

IS NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE VIABLE AS A STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY?

By LTC Goh Nichola

ABSTRACT

Non-Offensive Defence is described as the strategic defence stance taken by a country to safeguard its national interest. Without being aggressive with its military, a nation can potentially deter an aggressor, through its uneven terrain or foreign alliances. In this essay, the author states that non-offensive defence is viable as a strategy only if certain conditions are fulfilled—suitable geography, benign strategic environment and neutral foreign outreach. In the case of Japan, the author puts forth an additional condition, which is alliances. In the author's opinion, however, Non-Offensive defence is only fully viable if the three conditions highlighted above are met.

Keywords: *Offence, Defence, Strategic, Conditions, Environment*

INTRODUCTION

Non-Offensive Defence (NOD) gained prominence during the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s to early 1980s as a strategy for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Nevertheless, it has remained prominent in the discourse of security studies till today. In this essay, the author argues that non-offensive defence is viable as a strategy for national security only if the following conditions are fulfilled—the geography of the country in question must be defensible, its strategic environment must be benign, and the way it conducts foreign policy must be neutral and predictable.

STRUCTURE OF ESSAY

In this essay, the author will first introduce the concept of NOD. Next, he will make an argument that three factors of geography, strategic environment and foreign policy are critical before NOD can be considered. She will also use Switzerland and Sweden as case studies to illustrate this argument. Lastly, the author will discuss participation in a strategic alliance as an additional and final factor that determines the viability of NOD. NOD will be considered in the context of the post-Cold War environment and the scope will be limited to non-nuclear states. The discussion will also be confined to conventional threats posed by state actors as it is outside the remit of this essay to discuss the effectiveness of NOD against non-state actors (e.g.

extremist groups) and hybrid tactics (e.g. cyberattacks) employed by state actors.

THE CONCEPT OF NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE

The concept of NOD originated during the Cold War as a means of defusing tensions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Moller and Wiberg identified the three purposes of NOD as follows: (1) to facilitate arms control and disarmament, (2) to strengthen peace by ruling out pre-emptive and preventive wars, and (3) to provide effective yet non-suicidal defensive options.¹ The armed forces of a state which adopts NOD should be seen to be capable of credible defence, yet incapable of offence.² However, NOD still allows for the conduct of a tactical offensive or counter attack as these are seen as defensive moves to repel an enemy to restore the status quo, rather than an offensive move that takes the war to the enemy.³ In other words, a NOD strategy allows for self-defence within and near to one's borders, but precludes offensive force projection for purposes beyond immediate self-defence.

NOD - The Security Dilemma and the Offence - Defence Theory

The concepts of security dilemma, co-operative security and offence-defence theory must also be discussed to develop a comprehensive understanding of NOD.

One of the first explanations of the security dilemma was offered by John Hertz who stated that 'self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs, tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening'.⁴ In other words, the security dilemma is key in generating a competitive process of arms racing amongst countries.

The concept of NOD as a solution to the security dilemma stemmed from the Offence-Defence Theory (ODT). Describing ODT, Jervis argued that the severity of the security dilemma depended on two factors: (1) the offence-defence balance, which determines if the offence or defence has the advantage on the battlefield, and (2) offence-defence distinguishability, which determines whether offensive and defensive capabilities can be distinguished.⁵ When the offence-defence balance favours the offence, the probability of war increases as arms races intensify and there are perceived advantages to launching a pre-emptive strike.⁶ Moller posits that NOD is the answer to this phenomenon.⁷ With NOD, a state's acquisition of strictly defensive armaments should not lead to the acquisition of offensive weapons by its adversaries, unless they are indeed harbouring aggressive intentions.⁸ Second, adopting 'unmistakably' defensive steps in a crisis situation eliminates the risk of the adversary launching pre-emptive attacks.⁹

With NOD, a state's acquisition of strictly defensive armaments should not lead to the acquisition of offensive weapons by its adversaries, unless they are indeed harbouring aggressive intentions.

