

POINTER

The Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces

Features

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Operations Other Than War in a Coalition Environment

Armed Forces and the Comprehensive Approach: SSRTOs

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Editorial

This issue of *POINTER* features articles dealing with the continued transformation of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) into a Third Generation fighting force. Given the rapid and sweeping changes involved, it is imperative for the SAF as a whole to be flexible and innovative, a requirement that invariably emphasizes organizational culture and personnel. In “SAF Transformation – Focusing on the People,” ME6 Chia Chee Chen emphasizes the need to manage change and create the capacity to change in an organization through a people-centric approach, linking the various concepts into a transformation framework useful for the SAF. Noting that individuals are the most important agents of transformation, ME6 Chia identifies the key groups of Warrant Officers, Officers and Senior Management in the SAF and recommends different change management approaches for dealing with their expectations effectively and channeling their strengths productively. Advocating systems thinking as the way forward, he then proposes methods in dealing with common impediments to its implementation, including turf wars, difficulties in learning from experience and work-family conflicts.

“High Flyers: Implications of Short Officer Careers in the SAF” by CPT (NS) Toh Weisong notes how the short officer careers in the SAF have cast doubt on the professionalism of its officers, leading to calls for their careers to be extended. He argues that short careers must prevail for now because of unique macro-level factors beyond the SAF’s control, such as social attitudes towards National Service and military careers in general and increasing competition from other employers. Instead, he examines alternative ways in which

professional competency can be built and retained in junior officers given the constraints of such short careers, with particular emphasis on realistic training and the effective inculcation of warfighting skills.

The SAF must also consider its expanding role and responsibilities in an uncertain security landscape, an issue that concerns armed forces around the world and was the topic of the inaugural Goh Keng Swee Command and Staff College (GKS CSC) Seminar 2011. Held at SAFTI Military Institute (SAFTI-MI) from 6-7 October 2011, the GKS CSC Seminar 2011 was entitled “Operations Other Than War in a Coalition Environment: Opportunities and Challenges for Modern Armed Forces” and jointly organized by GKS CSC, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and the SAF-NTU Academy (SNA). Thus we are once again sharing our editorial space for this issue, with Professor Ong Weichong and Ms Manaswini Ramkumar providing a short introduction to five essays from this seminar.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR IN A COALITION ENVIRONMENT – OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MODERN ARMED FORCES

The role of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has evolved from “rising to the defence of Singapore” in the First Generation years of the 1960s to the “full-spectrum force” of today. In peacetime, the Third Generation SAF is expected to respond flexibly to the spectrum of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) contingences ranging from Peace Support Operations (PSO) to Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR). The evolution of the



SAF from First Generation to Third is very much intertwined with Singapore's growth as a nation-state and a responsible member of the international community. The expanded role and capabilities of the SAF thus can be best explained within the context of a larger global development—one that calls upon national armed forces to play a role beyond that of homeland defence. Indeed, in today's security environment, national security is inextricably linked to regional and global security. It is this correlation between national, regional and global security that underscores the rise in collaboration and cooperation between military forces worldwide—through multilateral exercises, joint training, International Military Education and Training (IMET) and coalition operations. In short, collaboration between armed forces is essential to achieving security and stability both at home and in the neighbourhood.

In this issue of *POINTER*, readers are provided with an assessment of the various opportunities and challenges faced by modern armed forces in OOTW—in a coalition environment. The areas of focus are namely: International Criminal Law (ICL), stability operations, interoperability, peacekeeping and training. A common element that can be found in all five papers is the blurring of roles and functions between the armed forces and civil agencies. Indeed, the duties of the 21st century soldier are multidisciplinary, with each soldier expected to be a practitioner of defense diplomacy, development economics, civil engineering and peacemaking.

The article by Mr Alvin Tan explains the role of small states in upholding and shaping ICL in accordance with local value systems and regional notions of justice. Tan begins his analysis by stating that philosophical underpinnings of justice differ from region to region, and in South East Asia they are markedly different from Western legal traditions that underscore the international criminal justice system. To make

international criminal law more international and to increase its applicability, he explains the need to focus on cultural specificities and to accommodate cultural nuances when using ICL to mediate disputes between nation-states. Being an overwhelming undertaking for any individual state, small states can provide a regional mechanism for dispute mediation and resolution, thereby contributing towards regional security and stability, a function that could be undertaken by the South East Asian regional body, ASEAN.

