

From Terror Fallout To *Terra Firma*: Convergent Focus On Strengthening Homeland Security
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"It is not possible for us to deal with these new threats with the same type of structure and capabilities we had in the past. It does not make sense for us to pretend that these threats are not there. They are there, and we have to guard against them. At the same time, we should not let these threats disrupt our way of life. "

*Dr Tony Tan,
DPM and Minister of Defence, 6 Jan 2002¹*

"Homefront security must be the shared responsibility of every Singaporean."

*Mr Wong Kan Seng,
Minister of Home Affairs, 17 May 2002²*

Introduction: Strategic Insecurity

The global security climate took a sudden nose-dive from one of post-Cold War euphoric "New World" Order to one of strategic insecurity - after Sep 11. The dark plumes from the collapsed WTC buildings subsequently gathered to form war clouds over Afghanistan and cast a pall of dread over many other parts of the world. The geopolitical implications continue to play out beyond Central Asia and the Middle East with the potential complication of an event involving the diabolical use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. With such a dim prospect in mind, the war on global terrorism is clearly not just an American one.

Terrorism has in fact taken on a catastrophic and strategic dimension, well beyond the sharp surrealism of the WTC strikes at the heart of America. Terror operations are no longer waged solely by disaffected groups and individuals on a local scale with limited goals, but by radicalised groups operating through well-funded global networks of cells with grander grotesque agendas. The new global terrorism is not ad hoc or tactical in nature but highly synchronised, self-organising and strategic in its "global media-spectacular" objectives. Many would-be terrorists with malleable domestic agendas appear ready to rise to the battle-call. Many of them also appear to draw inspiration from the ready-made Al Qaeda discourse of unmitigated violence. In fact, many are also being franchised through its "pyramid" network of global support and sympathisers. The new enemy operates clandestinely through secure cells amongst indigenous populations. Recent Pakistani intelligence reports indicate that the Al Qaeda network has made plans for a world-wide suicide-bombing offensive against the US and its allies. Such sinister threats have already manifested in the acts like those of the suicide bomber who killed 15 people, including 11 French nationals, in Karachi in May 2002. Another fatal attack occurred barely a month later on 14 June 02 when a bomb explosion outside the US Consulate-General's office in Karachi killed 12 people.

Even after the dust has settled on the US war in Afghanistan, with possibly another one kicked up in the Persian Gulf again, it is likely that the global war on terrorism will continue for some time and with far-reaching ramifications. The anticipated global and sustained nature of

warfare against terrorism requires a major rethink of the way national security is to be attained and preserved. For many countries, security now begins, first and foremost, at home. As one writer puts it: "When war comes home, so must war strategy."³ The same keen focus on homeland security applies acutely to a small and open city-state like Singapore.

Taking Stock of the Rising Tide of Terror

Like many countries, Singapore has responded to the new threats and geopolitical insecurities by tightening and beefing up our military defence and homefront security apparatus. We have also judiciously reviewed and kept our contingency plans warm to deal with any sudden deterioration in our external and internal security environment. But whatever we do, Singapore cannot expect to escape entirely from the negative spill-over effects of global terrorism. Being a small and porous society plugged right into the global economy, Singapore's small size, the open nature of our economy, and our fluid geostrategic environment make us an attractive target. We must therefore be constantly vigilant with resolute zero-tolerance for terrorism-related activities. The challenges to our border and internal security are compounded by the fact that Singapore is both a busy international air hub and sea hub with a highly mobile population. Every day, hundreds and thousands of people and goods move in and out of Singapore. It is clear that increased security comes at a high price, and we must find a balance between the many competing economic, social and security demands while safeguarding our vital infrastructure and interests.