Critics of NOD often point out that NOD is doomed to fail as its workability is premised on one's adversary being able to distinguish between weapons that have been procured purely for defence, and those that have been procured for offensive purposes. This is

exemplified in Buzan's description of the power security dilemma where each state views its own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening.¹⁰ While logical solution would then be to develop a 'demonstrably defensive system', this is easier said than done.¹¹ In rebuttal, Moller suggests that meaningful distinction between offence and defence can only be made at the level of postures; conceptually, NOD can still work as an overall defensive posture, is what ultimately counts, as opposed to the complete lack of offensive weapons.¹²

NOD and Common Security

Common Security was first mooted as a solution to the security dilemma in the 1982 Palme Commission which suggested that in the nuclearised world of the Cold War era, security is first achieved with, and not against, the adversary through United Nations (UN) sponsored collective security and confidence building measures.¹³ Riding on the concept of common security, advocates of NOD point to its ability to resolve the security dilemma and facilitate common security by removing any misperceptions about the intentions of a state's defensive military preparations.¹⁴

NECESSARY PRE-CONDITIONS FOR NOD

As much as advocates present NOD as the panacea to the security dilemma, the author argues that NOD is viable only under specific conditions. First, the geography of the country in question must be defensible. Second, the country must be situated in a benign strategic environment and be strategically unimportant. Third, a non-offensive military posture must be backed up by consistently neutral foreign policies in order to eliminate any doubts from potential adversaries regarding a state's intentions. Furthermore, all three conditions must be fulfilled simultaneously in order for NOD to work. The following section will explain the relation of each factor to NOD, while the next will introduce Switzerland and Sweden as case studies for and against the viability of NOD. The author further posits that if the above conditions cannot be fulfilled, NOD is still possible under one unique circumstance—when a state enjoys the security provided by a strong strategic alliance.

(1) Defensible Geography

Geography determines the attractiveness and susceptibility of a country to attacks by potential aggressors. Natural barriers in the form of mountain ranges or water bodies form fortifications upon which a country's defensive military posture can be based. This is best characterised by New Zealand. New Zealand is situated in a remote corner of the Pacific Ocean, at least a thousand miles away from its nearest neighbour and strategic ally, Australia. New Zealand's remoteness almost all but rules out foreign invasion as a plausible threat. This has translated into New Zealand's steadfast commitment to NOD. The Strategic Defence Policy Statement of New Zealand published in 2018 continued to articulate the Defence Forces' ability to detect, deter and counter threats to New Zealand's territorial integrity and sovereignty as one of its key defence outcomes.¹⁵ However, complex disruptors that transcend physical distance such as climate change, developments in the cyber and space domains, terrorism and nuclear proliferation were given more attention as security threats to the country as opposed to the threat of invasion from a conventional adversary.¹⁶ As such, New Zealand continues to maintain an order of battle with no offensive

capabilities such as fighter aircraft, main battle tanks, destroyers.

Geography determines the attractiveness and susceptibility of a country to attacks by potential aggressors.

Natural barriers must be conceptually distinguished from possessing strategic depth. The first is determined by geographic features such as impassable mountain while the latter is conferred purely by land size. Strategic depth offers advantages to the defender, as the amount of force that an attacker can project is reduced considerably if it has to travel a long distance just to reach the defender.¹⁷ However, a state cannot rely solely upon strategic depth to defend itself, as witnessed by the invasion of Russia by Germany in World War II (WWII).

In this discussion of geography, physical geography is given more importance than human geography. Some authors on NOD have incorrectly identified ethnic or ideological homogeneity as pre-conditions necessary for the fostering of strong



German Invasion of Russia in 1941.

nationalistic sentiments, which in turn fuels popular resistance against would-be aggressors.¹⁸ This view is deeply misguided and ignores the many examples of pluralistic nation-states which include the mobilisation of all aspects of society in their national defence strategies. Examples include Switzerland's concept of general defence which includes the entire population, and Singapore's total defence which encompasses military, civil, economic, social, psychological and digital defence.¹⁹ Rather than homogeneity, a high degree of socio-political cohesion is necessary for states which wish to pursue NOD.²⁰

