing through cyberspace, WMD proliferation has made it easier for both state and non-state actors.

Recent developments in manufacturing and computing, such as the advent of 3D printers, alongside advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have increased access to WMDs. A report published by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies asserted that the use of additive manufacturing can reduce the materials and component costs for WMDs and increase the accessibility of building such WMDs. With increased ease and accessibility, as well as reduced costs, the risk of proliferation is likely to increase, especially as technology such as additive manufacturing and AI continue to develop.

Cooperation through PSI

The evolution of the proliferation landscape has resulted in a shift in the PSI's focus from maritime military interdictions to tackling new counter-proliferation issues such as proliferation financing and exports controls.

The proliferation landscape also makes that no one country can tackle such diverse challenges alone. It must be emphasised that proliferation is a global issue. Collectively, it is important for all our countries to work together to uphold the safety and security of our region and our countries through robust counter-proliferation discussions and practices.

Singapore's Efforts

As a major maritime hub and island-state located along key trade routes, Singapore takes our obligations to counter the proliferation of WMD and related materials seriously. Singapore is one of the busiest transhipment hubs in the world, accounting for almost one-seventh of the world's total container transhipment throughput, and more than 4% of global container throughput. We operate a total of 53 berths with a designated capacity of 50 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEUs) yearly at our three container terminals.^[2] As a responsible trading nation, putting in place a robust exports control regime is therefore critical to safeguard against the illicit movement of items through our ports.

We believe that PSI helps to establish greater regional security and to create a stable environment that facilitates growth. Singapore remains committed to hosting XDS to maintain the momentum of PSI-APER exercises, given its importance to our regional security landscape today and the future.

This is a sentiment clearly reflected in the attendance that we have today with more than a 100 virtual and physical participants from various government agencies representing over 20 countries. Your participation sends a strong deterrent signal to the region and any would-be proliferators, that we are all dedicated to counter-proliferation efforts and committed to preserving international peace and stability.

Conclusion

Over the next two days, participants will get to exchange ideas, learn best practices from each other, and enhance interoperability through discussions and role-playing counter-proliferation scenarios.

It is my sincere hope that everyone finds XDS21 a fruitful and enjoyable exercise, and that all of you come away from the exercise having learnt new ideas to invigorate international counter-proliferation efforts.

Thank you very much everyone. Thanks for joining us and have a good day.

^[1] According to Las, B. R. (2019), it is "highly likely that Al Qaeda and ISIS will disseminate chemical weapons expertise to their affiliates in Southeast Asia that transform the region into a domain for chemical terrorism".