The preventive arrests of 13 *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) cell members, who had plotted to bomb American interests in Singapore in late 2001, brought the uncomfortable truth of the problem right into the psyche of many Singaporeans. They had planned to make up to seven truck bombs from 21 tonnes of ammonium nitrate to blow up the US embassy and other American targets in Singapore. Plans were also afoot to hijack an airliner within the region and crash it into Singapore's Changi International Airport. Fortunately, they were discovered before they could do any damage. We have also had our fair share of anthrax scares, bomb hoaxes, plane hijack warnings and veiled threats with little signs of attribution. Recent revelations of a second wave of preventive arrests in August 2002 by Singapore's Internal Security Department of 21 Singaporeans for terrorism-related activities highlight the extent and penetration of the threat.⁴ Despite our best efforts and intentions, we remain vulnerable to rogue threats that roam at large and loom in the shadows. The presence of US interests in Singapore and our open support of the US-led war against terrorism make us, like many countries, a target by association. To be sure, our security agencies will not let-up in efforts to ensure Singapore remains one of the safest countries in the world. They will continue to lessen our attractiveness and vulnerabilities as a target with a matching higher visibility deterrence posture and enhanced early warning through full-spectrum vigilance. This can help to mitigate the fear and manage uncertainty somewhat.

Indeed, the point well made by many commentators about dealing with uncertainty is not trying to predict the future. Instead, it is about framing new mindsets, developing unified organisation and putting in place responsive capabilities to deal with a range of threat scenarios. There is no single-line approach to managing uncertainty. Straight line-thinking goes out the window now that the terror of complexity and chaos threaten to shatter more than mindsets. The challenge will be to have the right strategies, policies and capabilities that are robust enough to operate effectively across a range of possible futures. In dealing with strategic complexity, *strategic convergence* of a nation's mindset, resources and capabilities appear to be the key imperatives. Before outlining some of the measures Singapore has taken, it may be useful to quickly outline the new threat context.

New Threat Context

Global terrorism appears to have sunk deep roots into many countries in Asia and around the world. Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon to Southeast Asia, they have, until recently, been largely isolated and often unrelated; albeit not regionally or globally networked. Security analyst reports indicate that Asian terrorism groups have seen an increase in numbers over the past five years, and the recent exposé of terrorist networks in several Southeast countries has led some to brand the region as a second front in the fight against terrorism. Such a disturbing development coupled with religious extremism represent highly undesirable underlying trends that must be checked lest they cause long-term disruption; particularly if the local governments are unable *or* prevaricate on curtailing the growth of extremist and obscurantist groups purveying violence. Whether politically exploited or left entirely on their own volition, such disparate groups can initiate damaging hostile actions despite their seemingly modest resources. The danger for many states faced with the threat right at their doorsteps and within their homeland has become more real now than remote. It cannot be underestimated. Any mass casualty terrorism attacks emanating from neighbouring/domestic sources or those further afield impacting on our shores will seriously damage the region's peace, social stability and business confidence. The very survival and integrity of nation-states may come under grave threat. This has been well-acknowledged by all countries in the region, with stepped up bilateral and international cooperation. At their recent meeting on 17 May 02, senior officials from the ten ASEAN nations agreed that closer cooperation was needed to counter terrorism. A statement issued at the end of the meeting stressed that ASEAN would give priority to transnational crimes such as terrorism, arms smuggling, piracy, cyber crime, money-laundering and the trafficking of women and children. Following up quickly on the statement, the group has since concluded another important agreement the ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on 1 August 2002. Such intra and extra-regional efforts highlight some of the serious multilateral inroads that have been made.

For all intents and purposes, the world post 9-11 is caught up in more than a crisis. It would not be hyperbole to say that many countries in the world are now in a general state of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) and cannot afford to let their guard down for a moment. Low Intensity Conflict denotes a condition of irregular and interminable warfare waged across a broadfront of a nation's domains; from physical/cyber attacks and economic sabotage to social disruption and psychological dislocation. And it can persist for long periods from troubled peace to hot war. It follows then that, full-spectrum response to a LIC scenario means that the operational readiness posture of our security agencies must fit a "pulse-and- plateau"⁵ profile, rather than the "ramp-and-spike"⁶ profile of conventional threat scenarios. But try as some countries might, there is no *Maginot Line* or *magic bullet* when dealing with the LIC of global terrorism. This new type of Low Intensity Conflict can have disproportionately devastating effects through the sheer cunning of asymmetry and suicidal surprise. It is a threat that has no qualms about the cynical use of civilian infrastructure to attack civilian targets. In sum, it is aimed at disrupting daily life by instilling chronic public fear. It therefore demands a fundamentally new way of thinking and organising for preserving our national security. Conventional national security mechanisms, often inter-state in orientation and episodic in operation, are not well-designed to be responsive enough to deal with the new threat posed by catastrophic terrorism, waged by non-state actors, in a sustained and strategic manner.