(2) Benign Strategic Environment

Two elements of a country's strategic environment encourages the adoption of NOD. They are: (1) location in a strategically benign environment, and (2) lack of major power conflicts or strategic interest.²¹ A strategically benign environment is defined as the absence of neighbours who harbour aggressive intentions. New Zealand once again serves as an excellent case study of this factor. While regional developments in Southeast Asia and even further afield in China and North Korea have been cited as having implications on New Zealand's security outlook, New Zealand's situation in the peaceful neighbourhood of the South Pacific has enabled it to adopt NOD as a defence strategy. NOD would not have been viable if New Zealand had aggressive neighbours capable of and wishing to launch a war of aggression against it, as movement towards NOD is dangerous when viewed by an aggressive adversary as a sign of weakness.²²

On other hand, NOD has also remained viable for Switzerland despite its location in the historically tumultuous region of Western Europe because it serves little strategic interest. This is explained by Collins who postulates that a state is less likely to feel threatened by external aggression if its geography is of no interest to a power or belligerents in a conflict.²³ This postulation is vindicated by Switzerland's non-involvement in WWII.

(3) Neutral and Predictable Foreign Policy

The last determining factor of the viability of NOD is the way in which the country in question conducts its foreign policy. According to Roberts, a successful

defensive posture is predicated on 'conducting foreign policy in a consistent, cautious and responsible manner over a long period.'²⁴ This stems from the argument that the security dilemma arises not only from the ambiguity of the adversary's military intentions, but also from foreign policy intentions.²⁵ Hence, NOD is demonstrated not only through a state's military doctrine but also its political intentions.²⁶ In other words, the overall offensiveness or defensiveness of a state's security strategy is signalled through both its military order of battle and the way it conducts its international relations.

SWITZERLAND — AN EXEMPLAR FOR NOD

While New Zealand and Switzerland have both been discussed as examples of countries for which NOD is viable, New Zealand's NOD is largely predicated on its geographical remoteness, a luxury few countries can afford. As such, Switzerland has been chosen for further analysis because it has been uniquely successful in avoiding war since 1815 despite its location in Europe.

NOD in the context of Switzerland cannot be discussed without first addressing the country's offensive capabilities. In his criticism of NOD, Gates points out that Switzerland's main battle tanks are proof that a defensive system is 'impossible even for a country blessed with geography.'²⁷ However, Swiss tanks and fighter aircraft are not incompatible with NOD; they simply form a strategy of deterrence-by-denial by setting a high price for would-be invaders.²⁸ Besides, pure defence is near to impossible as one's adversaries would be free to act as it chooses if one is purely defensive and projects no offensive threat at all.²⁹ Given the history of European armed conflict, it would naive for Switzerland to adopt a purely defensive posture. Instead, it has chosen to maintain some offensive capabilities for the sole purpose of repelling attackers, while relying largely on passive defences such as anti-aircraft missiles, early-warning radar systems and obstacles against tanks.³⁰

Switzerland's non-offensive military posture is enabled by the trinity of factors outlined in the previous section. First, even though Switzerland is not a large country, it enjoys the protection of the Swiss Alps which form a natural barrier against invaders. Second,

the importance of strategic environment is highlighted by Switzerland's experience in WWII. While the neighbourhood of Europe was anything but benign in WWII, Switzerland's lack of primary strategic significance and raw materials were contributing factors in Germany's decision not to invade Switzerland.³¹ Lastly and most importantly, Switzerland's NOD is underpinned by an overarching foreign policy posture of neutrality that is 'consistent, non-assertive and predictable'.³² This is backed by a commitment not to take sides in international conflict and denying right of transit for foreign forces.³³ A unique combination of three factors have allowed Switzerland to maintain its policy of 'armed neutrality'.³⁴

Switzerland's NOD is underpinned by an overarching foreign policy posture of neutrality that is 'consistent, non-assertive and predictable'. This is backed by a commitment not to take sides in international conflict and denying right of transit for foreign forces.

