



SAF PROFESSIONAL READING LIST : TRI-SERVICE WARFIGHTER COURSE

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INTRODUCTION

1. Nurturing first class people in a world-class organisation is one of the key thrusts under the O.N.E. SAF framework. This would require us to strengthen our professionalism, create knowledge and build the necessary leadership competencies. One of the measures undertaken by SAFTI MI to strengthen the professionalism of our officer corps is to inculcate a spirit of life-long, self directed learning and a good reading habit which includes the promulgation of a SAF Professional Reading List (PRL).

SAF PROFESSIONAL READING LIST: RATIONALE

2. The SAF Professional Reading List (PRL) was devised to cultivate and stimulate the reading habit of SAF officers/learners attending the four ROA courses in SAFTI MI. This Reading List was also formulated to provide SAF officers/learners some insights into the thinking and vision of our senior political and military leadership, past and present and to get them thinking and discussing military-related issues with the help of review questions.

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3. The SAF PRL consists of 4 segments with each segment comprising 5 to 6 short articles (speech, journal article, or book extract). For Tri-Service Warfighter Course (TSWC), the PRL theme is Professionalism and Leadership. It is important that an officer at this stage of his/her career reflects deeply upon the challenge of being a professional soldier and a leader-warrior. This will place him/her to be in a better position to lead and motivate the men/women under his/her charge.

4. The following articles comprise the TSWC segment of the SAF PRL:

- a. Desmond Kuek, "Rising to Army 21: Adding Values, Holding Values"
(see ANNEX A).

- b. Lee Hsien Loong, “Professionalism in the SAF” (see **ANNEX B**).
 - c. Neo Kian Hong, “Values Based Leadership in the SAF” (see **ANNEX C**).
 - d. Ng Chee Khern, “Effective Leadership: Contextual and Invariant Dimensions” (see **ANNEX D**).
 - e. Tan Kim Seng, “Trends Towards Careerism in the SAF — Where Does our Profession Lie?” (see **ANNEX E**).
 - f. Carl E. Vuono, “Professionalism and the Army of the 1990s” (see **ANNEX F**).
5. Two review questions for this theme are provided below to guide officers in their reading and to provide focus as follows:
- a. How can we enhance professionalism in the SAF?
 - b. Why are values important in a professional organisation like the SAF?
6. We hope you have an insightful reading!

MILITARY STUDIES BRANCH
CENTRE FOR LEARNING AND MILITARY EDUCATION

Rising To Army 21: Adding Values, Holding Values

BG Desmond Kuek
POINTER, 1999, V25N3

"The joy of a journey is not only in the destination, but more importantly, in the camaraderie of having walked it together."

In rising to the challenges of the Army in the 21st century, our focus remains the hearts and minds of our people¹ Army 21 is more a journey than a destination. A journey which we have to walk together. A journey we hope to begin today. There will be choices to be made and challenges to overcome. Decisions made — individually and collectively — will impact not only the course that is taken, but also the end state. Like any journey, there will be uncertainties and discomfort. Having a clear vision of where we want to go will keep us motivated, focused and directed.

MAPPING THE ARMY 21 ENVIRONMENT

The Army 21 environment will be dynamic. The external geopolitical scene is likely to continue to be unpredictable. The pace of technological change will increase, and we will lag behind if we are not prepared to fully embrace it; or suffer organisational indigestion if we cannot fully assimilate it.

The Army will be called upon to handle a greater variety and complexity of tasks. These include a spectrum of operations other than war. It will call for mental agility, and flexibility in our force structure, training and doctrine. We will need to be ready to do more with what we have, and be innovative to overcome our limited resources of manpower, money, time and training land.

Our people, whether regular or national serviceman, will be more discerning. Aspirations and expectations will be higher. We will need to manage them, and work towards strengthening our value system so that Army 21 can be a cohesive and committed force.

COMMAND CHALLENGES AND PARADIGMS

These environmental trends set the backdrop against which we must rise to meet the challenges of Army 21. Underlying the Army 21 plans are a set of competing demands and command challenges which have to be reconciled. I have listed seven:

- Moving Fast — Staying Firm
- Standardising the Individual — Individualising the Standards
- Taking Orders — Thinking Minds
- Inspiring the Best — Caring for the Rest
- Emphasising the Basics — Developing the Advanced
- Multi-tasking — Specialisation
- Effective Centralisation — Efficient Decentralisation

They are inherent tensions, with no easy answers. Finding the right balance and mix to these competing demands at the individual and organisational levels will shape our Army into the 21st century.

MOVING FAST — STAYING FIRM

The need to move fast to respond to changes in the operational environment, deal with domestic challenges and keep pace with technological advances is already well understood. We need to be a force that is dynamic and daring in outlook, ever willing to change tack and move ahead at best speed. Moving fast, however, can cause great turbulence in the rank and file. Change always unsettles. If we are not careful, we could be like the proverbial rolling stone that gathers no moss. Proponents of the importance of standing firm would say that consolidation would allow the organisation to stabilise and create a better climate of confidence as people are given time to establish themselves.

Into the 21st century, we need to be able to moderate between the need to move fast and build a firm foundation at the same time.

A couple of illustrations will show that they can and must co-exist. Army 21 will require us to move fast to exploit information technology to the fullest. This will enable quicker work processes, flatter structures and greater situational awareness. It will allow us to achieve our mission more effectively and efficiently. However, we cannot protect our national sovereignty by fighting in cyberspace. Real power and deterrence still lies at the trigger end of a gun barrel, and to ensure that the Army's key mission components can still be fulfilled, we must stand firm and committed to operationalising the firepower and manoeuvre aspects of land warfare; and in strengthening the mental and physical toughness of our soldiers. The WOSE 21 study² is another example. We will need to move fast and boldly enough to attract

and retain quality people in the face of a private sector pull. New initiatives are being studied but whatever these changes, we will need to stay firm in our emphasis on providing sufficient grounding in their route of advancement so that a professional corps can be built up and maintained.

Understanding the need to stay ahead of the competition, and of societal changes, gives us the imperative to move fast. Understanding the need for professionalism and discipline in the Army mandates us to stand firm on core issues and fundamentals which underpin our mission.

STANDARDISING THE INDIVIDUAL — INDIVIDUALISING THE STANDARDS

Armies all over the world have tended to standardise the individual, regardless of his/her background or potential. One good reason is that it is cost effective. In addition, if the assumption is that the base is reasonably homogeneous, then the other good reason is that it is also efficient. There are down-sides to this. The price to pay for standardisation can include an erosion of morale, loss of individual initiative, and our inability to optimise the innate potential of individuals. Also, for standards to be realistic in a large population base, they are usually pegged at a reasonable average rather than at an exceptional level. The danger is mediocrity.

On the other hand, to individualise standards is a bit of a contradiction in terms. What is the standard if we accept all kinds of individual yardsticks? Standards by definition imply some uniformity. To over-emphasise individuality may also compromise the secondary goal of National Service serving as an effective socialisation and nation-building tool.

Increasingly, we will need to be able to maximise the potential of each individual, without sacrificing system efficiency and effectiveness. The answer lies in making a distinction between the means and the ends. We must not compromise on high standards, but we should and must vary the methods used to achieve these standards. Allowing space for alternative approaches but not compromising standards and targets is the key for Army 21.

The Army 21 initiative for dual-tracking of our regular officers is an illustration of this challenge. We need not narrow ourselves to only one career development path for all, nor in defining the same measure of success for all. Clearly, we are better off with a variety of career development paths to suit the strengths and inclinations of different individuals, and allow our officers alternative specialist routes along which they can work their way towards realising their full potential and achieving their measure of success.

TAKING ORDERS — THINKING MINDS

We want both. We want obedience and discipline, and at the same time, strong initiative and a questioning mind. The challenge is how to nurture both at the same time.

Like all Armies, we will continue to value discipline and unquestioning obedience to orders. This is ostensibly to prepare against fear and fire in the battlefield; and because of the need to integrate individuals collectively as a team in a short time.

However, the battlefield of tomorrow will be increasingly sophisticated, and age-old methods may no longer be relevant or effective. We need to constantly challenge the methods that we may have grown accustomed to, and look for better ways to do things, even if the old methods still work. We are well placed to do so. Our manpower resource is increasingly better educated, our soldiers are increasingly and intelligently vocal, and this is a strength which should be harnessed in Army 21. A large National Service base also lends itself to a rich cross-pollination of ideas and practices from the private and commercial worlds.

Eventually we must strive towards a new paradigm on discipline: the discipline of the questioning mind. This is the only way to build a learning organisation and enhance the store of knowledge capital to ensure that Army 21 remains professionally competent and progressive.

We need therefore to continue to refine our training system to further enhance the process of understanding the intent and underlying considerations behind a task, and not only the how and what to do. It is more important to explain the "why" in a mission than to specify the "what". Subordinate commands who see a better way to do things have an equal responsibility to highlight this to the higher command. This is an ethic which must permeate peacetime training, staff work and operations.

INSPIRING THE BEST — CARING FOR THE REST

We need to inspire our best to give of their best; and at the same time also motivate and care for the others, including those who may fail while trying. To have a climate of innovation and a spirit of daring initiative, we need a command culture that accepts failure as part of the learning process.

Here we make a distinction between failure due to lack of effort, failure due to incompetence, and so-called "failure" due to innovative attempts to overcome an uncertain environment. Of the first, the saying goes that "the only way to avoid making a mistake is to do nothing — but that would be the ultimate mistake". As for

failure due to incompetence, we should recognise that it is not only the individual's failure, but also our failure as commanders to anticipate and put in place support systems to better ensure his success. This is the framework of Mission-Demand-Support³ and the thrust of our "Care for Soldiers" emphasis.

The strength of Army 21 depends not only on the best and brightest to succeed. It depends on everyone to continue to try, to innovate, and to bring forth the best in their areas of work. The Officer 21 initiatives also aim to address this aspect. Only if we show care for our people, develop them to their maximum potential and allow them space to experiment and fail, can we expect them to be loyal and committed to adding value to the organisational cause.

EMPHASISING THE BASICS - DEVELOPING THE ADVANCED

Clearly we must do both. Often, the complaint is that there is not enough time, especially when the same people are caught between meeting the training requirements of a finite National Service training cycle, and supporting the demands of higher level exercises.

We have to figure out how best to achieve both requirements. Training simulation such as SIMLAB is one obvious way where higher level command exercises need not always steal unit commanders away from their primary responsibility of supervising basic low level training. We should therefore do more along this vein. Yet in a way, the two requirements are complementary. In order to move on to advanced training, we must be proficient in basic skills and drills. Equally, higher level exercises should not gloss over soldiering skills and basic fieldcraft and tactics.

While we experiment with new technologies, better equipment and more advanced systems at the macro level, we must not believe that they can entirely make up for individual soldier competencies. Back to basics and strong leadership remain vital training needs which help to enhance individual survivability and force preservation. At the same time, a feeling of individual competence will serve to heighten the soldier's confidence in his own abilities and his perception of the effectiveness of the Army.

MULTI-TASKING — SPECIALISATION

The need for organisational flexibility and the reality of our resource constraints require us to have people who can be multi-tasked. Yet advanced technology, more complicated operations, and limited training time require us to specialise.

This is a time and resource allocation issue. We could solve it if we had more people or more time - but we do not have the luxury of either. The issue is not new — we have had to face up to it in our two-year training syllabus where we know that not everything can be done to the same level of proficiency given the time constraints. What is new however is that creative training can increase the potential for multi-tasking by better optimising training time and resources. What is also new is the need to re-examine the way we allocate manpower resources. Use of technology alone cannot be the criteria for allocation. Besides asking who needs to use technology, we will now also need to ask who has the widest scope of work and needs to be most versatile? Who operates most usually under an environment of uncertainty? These then should be the vocations which need to be allocated the best resource.

As an example, a storeman may now need to be computer literate to operate IT-dependent systems. Infantry, guards or mechanised infantry vocations may turn out to be the most demanding as their operational environment would likely be fluid, requiring very responsive minds. On the other hand, other tasks, traditionally considered more technologically advanced, but also more routine in nature, could well be undertaken instead by people who demonstrate less aptitude for flexibility of mind and spirit.

EFFECTIVE CENTRALISATION — EFFICIENT DECENTRALISATION

Finally, Army 21 will compel us to consider the optimal degree of decentralisation given the requirements in the future. We have as far as possible advocated centralised planning and decentralised execution. This promotes initiative, empowers people to take on larger responsibilities, and also avoids clumsy work structures and information overload at the central decision body.