There is now a blurring of traditional notions of external and internal defence. The boundaries between war and peace have also been clouded by the LIC of global terrorism. The key impact of such blurring will be in the redefining civil-military security functions as well as converging

public-private interests to overcome the disparate nature and magnitude of potential threats. Such threats now effortlessly traverse the realms of physical, psychological and cyber space. The threat envelope and target spectrum has now widened considerably and it would be impossible to guard all gateways or angles. Some even go so far as to argue that the search for "foolproof" Homeland Security breeds Homeland insecurity, especially when not enough is done to design systems that fail smartly.⁷ Quite apart from the obvious challenges ahead, it is clear that we will need to prioritise where we intend to commit resources after a circumspect survey of the most credible threat vectors and weak links throughout the national infrastructure.

To be sure, conventional security frames of references and operations designed for state defence focused on an external state's military aggression will now have to be augmented. The Sep 11 attacks do not fundamentally change the need for a strategy of deterrence and for a strong defence capability, especially for a small country like Singapore. However, the traditional focus on conventional aggression by an identifiable state adversary will not suffice when one's homeland is exposed to the global terrorist threat which is difficult to screen-out or pin-down. While diplomacy backed by a strong deterrence capability will still form the bedrock of our national security policy, homeland defence must now be looked at with new lenses and tackled with fresh ideas.

Some Organising Principles for Homeland Security

- **Close Civil-Military & Public-Private Partnerships**

As French Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, a key transnational terrorism crime fighter and expert on the Al Qaeda network, had put it: "Coordination is more effective than competition".⁸ Civil and military agencies must now quickly come to a consensus on the threats "out there and in here" in order to converge on the common space of close systemic coordination. Bureaucratic barriers need to be removed and turf wars avoided. The military brings to the table of inter-agency cooperation, a big plate of manpower, logistical resources, expertise and capabilities (Intelligence, Information, Aviation, Maritime *et al*) that can help augment the capability envelope of the civil security enforcement agencies. Private commercial entities will also have a bigger role to play in boosting homeland security especially when terrorists gun for soft targets commercial infrastructure, public spaces, transport and high density urban population centres - besides traditional hard targets like government buildings and assets. The onus is now on private entities and public agencies to establish clear mechanisms for crisis and consequence management, in order to respond effectively and minimise disruptions when attacks occur. Footing the costs and burden-sharing will be a joint public-private affair. In a similar vein, it is envisaged that greater public communication on joint national security education activities will be important, as both public agencies and private entities forge new partnerships and acknowledge their common stakes in preserving a climate of peace, security and stability.

- **Integration of Effort**

The new threats now require a greater degree of intelligence and operational integration to sustain a level of higher alertness and operational responsiveness. This calls for a greater integration of effort in order to fight and win this new type of conflict decisively on home ground. Integration of effort allows for enhanced real-time and round-the-clock Intelligence-Operations co-ordination. For example, the formation of Homeland Security

mechanisms to achieve integration of operational command both horizontally and vertically throughout a country's decision-making structure, would serve to foster policy-operations-intelligence integration, and help determine the key capabilities to be developed to plug any gaps in the national security system. This can then lead to better exploitation of the relevant emergent technologies, as well as initiate research and development into new capabilities for military and homefront agencies.

- **Seamless Transition from Peacetime to War**

Integration of effort will also enable the seamless transition of disparate national agencies from troubled peace to hot war with minimal disruption and in a co-ordinated manner with strategic oversight. Tighter civil-military co-ordination and integration at both the policy and operational levels will be critical. The military's role in homeland defence will have to be reviewed and critical changes made to existing national command structures and civil-military organisation to facilitate its heightened responsibilities to deal with the spectrum of threats. To overcome global terrorism, war-fighting and crime-fighting must now go hand in hand. In addition, terrorism is clearly not just a homeland security issue for homefront agencies to tackle. It is also a force protection issue where the military already has a clear role and broad scope for involvement. Military force protection issues will now increasingly figure in the forefront of military planning. The challenge will be in integrating air and sea defence, and cyber defence with other components of homeland security. But the military must guard against overreach. In other words, combat readiness must not be eroded as the military takes on more responsibilities on the homefront and stretches its resources to augment the civil security agencies and national instruments of power.