While the case study of Switzerland proves that NOD is viable if the necessary geographical, strategic environmental and foreign policy pre-conditions are met, it also serves as a reminder that NOD must be based on an overall coherent defensive stance backed by neutral foreign policy, rather than a paucity of offensive capabilities in one's inventory.

SWEDEN — A CASE AGAINST NOD

Like Switzerland, Sweden's policy of armed neutrality has enabled it to avoid war since the Napoleonic Wars. However, compared to Switzerland, Sweden's less defensible geography, tenuous strategic environment and wavering foreign policy all mean that NOD is less viable as a national security strategy. These factors, especially the evolving strategic environment, have culminated in Sweden's readjustment of its approach towards defence in recent years.

While Sweden stands as the fifth largest country in Europe, it also has one of the longest coastlines in Europe, which is not easily defended.³⁵ The difference in geography between the country's northern and southern regions has necessitated a variable NOD system. Territorial defence is to be sufficient in the landlocked Northern region bordered by Finland and Norway, while deterrence-with-punishment led by the air and navy is required in the South with its long coastline along the Baltic Sea.³⁶ While defence of the South involves more offensive capabilities, Sweden's overall military posture can still be described as defensive with a focus on territorial defence near to its borders.³⁷



Russian BMP-2 from the 58th Army in South Ossetia, Georgia.

Swedish policymakers were so confident in the lack of military threats that the country underwent massive self-disarmament in the 1980s which saw the wartime strength of the army reduced by 95% and that of the navy and air force by 70%, scraping of conscription in 2010 and the steady reduction of spending on defence from 2% in 1990 to 1% in 2016.³⁸ However, Sweden's evolving strategic environment has been a key factor in the country's recent rethinking of its NOD policy. Sweden was forced to acknowledge a 'dramatic' shift in the strategic environment of Europe and the Baltic Sea first with the invasion of Georgia by Russia in 2008 and then again in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by Russia.³⁹ This was exacerbated by the fact that Sweden's location as a strategically important outpost in the Baltic Sea meant that there would be a rush for Swedish territory if conflict were to break out in the Baltics.⁴⁰ As a result, Sweden has been forced to consider membership in NATO while



Wikipedia/JMSDF

JS Izumo, an Izumo-class helicopter destroyer being refitted to carry F-35B stealth fighters

increasing military co-operation with NATO, Finland and the United States (US), while simultaneously rebuilding its military capabilities with a US \$1.2 Billion increase in the defence budget from 2016 to 2020.⁴¹

While Switzerland's unassailable neutrality forms the foundation upon which its NOD policy is built, the same cannot be said about Sweden as its activist foreign policy is in constant tension with its policy of NOD.⁴² In the aftermath of WWII, as a member of the United Nations (UN), Sweden chose to apply its neutrality when the UN Security Council agreed on sanctions.⁴³ During the Cold War, while Sweden maintained a facade of neutrality by resisting membership in NATO, discreet agreements were made on how NATO would come to the aid of Sweden if it were invaded by the USSR.⁴⁴ After the end of the Cold War, Sweden's membership in the European Union (EU), NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, and its thriving arms export industry all called Sweden's self-proclaimed neutrality to question, as did the 2009 parliamentary declaration of military solidarity with any EU or Baltic state that comes under attack.⁴⁵

While these developments in Sweden's military capabilities and alliances do not signal abandonment of NOD in its entirety, they signal a grudging yet urgent acknowledgement by Sweden that a weak defensive

posture is no longer sufficient to ensure national security and sovereignty. While it be a stretch to presume that Sweden will discard NOD entirely in the future, one cannot ignore the small but gradual moves that it is making towards strengthening its offences.

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES — CASE STUDY OF JAPAN

The above section outlined the three conditions necessary for NOD to be viable as a national strategy, and illustrated why all three conditions must be met simultaneously using the case study of Switzerland. However, NOD success stories like Switzerland are few and far between. Does this then mean that NOD is a largely unworkable concept? At this point, the author puts forth a fourth condition for consideration—NOD is viable for countries which find themselves without the benefits of defensible geography or a benign strategic environment if they are part of a powerful security alliance. Japan will be used as example to illustrate this.