We will however be forced to challenge the conventional, and challenged to do more. The information wave will change the way we organise ourselves and the work flows which we have been accustomed. With networking, the information required for decision making would be available on demand by anyone with access. We will see networked systems with multiple decision nodes, and this will present viable alternatives to the traditionally more hierarchical system in meeting the challenges of tomorrow. In such an environment, re-centralisation may instead turn out to be more efficient especially if resource numbers are a constraint. We are already seeing the application of this with more zonal workshops and central storehouses. Decentralisation may well turn out to be more effective if better manpower quality and new decision tools through IT allow us to entrust decision-making to the lowest level capable.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the Army 21 journey is not just about new technologies, work processes or organisational systems. It is more importantly about people. It is about how we, individually and collectively, understand the competing challenges, so that we can better value add to the entire process of change in building Army 21.

How much more can we empower our subordinates given the information-rich and dynamic environment of the future? How can we develop our people both deeper and broader in their short time with us? How do we build on basics while also pushing new frontiers in training and technology? How do we create the conditions for success, yet allow space for failure? How do we inculcate the discipline of a questioning mind while keeping people within ranks and boundaries? How do we maximise individual creativity and potential without sacrificing system efficiency and effectiveness? Where do we move fast to add greater value, where should we stand firm and hold on to old values?

The seven command challenges I have highlighted are intended to provoke thought, not so much to prescribe solutions. The answers we will have to search out in our journey together, tweaking our responses in the face of uncertainty and fluidity, adding value at each stage of the way.

In this sea of change, what we must hold on to as we passage from the 20th to the 21st century remains our core values. Loyalty to country, leadership, discipline, professionalism, fighting spirit, ethics and care for soldiers — these are crucial to anchor us as we steer a decisive course towards realising the vision of Army 21.

Endnotes:

1. This speech was delivered on 8 April 1999 at the WY 99 Army Workplan Seminar.
2. This study reviews the current structure of the Warrant Officers, Specialists and Enlistees (WOSE) Corps to provide an enriching and rewarding career that is commensurate with the Army 21 Vision.
3. The Mission-Demand-Support framework: Mission — to define the mission and the goals to be achieved; Demand — to demand from the soldiers/units the required standards in order to achieve the stated mission; Support — to provide soldiers/units with the necessary and appropriate support in terms of knowledge, expertise and resources.

Speech by BG Lee Hsien Loong to SCSC Students, Commandant's Evening on Professionalism in the SAF, 28 Jun 84.

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Introduction

What will determine the quality of the SAF for the next 10 years? The professionalism of SAF officers and SNCOs. The quality of our people will be more important than the amount of money we spend, the type of training and infrastructure facilities we get, or the sophistication of the weapons we buy. We must thoroughly know our business, and function together as an effective, cohesive team.

We can never overwhelm a threat with numbers. Not because we know who our threat is and he is bigger, but because no matter who our threat is, it is hard to imagine that he could be smaller. Quantity is out of the question. It must be an article of faith, that with the SAF, quality is what counts.

Professionalism is a natural problem for us for several reasons. Firstly, as a national service army with two reserve divisions, we have to look after a large number of conscripts. Secondly, we have many reservist key appointment holders in the orbat. Their military professionalism is as important as that of the regulars.

Thirdly, there is the regular cadre itself, upon whom the viability of the entire orbat depends. Regulars tend to think, almost automatically, that we are Professionals. Yet we do not automatically become professional just because we have spent 10 years on a job. Are we really professional? That is the question I shall question in this paper.

What is Professionalism?

First, let us examine what professionalism is. There are three levels: (1) on the individual level — individual proficiency; (2) on the organisational level — system discipline; (3) also on the organisational level — macro-competence.

Individual Proficiency

We must know our business as soldiers. Whether we are artillery men fighter pilots, we must know our own arm — its capabilities and limitations, how it fits in with other arms, how we can exploit it, how to use little tricks, to get the maximum out of our forces. First principles are easy to derive. It is easy for an outsider to read

Liddell Hart, or the memoirs of Rommel, and make some sense out of it. But as professionals, we have done it ourselves, we have a feel for it, we know the very limits of our instrument.

In armed forces which have well-defined enemies, it has to go beyond that. Professional soldiers must know two other critical things inside out – the enemy, and the terrain. For us it is not so simple, because our threats are not so clearly identified, but in the first instance we must know our arm.

System Discipline

Individual proficiency is important, but I would like to concentrate more on the organisational level, because it is easy to forget that many skilled individuals do not automatically make an army. In a gang of gongfu fighters, each warrior may be very capable, but put together as a gang, they may not be very formidable. Professionalism has to manifest itself in the overall performance of the organisation.

The German General Staff up to World War II illustrates how this can happen. There is a legend that two German General Staff officers trained in the General Staff academy, separately assigned the same tactical problem, would both come up with the identical tactical solution. It illustrates the extent to which the Germans were able to indoctrinate their officers, to drill them so that they all understood and applied the same analytical tools, made the same calculations, and came out with the same result. It might never be a brilliant result, but neither will somebody fail the test because he does not know how to do the calculations. In a big organisation, ensuring a minimum is as important as having a few peaks in performance. The German war machine was able to work and fight under extreme conditions in war far better than the Allied war machine. Soldier for soldier, tank for tank, general for general, the Germans fought better, thought faster, reacted swifter, and won under equal circumstances.

Take the second battle of El Alamein, a great victory for Montgomery. Why? Look at the statistics¹ — 230,000 vs 80,000 soldiers, 3 to 1 superiority, almost DS requirements. 1,440 tanks on the Allied side, 260 on the German, plus Italian tanks, about 3 to 1; but if we count only tanks which were working and with good firepower, there were only 210 such German tanks — 6 to 1. The amazing fact is not that Montgomery won, it is that the Germans fought so well under these circumstances.

It cannot be explained in terms of individual brilliance or superhuman characteristics. It can only be explained in terms of overall organisational efficiency and competence. The German advantage was not in having better people to organize, but in being able to organise people better. Thus they out-performed others who had greater resources and talents, but could not quite put together an efficient fighting

force. We do not want to lose a war, but I would rather emulate the Germans than the Allies.

The SAF is not an organization where one man makes up his mind and everybody else follows. If it were, the problem of discipline would be simple. All we would have to do would be to do as we were told. But it is not. Instead, it is an interlocking network of cooperating decision-making agents, each one working within certain limits, having a certain freedom of action, predictability, common conventions, understandings, expectations of how everybody else in the organisation will behave. In no other way can an organisation perform efficiently, responsively and sensibly in a rapidly changing environment.

To make the network of cooperating decision-making agents work, all the agents must understand their roles, not only what they must do, but also what they must not do, and should pass along to other levels to decide. A division should be able to expect certain things of a brigade, and a brigade should be able to expect certain things of a neighbouring brigade, and of the aircraft and the ships supporting it. This will only happen if the members of the organisation work according to rules which are well-defined, although perhaps only implicitly understood and never completely formalised. A working organisation needs system discipline. If everybody is able to that, then management by exception can work.

Management by exception assumes that exceptions will be noted, reported and acted upon. If the agents in the organisation do not understand the limits of their decision-making power, then exceptions may be noted, but may not be acted upon or passed along, and the whole network will break down.

We sometimes think of an organisation as a system which will examine a problem, make some analysis of it, decide the best course of action, and carry it out. Political scientists would call this the "rational actor model" of organisational behaviour.

System discipline refers to a different way of looking at the organisation. It deals with the bureaucratic process, the norms, the cycles, the usual procedures of doing things — following the rules. Rules are not necessarily bad. The problem is how to make good rules, which people will enforce and abide by, and understand to be necessary for the existence of the organisation.

The KAL 007 case illustrates the idea of system discipline. When the aeroplane was shot down, you might have asked why the Russians did it, what their considerations were, who made the terrible decision to shoot it down. If you did so, you would have been applying the rational actor model to analyse the problem.

An alternative interpretation of such an episode would see it not as one rational or perhaps deranged actor making a crazy decision to shoot an aeroplane down, but as the unthinking workings of a complicated air defence network, possessing established rules of engagement, guidelines for consultation, for scrambling fighters, for shooting down aeroplanes. When an infringement of air space occurs, the system just goes into action like clockwork, and it is out of people's hands. I see a blip, I report to my supervisor. My supervisor looks at it, he consults his supervisor, maybe it goes two levels up. Meanwhile, the rest of the machinery cranks into motion, fighters scramble, tail the intruder, and shoot it down. It is the way the system works, inevitable and inexorable. It was an evil deed, but there was no evil man. Every person in the organisation was just doing his duty.

That is an example of system discipline malfunctioning. But without system discipline, you would have not one KAL 007, but a dozen. Well established system discipline will be the basis for macro-competence.

Macro-Competence

Macro-competence is our jargon for productivity. Productivity in the army is not about using fewer cooks to cook the same amount of food or fewer drivers to drive the same number of cars. It is the ability to deliver when we go to war. What are the goods which we must deliver at the minimum cost? Victory, for the least amount of lives and sacrifice. Victory depends on macro-competence, the ability to orchestrate large-scale activities and to react promptly to changing situations. The SAF must respond swiftly and sensibly to threats, and cope with them before they can cope with it. It depends on the individual competence of the officers, and on the system discipline rules being well understood and well exploited by the high command.

Here is an example of macro-competence. In SCSC exercises, students draw lines and analyse courses of action. We have had this debate before, do we plan in detail and examine every move which our subordinate formations make, or do we plan in general, just establish thrust lines, and leave our subordinate formations to get on with the job as best they can contrive? These are two opposing basic philosophies. The Israelis do one, the Americans do the other. We follow the Israelis.

The argument for thrust lines is that we give him maximum flexibility. It is up to him. He is applying his mind to the problem more than we can afford to, so he will come up with a better solution than we can. We do not constraint him, or set him unnecessary limitations.

The argument for planning in detail is quite a subtle one. I once heard it expounded by an Israeli officer: "It is not that I do not trust my subordinate, but if I

constrain him I know exactly what he is going to do, and I know that he will try his best to conform to the plan. When changes are necessary I can change because I know exactly where he is, what the situation is and what options are open to me. I can issue new orders, and he can amend his plans and carry on. If I just give him a thrust line, when the situation changes and I want to reshuffle my forces, I will be spending the next three hours asking people where their forces are, what they are doing, whether they will be available for the new mission, whether I can change the plan in the following way. I am willing to sacrifice flexibility at the low level in order to gain flexibility at the high level. In war, it is high level flexibility which counts." That is macro-competence.

ARE WE PROFESSIONAL?

Where do we stand? Let me tell you my personal view. I shall be frank, and highlight shortcomings. Although I do not say so, in fact many things are going well, so do not conclude after this that we are in a desperate state. Nevertheless, look at the facts as they are.

Individual Proficiency

Our officers are trained on many courses. But there are things which we cannot learn on courses no matter how long we spend on them, which we have to learn on the job, but not by osmosis alone. We think that we gradually absorb knowledge from the environment through practical experience, working, informal contacts, and a few training exercises, but informal unconscious absorption for a military officer is insufficient. It will not make a general. What we learn on courses does not necessarily deepen and get further assimilated as time passes. Unless we work at it, it dissipates and disappears. We are left with a vague memory that we have learnt this before, we think we know it, but we really do not. Although we study very hard on our courses, the great pity of it is that after we have gone into our jobs training troops and running battalions, we no longer are learning in any systematic way. Wearing a collar dot must not be like wearing an airborne badge. When we wear an airborne badge, it may not mean our parachuting skills are current. It may only mean we once attended an airborne course. But when we wear artillery collar dots, it must not only mean we once attended an artillery course.

Recently, the Artillery introduced an officer professional validation system, much to the consternation of the artillery officers who now have to validate their competence, to prove that they can still calculate trajectories, work out gun deployment drills, and figure out support orders. It was done not to embarrass anybody, or to pass or fail anybody, but so that the officers would be able to get a self-assessment of how good they were.

Many of the officers came soberly to the conclusion that they would have to study much more, to master the techniques, formal knowledge, things which we cannot pick up just by sheer cleverness alone, or work out from first principles. There are facts to know, procedures to be familiar with, precedents to be aware of, experiences which other people have accumulated, which we cannot possibly duplicate or guess the conclusion of just by meditation and introspection.

Therefore to become truly professional officers, we must work at it while we are on the job. We must work at it, we must help our subordinates work at it, and our superiors must help us work at it. There is a lot of scope for improvement on that score.