- **Clear and Concerted National Security Strategies**

In order to stand up effectively against the new threat over the longer term, security and civil ministries and agencies must work even more closely in a concerted national security effort. Turf issues while at times unavoidable, should not be allowed to fester and prevent systemic co-operation. Dialogue, trust and understanding will have to be genuinely fostered in order to initiate and develop new homeland security capabilities to tackle the multifarious threats confronting a nation in the immediate and long-term. But before these can be done in a focused yet holistic manner, there is a pressing need for consensus to define national security strategies that will better frame, prioritise and co-ordinate often disparate national security efforts. Strategies can no longer afford to be implemented and reviewed piece-meal. They must instead be reviewed constantly and comprehensively as part of a fluid continuum. The formulation of a national security masterplan or multi-year blueprint to provide policy oversight of all key national security initiatives and programmes will be crucial for driving the strategic process along.

A clear national security strategy would also augment a well-developed conventional defence strategy in an asymmetric era where war can no longer be easily contemplated and neatly conducted according to text-book manoeuvres, predicated on short and decisive victories. Any conventional war or period of tension that we can be expected to face in the future will in all probability be waged along the entire spectrum of conflict from troubled peace to hot war; though not necessarily sequentially but simultaneously. Such a war will not have a clear or easy end in sight. This is the harsh reality we must

face against shadowy enemies state-sponsored or otherwise. Such enemies are not readily cornered, easily cowered, or reasonably dictated to by conventional logic premised on force of arms or cost-benefit calculus. The new terrorists are fueled by a radical religious ideology that is more intent on smashing rather than sitting at the negotiating table. Thomas Friedman has referred to them as "undeterrables".⁹ Described by another analyst as "punishment terrorism", the attacks of the new terrorism are consciously committed to punish a perceived "wrong-doer", who may be a State, an organisation, group or individual. It is retributive in nature and does not have any other objective or demand to be achieved beyond the act of retribution. It is the use of terrorism as a weapon to give vent to anger and not necessarily to achieve any strategic objective or tactical demand in every instance.¹⁰ While old-style terrorists often have a clear political goal to direct their message through often isolated acts of violence and political ransom like kidnapping, the new-age terrorists, of the Al Qaeda mould, appear more intent on making many heads roll in addition to grabbing the headlines. Mass murder and mayhem *is* the mass media message.

Groundwork for the New National Security Paradigm

Well before 11 Sep, we had already put in place an integrated national command structure that provides strategic policy oversight of our national security apparatus and operations to deal with unconventional threats. The *Security Policy Review Committee* (SPRC) made up of ministers from the key security ministries with a keen internal focus and external orientation ie. Defence, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. It "actively drive[s]" the build up of required capabilities and infrastructure to protect the Singapore homeland.¹¹ Close support is also garnered from the other national ministries on specific overlapping issues requiring special expertise eg. Health and Environment. We have also spent more than a decade building up a well-oiled Total Defence mechanism. One of the key lessons learnt from our recent experience with the national security milieu post 9-11 is the importance of better synergy and orchestration of policy coordination, strategy development, intelligence dissemination and security operations by focusing all the instruments of national power at our disposal. Towards this end, the *National Security Secretariat* (NSS) an "operationally-oriented"¹² inter-agency outfit - assumes the lead role at the strategic level in co-ordinating and integrating inter-agency efforts to build-up national resilience against threats posed by terrorism, as part of the enhanced homeland security architecture. The following critical areas below have been identified and are being holistically addressed. They also represent our new strategy-driven efforts, to ensure that Singapore continues to surmount the new security challenges that have emerged:

- **Tighter Intelligence and Operations Integration**

Since 11 Sep, Singapore's security agencies have focused significantly more resources on monitoring potential terrorist threats. To prevent fatal blind-spots, it is clear that hard arsenals alone will not be enough to tackle the new threats. We need also to focus on building sharp yet "soft capabilities" like integrated deep-cover HUMINT to penetrate terrorist cells, where possible. In addition, inter-intel agency linkages for more accurate threat/risk assessments to cue appropriate operational responses will also need to be strengthened. New mechanisms for pooling existing expertise and developing new knowledge on terrorism, with the corollary setting-up of a central database can help build up intelligence coverage of terrorist groups for counter-terrorism purposes. Such institutional convergence will also enhance Int-Ops integration at the operational levels to enable timely and appropriate responses to alerts. The *Joint Counter Terrorism Centre*