The article by Dr Thomas Hammes deals with the future of stability operations. The complex execution of stability operations notwithstanding, Hammes observes that the academic community is not unified even in the definition of the concept and its scope. While acknowledging this stark reality, he goes on to explain that stability operations are undertaken as a necessity by the great powers, owing to five drivers—energy supply, mass migration, critical resources, humanitarian impulse and domestic politics. These drivers result in making stability operations a form of hybrid warfare, in which the expertise brought by small nation participation is of immense value and assistance in devising creative solutions. Hammes concludes the article by cautioning future undertakers of stability operations to plan with the mindset of achievable rather than aspirational goals.

The essay on the issue of interoperability is authored by CDRE Richard Menhinick. Drawing on his first-hand experience of working alongside naval task forces as part of the Combined Maritime Force, Menhinick's paper provides insight into the necessity of interoperability at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, in addition to technological interoperability. His experience in working with the naval forces of small nations highlights the requirement of the softer aspects of interoperability during coalition missions—trust, mutual respect, cultural understanding, patience and courtesy.



These values are crucial for mission effectiveness from the strategic command level down to the tactical level. Menhinick also emphasizes the role of education and international exchange courses in promoting cultural understanding and interpersonal relationships, thereby fostering personnel interoperability during missions.

BG Tan Huck Gim, who served as Commander, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), focuses on the role played by Fijian peacekeepers in UNMISET as part of the peacekeeping force that involved the participation of 26 nations. Similar to CDRE Menhinick's views on mutual understanding between military personnel, BG Tan comments on the level of professionalism and respect displayed by each national force, which ultimately ensured maximum integration of efforts. His article describes the contribution of the Fijian peacekeepers, who displayed an exemplary level of force integration as part of the larger coalition effort to stabilize East Timor. The accomplishments of a small troop-contributing nation such as Fiji is illustrative of the value of small-nation involvement.

The final article by Professor Cynthia Watson addresses the changing role of the US military's focus from traditional combat operations to Stability, Security, Reconstruction and Transition Operations (SSRTO) involvement. She states that in the post-Cold War era, the American military began to be used as a tool of statecraft to coerce belligerent governments to accept American terms and conditions that were meant to protect its national interests. This shift in the military's role leads to the question—should armed forces abandon training for traditional combat and instead focus on strengthening training for SSRTOs? In her conclusion, Watson calls for simultaneous training for both combat

and SSRTO functions—but taking into account of changing regional security dynamics and the demands placed on armed forces.

In an era where security threats no longer reside within the confines of national borders, coalition operations have become the norm rather than the exception. Moreover, the armed forces of small states such as Singapore are taking on a greater if not more visible role in coalition missions that have grown in terms of scope, scale, function and complexity. Given the impetus for a more multilateral approach to conflict resolution and advancement of regional and global order, the armed forces of small states will increasingly be called upon to take on greater responsibilities. Rather than provide a definitive roadmap, this selection of essays hopes to impress upon the reader the immense challenges as well as opportunities for modern armed forces to maintain their relevance in an age where the realities of conflict extend beyond the pristine battlefields dominated by the military.

**The *POINTER* Editorial Team &
GKS CSC Seminar 2012 Organizers**



SAF Transformation – Focusing on the People

by ME6 Chia Hee Chen

Abstract:

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is moving towards Third Generation warfighting forces, but it is also important to focus on the people aspect of the transformation. This article deals with both managing change and creating the capacity to change in an organization. Exploring both the need for different change management approaches and the impediments to internalizing systems thinking in an organization, the article links the various concepts into a transformation framework useful for the SAF.

Keywords: Force Transformation; Organizational Learning; Systems Thinking; Third Generation SAF

INTRODUCTION

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) has embarked on the transformation journey towards Third Generation warfighting forces that involves SAF's processes, structures and weapon systems. History has shown that human capital is either the ingredient for success or stumbling block of organizational transformation. Therefore, while SAF is looking into reorganizing its warfighting forces, it is also important to focus on the people aspect of the transformation.

This article will focus on two areas: change management and creation of the capacity to change. It will propose concepts for these two areas to address the likely transformation pitfalls commonly caused by people. Finally, it will link the various concepts into a transformation framework that will be useful for the SAF. The essay will first elaborate on the driving forces behind transformation in SAF.