Despite a sizeable fighter fleet and the refitting of the Izumo and Kaga helicopter destroyers to carry F-35Bs, the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) is no misnomer.⁴⁶ While it cannot be said that Japan's capabilities are purely defensive, Japan has significant defensive limits, most notably its lack of conventional first strike or counteroffensive capability.⁴⁷ The Izumo

and Kaga helicopter destroyers currently carry only short-range self-defence missiles, and its modern fleet of fighters is warranted by the frequent intrusion of Japan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) by Russian and Chinese aircraft.⁴⁸ Then Prime Minister Abe had maintained that Japan remained committed to the 'defense-only doctrine' and was completely reliant on the US's strike capabilities, including nuclear capabilities.⁴⁹ In the face of aggression from North Korean, tensions with China and wariness of Russia, Japan is only able to maintain a defensive posture because of its security alliance with the US provided for under the 1951 US-Japan Security Treaty and the updated 2015 Guidelines for Co-operation.⁵⁰ In the unlikely event that Japan loses the comprehensive

defence provided by the US umbrella, there is no doubt Japan will pursue an offensive stance to ensure its defence.

CONCLUSION

The concept of NOD has been the subject of much debate between advocates and critics. This essay has acknowledged the arguments for and against NOD and illustrated how NOD is viable only under very specific conditions such as those enjoyed by Switzerland. This essay has also presented Sweden as an example of how national security strategy cannot remain static and must evolve with changes in one's strategic environment, even if NOD as a national strategy has worked well in the past.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Apps, Peter, "Commentary: Why neutral, peaceful Sweden is preparing for war," *Channel Newsasia*. 4 Jul 2016. Accessed Apr 26, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sweden-reintroduce-national-service-preparing-for-war-10292000>
- Butfoy, Andrew, "Offence-Defence theory and the security dilemma: The problem with marginalizing the context" *Contemporary Security Policy* 18, No. 3 (1997): 38-58.
- Buzan, Barry, "Does NOD have a Future in the Post-Cold War World," ed. Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg *Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century* (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): 24-27.
- Carlqvist, Ingrid, "Sweden: the Defense that Disappeared," *Gatestone Institute*, Aug 7, 2015. Accessed Apr 30, 2019, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6287/sweden-military>
- Collins, John M, *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1998): 285-297.
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs, "The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance in Strategy and Public Opinion," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Jul 6, 2019. Accessed Apr 29, 2019, <https://www.fia.fi/en/publications/the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden?read>.
- Fischer, Thomas and Daniel Mockli, "The Limits of Compensation Swiss Neutrality Policy in the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, No. 4 (2016), 12-35.
- Gady, Franz-Stefan, "Japan approves Plans to Convert Izumo-Class Into F-35-Carrying Aircraft Carriers," *The Diplomat*, Dec 19, 2018. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/japan-approves-plans-to-convertizumo-class-into-f-35-carrying-aircraft-carriers/>.
- Glaser, Charles L. and Kaufmann, Chiam, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?," *International Security* 22, No.4 (1998): 64-65.
- Hashim, Ahmed S, "Security Dilemma, Offensive-Defense Theory, and Non-Offensive Defense Theory," (Lecture, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, SAFTI Military Institute. Singapore. Mar 30, 2019).
- Hertz, John, *Political Realism and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities*. (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951)
- Jervis, Robert, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, No. 2 (1978): 167-214.
- Kokoshin, Andrei A, and Larionov, Valentin, "Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations", in ed, *Non-Provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies*, Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989): 35-44
- Layton, Peter, "Commentary: Japan's very busy and stretched fighter jet force," *Channel News Asia*, Apr 11, 2019. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/japan-f35-busy-fighter-jet-air-self-defence-force-11424940>
- Ministry of Defence, "The 5 Pillars of Total Defence," *Ministry of Defence* https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_website/topics/totaldefence/about_us/5_Pillars.html
- Moller, Bjorn, *Common Security and Non-offensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991): 20-23.
- Moller, Bjorn and Wiberg, Hakan, *Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century*. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994): 23-24.
- Moller, Bjorn, Gustav Daniker, Shmuel Limone and Ioannis A. Stivachtis, *Non-offensive defence in the Middle East* (New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication, 1998): 7.
- Nikkei Asian Review* "Abe denies shift to offensive weapons policy" *Nikkei Asian Review*, Jan 26, 2018. Accessed Apr 18, 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Abe-denies-shift-to-offensive-weapons-policy>
- Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982)