(JCTC) has been set-up to serve as the central coordinating intelligence agency to integrate the activities of the country's various intelligence services, and be the main contact point with foreign intelligence agencies. Other new outfits like the *Homefront Security Centre* (HSC) have also been set-up under the Ministry Home Affairs to work closely with their SAF and JCTC partners to oversee joint security operations and exercises to test operational responses to terrorism and other security threats on the homefront. The formation of a "scalable" *National Security Task Force* (NSTF) as an interagency body to coordinate operational response to security threats is another important example.¹³ Such new outfits complement and strengthen extant structures like the National Emergency System (NEST) for ensuring civil/economic security during civil emergencies, and the Executive Group (EG) in leading the management of civil security/emergency situations like hijack, bomb explosion, terrorist sabotage or civil disaster.¹⁴ The new outfits are not meant to create additional hierarchical layers of bureaucratic snafu. Instead they generate important new interagency nodes that will transmit greater seamless synergy throughout our entire national security network by reducing institutional stove-pipes.

- **Closer Civil-Military Interface and Public-Private Cooperation**

Over the past few years, the various security ministries and agencies of Singapore have developed the healthy habit of close interactions and consultations from the policy level down to the agency/operational levels. The close working rapport can be seen in the various national security initiatives ranging from enhancing our critical infrastructure to resource protection. The SAF and Home Team agencies have also jointly developed and fine-tuned operational mechanisms to protect our vital public and private installations around Singapore. The close co-operation seen in troop deployments to safeguard the Singapore Changi International Airport and petro-chemical hub at Jurong island are cases in point. The close civil-military coordination involved in securing the successful conclusion of high signature public events in Singapore (eg. *Asian Aerospace 2002 and Asia Security Conference* from 31 May-2 June 2002) and other key installations island-wide post 9-11 are also positive signs in the right direction. We have also tightened up border controls and stepped up cargo and immigration checks at all land, sea and air exit/entry points into our island republic. More work lies ahead and the various ministries and their agencies are separately spearheading reviews of our contingency and emergency plans under their respective purviews. Regular security exercises and mega-event security operations will continue to be jointly planned and executed to tap synergies and hone competencies.

- **Enhanced Total Defence**

It is clear that the fine line between external and internal defence has all but blurred, if not disappeared. Post 9-11 events have lent greater credence to the prudence and faith we had in instituting Total Defence for Singapore two decades ago. Total Defence has served well in conventional deterrence but it will now have to be enhanced further in the following areas to tackle the broader spectrum of threats:

- National Psychological Resilience and Social Harmony. The key effect of terrorism is fear. It is therefore imperative to have national communication mechanisms in place to disseminate accurate public information and disabuse

disinformation. This is vital in mitigating any climate of doom and gloom and to allow life to go on as normally as possible by cushioning the shocks of surprise attacks and weathering the storms of protracted adversity. The key objective will be to build up greater psychological and social resilience to weather the unpredictable storms of full spectrum conflict without descending into general hysteria or social paralysis. Another important aspect of terror to guard against, besides paranoia, is that of social suspicion and discord. Tensions can arise if misperceptions that certain segments of a society may be targeted for national security enforcement actions are not promptly corrected and seen to be fair. Multiracial-religious states, especially one like Singapore, must tread a fine balance between maintaining security and managing sensitivities amongst the different groups. While there is a need to act firmly, states must be careful not to react over-defensively. The war against global terrorism is clearly not a religious or civilizational war, no matter how convenient and attractive the logic may seem to some. It is a war against transnational criminals who seek to tear the social fabric of nations by driving a bloody stake of terror and suspicion through its body politic. Ultimately, the real centre of gravity in the terrorism battle revolves around winning hearts and minds. Post 9-11, Singapore has taken a determined bottom-up approach to promote a deeper sense of social harmony. We have instituted new mechanisms like Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCC) to enhance understanding and interaction amongst the various races and religious groups in Singapore. This is being done through grassroots outreach activities like inter-faith worship site tours, community club courses, working through TV media programmes and even breaking fast during the Month of Ramadan by the children and youths of the different religions. Schools are also another focus area where the common space of early interfaith and interracial interaction amongst young minds can be preserved, if not enlarged and strengthened. Tomorrow's social cohesion begins with good grounding of the younger generation today, and should never be assumed. It will always be work and dialogue-in-progress.