The second point on individual proficiency concerns learning tactics. We are learning the rules of the game, but we have not learned combinations of the game. What we do in SCSC are the rules and principles. "If I want to mount an attack, these are my considerations: (1) I must have my forces concentrated; (2) I must have supplies; (3) I must be able to take the enemy from his weaker flank; (4) I must exploit onwards." The combinations of the game are the tricks, how to make a completely unexpected move, how to sacrifice a battalion to win the battle. We have not become so familiar with our tools that we can spring these tricks on a completely unsuspecting enemy.

It is very difficult to do this on a course. So much time is needed to study the principles. Even if we worked on all our weekends, we would not be able to go far beyond that into developing combinations and becoming master tacticians. Neither could we extend SCSC to a one and a half year programme to teach all these things. We must learn while doing other jobs. Is it inevitable that when we are very busy doing our jobs, we have no time to learn?

Henry Kissinger made the point in his memoirs that most people come to high office with a fixed stock of intellectual capital. As they go along it drains away, because everyday they are crisis-managing, dealing with some crazy dictator, flying off to a far corner of the world, humouring the president, going up to Capitol Hill, etc. They never finish doing these things, and at the end of the day, they are very tired, but not very much wiser. If you really want to become wiser, and do all this, come well prepared and then go on. I would draw a different conclusion. Our officers are like senior administrators in the US government. We run around very busily, but we do not become very much wiser. But it is not that we must start with a bigger stock of capital. We must run around less, be less busy, learn better while we are working, and develop as we go along. We are not in the top administrative echelon. There is still time for us to learn.

System Discipline

How do we rate in terms of system discipline? There are three points. First, doctrines. One of the key ingredients of tight system discipline is to have doctrines which are widely known, understood and implemented. It does not mean everybody agrees with them, but everybody understands what he is expected to do, and knows when he deviates that he is doing something different. The doctrine is what negotiators and diplomats would call a 'single negotiating text'. There is one document put together, published, formalised, which everybody can study, criticize and propose amendments to. When we propose an amendment we formulate the language, debate the merits of the case and finally if we change the language, we know we have consciously altered the doctrine.

We have ideas on how to do things. We have concepts on how to operate division headquarters, fighter squadrons, and naval task groups, but in many cases we do not have a single negotiating text. Those of you who are proficient in your own arms will realise how often we are like two armour officers, who have between them three armour doctrines.

The second point on system discipline is exception reporting. Somehow exception reporting does not run with the certainty that it ought to. Two examples, without prejudice to anybody, will illustrate this point.

One is the case of a rubella outbreak in one of our camps. We heard about it not because the system reported it, but because a reporter rang up from the newspapers to say "I hear there are a lot of soldiers in Middleton Hospital. Have you got a German measles outbreak?" We checked it out, and indeed we had got a German measles outbreak. We spent the next three weeks coping with it. So something significant to the central management of the organisation had happened, but it had not been perceived as such by the decision-makers in direct contact with the problem, who were coping as best they could. They felt that this was something they could manage, not an exception which needed to be reported further up. It does not mean that they were wrong, it means that there was a difference in perception as to what constituted a significant exception. HQ thought that it was, they thought they could cope. Common expectations were not fully achieved.

A second example of exception reporting was the remarkable epidemic of finger-chopping. Soldiers chopped off their index fingers so they could not shoot, therefore they were downgraded to PES 3, were immediately exempted from being combat soldiers, became GD men serving in the Mess and were sent out of the Army without reserve liability. About 20 soldiers did this before we realized what was going on. Some of them actually got through the system.

The amazing thing is that the direct superiors knew it was significant, and yet somehow our reporting chain was so fragile that this information could not go up, across, down to the medical people who downgraded, to the manpower people who acted on this information and issued the posting orders. The people were not negligent or incompetent. These were all able, hardworking people, working the system. But the system made it very hard for all of them to be properly coordinated, for all their expectations to work, and not to have arguments afterwards: "Why didn't you tell me?" "But why didn't you ask?"

Next to exception reporting is exception handling. Not everything needs to be reported up to the highest level. Different levels can cope, and after they have coped, sometimes it is sufficient just to tell the next level that all is well. My feeling from reading reports of boards of inquiry and investigations is that although the exceptions are usually noticed and dealt with, the handling does not reflect quite the same priorities and values which should be disseminated throughout the organisation. The boards are not aware of top management thinking, of the correct guiding principles. They have acted as best they could, but we have often had to ask them to reconsider their judgement, taking new factors into account. This happens not only at MINDEF HQ, but to you, when your subordinates report to you. We have not yet established tight and reliable system discipline in the SAF.

Macro-Competence

I was once asked the difference between working in the army and working in the civil service. I answered that I had never worked in the civil service, but I thought the army does things faster. What about statutory boards? I stoutly maintained that the army does things faster even compared to statutory boards, because our people are action-oriented. Once we have made up our minds, we carry on. I am not sure I convinced the person I was talking to. I am not sure I convinced myself, because many times we have to console ourselves with a little tag, 'TTT'. This stands for 'Things Take Time', and sometimes things take a lot of time.

In a big organisation hardly ever do we see a problem, react to it, and solve it permanently. More often we look at the problem, think about it, react and wait a few weeks to see whether the reaction actually takes place. It may not, in which case you prompt once more. Eventually something happens, we re-assess, the problem is still there in a changed form, and we act again.

Granted, problems are long-lasting, but the time taken for the SAF to react sometimes frustrates all of us. It frustrates you when you have a suggestion to put up to the HQ, and the HQ thinks about it for 6 months without doing anything. It frustrates us when we have a suggestion to put to you, and you think about it for 6 months without doing anything. We can all remember examples of both cases. We are

trying to solve a problem, and we have what appears to be a sensible, rational, fairly well thought out solution. We put it across individually to people and they say, "Yes, I think it is a good idea, we will do it." And then we wait.

It reminds me of the day I was standing at 6 o'clock in the morning on a parade square waiting to set out on a battalion route march. I looked for the man who was supposed to lead the column, and eventually I found him I asked him, "What are you waiting for" He said, "I am waiting for an order to go, Sir." So I said, "Go!", and the whole battalion marched off into the sunrise. I sometimes feel like that when trying to get people moving on a wider scale. I find a problem, marshal everybody, explain it to them, convince them, and then look for the man in front to whom to say "Go". Sometimes I cannot tell who is in front. Maybe we are all arranged in a circle, and it takes a long time to say "Go". I speak to you, you say, "Yes, it is a good idea." What are we waiting for?

Some examples will illustrate how difficult it is. We have been talking about commanders' training for two and a half years. It is just getting off the ground. The idea that it is sometimes necessary to train commanders, even if at the expense of training troops, and that MINDEF will not frown too angrily if we sometimes neglect our troops to look after commanders, is just seeping through. Even today, if just half of our officers understand all this, we will have done well. That is the nature of big organisations. It takes a long time to put across perceptions, and even longer to put across motivations.

We talk about support company training. Everybody agrees that the infantry battalion headquarters tend to neglect the infantry support companies, and often do not know what the support companies are doing. We tell them to do support company live firings, to shoot, but they do not shoot. So we ask, "What is the problem?" No time, no ammunition, no expertise, no range, no this, no that. We provide one at a time, and each time we provide, there are three more problems left. The next time we provide, there are still three more problems left. Eventually it is like killing the Hydra, putting a flaming touch to the heads we have just chopped off, so no fresh heads can sprout while we chop off the rest. At last, we are succeeding.

Ought we to be satisfied with ourselves for being faster than the civil service? Are we in fact faster than the civil service? Faster than the statutory boards? Macro-competence is something to be worried about.

Let me finish this assessment on two optimistic notes. Firstly, we have made progress in one critical aspect. We know what not to covet, a sign of maturity. We wear uniforms, and think of ourselves as knowing all our business. We put up requirements to our superiors. Once upon a time, we would ask for the earth. "I need so many aeroplanes, I must have so many tanks, divisions, aircraft carriers." And if

somebody turns to you and says, "But do you really need all these to fight a war?", then you put your hand on your heart and swear, "If I do not have all these, Sir, I cannot in good conscience go to war. My soldiers will die. These are operationally essential." So the poor decision-maker, confronted with the subordinate telling him on his professional judgement that everything is operationally essential, approves with a heavy heart, and the money sinks before the aircraft carrier arrives.

We are past that stage. Now when we say the following is what we require, we often are also in a position to say the following is what we do not require. We have evaluated this, it is very desirable, but we know our requirements, and in all good conscience we can say we do not need this. So we can save the money for something else which we do need. We accept, even though sometimes reluctantly, that operational requirements are not absolute. If it costs too much, we do not want it. Sometimes even if something is cheap, we may not want it. This is a telling indicator that all is not amiss in the SAF.

The last point of my assessment, to balance what you might consider a gloomy picture, is that none of this is intended to be a reflection on anybody. I am not saying anyone is incompetent, that you are wrong or that we are wrong. What I am saying is that our system has not been able to make ordinary people do extra-ordinary deeds. It has not been able to make fallible people into an infallible organisation. We are us — ordinary People, a fair cross-section of Singapore population, a fair cross-section of Singapore talent. We work as hard as other people work, and yet when we look at the outcome, we are still unsatisfied. Why? The reason is not that people are inadequate or lazy, but that we may not be professional enough.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

Why are we in this state of affairs? Let me go through a series of possible explanations. Some I believe, some I do not.

The first explanation is that we have the wrong pre-occupations. We have to look after the parades, displays, SAF Days, routine training, and employers' visits, so we never have time to do the right business. Perhaps it is part of the reason, but is it a big part? I know from personal experience that people prefer to do what they know how to do, rather than what they need to do. It is a natural human failing. When it comes to professionalism, this has happened on a large scale. Of course employers' visits and parades keep us busy, but we must not do it to excess just because we know how to do it. Raising professional standards and knowledge is much harder. The tendency is to put it aside until we have time, and conveniently we do not have time. The next explanation is that we are not clever enough. I doubt it. The Germans proved in the Second World War that even after years of war and carnage, when many of their best and brightest had been killed, they could still put together a formidable

fighting force. Therefore it cannot be that we are more stupid than other people, only that we need to be better organised

Of course, not everybody is equal. Some do more important, some do more confined jobs, and we have to use our talent wisely. The Germans did it with the General Staff system. The best 10% would be General Staff officers. Every commander owned one. He was a valuable asset. If the commander wanted any job done, he gave it to the General Staff Officer. At the same time the General Staff Officer had his communication network, a link to the General Staff Officer at the superior headquarters. Thus throughout the hierarchy there was a complete parallel nervous system, which communicated new ideas, new discoveries, new directives, and which made sure the system worked.

We are all short of able people, and we must put them in the right places. My feeling is that the general calibre of our officers is alright, but we need a few more of these critical nodes who are able to transmit and transmute impulses rapidly and accurately, interpreting the data and sending them out again. We have tried to do that without Wranglers.

Commanders, by temperament and by job necessity, have to be dissatisfied, especially with our officers. We tend to judge our subordinates by our own strict standards. It is reasonable for a commander to look at all his officers and say "All of them are not equal to me", but that does not mean we are not good enough. If we look at it from a higher plane we would say "They are different from me, but for their job, they are more than adequate. Without them, I would not have any job done at all."

The third-possible explanation is that we have no critical mass. We need to form a core of exceptional people to sustain standards and carry the rest along. With a large number of people, there will be amongst them a critical mass of talent which can galvanise the entire group. Not only brains, but other skills as well. We need people with all kinds of particular talents who can run the different specialist organisations.

It is difficult for us to maintain the standards of our armour training. Not that our soldiers are any poorer gunners than the Israelis, but the Israelis have such a large group that amongst them there will be the naturally talented ones whom they can pick out and appoint the master gunner. He will then make sure that all the rest can shoot. They may not all become master gunners, but certainly they will be competent. In time, another man will by chance have the correct combination of talent and inclination, and will become a new master gunner. We have a small pool, so we find a master gunner minus. He trains a few other gunners, not all of whom have the highest talent, and if by chance that group does not include somebody who is absolutely up to the mark, then the next master gunner will be master gunner minus-minus. So our

standards go down.

Another reason we need a critical mass is to produce mavericks. The organisation cannot be all made up of conformists. Mavericks keep the organisation lively. How did the Germans before the Second World War come up with the blitzkrieg technique? Guderian was an upstart, one talented person against the organisation. But when his idea was accepted, there was a tremendous pay-off all round. It depended on one man with a different idea. We do not have enough mavericks.

The fourth problem with us is that we are not communicating enough. Communication is the essence of management and leadership. We are trying to communicate our ideas to an audience who are sceptical, uncomprehending, and perhaps unconvinced. It is very difficult to overcome all these hurdles, get them on our side, and finally have them go out as our proselytizers, telling others "Yes, the colonel spoke to me thus and so, and I think the colonel is right. Why don't we change, and do the following instead." Colonels do not get ideas accepted simply because they are colonels, neither do majors, neither do captains.

