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SETTING UP SAFTI
60
FOUR
newest nation state on 9
th
August, 1965, had to marshal its defensive options without ado.
The starting point was inevitably the creation of a military command element in sufficient
proportion to the anticipated troop expansion. The Government’s decision to make the
creation of a viable defence force at least a co-equal priority with economic development—
despite at least one well-meant recommendation to forego military defence—and the
looming financial burden it entailed, was both pragmatic and courageous, while the creation
of SAFTI practically overnight was a demonstration of dynamic political leadership. SAFTI
was literarily Singapore’s first force multiplier.
SAFTI’s potency also stemmed from the fact that the Advisors proved to be of exceptional
professional integrity. While they themselves had initiated the offer to help for their own
political objectives and had been accepted only after more compatible alternatives had turned
aside, they did not come solely with a foreign policy agenda, though diplomatic acceptance
was important to them. They brought with them an ethos that remains the hallmark of the
SAF. They customised their tutelage from the ground up not only to suit an environment
alien to themselves, but also to ensure that the SAF was launched on the right trajectory.
They passed on profound hard-earned lessons without hesitation.
For all who participated, the creation of SAFTI also represented a leap of faith in Singapore’s
ability to hold its own.
Endnotes
1. Interview with Captain (Ret) Steven Ng, 14 February 2006.
2. Interview with Chelliah Tiruchelvarayan on 10 August 2005.
3. Memorandum D. 00501/63/3 dated 6 August 1963 from Permanent Secretary, Home Affairs,
to State Advocate General.
4. Ng Eng Hua, et al, SAFTI Silver Jubilee 1966-1991, Singapore: Viva, 1991, p. 74.
5. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World To First, Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2000, pp.30-31.
6. The historic details of the construction of SAFTI and the concepts underlying the training philosophy are
from a transcript of an interview between the Chief Advisor and an official from Security and Intelligence
Division over 18, 22 and 26 July 1977.
7. The Chief Advisor was referring to then LTC Ronald Wee Soon Whatt, later Colonel and
Director, SAFTI, and MAJ Richard Jambu who went on to command a division as a Colonel.
8. Ng Eng Hua, et. al., 1991, p. 34.
9. Our Security. Keselamatan Kita, Singapore: Ministry of Interior and Defence, 1969, p.21.
10. Interview with Captain (Ret) Hong Seng Mak, then Warrant Officer 1, Company Warrant Officer ‘A’
Company,SAFTI, on 23 March 2005.
11. Ng Eng Hua, et. al., 1991, p.19.
12. Malay for “half”, referring to two fingers of Scotch in a shot glass, a favourite after-duty pastime in officers’
messes and social clubs in colonial days.
13. Minutes of the Weekly Conference, General Staff Division, Ministry of Interior and Defence, 9 May 1966.
14. Minutes of the Weekly Conference, General Staff Division, Ministry of Interior and Defence, 6 June 1966.
15. Ng Eng Hua, et. al., 1991, p. 4.
16. ibid., loc. cit.