Senior Ministers of State for Defence, Heng Chee How and Zaqy Mohamad,

MINDEF Officials.

Chief of Defence Force,

Service Chiefs,

Directors-General,

Heads of Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies,

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me bid a very warm welcome to everyone here to the 13th International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference Asia, or IMDEX Asia. I'm glad that IMDEX has resumed after a hiatus of 4 years and all of us went through a miserable few years due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But I am glad also, that IMDEX has grown significantly when it was incepted in 1997. There were 65 exhibitors, 2,500 trade visitors and 5 navies. This year, we received 47 VIP delegations, including 22 Navy Chiefs, Coast Guard Directors-General, and Heads of Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, and 18 ships now on display in Changi Naval Base. With more than 200 exhibitors from 25 countries, we also expect to welcome over 11,000 trade visitors this week. IMDEX has grown over the years, and despite the disruption by COVID, it is a clear indication of its value to the regional, if not the international community.

Apart from the value that IMDEX adds to trade and commerce as the global economy recovers, IMDEX provides an important platform to maintain and hopefully enhance regional stability and security. That alone provides sufficient cause for government leaders and military commanders to be here. Because, in my mind the top priority for all government leaders, at least in the next decade, if not longer, is to avoid a physical conflict in Asia. Should that calamity ever befall us, whatever the cause and post hoc justifications, the World as we know it will be radically changed and indeed impoverished – a simultaneous war in Europe and Asia will be disastrous for all of us.

Globally, countries near and afar are still grappling with the aftermath of Russia's unlawful invasion of Ukraine. But Russia only accounted for 2% of global exports in 2020. Prior to the invasion, Europe was dependent on Russia for its energy needs, which are now being re-configured – Russia went from supplying 40% of the EU's gas needs, to less than 20% in 2022. Reducing dependency entirely will take time, but it is progressing apace.

Beyond energy, many countries experienced supply shocks from the mundane to the esoteric, whether it was wheat, corn, nickel, or even potash, an essential input in fertiliser production. Any disruptions revealed the interdependencies that countries had built for the past three decades or longer under the banner of globalisation, in trade, commerce, finance and people exchanges. The war on Ukraine by Russia has reversed this for Europe and beyond - continued globalisation during periods of wars or conflicts is not possible.

What lessons should we in Asia learn from this dismal aftermath? When the US Administration under President Bill Clinton supported China's accession into the WTO in 2001, he persuaded US Congress with this quote, "if you believe in a future of peace and security for Asia and the world, you should be for this agreement." This was President Clinton's main line. "But if you believe in the future of peace and security for Asia and the world, you should be in agreement for China to accede into the WTO." The US then believed that with China, just like the economic integration between Europe and Russia, trade and economic interdependency would deter wars.

This belief and aspiration was an extension of the "Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention" which posited that no two countries with McDonald's burger joints would go to war. Free trade with one another, open borders, and shared common prosperity would increase their interdependency, so that fighting with each other would simply not be worth it.

This was the same reasoning why many European leaders increased their energy dependence on Russia. This hope and resolve was certainly not transient but a concerted and prolonged one. From Chancellor Schroeder to Merkel, over a span of more than 20 years, Germany's dependence on Russia for gas grew and reached 55% before the Ukraine invasion. Germany was not alone - for Poland, energy dependence reached around 50%, and Italy 40%, for example. Relying on another country for energy supplies, one of the most potent forms of leverage the supplier country could exert on the receiving country, was a vivid demonstration of faith in the hope that deepening economic ties would reduce the risk of war. Russia's invasion of Ukraine put paid to that idea. We can mourn the end of that cherished hope and this state of affairs, but for Europe and the West, it is a fait accompli. No leader in Europe that I have spoken to today believes that Russia can ever be integrated into Europe, not least within this generation, probably longer. Those hopes have evaporated.

The most important question for all of us here today and indeed globally, is whether that will be true too for Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific region? Because unlike Russia, the stakes of a war in Asia are much higher and even existential for many countries. Without exaggeration, conflict in Asia could have an effect akin to the aftermath of WWI, where four existing empires were decimated and the world map altered literally for nations and states. Lives, post conflict will never be the same again.

As of 2020, China, Asia's largest economic and military power, accounted for nearly 15% of global exports. It is a top trading partner for ASEAN and Australasia. The World is dependent on China as a major manufacturer for sundry goods and many essentials for our way of life – our phones, cars, washing machines, clothes, shoes and furniture. No transnational global challenge can be dealt with, without China's input. For instance, beyond the reduction of carbon emissions to address climate change, all momentum behind electric car developments could stall without cobalt, lithium and nickel, of which China controls around three quarters of the market.