We do not know how to communicate, not directives and instructions, but nuances, intentions, purposes, the thinking behind an order, why we want people to do commanders' training, or why we must have leadership by example. There must be very close rapport for all these nuances to get through, and for feedback to be received. When I ask someone for his view, sometimes he says "No, I cannot tell you because otherwise I may get into hot water." We have to reach a position where we can talk in a relaxed and half serious fashion, what I call technically "after the third beer". This speech is a case in point.

Sometimes when I am telling you something, I have to ask you to assume that I have had three beers, even though maybe I have not, because I am telling you as a friend, and I hope you will also tell me as a friend after pretending to drink three beers. Then we can speak frankly. Neither of us will be fully held accountable for what we have said, but the meaning will be communicated. It is a necessary technique. Traditionally, in the army you stand to attention to hear what your commander has to say, and then you go out and wonder "What did he say? Do I remember 30% of it?" We are not communicating enough.

It happens at every level. I once did a psychological test which classified my management style. I could be an executive, a bureaucrat, a benevolent autocrat, or a deserter. I had a very high deserter score. To find out why, I reread my answers. I found that on all the statements which said: "If my commander disagrees with me, I will listen to him." "If I have something to tell my commander, I will tell him," If I have a disagreement with my commander, I will make a serious effort to see his point

of view," I had answered "I never bother", which shot up the deserter score. That was a revelation. After that I considered very carefully: Is this really how I behave? So I tried to change.

Many of us have this problem. You will say "Well, my boss does not understand me. I have my frustrations, and he has his values." How often [do you say, "I do not understand my subordinate. I have my values, and he has his frustrations?" You don't, you think you are alright. It is very difficult to appreciate that you are not communicating enough, and to try to change the organisational climate so that you begin to communicate enough. If we can do that we will achieve better system discipline, and a much more macro-efficient organisation.

The last and critical reason we have not done very well is that we have not had a sufficiently well-defined common vision. This is reflected in the earlier statement that we do not even have single negotiating texts for doctrines. We need a clear idea of what we are developing towards, what MINDEF will be like after five years, what the SAF will be like in battle. It is very difficult to dream up a vision, to articulate it, and to have it accepted as legitimate. Only a prophet can do that, and we need one in each generation. The lack of this vision has hindered us for a long time.

Connected with this lack of a common vision is the question of goal stability. We change, we have new ideas, we try to implement, we are in constant ferment. Ferment is good, because stagnation is worse. We have been in ferment for a long time. We have our ideas, we have our predecessors' ideas, and our successors will have their ideas. How do we constrain ourselves so that we are not stifled by what we have inherited, neither do we throw away the house into which we have just moved? We all have our own clues as to how to do things. "If I were there, I would do it differently." Sometimes we are there. If we manage to do it differently that may be good, if we manage to do it the same, that may not be a bad thing. It all depends.

There is value in change, but there should also be value in stability. Recently I had to recommend choosing between option A or option B. I had already chosen option A a few months ago, given 50% of the information. Now 40% more has come in, and it looks like option B is the right answer.

Should I back-track, undo option A and switch to option B, which appears slightly better? I reasoned that it is like choosing a bride — you look around and you meet so many girls, and eventually you settle for one and marry her. The next day another nice girl comes along, slightly better. What do you do? If you are wise, I think you will stay married. I recommended to stick to option A. Since then the last 10% of the data has arrived, and it has vindicated my choice.

This is how our decisions have to be. You already have a decision which is not

optimal, but near-optimal. There is a better one, but there is a very high cost associated with changing. Our inclination is to say change and absorb the cost, the long-term benefits will be worth it — but the long-term never arrives.

CAN WE DO BETTER?

Those are some of the reasons we are having problems. What can we do about it? Firstly, we must persuade officers that training does not begin or end in courses, that commanders must educate not only their officers but also themselves, that we must be interested, we must speak out, we must not be afraid to disagree, we must not be complacent.

We do not have enough of a critical mass. We cannot expand the army to recruit 1000 more men, and hope that one of them is Guderian. But we hope perhaps to bring in 20 more promising men, out of whom one might be Guderian. That is why we are recruiting more better quality officers. It is not to supplant jobs. We are looking for the ferment, the yeast, the sparkle which will leaven the entire organisation, and make out of ordinary human beings good staff officers and good commanders.

I have been fortunate in my subordinates. They were not always my choice, but they were the ones who were given to me. I have always felt that how a man performs is a reflection on his superior. He is not a bad man, but perhaps his superior does not know how to handle him, how to use his ideas, how to bring out the best of him. One man not up to his job in critical appointment can demoralise 50, 100, 1000 subordinates. It is therefore in the vital interest of all of us, the followers as well as the leaders to have able, dedicated, high flying, high profile people who will be the leaders, in these key appointment, who will bring the rest along, and make the best out of us.

Secondly, communicate, and encourage an upwelling of ideas.

Thirdly, foster stability. I spoke to you about the new broom syndrome. The thought I would like to leave with you is that three brainwaves a year is enough. If you have more, keep them to yourself for the time being, look at them again next year, and if they still seem to be good ideas, then implement. It is a big organisation, and people need time to adapt and react. It is good to have a lot of ideas, but choose carefully what you want to focus on, so that there is time for results to show. Otherwise, you will be in a situation which often confronts commanders in war-games and in war. Brigade to be committed on the west, situation changes, brigade commit to the east, STOP! brigade go back west again. The Grand Old Duke of York² knew all about this, as much as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. Remember, you think about 1,000 times faster than the organisation can possibly change, even if it is a good

organisation, so take that into account.

CONCLUSION

This is not a problem with a simple solution. It will not go away quickly. We will be addressing it over and over again. I asked Commandant just now whether CGS did not come to speak about this a few years ago in the Staff College, and he said "Yes, but that was many years ago, and this is a completely different crowd." But it is the same problem. So I have no doubt that in five years' time this conversation will be repeated here.

Meanwhile we have to try to make it work. How? Believe it can be so, and it shall be so. Because for people to change, to do things, to achieve great deeds, you must first believe that it can be done, and that it is worthwhile doing. Only then will you see that what you imagined to be difficulties can actually be overcome. So believe that it can be done, believe that it is within our capabilities to be professionals, to become collectively far more than we could possibly be individually, and we will create the atmosphere which will make it possible.

Endnotes:

1. The figures are taken from Liddell Hart, History of Second World War, Chapter 20, page 298.

2. The Grand Old Duke of York
He had ten thousand men
He marched them up to the top of the hill
And he marched them down again.
When they were up they were up
And when they were down they were down
And when they were halfway up the hill
They were neither up nor down.

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Values-based Leadership in the SAF

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Introduction

Leadership is key for military success. In the Army's transformation into the 3rd Generation fighting force, uncertainty and flux are being generated as the Army realigns its organisational and force structures, and revolutionises the way it thinks, trains and fights. New technologies and capabilities are being developed at a much faster pace than before, and more new strategies and initiatives are being undertaken to ensure that the Army remains relevant and ready for a spectrum of operations from peace to war. Strong leadership is therefore required to organise and hold the transformation effort together as well as to unite the Army in working towards common goals and desired outcomes.

Leadership is a very wide topic and there are many perspectives. There is, however, an important aspect of leadership that I would like to highlight, and that is Values. **An organisation is heavily influenced by its leaders, and leaders by their values.** The success and continuity of an organisation depends on it. Values are the anchors for leaders to make decisions in an increasingly complex and unpredictable environment. In situations where the boundaries between right and wrong are unclear, values keep our actions aligned and true to our people, ourselves and the Army.

In this essay, I will first explain why values are important for modern organisations. I will then highlight the idea of the Moral Quotient in leadership and propose some simple ideas to ensure that values are put into practice.

The Importance of Values for Modern Organisations

Last year, our Prime Minister articulated the competitive edge that Singapore has as a nation. They are trust, knowledge, connectivity and life. Trust ensures that our nation and people are valued by global companies, and is particularly important as Singapore strives to be a global financial hub. Knowledge is vital to Singapore's growth, and Singapore has been investing in its "polis" and networking with key centres of excellence in research and development (R&D) to build a knowledge economy. Natural connectivity is an advantage that Singapore has, as it is well-situated in the global grid to facilitate the movement of people, goods, money and knowledge. Lastly, the excellent quality of life that Singapore provides will create a positive and appealing environment to root our own talent and attract new ones to sustain its growth. Amongst these factors, trust is key in pushing Singapore above the

rest.

After the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis in 2003, I was invited by the Australian Defence Force to share Singapore's experience in dealing with the crisis. About 150 civil servants from various governmental departments attended the session. After my briefing, an Australian civil servant from the Prime Minister's Office commented that it was remarkable how our diverse society, when faced with adversity, could work together with their leaders to overcome the problem. He added that such a feat would have been almost impossible in any other country. From this observation, we should realise that what Singapore accomplished in the SARS crisis was only possible because of the high degree of trust that exists amongst the people as well as between the people and their leaders.

Almost 20 years ago, when I was a young staff officer in Joint, I was invited to the Istana for a ceremony to recognise our servicemen who had served in an overseas mission. I noted that the reception was extremely frugal and plain. While we were not a rich country, I thought that we could surely afford something nicer. Curious, I asked a long-serving staff in the Istana about my observation and he told me that it was deliberate. He said that many developing countries needed some form of aid from the more developed countries, but it irritated the developed countries when they visited the poorer countries only to find the leaders in the country spending money on themselves and not on their people. The lack of values in leadership was obvious. In Singapore, our people trust our leaders to be good stewards and it is therefore important not to betray this trust by doing the right things for our people.

We are doing well at the national and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) level. The SAF is recognised not only as a well-trained and well-equipped force but also as a trusted and professional force. This image has been reinforced by our contributions to international and humanitarian missions, such as Operation Flying Eagle. We are trusted by our friends to deliver on our words. What we cannot do, we do not promise. However, being successful so far does not mean that we will remain successful. We must not take what we have achieved for granted. We know the importance of trust and values in our organisation and nation, and we must ensure that every generation continues to develop enduring values. We are reminded of the consequences when values erode through examples such as the Enron collapse, the NKF scandal, and the food and toy quality control problems in China.

The New Q

Singapore has developed very quickly in the past four decades. Our companies and the SAF have advanced in tandem with the economy. In the past, it was good enough to be just good doers who possessed high IQ (Intellectual Quotient). Then EQ (Emotional Quotient) came into play, and was seen as crucial when we had to

socialise to do business. So we developed that. But now that our nation and organisation have reached an even higher level, what is next? If you look at strong organisations and successful countries today, you will notice that people are key. These people need to be inspired by things other than money — things such as good leadership and strong values. There is a moral element to it and some say therefore, that the next Q is **MQ (Moral Quotient)**. People are glad to be associated with great organisations because these organisations have leaders that possess the necessary MQ to inspire them through shared values and ideals. Values determine who we are and what we do as leaders. To have strong leadership, it is necessary to think about how we can nurture and apply our values. For ease of memory, I would like to use the acronym **REAL**.

Reflect and Seek Counsel

It is important to take time to reflect on our values. We must be clear on what our values are. They are our operating and guiding principles. We may notice in certain occasions that taking some positions and selecting an option may come to us more readily than to others. That is probably because we already possess certain convictions and beliefs. However, our beliefs in areas that we think we are clear about may also be tested in certain situations. For example, some feel that it is acceptable not to be too precise in marking our parking coupons. Others think that it is alright to take papers meant for the office back home for personal use. A few may even think that since they have no problems in achieving the Individual Physical Proficiency Test (IPPT) gold standard, there is no need for them to complete all five stations on the actual test date and simply declare that "everything is in order". These occurrences are rare but it serves to remind us that small lapses may lead to greater lapses over time due to poor personal and collective moral standards.

Besides reflecting on our own, **we must seek counsel from our peers and superiors** as well, to hear about their experiences and learn about how they handled various issues and challenges. A few years ago, when I was in the General Staff, I was approached by a Commanding Officer who was in a dilemma. His unit had been working very hard over the past year and was on the verge of being declared the best combat unit. All of us know how difficult it is to motivate and rally a unit, and this positive recognition would be extremely important for them. However, a week before the announcement, his logistics officer informed him that there were some problems in the accounting of stores and if this logistics lapse was factored in, it would cause the unit to be relegated to the second last position. All he had needed to do was to wait for one more week. It was a tricky situation. However, I said to him that since he had called me, it meant that he already knew the right answer and that he just wanted someone to share his disappointment with. Therefore, I simply told him to go ahead and do the right thing. His unit came in second last that year. **Even with counsel, we must know that the responsibility still lies with us.** As leaders, we are often faced

with similar situations that require difficult decisions, and every one of these decisions we make helps to strengthen our convictions and beliefs. They also serve to educate us in taking on and making more difficult decisions later in life. The judgements that we make define who we are, and will inevitably influence and shape the behaviours of those we lead.