- Critical Infrastructure Assurance. In an era of Bio-Chemical and cyber threats, we are also paying greater attention to preserving our critical infrastructure in times of prolonged national duress. Vulnerability studies are being conducted to ascertain the extent of our strengths in sectors ranging from Transport, Communications, Water and Food supplies. The robustness of financial system from the broad spectrum of systemic infrastructure attacks spanning across physical, psychological and cyber realms will have to be looked into comprehensively.

- **Developing New Capabilities & Leveraging on Technology**

Another key focus of would be to seek out new capability developments and to do so by leveraging on technological advances where relevant. A National Security technology blueprint could be drawn up to define and develop *Big, Hairy Audacious Goals* (BHAG)¹⁵ to thwart WMD terrorism. Take for example the goal that all joint security and civil defence forces must be prepared to conduct combined operations for extended periods of time in hazardous chemical and biological environments and to overcome this challenge through comprehensive protective measures on the ground, in the air and at sea. Of particular interest will be the development of better monitoring, surveillance and detection capabilities by exploiting emergent high technologies. To be sure, advances in deep-scanning, radiation-tolerant microelectronics, Artificial Intelligence and Biometric technologies have broadened the scope for future employment. Chemical and

radiological spectral scanning technologies are also being actively explored to boost aviation and maritime check-point security. And for now, bio-sniffers remain the holy-grail of detection technologies. In fact, Singapore's public health authorities have recently announced plans to put aside a hefty \$100 million war-chest to build sophisticated laboratories and capabilities to detect quick-spreading infectious diseases and combat bio-terrorism. Weaponized bio-threats such as that posed by the potential return of a pandemic small-pox outbreak demands concerted syndromic vigilance by the international community *and* contingency vaccine stockpile planning by domestic public health authorities.

- **Funding and Procurement**

Another point well-mooted by many security analysts is that successful strategy must ultimately include the provision of meaningful guidance for resource allocation. The correct prioritisation of funding and procurement will lead to the development of the right capabilities to meet the real threats. One of the key problems faced by many countries, like the US, is over the question of funding. When the respective national security project team studies are completed, we will be in a better position to refine the right strategies to pursue and identify/prioritise the key areas where funding commitment and smart procurement will give us the critical force-multiplier edge we so desire.

- **Anti-Terror Legislative Mechanisms and Enforcement Powers**

The nature of the new terrorism requires a bold legal approach to criminal prosecution. Blocking an actual attack, whether by disrupting the perpetrator's financial and logistical support or stopping attacks outright in a timely manner, requires more than intelligence and operational teeth. It requires legislative mechanisms to allow financial regulators to better monitor suspicious transactions, as well for enforcement agencies to effect preventive arrests to forestall attacks. In fact, Singapore has recently enacted a bill to counter money laundering and other means of financing terrorists. Not unlike the letter and spirit of the US's newly installed *Patriotic Act*, post-colonial countries like Malaysia and Singapore have inherited from the British, their respective *Internal Security Acts (ISA)* for prosecuting agents of terror, often even before they strike ie. arresting what the US calls 'enemy combatants'. Publicising successful pre-emptive security (CT 'sting') operations, like the recent Internal Security Department (ISD) arrests, may severely disrupt and disincline potential perpetrators and copy-cats from attempting terrorist attacks on Singapore. More importantly, they also underscore the continued relevance and functional utility of maintaining sharp legislative mechanisms like the ISA for preserving security. For all intents and purposes, the ISD is more than a domestic Intelligence Service. It is also a law enforcement agency with powers for crime pre-emption and prevention, and not merely *post facto* criminal investigation. In fact, in an effort to harmonise its intelligence function and enforcement powers, senior ISD Intelligence officers can now be given powers similar to that of police officers to allow them to exercise certain provisions under the ISA eg. for effecting arrests and detention. Following the normalisation, senior ISD intelligence officers can also be given police powers of investigation under the Criminal Procedure Code or other laws prescribed by the Home Minister. Officers will also be given immunity while carrying out a warrant similar to all police officers.¹⁶