DRIVING FORCES OF TRANSFORMATION

The SAF is transforming to cope with new threats and tap the opportunities of the



An SAF medical team member applying a cast on a boy with help from a Dutch health care assistant

multifaceted, changing environment in the 21st century. The three main thrusts behind the SAF's transformation are the expanding spectrum of operation, rapid advancement in technology and resource limitations.

The first main thrust of the SAF's transformation deals with the expanding spectrum of operations. The SAF has built up a credible defense force against conventional threats over the past 35 years. However, the new geostrategic situation has expanded the SAF's roles and responsibilities.



The 11 September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks have changed the security landscape of the world drastically. The SAF must reorganize and build new capabilities to deal with threats from non-state actors. In addition, its involvement in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) such as Peace Support Operations (PSO) and Humanitarian Aid Disaster Relief (HADR) has increased over the recent years.

Rapid technological advancements, especially in computing power have transformed the business world from industrial age to information age. The last ten years have seen the Internet revolution leading to the current era of globalization. The SAF has also tapped on the benefits of the reduced cost in Information Communicating Technology (ICT) by initiating Integrated Knowledge Based Command and Control (IKC2) to network and increase the sensemaking capabilities of its combat forces.

People are the main factor in determining the success of organizational transformation and they can be categorized into a few categories that require different change management approaches.

The last driving force for the transformation is limited resources in terms of budget and human capital. Singapore's economy is maturing, with slower GDP growth: the SAF has faced defense budget constraints previously and will again eventually. On the other hand, weapon system costs are increasing rapidly. In tandem with the slower economic growth, Singapore's demographics are also changing due to the low fertility rates over the years.¹ In one or two decades, the number of young Singaporeans

joining the work force will shrink. Hence, the SAF will have to continue to explore innovative ways to reduce its reliance on manpower.

What Should Not Change

Although organizational transformation is a large-scale change that affects organization strategy as a whole, it is important for the organization to recognize what underlying fundamentals should not change. Goodstein and Burke suggest that for transformation to be successful, an organization needs to identify and retain certain fundamentals.² Management should reinforce unchanged fundamentals and communicate them to the workers so that they will not be lost in the process of transformation. Unchanged underlying fundamentals have provided the background in forming the proposed Transformation Framework shown in Annex A.

MANAGING CHANGE – COLLECTIVE INDIVIDUALS CHANGE (CIC)

Black and Gregersen suggest that lasting success in transformation lies in changing individuals first—organizational transformation will follow. An organization changes only as far or fast as its collective individuals change.³ They argue that in order to achieve transformation success, an organization should focus on changing every individual in the organization. This concept is ideal but impractical as the different individuals come with different characteristics and it will be too big a burden for a large organization such as the SAF. However, instead of changing every individual in the organization, this essay redefines Collective Individuals Change (CIC) as formulating different change strategies to tackle the change resistance of different categories of people in an organization. The CIC concept converts people from hurdles to drivers of transformation.

CIC is anchored on the principle that people are the main factor in determining the success of organizational transformation and they can be categorized into a few categories that require different change management approaches. CIC groups the people that wear similar colored “lenses,” although their lenses may differ in intensity and shade. The color of people’s lenses refers to their education, work scope, training, roles and responsibilities in the organization. Each category of people exhibits unique culture, social circle and mental models. By understanding their culture and mental models, an effective change management approach can then be implemented to help this category support each other and change collectively.

In the SAF, the CIC concept should be applied from junior to senior management—from Warrant Officers to Senior Officers. CIC does not target the specialist group but the supervisors instead—it will buy-in the supervisors towards transformation and they will then influence and lead the specialists towards transformation.

Although the subsequent sections split the CIC discussion based on the categorization of people in terms of different management level in SAF, it is important to highlight that the concept can

also be applied by re-categorizing the people in terms of their vocation or unit.