Educate and Develop Shared Perspectives Based on Values

As leaders, we have the responsibility **to educate and develop shared perspectives based on our values**. Shared values build trust and understanding within the organisation. An organisation with a good shared values system will engender a positive working environment where people are able to perform and do the right things.

In today's operating environment, change is constant and transformation is necessary. The inability to do so will lead to stagnation and eventual failure. **To change organisations, the mind must first be changed.** When we first started our transformation journey, we faced many difficult challenges, as there was a lot of resistance to change. The Army then had already been successful on many accounts, and some thought that all the Army needed to do was simply to continue doing things the way it was done before. As the old axiom goes, *why fix it when it is not broken*. However, this is not how the Army works. Instead of resting on our laurels, we started to envision what future challenges would be like and took on the proactive approach to change and adapt ahead of the curve. We change before change is forced upon us. To shift mindsets and build shared perspectives, the Learning Organisation (LO) initiative was introduced to improve the quality of conversation within the Army. Significant progress has since been made. The LO movement was soon introduced SAF-wide and today, we are moving aggressively to becoming an integrated SAF. The mental model has shifted and the question today is not how to protect our legacy but how to create a new future to achieve a more potent and effective 3rd Generation SAF, which operates as ONE.

We have to learn to apply our values and leadership in new operating environments. In the past, while different security agencies do coordinate their efforts, it was not exactly integrated. However, after 9/11, under the leadership of various governmental agencies, we have established a robust integrated network amongst the various government agencies to provide a holistic operational approach to secure Singapore. In our peace support operations in Timor Leste in 2004, we learned to conduct humanitarian operations to provide assistance to the people there. Our actions were motivated by our values to help others whenever we could. When we were asked to assist our Indonesian friends in Aceh after the Asian Tsunami, we ensured that the assistance rendered was professional and sincere. Our efforts were much appreciated because they were genuine and were not done to stage a "Kodak"

moment. Thus even in uncertain situations, we must remain grounded by the right values to make decisions with the right motivations in order to portray a professional image and receive continual support from the people.

In today's operating environment where the three block war¹ is commonplace, our perspectives to situations may vary depending on which part of the three block war we are in. In a complex operating environment, there is a need to continually develop new perspectives to take in each of the ever-changing scenarios. Leaders must continually reframe their perspectives to ensure their relevance, and it must be done based on sound values and the right motivations.

Action and Learning

We should not talk about values as theory. We must be prepared to act on our beliefs and make hard but principled decisions. During the SARS crisis, it was decided that we should adopt a very open attitude in providing information to the public and the international community. Such an approach was unusual in consequence management operations. Surely it would constrain and hinder our work in combating SARS. Nevertheless, we went ahead with this approach. WHO experts were embedded in the executive group and they had all the information we had. The media was briefed everyday, and they were given all available information so that they could help present these information in a way that the public could understand. As it turned out, this approach proved to be effective and, more importantly, enabled us to gain trust from all quarters to get the job done better. We noticed that several other countries had trouble in dealing with the crisis because they had not been as open as we were.

Last year in May, after an incident where a few soldiers were killed, we were asked to consider terminating the overseas exercise. On one hand, we had to consider whether the troops were in a condition to continue and if the leaders could carry the ground. On the other, we understood the principle of resilience. In operations and in difficult times, we must be prepared to maintain our aim. With counsel from the psychologists and various commanders, we directed for the exercise to proceed after a few days. Meanwhile, we mobilised all our available resources to provide help and assistance to our injured personnel. We had a difficult few days, but we understood that the men from the unit subsequently agreed that it was a right decision after all.

As professional military personnel, we must be prepared to stand by our recommendations and tell the truth. Sometimes, we may be pressured to say something to facilitate a decision. We must be prepared to deal with such dilemmas. In the movie *A Few Good Men*, soldiers felt obliged to keep a secret on some unjust act in order to protect the honour of the unit. In the first place, we should be careful not to have a misguided sense of values. For example, just because our subordinates

work very hard for the unit, it does not mean that we do not mete out the appropriate punishment when they make mistakes. Some leaders may get confused and choose the value "care for soldiers" in such situations to protect the erroneous soldier. That should not be the case. One of the lessons learnt from the last Lebanon war was that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had neglected training their reserves due to budgetary issues. As a result, the IDF suffered serious repercussions due to the poor combat readiness of its reserve forces. With limited resource availability, decision-making boils down to finding the right balance, and informed and balanced decisions can only be made when all available information are accessible and factually presented.

In operations, we often spend time looking at how we can do things better but often neglect discussing the principles behind our actions and decisions.² After decisions and actions are executed, there should be learning sessions to share the rationale behind each action and decision, and to determine whether the premise on which the actions taken or decisions made is correct. Correct things done for the wrong reasons are not desirable as well.

To ensure that we can have a values-based leadership, we should reflect on our daily decisions and seek counsel to test ourselves. We should also educate our people and have platforms to clarify and develop common perspectives based on our shared values. Finally, we must act on our convictions and learn through our decisions and their outcomes.

Conclusion

When we look around, we see some countries struggling and some organisations crumbling. More often than not, we find these countries and organisations suffering from either poor leadership that is lacking in values or insufficient critical mass of people with the right values. Even in the US, we see voters hungering for a moral leader that they can trust, such as John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, who has become a strong contender because he is perceived not only as an experienced senator but also as an upright and moral leader as well. His values are reflected by his words: "A democratic government operates best in the disinfecting light of the public eye. Ethics and transparency...are the obligations...and the duties of honourable public service."

Singapore's success is built on meritocracy, harmony and trust within the society. Strong values and moral fibre are vital in sustaining the nation's success. The SAF, particularly the Army, provides and nurtures the moral fibre of the nation, and is responsible for imbuing the same set of values into the generations of Singaporean males that pass through the organisation. Therefore as leaders, we must possess MQ to continually ensure that shared values exist in the SAF so as to maintain our

professional standards, and engender common understanding and expectations between us and our people.

Finally, I would like to end with a story told by Warren Buffet when he visited the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1998. Warren Buffet was tasked by the President of the United States, to select a CEO for a financial firm which was on the verge of collapse. The firm was worth about US\$150 billion. Warren Buffet had twelve candidates to choose from. He was tasked on Thursday and was told to reveal the name by the following Monday. By Saturday, Warren Buffet was still unable to decide on the CEO because of the high calibre of candidates. He then decided to use three criteria to facilitate the selection process - Intellect, Drive and Character. When he used the first two criteria, he was unable to eliminate anyone as they all possessed the necessary intellect and drive to qualify as a candidate in the first place. But when he used character as the criterion, he selected his CEO. The moral of the story is that while skills, competencies and intellect can be developed, it is character and values that ultimately differentiate the great leaders from the rest.

Endnotes:

1. The Three Block War was used by General Charles C. Krulak to describe how small unit leaders must be agile enough to meet the challenges of conducting humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and traditional warfighting, often in the same area of operations and at the same time. General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War" Marines Magazine, Jan 1999.
2. When we communicate commander's intent, we usually explain the intention of the operations, and rarely the values and principles behind the operations.

Speech by BG Ng Chee Khern, Chief of Air Force, at the Singapore Command and Staff College's Distinguished Speakers Programme on Effective Leadership: Contextual and Invariant Dimensions, 19 Jan 2007.

Pointer V33N1 2007

Introduction

The subject of leadership has received wide attention across many disciplines, ranging from management, history, economics and philosophy, just to name a few. Despite the attention, what leadership really is remains elusive. Defining leadership is not easy. It can be argued that the diversity of views exists because fundamentally, effective leadership is highly contextual in nature.

Leadership is an art and not a science — in the same way as warfighting is largely an art. In leadership, as in war and in art, there are no fixed formulas to be effective. There is only good judgement and good taste. Dogmatic application of the principles of war usually leads to disastrous outcomes; great chefs do not produce great dishes by mechanically following cookbook recipes. Leaders do not become effective by having a fixed formula of seven habits for example. Leadership requires a judicious mixture of principles to be effective. Warfighting requires a judicious mixture of principles of war to win. In both cases, the best mixture of principles depends on the context.

To Clausewitz, war is a clash of human wills. Since it is a clash of human wills, war is difficult, the permutations of action-reaction are endless. To me, leadership is the harmonisation of wills across various stakeholders, which include oneself, one's bosses, peers and followers. Harmonisation and alignment of human wills, which is what leadership seeks to do, is similarly difficult.

Contextual Dimensions of Leadership

In this article, six dimensions of leadership will be described and discussed, along with how the application of leadership principles may change with context. The first is the dimension of leadership and management. Leadership is about defining visions, setting ambitions for the organisation, looking ahead to the future, and conceiving initiatives to adapt to changing environments. In short, it deals with an organisation's purpose and produces change that brings it forward. Management is about maintaining control, allocating resources, implementing initiatives and working efficiently. It ensures that the organisation delivers its objectives within the stipulated time and budget. Some related views are that leadership entails problem

identification, while management is primarily concerned with problem solving; management works within the system, whereas leadership works on the system; and leadership is about doing the right things, while management is about doing things right.

In most situations, one will need to apply a combination of leadership and management. How much of each is needed depends on the context in which one's unit operates. In a state of transformation and change as the SAF is in today, where we are in the process of transiting into a vastly different force structure, leadership should be more emphasised. This is because of the need for creativity, imagination and 'thinking out of the box' to generate new ideas that will allow a breakthrough beyond current thinking borders. On the other hand, when the organisation is at a stage of consolidation and focusing on the safe operationalisation of new platforms and capabilities, as the RSAF was in the 1990s till a few years ago, management will take on greater significance. In this situation, one should avoid creating a state of flux and more rightly place his focus on achieving taskings safely and effectively, as was the case in the 1990s.

Secondly, the leadership and command dimension will be discussed. While the distinction between leadership and management has been given some attention in the SAF, or at least the RSAF, the distinction between leadership and command has not been given the same focus. One of the key constructs of leadership is 'leading by example' or 'leading from the front'. Leadership is largely about influence — influencing others by providing purpose, direction, inspiration and motivation. It involves persuading people to willingly endure hardships and undertake dangers that if left to themselves they would do their utmost to avoid. However, to command requires one to do more and also less than to lead and influence. Commanders are also expected to decide and exercise judgement, and in many ways, to perform a higher-order creative managerial function that seeks to direct and coordinate the effective use of military force. In real life, there is often no clearly right or wrong way of doing things, and more than one good reason usually exist to drive the conclusion in different directions. That is why judgement is needed: it is the ability to think of many matters at once, in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequences. In essence, command is an exercise of judgement to make the right decisions. High commanders may not exercise much leadership in the sense of directly influencing many others. This is the change over history noted by Keegan in his book *Mask of Command* between command in the modern era compared to command in the heroic ages, such as during the time of Alexander the Great, where the distinction between being a leader and being a commander was next to non-existent.

How much command and leadership is needed is again contextual. This article contends that at the tactical levels of the platoon and company for example, one

would require more leadership than command. This is because at the junior levels, there is considerably less scope for decision-making, and more often than not, officers at these levels are mainly responsible for motivating people to achieve already specified objectives. However, as one moves from the tactical to the strategic level, the physical presence required to influence others is steadily reduced. As such, once he reaches the levels of the Division, Formation or Fleet for example, a bigger proportion of command over leadership will have to be exercised. While leadership and influence remain relevant, their part vis-a-vis command and decision-making will be significantly diminished. In fact, it may be that senior commanders who spend too much time on leadership and not enough on thinking and exercising judgement may well be doing so at the expense of the bigger strategic picture.

The third dimension is that of the intellect and the moral. Moral here refers to character, not morality. It is the character qualities of a person and not the intellectual or physical qualities. This is what Napoleon meant when he said, "the moral is to the physical as three is to one". Leadership is far more than just being clever and knowing what has to be done. It entails the moral and personality aspects of ethics, moral and physical courage, and daring and caring to do things. It is the willingness to overcome inertia and prevail against all obstacles, antagonists and doubters. It rests on the mentality and conviction that ultimately, all problems can be tackled and solved.