Roberts, Adam, "Britain and non-nuclear defence," in *Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy*, ed. John Baylis (London: Macmillan, 1983): 30

Roblin, Sebastien, "China's Worst Nightmare: Japan's Navy Armed Aircraft Carriers and F35s," *National Interest*, Dec 20, 2018. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-worst-nightmare-japans-navy-armed-aircraft-carriers-and-f-35s-39257>.

Swiss Info, "Armed Neutrality," Swiss Info, Nov 29, 2016 accessed May 2, 2019, <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/armed-neutrality/29289102>

Teo, Kay Leng Derek, "The Viability of Non-Offensive Defense as a Strategy for National Security," Pointer (2012): Assessed Apr 30, 2019. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/content/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2012/v38n4/_jcr_content/imindefPars/download/file.res/V38N4%20UPLOAD%20TO%20INTERNET%20BINDER.pdf

Vervloet, Fjodor, "Swedish Neutrality in the Cold War," 30 May 2014. Accessed Apr 24, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/26214585/Swedish_Neutrality_in_the_Cold_War

Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma," *Dilemmas of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and N.J. Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 30

Wiseman, Geoffrey *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security* (New York: Palgrave, 2002): 5

Xu, Beina, "The US-Japan Security Alliance" Council on Foreign Relations, Jul 1, 2014. Accessed Apr 25, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>

ENDNOTES

1. Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg, *Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century*. (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994): 23-24.
2. Bjorn Moller, *Common Security and Non-offensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1991): 20-23.
3. Ibid.; Andrei A. Kokoshin and Valentin Larionov, "Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations", in ed, *Non-Provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies*, Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989): 35-44
4. John Hertz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities*. (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951)
5. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, No. 2 (1978): 167-214.
6. Ibid.
7. Moller et al., *Non-offensive defence in the Middle East* (New York and Geneva: United Nations Publication, 1998): 7
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Barry Buzan, "Does NOD have a Future in the Post-Cold War World," ed. Bjorn Moller and Hakan Wiberg *Non Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century* (London and Boulder: Westview Press, 1994): 24-27.
11. Geoffrey Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security* (New York; Palgrave, 2002): 5
12. Moller et al., *Non-offensive defence in the Middle East*. 7.
13. Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982)
14. Moller et al., *Non-offensive defence in the Middle East*, 50.
15. *Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Policy Statement 2018* (Wellington, 2018)

16. Ibid.
17. Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?", *International Security* 22, No.4 (1998): 64-65.
18. Teo Kay Leng Derek, "The Viability of Non-Offensive Defense as a Strategy for National Security," Pointer (2012): Assessed Apr 30, 2019. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/content/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2012/v38n4/_jcr_content/imindefPars/download/file.res/V38N4%20UPLOAD%20TO%20INTERNET%20BINDER.pdf
19. Wiseman. *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 20. "The 5 Pillars of Total Defence," *Ministry of Defence* https://www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/mindef_website/topics/totaldefence/about_us/5_Pillars.html
20. Ibid.
21. Ahmed S. Hashim, "Security Dilemma, Offensive-Defense Theory, and Non-Offensive Defense Theory," (Lecture, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, SAFTI Military Institute. Singapore. Mar 30, 2019).
22. Andrew Butfoy "Offence-Defence theory and the security dilemma: The problem with marginalizing the context" *Contemporary Security Policy* 18, No. 3 (1997): 38-58.
23. John M. Collins, *Military Geography for Professionals and the Public* (Washington DC: Brassey's, 1998): 285-297.
24. Adam Roberts, "Britain and non-nuclear defence," in *Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy*, ed, John Baylis (London: Macmillan, 1983): 30
25. Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma," *Dilemmas of World Politics*, ed. John Baylis and NJ. Rengger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): 30
26. Bjorn Moller, *Common Security und Non-Offensive Defense – A Neorealist Perspective* (London: UCL Press Limited. 1992): 1-3.
27. David Gates, *Non-offensive Defence: an alternative strategy for NATO* (London: Macmillan, 1991): 30-40.
28. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*. 135.
29. Gideon Y. Akavia, "Defensive Defence and the Nature of Armed Conflict." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 14: 27-48.
30. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 249.
31. Buzan, *Does NOD have a Future in Post-Cold War World*, 59.
32. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 360.
33. "Armed Neutrality," Swiss Info, Nov 29, 2016 accessed May 2, 2019, <https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/armed-neutrality/29289102>
34. Ibid.
35. Ingrid Carlqvist, "Sweden: the Defense that Disappeared," *Gatestone Institute*, Aug 7, 2015. Accessed Apr 30, 2019, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6287/sweden-military>
36. Gates, *Non-offensive Defence: an alternative strategy for NATO*, 69.
37. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 280.
38. "The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance in Strategy and Public Opinion," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Jul 6, 2018. Accessed Apr 29, 2019, <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden?read>.

