One of a Kind (2nd Edition)

SETTING UP SAFTI

FOUR

III. MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

Some calculated deliberations went into the proposition to set up SAFTI. The over-riding

consideration was that Advisors would not run the show in the SAF. They could be co-

instructors in the first course or courses at different levels, arms and services and then step

back for Singaporeans to take over, the idea being that Singaporeans had to be responsible for

the work and learn on the job. Only this way could the real needs of Singapore surface to be

addressed and Singaporean incumbents grow into their professional responsibilities.

A second consideration was that MID must accept the military doctrines represented by the

Advisors because these were the sole basis of their expertise. They were not in Singapore to

promote a doctrine alien to themselves. By doctrine, they meant operating principles, battle

discipline, attitude towards combat and other value systems, organisational logic and core

operating procedures. Apart from the concept of commanders having to be at least competent

in everything they demanded of their troops, examples covered leadership training, cross-

training of troops and specialists, the extensive use of night, exploitation of difficult terrain

for an unexpected approach, combined arms operations, intelligence gathering, battle drills

and rehearsals of the assault phases of a mission on simulated objectives as basic operating

tenets. In due course, Singaporeans could adapt the basics to better-fit local conditions or

formulate their own proprietary tenets; indeed this would be the ultimate objective.

SAFTI was conceived as a central school for commanders, including NCOs and not officer

cadets alone. In 1965 and until mid-1966, the broad plan for the development of the SAF was

based on creating six regular battalions and six reserve battalions (one of several takes on Dr.

Goh’s 12 battalions) for which SAFTI would supply the command elements.

It was a radical

departure from initial notions of sending selected officer candidates abroad to UK or other

countries, a natural reflex of the experience so far in Singapore. The impracticality of this idea

aside, in terms of the numbers envisaged, it was argued that a local training establishment

would help crystallise Singaporean objectives.

made it, there could not even have been a site survey at hand, let alone an architect’s plan.

Ellazari and Pak Thoe appeared to have struck a close bond with daily meetings where Pak

Thoe acted unhesitatingly on the conclusions they arrived at.

But, a delay did occur and was used to good effect to do the paper work. Nothing could

be done on the ground for about another two months while owners of several estates who

were living in London were contacted. In fact, there were instances when training for the

preparatory course for instructors was held up because clearance to enter the private estate

grounds had not been obtained. Yet, SAFTI was officially opened on 18

June, 1966, 18 days

after the first intake reported for their course.