However, effective leadership is achieved not by focusing solely on the intellect or the moral. Rather, it comes with balancing intellect with the different aspects of the moral. A leader who is daring but stupid spells disaster; a leader who is clever but cowardly will be worthless; a leader who is daring but immoral is depraved; and a leader who is brave but irresolute will not prevail. In the SAF, while the role of intellect weighs strongly in our human resource practices, our ranking officers may not always be the most intelligent, as the organisation takes an equally serious view of our whole character. The SAF Officer's motto To Lead, To Excel and To Overcome is not just a catchy phrase. It is the moral that this article speaks of.

Fourthly, the dimension of command and staff competencies. Let me explain this by sharing my own experience. People have asked me about the difference between my present appointment as the Chief of Air Force, and my previous appointment as Director JOPD and concurrently the Chief of Staff (Air Staff). My answer has been that as DJOPD and COS(AS), even though I had a strong role in many of the recommendations submitted to CDF and CAF from the staff departments, they have to "carry" the decisions more than I do. However, as the Chief of Air Force now, if policies implemented do not turn out as expected, I would be the one who has to face up to everyone affected in the RSAF, and answer for any failures to my bosses, my organisation and my people. The point is that leadership consists of a combination of command and staff competencies. The staff component is to think

and recommend, while the command component is to decide, and bear the burden and consequences of the decision.

Ideally, a leader should be a strong commander and also have strong staff abilities. However, one can be a great leader without being a strong commander or have good staff or intellectual abilities. Some of us would have read the story of the Three Kingdoms, and we would know that Liu Bei was neither a very wise commander, nor a courageous warrior. Yet he was revered not only by the people of his time but also many generations after him. He was a leader who managed to attract the best commanders and the wisest counsellors to him. Counsellors such as Zhuge Liang and Pang Tong, commanders such as Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, do his bidding. The point is, as if things are not complex enough, this article postulates that to be an effective leader, one does not always have to be the most talented person. Talented people will readily come as long as one is charismatic and shows that he recognises and appreciates talent.

The fifth contextual dimension of leadership is the upward, sideward and downward responsibilities. To illustrate, as the Chief of Air Force, I constantly engage my superiors in MINDEF HQ and CDF, informing them of my intentions, and seeking their consensus and directions. Sideward, I engage Joint Staff and the other Services, tabling papers at their meetings to inform them of Air Force developments, and building relationships through formal and less formal means. For instance, I have invited some senior officers from Joint Staff and the other Services to fly on the F16 to better understand the capabilities of the Air Force. Downward, I spend hours engaging Air Force personnel at all levels, holding a series of cascade briefings, dialogue sessions and squadron visits. While one may need to spend substantial time and effort to fulfill these responsibilities, I believe that it is necessary, as effective leaders manage not only superiors and peers, but also their subordinates.

There is no magic ratio, however. One will need to find in his own situation the balance required across the three facets of responsibilities. For example, if one's unit is new or in a state of change, he should look upwards more to seek directions and agreement with his intended approach. If one is involved in developments that will affect the units or people around him, he should look sideward to ensure that he would not walk in isolation. If one is moving from a stage of conceptualisation to implementation, he should focus downward to secure the buy-in and support he needs from the people working under him. Ultimately, there will be many other considerations, and it is for one to decide what the right balance would be.

The sixth and final dimension of contextual leadership is none other than leadership style. This focuses on one's behaviour towards his subordinates. There are many ways of delineating leadership style, and one of the most widely used is the transactional and transformational models. The transactional model is largely the

carrot-and-stick approach, and it prescribes the need for leaders to combine active-checking functions like those of a policeman, with passive-standby functions like those of a fireman. The transformational model hinges largely on the empowerment of subordinates through charismatic influence and intellectual stimulation by the leader. At the risk of stating the obvious, there is no one correct style. Transactional styles tend to be useful when there is no room for error or when the staff is not sufficiently competent, while transformational styles are more suited to inspire shared higher purpose and long-term commitment. As a leader, one will have to interact with the situation to decide the most effective style to adopt for any given circumstance.

To recap, six dimensions of leadership that are contextual in nature have been covered. They are namely leadership and management, leadership and command, intellect and character, command and staff competencies, superior, peer and subordinate management, and lastly leadership style. The article will now move on to what I personally believe are the *sine qua non* or invariant dimensions of leadership — five particular fundamentals that are not contingent on the situation and that one must do at all times.

Invariant Dimensions of Leadership

The first fundamental is team-building. Team-building is the process of fostering trust amongst one's followers, building relationships with them, and influencing them through one's actions and behaviours rather than through formal authority. Treat people with respect and dignity, give meaning to what they are doing, and make a difference to their lives. There is an analogy that sums up this point quite nicely: good leaders are like the best conductors — they go beyond the notes to reach the magic in the players.

Secondly, coach and groom the next generation to bring out the best in them. Aim to develop leaders and not followers. Do not constrain people's potential simply because of the fear that they may outshine you. You will be amazed by how much they can do for you if you create the right environment for them to contribute. Look at your own experience. Many of you would remember that how well you did depended largely on how much your boss allowed you to contribute, how much he welcomed your contributions. Hence, how well your subordinates in turn do depends to a large extent on the environment you set for them. A senior SAF officer once made a remark that can be used in this context. He said that if you cannot make yourself useful, you should at least get out of the way. If you sometimes run out of good ideas, do not be afraid to let your subordinates flourish and take initiative. Give them your support and encouragement and they may pleasantly surprise you with how much they are capable of.

My personal preference towards coaching and grooming has been to adopt an inclusive approach that gives people the right-to-know, rather than stay exclusive based on the need-to-know. When giving directions and making decisions, explain the rationale so that the basis of your decisions are understood. I believe that one of the best ways to coach and groom people is to open up your thoughts to them. Some of you would have been involved in dialogue sessions with me or received long discursive emails and letters from me. You would know that in these sessions, emails and letters, I am usually candid and open with my thoughts. While my efforts to share are time-consuming, I think they are necessary because of the coaching and grooming that is achieved through them.

Thirdly, it is important for one to maintain a high level of vigour and rigour, both intellectually and emotionally. One of the impetus behind the keep-SAF-young policy is to ensure that our leadership remains vigorous and dynamic. Being vigorous means that one keeps up his energy and enthusiasm levels, while being rigorous means that one pays close attention to the things he needs to do and strive for excellence and the best standards. Leadership is a tiring task, not helped by the sheer pace and tempo of things in the SAF. One must be prepared for situations where the drive to get things done can come only from within oneself.

Fourthly, good leaders stay optimistic and keep hopes alive. One may not realise it, but any feeling of negativity in him will easily be passed on to his people on the ground. In the face of adversity, one needs to maintain his composure, stay on top of the situation and not allow his emotions to get the better of him. To use the words of Napoleon again, "a leader is a dealer in hope". Subordinates will always look to their leader when the chips are down and when they need to find reasons to keep going.

The fifth fundamental is to demand standards and ensure proper follow-through. Demanding standards means that one does not let people get away with superficial or easy answers. It requires probing into things and not simply going through the motion. The other aspect is the need to ensure proper follow-through. One significant trait, which distinguishes the military from the civilian sector, is that when an instruction is passed, we will always ensure that it is followed through. It is sometimes tempting to focus on the problems with the easier solutions because it takes too much to overcome the harder ones. However, in any venture of significance, the difficulties involved will be vast, people will have to be persuaded, their heartaches conquered and uncertainties mastered. Leadership is not only about taking them to where they want to go; more importantly, it is also about taking them to where they don't want to go but ought to go.

I have many other thoughts but I think these are sufficient for now. They are of course non-exhaustive, but in my opinion, the more significant ones.

Conclusion

Leadership is an arduous task. There is no scientific law or universal causal relationship that will allow one to simply invoke a principle and everything falls in place. That will be too easy and it will devalue the whole notion of leadership. Instead, one will need to interact with the situation and decide on the relative weightage of the principles required in the given context. Besides the contextual dimensions, I have also described some of the more invariant dimensions that I believe all worthy leaders must pay attention to. I hope you have found my thoughts useful and refreshing.

Afternote

Leadership Styles across Cultures

One further observation on the contextual dimension of leadership is that because Chinese and Western conceptions of warfare are different, this may have resulted in styles of leadership that are dissimilar. The Western conception of warfare reflects Clausewitz's thinking, where war is a means to an end. It advocates meeting strength with strength, using maximum force and fighting a decisive battle, with the objective of imposing one's will on the enemy. On the other hand, the Chinese conception takes after Sun Tzu's ideas, where war is a necessary evil that has to be managed when it occurs. Chinese warfare emphasises the art of asymmetry and the use of minimum force, and the objective is to undermine the enemy's will more than to impose one's will. Different approaches should result in styles of leadership that vary across Western and Chinese leaders.

From the historical point of view, it may also be significant that Western wars were mostly fought to annihilate the enemy, or at least to the point that they succumbed to the invader's will. In contrast, Chinese wars tended to be 'civil wars', whose aims could be ideological rather than physical. The enemy need not always be physically destroyed, and could often be persuaded to switch sides. It is thus arguable that the history of Western and Chinese warfare could have engendered the development of very different leadership styles. Western military commanders have looked at Chinese or more generally Oriental leaders as devious, even cowardly. Conversely, Chinese and Oriental leaders have looked at Western military leaders as unsubtle, even foolhardy and brutal.

Trends Towards Careerism in the SAF: Where Does our Profession Lie?

MAJ Tan Kim Seng
POINTER V21N4 1995

Introduction

With the establishment of the SAF a modernized peacetime army we are infected with the disturbing disease called careerism. This disease is not only confined to the SAF but is also a world-wide menace" in other armies and military societies. This requires careful attention; lest it spreads like a deadly disease turning "professional leaders into corporate managers and professional soldiers into employees of the state. The oft-quoted profession of arms is being challenged by this new phenomenon and the battle is still raging.

The debate on careerism centers on whether the profession of arms is a true military profession or is it another occupation that parallels that of the civilian occupation. The main argument for this disease is that more military officers are developing this unhealthy tendency towards taking the profession of arms as another occupation, focussing their efforts toward promotion as their ultimate objective. They no longer care about the values of the profession of arms that have built cohesive fighting units. They are more concerned with their career advancements.

Many sociologists, from Charles Moscovice to Sam Sarkesian, have attempted to address the features, causes and effects of this phenomenon inherent in peacetime armies. Yet nothing practical has been implemented to solve the scourge of careerism. It all boils down to its degree of severity and how well officer corps are coping with the disease. This article does not advance yet another impractical panacea but offers some ideas that should prove helpful in understanding this debatable and complex issue and suggestions to deal with this disease in our own military institution.

The Idea Professional versus The Careerist

The central activity of our profession is fighting and our members employ their combat skills to promote the well-being of our community. In order to serve well, the true professional places duty, honour and country above obligation to self. He constantly upgrades his combat skills through rigorous training without due regard to his own ambition. This has now changed. With the growing affluence of our economy for the past decade, we are experiencing a new challenge brought about by the advent of careerism into our military institution. This has brought about a dilemma to the military in distinguishing these two kettle of fishes. Here, I offer some features of

distinction between the professional leader and the careerist.

The careerists, in the modern sense of the word, are those that can get the job done despite the fact that they care little about the welfare of their subordinates. They are pure "managers". They do not lead, neither do they inspire or motivate others. They merely manage. They are less personal, less caring and more characteristic of contractual relationships than value-oriented relationships.

In short, the primary motive of the careerist is promotion. They will do whatever they can to remain upwardly mobile in their careers. And they expect to be promoted at every turn in their careers in order to further their own self-interest. As we shall see, this group does well in peacetime, but they are doomed to failure when the bullets start flying.

On the other hand, a true leader is more personal and more oriented towards shared goals and values and more characteristic of the organisation demanding loyalty and selflessness for the greater good. The commitment of the professional and leader is then an unconditional and sterling quality as shown by his career length and life of selfless' service to the organisation.

The current development of the SAF has brought about an obvious dilemma i.e. do we want leaders who can really lead in times of crisis or do we want good managers in a peacetime environment?

Leadership versus Management

The question is really worthy of a debate here. Take the case of our junior officers' experience in the unit. Invariably our junior officers were taught leadership and management in the officer cadet school days; but yet, they seem to be confronted with the cynicism that they have developed because of their unpleasant experiences with a few senior "leaders". Regrettably, too many of these young officers have been exposed to a company commander, battalion commander or general staff officer who has apparently achieved high rank status despite questionable leadership qualities; lack of combat skills, knowledge, motivational abilities and credibility.

Although we aspire to teach leadership and management, there exists a dichotomy between the two polars - so much so that it becomes ; a question of leadership versus management. The difference is not always easy to define, especially in peacetime. Most definitions of management include the concept of planning, organising, supervising and controlling of resources, including human resources. In this context, an effective leader must be an effective manager. However, the reverse is not always true. An effective manager does not need to be a good leader in order to meet the "bottom line".

