INTRODUCTION

Dr John Chipman,

My fellow panellists,

Distinguished speakers,

Ladies and gentlemen.

First, let me thank the organisers, IISS, for inviting me to speak today at the 18th Manama Dialogue here in Bahrain, and really a big thanks to our Bahraini hosts as well for your excellent hospitality. It is a great pleasure for me and my team to be here in Bahrain. The topic – security of the global maritime choke points – is an important and timely one.

I come from Singapore, a maritime hub, for which seaborne trade has been our lifeblood since the 13th Century, long before we were a financial, technology or airhub in the region. For us, maritime security is more than an important topic – it is an existential one.

Though my remarks will focus on the Asia-Pacific region, but I hope that you will find some points of relevance that can be read across to this region.

MARITIME SECURITY IS CRITICAL FOR THE WORLD, AND EXISTENTIAL FOR SINGAPORE

Today, maritime trade remains the lifeblood of Singapore's economy. The Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea form two of our key arterial networks. Singapore sits at the intersection of the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. And I am sure many of you would know, the Straits of Malacca is the shortest sea route between the Middle East and East Asia.

The volume of crude oil and LNG that is shipped through the Straits of Malacca each day is only second to Hormuz. It carries almost three times as much of global seaborne trade compared to the Suez. And yet, at its narrowest point, the Straits of Malacca is less than 3km wide – much, much narrower than the Strait of Hormuz at its narrowest point.

MARITIME SECURITY IS UNDER THREAT

So therefore as you can see, maritime security in the Asia-Pacific, like in many parts of the world has come under increasing pressure. So, let me cite a few contributing factors and trends.

First, the South China Sea remains a potential flash point, with a web of contesting sovereignty claims entangled with great power politics and military posturing.

Second, some countries in the region have differing interpretation of the rules that govern the use of the sea. Some have a more restrictive interpretation of UNCLOS, and what are legitimate activities in EEZs, and what are not. If unchecked, the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, which is a cornerstone of the international maritime system, will be undermined - not just in the Asia-Pacific, but around the world, and including here in the Middle East.

Third, we see increased militarisation. And over the past decade, military spending in the Asia-Pacific has grown by about 60 percent, and it shows no sign of slowing down. Geopolitical uncertainties, fuelled by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and great power rivalry, have triggered strategic recalculations in many countries in the region. The singular conclusion appears to be to spend more on defence.

And we can expect the waters of the Asia-Pacific region to be more crowded, as countries expand their navies and coast guards. And this includes extra-regional ones deploying their assets to and through the region. And in such an environment, the risk of accidents and incidents will naturally be heightened.

Even though I was talking about the Asia-Pacific region, none of what I have said so far would have sounded unfamiliar or unrelatable to the Persian Gulf. Many of you here have seen and continue to see your own share of contestation and conflict – including the threats of piracy and the threats of terrorism.

WHAT SMALL STATES CAN DO

Faced with such a daunting slate of challenges, it is sometimes tempting to succumb to fatalism, especially for small states like Singapore and even as middle powers.

Our former Ambassador-at-Large Bilahari Kausikan used to say that small states like Singapore are intrinsically irrelevant, because we perform no function that cannot be done the same, and better, by larger states. But I would argue that being intrinsically irrelevant is not the same as being doomed to irrelevance – there is a big difference there.

And for Singapore, it is our deep abiding belief that small states too have agency, especially when we work together with other small states and middle powers.

Let me share a couple of ways in which Singapore has tried to play our part in the region.

First, in shaping norms and upholding our multilateral system and rules-based international order. So much depends on the seas that we can ill afford for the law of the sea to degenerate into the law of the jungle. If you ask me – the Navy and the Army guys here will tell you there is a big difference. We all have fundamental interests at stake in upholding the right of all countries to freedom of navigation and overflight, and in upholding the primacy of international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS. All countries, including and especially the small ones, therefore need to come together to ensure that our voices are heard. Our voices are louder when we speak in unison.

So dialogues, like the Manama Dialogue and the Shangri-La Dialogue, are invaluable platforms to bring together countries – small states, middle powers, and superpowers alike. The world needs platforms like these to set the tone and shape consensus on what are acceptable norms in the region and allow for global discourse.

And beyond dialogues, Singapore has and always will contribute our niche capabilities, within our resource limitations as a small country, to uphold the international order. And this is why Singapore participated actively in the multinational Combined Task Force 151, as part of international counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden.

Second, is to build trust and confidence through practical cooperation.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting, or the ADMM, and the ADMM-Plus are key pillars of the regional security architecture. In fact, the 9th ADMM-Plus Meeting will be taking place in Cambodia next week. Combined, the 18 ADMM-Plus militaries, which include the US and China, make up close to 90% of the world's military forces. The ADMM-Plus is today the premier platform for advancing practical cooperation on security and defence matters in the region. It was under the ambit of the ADMM-Plus, that we promulgated a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, or what we call CUES. All 18 ADMM-Plus navies have since adopted and practised CUES in ADMM-Plus maritime security exercises, because we all recognise that we have a common, practical interest in reducing the risk of miscalculation and escalation of incidents at sea.

Now, there are many other examples of this focus on practical, interest-based cooperation, outside of the ADMM-Plus. Since 2004, when piracy and armed robbery were rampant in the Malacca Straits, the littoral states – Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore – came together to coordinate joint aerial and maritime patrols, and this continues till today. In 2016, after a spate of kidnappings orchestrated by militant groups in the Sulu Sea region – the huge expanse of waters that border the southern Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia – the three countries forged a similar arrangement called the Trilateral Cooperative Agreement.

As a small state, Singapore believes that we can play our part to foster peace and stability by facilitating more of such practical cooperation. To this end, our Singapore Navy hosts the Information Fusion Centre – a regional Maritime Security centre that shares actionable information amongst regional and international navies, coast guards and other maritime agencies. And earlier in September this year, we officially opened the multilateral Counter-Terrorism Information Facility (CTIF), bringing together partner nations to share intelligence and provide early warning against terrorism in the region, including terrorism threats via the seas.

CONCLUSION

So, ladies and gentlemen, let me conclude. These are turbulent times, no doubt. With an increasingly fractious geopolitical landscape, multilateralism and the international rules-based order is under threat. Amidst the great power rivalry that we see around us, small states and middle powers are not without agency. We can all step up and fill in the gaps that have emerged in this more divided geopolitical environment. Multilateralism allows small- and medium-sized states to have a voice, and to secure open lines of communications and freedom of navigation.

Now, how countries react to, and manage challenges to multilateralism and the rules-based order, will affect regional stability and the international environment that we all depend on to prosper and grow.

And I believe that small states, especially when working hand in hand with middle powers, are well-placed to advance key principles and chart a positive, multilateral agenda based on practical cooperation.

Thank you very much.