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A HISTORY LESSON THE FIRST BATCH DID NOT GET
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power in the configuration of aircraft carriers was hardly a blip on the horizon, so to speak.
Even if had been more developed, it is unlikely that Britain could have financed the build-up
of adequate carrier groups compared to a sparse sprinkling of fixed air bases in the theatre of
operations.
The other great problem was that the threat scenario was speculative. Apart from a vague
uneasiness about the state of international relations based on spotty intelligence and the
interpretation of diplomatic initiatives, there was neither a concrete enemy nor a crisis timeframe
to concentrate the minds of the decision makers. In the event, it was agreed that a naval base
big enough to accommodate and maintain a main battle fleet should be built at Singapore (as
opposed to Sydney or Hong Kong), and such a fleet would be despatched in good time to take
up station against a Japanese threat. Beyond that, the debate bogged down over aid from the
US, the guarantee of timely intelligence, the expectation of sending a fleet over 10,000 nautical
miles in the face of a simultaneous threat to the British home islands, the time that could be
bought by military aid sent from India and what form the fixed defences in Singapore should
take. There was even a debate on whether the naval base should be Keppel Harbour itself
or on the northeast coast of Singapore, though this was settled with the realisation that co-
locating the naval base with the commercial harbour would hardly be conducive to Singapore’s
port operations, its economic mainstay.
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The withdrawal from the League of Nations by Japan and Germany in 1933 and the withdrawal
of Germany the same year from the Disarmament Conference eventually spurred Britain to
Located in present day Woodlands, the 1,000-foot King George IV Graving Dock was big enough to take in the
biggest ships of its time. Picture courtesy of “The Times Weekly Edition”.