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid, <https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6287/sweden-military>
41. "The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance in Strategy and Public Opinion," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Jul 6, 2019. Accessed Apr 29, 2019, <https://www.fia.fi/en/publications/the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden?read.>; Peter Apps, "Commentary: Why neutral, peaceful Sweden is preparing for war," *Channel Newsasia*. 4 Jul 2016. Accessed Apr 26, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sweden-reintroduce-national-service-preparing-for-war-10292000>
42. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 122.
43. Thomas Fischer and Daniel Mockli, "The Limits of Compensation Swiss Neutrality Policy in the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, No. 4 (2016), 12-35.
44. Fjodor Vervloet, "Swedish Neutrality in the Cold War," 30 May 2014. Accessed Apr 24, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/26214585/Swedish_Neutrality_in_the_Cold_War
45. "The Defence of Finland and Sweden: Continuity and Variance in Strategy and Public Opinion," *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, Jul 6, 2019. Accessed Apr 29, 2019, <https://www.fia.fi/en/publications/the-defence-of-finland-and-sweden?read.>; Peter Apps, "Commentary: Why neutral, peaceful Sweden is preparing for war," *Channel Newsasia*. 4 Jul 2016. Accessed Apr 26, 2018, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/sweden-reintroduce-national-service-preparing-for-war-10292000>
46. Franz-Stefan Gady, "Japan approves Plans to Convert Izumo-Class Into F-35-Carrying Aircraft Carriers," *The Diplomat*, Dec 19, 2018. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/japan-approves-plans-to-convertizumo-class-into-f-35-carrying-aircraft-carriers/>.
47. Wiseman, *Concepts of Non-provocative Defense: Ideas and Practices in International Security*, 150.
48. Sebastien Roblin, "China's Worst Nightmare: Japan's Navy Armed Aircraft Carriers and F35s," *National Interest*, Dec 20, 2018. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-worst-nightmare-japans-navy-armed-aircraft-carriers-and-f-35s-39257>.

Peter Layton, "Commentary: Japan's very busy and stretched fighter jet force," *Channel News Asia*, Apr 11, 2019. Accessed May 1, 2019, <https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/commentary/japan-f35-busy-fighter-jet-air-self-defence-force-11424940>
49. "Abe denies shift to offensive weapons policy" *Nikkei Asian Review*, Jan 26, 2018. Accessed Apr 18, 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Abe-denies-shift-to-offensive-weapons-policy>
50. Beina Xu, "The US-Japan Security Alliance" Council on Foreign Relations, Jul 1, 2014. Accessed Apr 25, 2019, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance>



LTC Goh Nichola is a Senior Force Transformation Officer in Joint Plans and Transformation Department. She is an Air Warfare Officer (Air Traffic Control) by training and was previously Officer Commanding of 203 Squadron. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, and an Master of Science in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics and Political Science.