- **Diplomacy and Co-operation**

At the broader international relations level, close bilateral and multilateral co-operation, like joint intelligence-sharing and enforcement operations are critical for effective global action against the new terrorism. No country can fight this war alone, if it hopes to win it decisively over the long-term. Security agencies with an external and internal orientation must find new ground to work with their foreign counter-parts. Enhanced interactions across the ministries and national agencies at the operational levels will minimise deviations and promote consistent policy alignments for diplomatic co-operation and domestic security synergy. The objective of our foreign policy will be to ensure that we stand on the right side of angels and secure the goodwill of friends and powers-that-be when we have to tackle the new threats, whether alone or as part of a wider regional/international coalition. On the latter point, new multilateral proposals like those floated at the recent inaugural Asia Security Conference (dubbed the "Shangri-La dialogue" after its Singapore hotel venue), calling for greater regional efforts in intensifying "backend cooperation" for CBRNE incident management and recovery exercises/operations may well be worth exploring, if sufficient common interest and political will can be found.¹⁷ Already, Singapore has made bold inroads by being the first in Asia to sign-up onboard the US *Container Security Initiative* (CSI) to help pre-screen sea cargo headed for the US, thereby contributing in no small way to better help secure an important part of the global sea trade system. Singapore and Chinese law enforcement officials have also agreed to work together to exchange information to fight terrorism.¹⁸ Sustained international collaboration and regional support will ultimately determine the degree of success in fighting the terrorism scourge together. It is a given that the foreign policies of small states, such as Singapore, are often dictated by complex national security interests and geopolitical imperatives.

Therefore, the diplomatic aims of Singapore's national security policy are necessarily conditioned by the threats we face and our inherent vulnerabilities - our physical size, geographical position, access to vital natural resources and dependence on freedom of international exchange and communications. They will continue to be safeguarded by pursuing the following principles:

- Securing peace and promoting prosperity in South East Asia and in the world as a whole;
- Respect for the independence and integrity of sovereign nations;
- Strengthening of the friendship and cohesion of ASEAN nations and like-minded partners both bilaterally and multilaterally;
- Opposition against aggressive activities of all types or interference against other nations;
- Free access by land, air and sea to all nations, based on the principles of free trade and enterprise; and
- Friendship with all nations respecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Singapore and the principles outlined above.

Conclusion: Networked Integration

The First War of the 21st century looks set to be a protracted one. Its disparate root causes will also not be resolved easily. Successful resolution may take generations, if ever. The difficult

path ahead demands that we articulate clear and concerted national security strategies, backed-up by the polling of relevant national resources and key instruments of power. In prevailing over the new threats posed by what has been called an "organisation of organisations,"¹⁹ in an era of "unknown uncertainties"²⁰, it is clear that we now need a *network to fight a network*²¹ both on home soil or afar. It is perhaps a salutary testimony on the integration and steadfastness of Singapore's security and intelligence agencies when John Arquilla recently paid the following generous compliment: "Indeed, we have much to learn from *the skillful networking orchestrated by Singapore* late last year as it neutralized a major terror network node that was planning an ammonium nitrate truck-bombing campaign against American targets there."²² But we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. Not when the threat is still out there and possibly still in here the second wave of Singapore arrests in August 2002 and similar ones in many countries around the world serve as a chilling reminder. [The latest message of mayhem from Bali has also "hit home" hard for many countries in the region.] In the main, the recent first anniversary commemoration should also remind us all that 9-11 was more than an indictment on the tragic failure of intelligence or imagination. More pointedly, it was a monumental failure in integration. The networked strategies and convergent structuring organisations outlined in this paper lay out the important transformational groundwork necessary for building a resilient National Security Architecture to safeguard the Singapore homeland. They also bring homeland security issues into sharp focus and accord them the high priority they urgently deserve. Convergent focus and coordinated action will be key. In an increasingly uncertain and polarised milieu, many countries can ill-afford to do any less. The home truth is that with many countries still reeling from the terror fallout of 9-11, we all badly need to put homeland security back on *terra firma*.