Leadership, in contrast to management, includes the critical concepts of influencing others, both directly and indirectly, towards mission accomplishment. Managers do not worry about influencing others. They force subordinates to comply and gain their unenthusiastic co-operation either through their confidential reports or ranking boards. Leaders, on the other hand, are able to inspire willing commitment from those they lead.

There lies the basic difference between leadership and management - while leadership is an attitude towards the military, management is merely an activity. So, leadership is what inspires others to give that extra bit that makes the difference in battle. One cannot manage to win; winners must be led. That is the essence of command.

Another way to look at the difference between management and leadership is to look at the "leadership delta". The delta comprises those additional personal attributes that elevate a manager to the level of an effective leader - sincerity, trustfulness, care and empathy. Characteristics that, when present, allow leaders to move organisations beyond the managerial bottom-line to true long-term combat effectiveness. This would appear to be a significantly different phenomenon compared to organisations that ostensibly appeared to be "effective", but, in fact, lacked real "leadership". We must not let this phenomenon delude us, because if we are not careful, we will tend to promote careerism.

Unfortunately, our promotion boards have been unable to distinguish the managers from the leaders and stop this outbreak of careerism. So what has happened is that our promotion and command selection system has not given due reward to effective "leadership", but has instead tended to reward effective "management".

Trends toward Careerism

Having discussed so much on the leadership and management concepts, it is timely to see why our very own military institution has succumbed to the scourge careerism and why we tend reward effective managers instead of effective leaders.

Traditionally, the army in the sixties and seventies had used duty honour, country and esprit de corps to motivate recruitment and retain quality personnel for further upgrading. Now, wages have become a motivational factor in the SAF. The military has thus become the stepping stone for the best to further their careers. With the various educational schemes, study awards and scholarships and the strong emphasis on educational qualifications in the officer corps, the SAF is encouraging more and more managers who do not have the commitment and loyalty to the organisation but are more concerned with their career advancement and ambitions. The strong emphasis that the SAF has placed on educational qualifications amongst the officer corps has created a division of officers into various classes.

The present climate in our institution is so conducive to officers who possess that degree to bring them to the top. It has become a trend to have that "in thing", i.e. a degree from a reputable university, for an accelerated route of advance career development.

While we can appreciate the SAF's desire to attract more able and talented intellectuals into the military profession, this trend is likely to lead more regular officers to pursue university level studies. Academic success or failure may thus make or break careers. The danger of this trend would then lead the military into an academic lockstep with the academic community. Our policies inadvertently encourage our officers to pursue a university degree not because of academic ability or available positions in the military but solely because it is the passport to career advancement and a "pampered" life. When the SAF insists on degrees for posts where academic ability is not a key factor, it automatically legitimizes this "paper chase". The SAF must acknowledge that many officers are capable of succeeding even without paper qualifications and it must not value academic degrees too highly in this profession of arms. Notwithstanding this effect, the trend will bring about other adverse consequences to the SAF.

The first is that it will foster a climate of self-deception. While it might attract a reasonable pool of brainy officers, it inadvertently frustrates the other young, idealistic and energetic officers who will leave the service and will be replaced by those who will tolerate or condone the system of imperfection by "play-acting" through their career.

The other consequence is that it will tend to corrode the image of the SAF and lower the credibility of our senior commanders because they demand high standards at every turn. It will also eventually squeeze much of the inner satisfaction and personal enjoyment of being in the SAF.

Ultimately, if we continue with the trend, the end result will be the breeding of careerism at the officer corps level. Professionalism thus becomes a secondary concern for the careerist. This is rather disturbing because the basic goal in the profession of arms is to produce officers suitable for war even in a peacetime environment.

We cannot allow the officer to develop a pure managerial mindset to the point of being blinded by the attractions that careerism offers. He who follows this trend will definitely expect to have his career card punched for promotion purposes. And to cover his trail, he will spend his time generating piles and piles of papers to be filed away for record purposes.

We must remember that like leadership, careerism is also a state of mind. But

unlike leadership, it emphasizes manipulating others in order to further one's own career. Rather than building cohesive fighting units the way leadership does, careerism tends to destroy it. Soldiers will fight and die for their leaders, but they will not fight just to generate another statistic to be punched on the officer's career card. Whether it is a peacetime or wartime condition, it will not change a soldier's perception of how well he will be led.

I am not suggesting that we need a crisis or a war to see the reality of where our profession lies in this present state of affairs. However, the present rate of attrition of personnel leaving the military profession serves as a functional equivalent of war. Manpower shortages become an acute problem. Vacant slots have to be filled quickly, subordinates suddenly need to stand in for departed superiors, sometimes for a long duration; while others, more unfortunate, are given concurrent appointments in their tour in the regular service; and for the more fortunate, promotion opportunities are opened up — all these are phenomenon of war without blood.

While the SAF has attempted to attract the good, it also breeds the bad and ugly side of soldiering. It is fast becoming a career of arms, no longer the traditional profession of arms.

The Second Minister of Defence (then Dr. Yeo Ning Hong) once said at a Manpower Policies Presentation:

"I do not equate excellence with good academic qualifications. A good degree from a reputable university is evidence of brain power. But it does not follow that an Officer without a degree has not brains. Anyway, intellectual excellence alone does not make a good SAF officer."

If these words are translated into actions for the SAF, then the present state of affairs will definitely improve substantially. Careerism may not even be tolerated. professionalism from the military point of view must prevail. In the military profession, the professional competence of good officers lies in their ability to lead men of average standing, have strong and sound characters, inspire others to excel and they themselves give the best they can. It must be an acknowledged fact that military skills and leadership are acquired skills that can only be thus acquired through training and education in the military institution, not universities.

Military intellectualism and academic intellectualism are not synonymous concepts while the former is a critical requirement in the profession of arms, the latter complements that critical requirement. Hence, military intellectualism should be the key factor in the measurement of good officers.

Back To Basics

As the officer corps moves towards the next lap, we have to shift our value system to suit the leadership environment and move away from the managerial values and practices associated with the scourge of careerism. Because careerism itself is such an insidious disease, it virtually threatens the integrity, morale and confidence of the officer corps. We have to start re-emphasizing high standards in terms of officers doing their jobs in a professional manner. One key factor is to re-direct the officers' attention away from their promotions and back to their duties. Officers that are driven by careerism must be singled out early before they are given high rank status to the detriment of the organisation. Academic qualifications should never be allowed to become a criterion for promotion. Promotion should be based solely on demonstrated competence. Academic excellence and professional competence are two different concepts too. Since the SAF exists to fight and win wars, priority must be given to producing competent officers who are trained to analyse and make decisions in war — officers who appreciate the human approach rather than the managerial approach to leading men and women by example. By eliminating the academic qualification factor, we can put a stamp on those "ticket punchers" or "card punchers" and maybe put a stop to the outbreak of careerism from the new generation of officers.

The new generation of officers must now direct their focus towards putting emphasis on their selfless devotion to the service of the armed forces. The officer corps must display a strong concern for the command climate they create for the organisation. Senior leaders play an important role in inculcating this aspect of leadership. They should adopt the teacher role to their junior officers. With this, the inner satisfaction which the senior leaders can derive will come if these junior leaders are able to think like them in the future when they are holding senior positions.

Conclusion

For the SAF to be a professional fighting force, the scourge of careerism must be eliminated. We certainly have room to improve our leadership environment, and conducive climate for the development of our quality manpower. We must develop a leader's state of mind in ourselves and in our subordinates. We need to hone our professional skills so that our units can be effective fighting forces. This is our primary aim. What we must not be engrossed in, is to be taken in by the attractions careerism offers. The policy-makers, on the other hand, must realise that it is prudent to offer a wide range of equal opportunities and chances to everyone and reward them equally well so as to give them a fair crack at life in the military.

Collectively, we in the officer corps must create a vision based on a sense of original purpose that is shared by all segments of the military institution towards a common goal; a goal to build a cohesive, fit and capable fighting force. Together, we

must exemplify the value of the mission to the military over self, devotion to the military institution as a whole, even at the risks of our careers, unit over the individual, service ethic over the job ethic, and most importantly, be nation-centred. Only then, can we be truly professional soldiers in our own rights. This is where our profession lies!

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Professionalism and the Army of the 1990s

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As the Army enters a period of dramatic change, it will once again rely heavily on the professionalism of its officer and non-commissioned officer corps. General Carl E. Vuono, the Army chief of staff, provides his views on the critical role that professionalism will play as the Army meets the demands of the 1990s. He presents the qualities of professionalism and offers programs for developing military professionals.

More than 200 years ago, the British army of Lord Cornwallis surrendered to combined American and French forces at Yorktown. As the British garrison marched out, the band played "The World Turned Upside Down" in recognition of the wholly unexpected outcome of the American Revolution.

As we move into a new decade, some would argue that it may be appropriate to play that song again. For the world is, indeed, being dramatically altered by the events that we see unfolding every day. As a result of this rapidly changing environment and in response to diminishing levels of resources available, the Army has begun to reshape itself into a smaller, but still highly capable force — one that will be as trained and ready to fulfill its global strategic mandate tomorrow as it is today, and one that will defend and advance US interests in a world of revolutionary change.

The overall blueprint that the Army is following as we evolve our force for the future is based on six enduring imperatives — imperatives that have forged the Army of 1990 and will serve as a beacon that will guide us into the next century.

These imperatives include:

- An uncompromising commitment to a quality force.
- A powerful war-fighting doctrine that will win both now and in the future.
- A mix of forces including heavy, light, and special operations forces in our Active and Reserve Components.
- Tough, realistic training.
- Continuous modernization.
- Development of leaders of unmatched ability.

As we work to shape the force within the context of these imperatives, one single, dominating characteristic will be fundamental to our future. That characteristic is professionalism.

In this article, I want to discuss the professionalism that exists in the Army today and to describe what we must do to enhance our professionalism in the years ahead.

The Concept of Professionalism

Professionalism is one of the most overworked terms in American society; it is used to describe everyone from office managers to baseball players. Indeed, in the common lexicon, one can be called a professional by virtue of either being paid for a particular talent or being very good at it.

To each of us, however, the term "professional" is of such profound importance that it warrants a more detailed and discriminating definition. A professional in the Army is a leader who is expert in the profession of arms, is responsible for soldiers and units, is committed to the defense of the nation and is bound by a strong ethical framework.

By this or any other definition, our leadership in the Army today is thoroughly professional, made up of outstanding officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who have dedicated their lives to defend the principles of freedom and democracy. Recent opinion polls reflect the high confidence the American people have in the military and suggest that the Army is widely respected throughout our society. This should be a matter of great personal pride to each of us who serves this great nation.

As capable as the Army is today, however, we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. As we reshape the Army, professionalism will assume even greater significance, for we will be a smaller Army, a closer-knit Army, an Army that will draw its strength from within. At the same time, we will remain an Army of the people, responsible to the nation and to the Constitution we have sworn to defend. As a corps of officers and NCOs, our professionalism will remain the bond that cements the Army of the future into the cohesive, trained and ready force that our nation demands.

This requirement is doubly important because we serve a great republic — a nation that relies on a Total Army, Active and Reserve, with the expectation that when the Army is committed, it will be fully ready. Military leaders know more than anyone the effort required to maintain readiness and the price that is paid by our soldiers if we allow it to erode. Consider the Army's fight at Kasserine Pass in 1943 — a battle in which, as described by Omar Bradley, "we took a licking." The Army was not trained and was not prepared for combat, and as a result, young Americans died needlessly. As we confront the challenges of the next century, we will not have the luxury of years of preparation; we must be fully ready at all times.

The Qualities of Professionalism

Professionalism — whether within the Army or in other walks of life — has its roots in three fundamental qualities: competence, responsibility and commitment.* These are the qualities that separate a professional from an employee, and they are qualities that are indispensable for the Army of today and tomorrow — an Army committed to the defense of the nation worldwide.

Competence. The first quality is competence. Put simply, we must be expert in the profession of arms, and we must know our jobs at every level — from fire team leader to chief of staff. Competence is not an inherited trait; it grows out of dedication, education, experience, tough realistic training and plain hard work.

In developing competence, a delicate balance is essential. On the one hand, we must concentrate on current tasks and be especially well versed in the basics of combat that win on the battlefield.

There is no substitute for rock-solid proficiency in the nuts-and-bolts operations that hold the Army together. On the other hand, we are compelled to develop the skills that we will need to fulfill future responsibilities and continuously embrace an ever-expanding vista of duties. In achieving the needed balance between these two dimensions of competence, we can neither sacrifice our focus on current duties nor lose sight of the future.