A conflict in Asia, particularly that between US and China which together account for more than a quarter of global trade, would be unimaginable, manifold times the disruption that Europe and the World is facing from the war in Ukraine. In global financial crises, we recognised and accepted that some institutions, particularly banks and the financial system were "too big to fail". That phrase applies eminently to the US-China relationship, their relationship with the ASEAN, other Asian countries, and Europe. That parties are even contemplating the possibility of such a scenario amid rising US China tensions, parsing war game outcomes and adjusting strategies, tells us that we have to redouble our efforts in diplomacy, conflict prevention and mitigation, confidence building measures, and co-operation. IMDEX 2023 meets in that context - we have much work to do. This is the priority for all leaders and we cannot fail our people.

The key structural change as with Russia with Europe, and China with the US is that political will and policies to increase dependency have regressed significantly. Purportedly, it is meant to be scoped and applies now to selected domains such as 5G telecommunications, high-end chips and other strategic or sensitive technologies. How and if selective decoupling is meant to work or if it works at all, is anyone's guess. History as a judge is not kind or encouraging to those who are engaged in economic warfare, however limited, as it can easily slide into the physical. The Cold War between the US and USSR yielded a positive outcome but few believe that this would be repeated for the US against China.

Ultimately, wherever that line is drawn, the impact of this deliberate decoupling will create pain for all countries, particularly because countries will increasingly be forced to choose sides. This occurred for countries as they rolled out their 5G networks and the US, along with its closest allies banned Huawei; or the Netherlands when the US asked that they restrict exports of lithographic machines to China. Now, under the US CHIPS and Science Act signed in 2022, companies with advanced semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the US are eligible for federal subsidies, provided they do not upgrade any China-based factories for a decade. This path of selective decoupling is not likely to be smooth, so we must expect many challenges and surprises along the way.

IMPORTANCE OF A PEACEFUL MARITIME DOMAIN

In the meantime, we in the defence security arena must take proactive steps to prevent or mitigate conflict in Asia. For the maritime domain, 30% of the world's sea borne trade passes through the South China Sea each year. One quarter of global oil trade and one third of global container trade passes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. We sit astride a key sea line of communication, and if conflict were to destabilise our region, it would have far-reaching implications worldwide.

Given the stakes involved, we must renew our collective commitment to maintain a rules based order to guide our interactions in the maritime domain – particularly United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which aims to preserve freedom of navigation while respecting the sovereign claims of individual states. Here, we call on China and ASEAN to accelerate the conclusion of a substantive Code of Conduct based on UNCLOS. That sorely needed agreement has been in the works for over 20 years, since China and ASEAN first agreed to adopt one in 2002.

The ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, otherwise known as ADMM, and the plus partners have already established the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, the Guidelines for Maritime Interaction and the expansion of the ASEAN Direct Communications Infrastructure. In the air, the Guidelines for Air Military Encounters also serves as the world's first multilateral document of its kind, aimed at managing air military encounters. These are positive steps but more needs to be done to reduce the risks of miscalculations at sea, and in any domain for that matter. We must not be complacent, because accidents or incidents can occur as they did at Hainan Island in 2001, where a US Navy EP-3 aircraft and a PLA Navy fighter jet collided in mid-air, and in 1999, where the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was hit by US bombs during the NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia. In today's environment of distrust and contestation, any such similar episode could provoke much harsher and protracted responses.

While ADMM and plus countries have in place mechanisms and frameworks pertaining to our assets, including military ships, of particular concern is that there are no similar mechanisms for coast guard ships. Over the past two decades, many states in the Asia-pacific region have bolstered their coast guards through upgrading existing vessels, expanding their fleets, and stepping up the frequency of patrols in disputed waters. Right now, coast guard ships number more than Navy ships, and miscalculations and missteps among them can occur. In 2020, a Vietnamese fishing boat sank after colliding with a China Coast Guard vessel near the Paracel islands. In 2010, a Japan Coast Guard patrol boat collided with a Chinese fishing trawler in waters near the disputed island chains - Senkaku Islands to the Japanese or Diaoyu to the Chinese. Countries need to give attention to increasing collaboration and co-ordination among coast guards and similar agencies, to ensure such incidents are averted.

Collectively, we must keep our sea lines of communication free and safe for routine business. In 2022, Singapore's Information Fusion Centre, or IFC, recorded a total of 104 incidents of theft, armed robbery and piracy – an increase of 13% over 2021. We can only deal with these transnational threats through close collaboration among stakeholders.

The recent recovery of our Singapore-flagged commercial vessel, Success 9, is a positive example where through the partners at the IFC, vital information was obtained and exchanged. The Malacca Strait Patrols and the recently inaugurated Coordinated Patrol Indonesia-Singapore, in which the two navies conduct coordinated patrols and share information, are further good examples between regional partners to strengthen operational responses to ensure the security of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

VALUE OF IMDEX

IMDEX 2023 serves to provide that platform for all of us to deepen mutual understanding and foster consensus – much needed elements if we are to maintain peace and stability in this region. I urge everyone here to use this opportunity well because the stakes have never been higher.

CONCLUSION

I am happy to declare IMDEX 2023 open, and wish everyone a fruitful exhibition and conference. Thank you.