Endnotes

1 cited in Lydia Lim, 'National Security Secretariat Set-Up at MINDEF' in *The Straits Times*, (7 Jan 2002).

2 cited in 'Government Acts to Counter Terror Threats' in *The Straits Times*, (18 May 2002), p. H4.

3 See Oliver Morton, 'Divided We Stand' in *Wired Magazine*, (December 2001).

4 19 of the 21 are members of the JI network, while the others are linked to the Philippines-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). See 'Another 21 Arrested Here Over Terrorism Plans' in *The Straits Times*, (17 Sep 2002), p.1.

5 Refers to a steady stress state over a prolonged period of crisis, whereby response demands may increase suddenly and then level off at a steady state indefinitely; until the next series of escalation or de-escalation activity.

6 Refers to a steady escalatory rise in response demands over a relatively short period of crisis, with rapid surge in response demands during anticipated high-tension periods. 7 Refers to systems that may fail because of attacks, but can recover quickly without losing too much of their systemic integrity and utility. See Charles, C. Mann, 'Homeland Insecurity' in *The Atlantic Monthly*, (Sep 2002), p. 82-102.

8 Cited in Kenneth Timmerman, 'Cracking The Afghan Network' in *Reader's Digest*, (May 2002), p. 112-28.

9 Thomas Friedman, 'Why Iraq Debate is Upside Down' in *The New York Times*, reproduced in *The Straits Times*, (19 Sep 2002), p. 17.

10 B Raman, 'Punishment Terrorism', (28 Mar 2002) available at <http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper431.html>

11 DPM and Defence Minister Tony Tan, cited in Robert Karniol, 'A Total Defence', in *Jane's Defence Weekly*, (4 Sep 2002), p. 25

12 *ibid*

13 See 'Task Force Ready To Swing Into Action On Security' in *The Straits Times*, (19 Sep 2002), p. 4.

14 See 'Government Acts to Counter Terror Threats' in *The Straits Times*, (18 May 2002), p. H4.

15 Exceptional organisations set challenging and often risky goals. BHAG is a concept advocated by James Collins and Jerry Porras, *Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies*, (Harper, 1997); The concept has also been adopted by VP and Senior Scientist of *Sandia Labs*, Gerry Yonas, in Sandia's advanced technology R&D work; See also *Sandia LabNews*, Vol. 53, No. 8, (19 April 2002).

16 See 'Police Powers for Intelligence Officers' in *The Straits Times*, (25 May 02), p. H2.

17 See Ross Babbage, *Recovering From Terror Attacks: A Proposal for Regional Cooperation*, (July 2002), Australian Strategic Policy Institute Occasional Paper. Tangentially, business disaster recovery may be big business for Singapore with the setting up of a new professional certification body Disaster Recovery Institute (Asia) to raise the standards of business continuity planning in Singapore; See Simon Wilcox, 'Disaster Recovery May Be Singapore's Next Big Hit' in *The Straits Times*, (3 Sep 02), p. A16.

18 See Maria Siow, 'China & Singapore Agree to Cooperate to Fight Against Terror', in *Channel News Asia.Com* (3 Sep 2002).

19 Rohan Gunaratna's comments cited in 'Tapes Give Evidence of Al Qaeda's Global Reach', in *CNN.Com*, (23 August 2002).

20 DPM and Defence Minister Tony Tan, cited in Karniol, *Op Cit*.

21 See John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, 'Fighting The Network War', in *Wired Magazine*, (Dec 2001); Thomas A. Stelwart, 'America's Secret Waapon', in *Business 2.0*, pp. 59-68; Ashton B. Carter, 'The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism', in *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/2), pp. 5-23; & Andrew Tan 'Government in The New Economy', in *Ethos*, Vol. 8 No. 2, (Singapore Civil Service College, 2002), pp. 9-15.

22 *Italics mine*. John Arquilla is Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, USA. See John Arquilla, 'It Takes a Network', in *The Los Angeles Times* (25 Aug 2002); also available at <http://www.rand.org/hot/op-eds/082502LAT.html> . See also John

Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (eds.) *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, (US, RAD, 2001).

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