This balance will be of even greater significance in the future Army — a smaller force that must have the capacity to expand rapidly into an Army capable of fighting a major conflict. Captains must be prepared to command battalions; lieutenants to command companies; and staff sergeants to become first sergeants almost overnight. The demands of the future may require rapid commitment and expansion of forces, far faster than our experience of World War II. Our professional development programs must be vibrant and real, designed with future battlefields in mind.

The Army has an excellent record of developing competence at all levels. Through each of the three pillars of our leader development program — through our schools, operational experience and self-development — we are creating legions of competent, confident leaders who are at the very foundation of our trained and ready Army. Today, we have the most tactically and technically proficient leaders our nation has ever fielded, and this has been categorically demonstrated in battle during Operation Just Cause and during training events at our combat training centers.

Our soldiers who fought in Panama report that although they were concerned as they went into combat, they knew that they were well trained, they were confident

in their fellow soldiers, and they knew that their leaders would take care of them. Competence served us well in Panama and will win on any battlefield anywhere in the world.

Many concepts of professionalism today stop with competence, reflecting a belief that a professional is merely someone who has acquired a technical skill. To be sure, competence is essential, but competence alone is not enough. We in the Army are required to take a broader, more comprehensive view of our profession.

Responsibility. A professional leader is not only competent but is also responsible — responsible for the performance of soldiers and units, and responsible for the performance of the Army as a whole. In a wider sense, our officers and NCOs are also responsible for the security of the United States and for the defense of the American people — a sacred responsibility that separates the profession of arms from every other walk of life. And most important, we are collectively and individually responsible to our society for the sons and daughters of America entrusted to our care. We must train them, prepare them and lead them so that, should they be called upon, they can fight and win the wars of our nation.

Responsibility extends beyond current performance. We are equally responsible for the future of the Army and for developing the next generation of professionals capable of assuming the mantle of leadership in the years ahead.

Our breadth of professional responsibility has important implications for leaders throughout the Army. For example, a battalion commander, in the words of that old phrase, is responsible for everything his battalion does or fails to do — its tactical performance, its state of readiness and its level of training, as well as the health and well-being of every member of his command. Moreover, since his battalion is an integral element of larger organizations, he shares in the responsibility for the performance of those units as well. And beyond that he feels a sense of accountability for the overall state of the Army, both now and in the future, even though he may have only marginal influence over events that occur in areas far removed from his command. This is the degree of responsibility all of us — officers and NCOs — must willingly assume at all levels.

By its very nature, the Army instills in our leaders a deep and abiding sense of responsibility. The entire chain of command must keep that all-embracing ethic at the forefront of our thought. Responsibility is an integral part of every leadership position in the Army and is a quality that we must continue to develop, foster and support at all levels. We want leaders in the Army who personally practice the maxim made famous by President Harry Truman that "the buck stops here."

Commitment. The final quality of a professional is commitment, and for the soldier, this means in the largest sense an unswerving devotion to selfless service in the defense of the Constitution and in support of the American people. As we shape the Army for the 1990s and beyond, we must focus renewed attention on this final and critical quality. We are currently blessed with vast numbers of leaders who have made an enduring commitment to the Army and to the nation. While there may be some who would make their commitment contingent on tangible rewards — fast promotions, abundant command opportunities and exceptional benefits — the true professional subordinates these considerations to an overarching commitment to selfless service.

To be sure, a professional leader is not blind to the need for tangible rewards and is entitled to a quality of life commensurate with his contribution to the American people and equal to that enjoyed within the society he has sworn to defend. But his commitment transcends the bounds of material gain. A professional has made an unqualified decision to serve the nation under whatever conditions may emerge. This commitment sustains each of us through harsh times and difficult assignments and gives us the focus that we need — a focus on current tasks, on professional growth and on the needs of the Army. It also forges in each of us an unbreakable bond with our fellow soldiers — a bond that will endure even under the most arduous of conditions in the crucible of combat.

In the years ahead, it is vital that we redouble our efforts to build and enhance the commitment of each officer and NCO to selfless service and to the profession of arms. This unrelenting commitment, when coupled with the other qualities of expertise and responsibility, produces leaders who have the competence, the sense of duty and the moral courage to serve the Army and the nation through periods of great international turmoil and domestic uncertainty.

Programs for Professionalism

I believe that developing professionalism within the ranks of our leaders must become a crusade at all levels — a crusade for the benefit of our soldiers, for the welfare of the Army, and for the good of the nation. But how do we approach this challenge? What should each of us do to enhance professionalism throughout our ranks? There is a wide range of programs and techniques, and many are being successfully applied in units throughout the Army. But here I want to lay out my general guidelines to serve as the foundation for a comprehensive program of professional development Armywide.

Enhance Pride. First, we must exploit the built-in advantages that we have in the profession of arms and capitalize on the pride that grows from a commitment to selfless service. We must recognize and promote the concept that the returns for

service to the nation go far beyond material reward. Although we should — and do — place considerable emphasis on our quality of life programs and equitable pay, our greatest rewards are intangible. They derive from the self-satisfaction of leading American soldiers and from the pride of serving a calling greater than ourselves.

In the early 1800s, Napoleon said that "a soldier will fight long and hard for a bit of colored ribbon." Of course, as Napoleon knew well, it is not the ribbon itself for which soldiers fight and die. The ribbon is of little intrinsic value, cannot be eaten and will not keep the rain off. Soldiers will fight for a bit of colored ribbon because of their pride in the achievement that the ribbon symbolizes. Recognition of achievement in the eyes of our superiors, peers and subordinates, when accomplished against tough, demanding standards, is a powerful force that drives us all. Many outside the Army have difficulty understanding this sort of motivation, yet it goes to the very heart of soldiering.

This intangible, yet vital, dimension of the Army is as important today as it was during Napoleon's time and has been demonstrated in examples beyond number. One such case occurred during early February at Fort Polk, Louisiana, when the soldiers of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry Task Force, returned from Panama to a division-wide ceremony and parade. It was a rainy, blustery day, and the soldiers were standing on a field that had turned to mud. But the atmosphere of that formation and the attitudes of those American soldiers brought out the sun. Several of the wounded were honored at the parade, some with injuries so severe that they came to the field in wheelchairs. But each of these soldiers chose to stand at attention throughout the ceremony, their faces reflecting both their physical pain and their immense pride in the role they had played in the defense of freedom. They had done their duty and done it well. Each of them proudly wore the Purple Heart as a badge of honor.

Leaders at all levels must seize upon every opportunity to build and support the kind of spirit that these soldiers embodied — a spirit that is intangible and yet remains very real, capturing the essence of the profession of arms.

Learn from History. Second, we must build on a sense of our own history — an important and sometimes neglected dimension of the Army. Americans have long been accused of having no sense of their national past — an accusation that applies equally well to most of us. We are often too embroiled in current crises to examine events and issues that have long been decided.

Within the Army, the serious study of our history has gained new momentum, and we must build on this in the challenging times ahead. For our history has profound relevance to the great issues of today and to the overarching plans that we have developed to shape the Army of the 1990s and beyond. Few vocations offer the opportunity to make history, and if we are to contribute to the future, we must draw

upon our past. The philosopher George Santayana reminds us that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it," and it is clear that lessons of history often point out the pitfalls that we must avoid. For example, we need look no further than the devastation of Task Force Smith during the early days of Korea to see what happens when an ill-trained, undermanned, poorly equipped Army is committed to battle. That is a lesson of history we must never repeat.

Of equal importance, history conveys a sense of our professional worth far more effectively than any other single source. As a corps of leaders, we must read and discuss our history. We must also understand history, and we must teach it to others, particularly our young soldiers. We have a heritage of battle and bravery, of combat and courage, and every soldier is entitled to share in its glory. Moreover, history teaches us the critical responsibilities that our predecessors have shouldered and the expectations that our nation has of us as members of a profession with such high ideals and values.

Share Ideas and Experience. Third, we must reinforce our skill in the art of exchanging ideas and opinions among ourselves. Leaders of the past, particularly during the interwar years, corresponded extensively with colleagues throughout the Army. The writings of Marshall, Patton, MacArthur, and scores of others like them were instrumental in refining the tactics, techniques and procedures that ultimately won the great land campaigns of the 20th century.

Many of us are involved in such exchanges today, and we must encourage and support these efforts across the Army. This dialogue will not only improve our own battlefield capabilities, it will also help foster the collective bonding that is so fundamental as we shape the Army of tomorrow. Our professional journals — designed to reach the broadest sweep of audiences across the widest range of issues — will be especially important in the years ahead. Each of us must assume a greater and more personal role in the reading of, and writing for, our journals and in the exchange of ideas and thoughts throughout our profession.

Build Our Formal Programs. Fourth, we have to reexamine our formal programs of officer and NCO professional development (OPD and NCOPD) at unit level. We must continue to emphasize these programs Army-wide. We cannot allow them to become after-thoughts in the quarterly training plan; rather, it is essential that they flow from a comprehensive view of professional development as an integral element of leader training. Leaders throughout the Army must scrutinize their programs with care and imagination and use them to build and intensify professionalism at every level. We should look for opportunities, for example, to implement reading and writing programs, and to emphasize practical lessons in our study of history, while not forgetting the more traditional subjects that focus on current job performance and the unit's mission essential task list.

Develop Subordinates. Next, we have to continue to stress decentralization throughout each of our units and at all levels. This is the most effective way to encourage responsibility and support innovation among junior leaders. Part of effective decentralization is the commitment by seniors to underwrite both the successes and the mistakes of subordinates who are trying to expand the horizons of the Army. I cannot emphasize this strongly enough. In a smaller Army, we must fight against the tendency to become too conservative, to avoid risks and to demand zero defects in everything our units do.

We must be wary of this trap — we can never sacrifice originality and imagination to some unattainable and counterproductive standard of perfection. Our young leaders in particular should be able to take prudent risks, to learn from their honest mistakes and, as a result, to achieve new levels of professional growth.

Build Standards. Finally, we must continue to set, enforce and practice the highest standards of ethical behavior and moral conduct. The Army, like all true professions, has a code of ethics to which each of us is expected to adhere. And, because of the nature of warfare, our code extends beyond the boundaries of American society, embracing international standards universally accepted by civilized nations. On matters of ethics, there can be no compromise, whether on the battlefield, in the motor pool, or in the corridors of the Pentagon.

Effective leader development programs are continuously reinforced by the untarnished image of unrelenting professionalism in our officers and NCOs. This is an image that must be burnished and sustained by a deep and abiding commitment to treat all our soldiers, all our family members and all our civilians with the dignity and respect that they deserve. Leaders listen with concern and act with compassion. If we are uncompromising in enforcing high ethical standards, each of us at every level will be able to look into the eyes of our soldiers and say confidently, "Follow me and do as I do."

A profession depends upon all of its members assuming and discharging their responsibilities to the utmost of their talents. Today, every leader in the Army is compelled to shoulder the burden of crafting and implementing effective programs of professional development while monitoring and guiding the programs of subordinate units.

At the most basic level, I believe that we can best enhance professionalism throughout the Total Army by building on the very features that make service to the nation unique. We must develop initiatives that revolve around the central tenet of our profession — selfless and devoted service to our soldiers, to our Army and to the American people.

Our nation asks much of its Army. It asks that we observe higher moral and ethical standards than the society we are sworn to protect; it asks that we endure the hardships of serving at isolated posts and quietly enduring onerous duty; it asks that we undergo the tough, realistic training necessary to ensure that the Army is fully ready. And it asks that we be ready to make the ultimate commitment — the sacrifice of our very lives in the defense of the nation. This is not an abstract concept. It is cold, hard reality brought home to each of us whenever we are called upon to fight in support of freedom and democracy.

We have today an Army of unmatched quality — an Army of dedicated men and women, expert in their calling and committed to the ideals for which our nation stands. It is critical that we now redouble our efforts to enhance the professionalism of everyone on the Total Army team. As we look to the future and as we shape the Army to meet the demands of a complex and dangerous world, our officers and noncommissioned officers will be the linchpin that will bind the Army together and will sustain us into the 21st century.

In many ways, the world of the 1990s, like the world of Lord Cornwallis, is indeed turning upside down. But the Army, a trained and ready professional force, must remain a solid anchor of reliability, prepared to fulfill its strategic mandate anywhere in the world, under whatever conditions emerge. This is the primary task that we, as professionals, must undertake, and it is a task in which we cannot and shall not fail.

- ***Similar characteristics were first hid out by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State, (Cambridge: The Harvard University Press, J 957). This book is an excellent point of departure for any serious examination of professionalism.***