Warrant Officers – The Engine that Provides Thrust

The Warrant Officer (WO) group has the longest career life in SAF and their technical expertise, experience, culture and mindset have the highest inertia against transformation. A specialist that joins with a diploma qualification will attain the rank of WO at an average age of 35, which will give him another 20 years in the SAF before retirement. They will also stay in a unit for a much longer period of time, as compared to an officer who will normally stay in one appointment for two to three years. The WO’s social network has therefore been around for a much longer period of time as compared to those of the officer. Being both the leader and role model of the junior specialist, WOs have great influence on their development. Senior WOs also play a part in the early years of officer development, when the officer usually taps on their knowledge. WOs can be likened to an engine, a fundamental component of aircraft design since the Wright Brothers first flew. Engine technology has changed over the years in order to provide more thrust to overcome a higher inertia




Figure 1: The U-Loop (Five Stages of Change)



of heavier aircraft and the demand for increased airspeed. If the WOs do not see the need to change or buy-in to the changes, it will be difficult to overcome their entrenched mindset.

In order to facilitate the WOs in mastering change, their immediate supervisors and senior management should understand the U-loop response to change suggested by Mick Copper.⁴ The U-loop curve represents the people performance and self esteem versus time at five different stages of change. The WO's supervisor has to help the WO move forward and away from the denial and discard stage of the U-loop. If the WO cannot get past the two stages, he will become the attenuator of the transformation process, and with his influence on the specialist and junior officer, they too will impede the transformation significantly.

With the understanding of the WO's strong mindset and social network coupled with his reluctance in moving out of the comfort zone, the "Change Agent Converter" is added to the transformation framework in Annex A. The Change Agent Converter signifies the importance of converting the WOs into change agents.

Officers – The Aerodynamic Airframe and Structure that Provide Lift

The officers group excluding the senior officers (LTC and above) are least resistant to change and transformation since they are generally the "new blood" in the system. This group of people are usually highly educated, with the majority of them having at least a bachelor's degree. They are professionals that the senior management can rely on to create new "out of the box" ideas and fit in well as the change agents of transformation. Officers are everywhere in the organization,

brimming with intense energy, confidence and willingness to keep pushing new frontiers, just like the aerodynamic airframe which provides lift and also gives the aircraft a striking appearance.

Are there then any concerns about the officers with regards to transformation? The first main concerns for the change management of the officers group is their overzealousness. The officers are relatively new to the system and are eager to prove their abilities. Coupled with their lack of experience, officers can introduce initiatives that are counterproductive. Due to their lack of experience, they may think that an infeasible idea is workable. This causes wastage of resources and creates disillusion towards transformation among their subordinates. The senior officers have to keep this in check by using coaching skills to inquire about any officer's ideas and help him clarify his thoughts. On the other hand, the officers themselves should recognize their lack of experience and be receptive to advice from their WOs and senior officers before implementing a new idea.

The second concern for the officers group is their difficulty in drawing the correct lessons from their experiences. Chris Argyris has coined the term single loop and double loop learning to describe this particular learning behavior.⁵ He gave a simple analogy: a thermostat that automatically switches on the heat whenever the temperature in a room drops below a 68 degrees is single-loop learning. For double-loop learning, we would require a thermostat that could ask, "Why am I at 68 degrees?" and then explore whether or not some other temperature might more economically achieve the goal of heating the room. Officers have been successful in their lives,

With budget constraints and logistical challenges, doing more with less is a fact of life.



especially in acquiring academic credentials, and they have full confidence in their problem-solving capabilities. Because they rarely fail, they may never have mastered learning from failure.⁶ Whenever problems surface in the workplace, this group of people usually look outward at external factors—they rarely look inwards and reflect critically on whether their own behavior could have contributed to the cause of the problem. More often than not, young officers who are out to prove their capabilities fall into defensive mode when issues are raised and usually refuse to go into second loop learning. Officers have to build their self-awareness as part of the Leadership Competencies Model (LCM). They need to go into second loop learning through self awareness and be mindful that the way they define and solve problems can be a source of problems in its own right.

In the transformation framework in Annex A, a “Single Loop to Double Loop Learning Transducer” is used to highlight this learning issue among the officers group and how they can be overcome by adapting double loop learning. The senior officers also need to use their coaching skills to guide and manage the overzealousness of the officers under their charge.

Senior Management (Senior Officers and Commanders) – The Autopilot and Navigation Systems that Provide Direction

It may sound strange that senior management is listed as one of the categories that may impede transformation. Being at the top level in an organization, especially in a hierarchical and authoritative one, they have a lot of power and influence in the organization. The senior management can be likened to the autopilot and navigation systems that guides an aircraft to its destination—erroneous signals from either system will cause the aircraft to fly off course.

Senior management is transforming the organization into something so fundamentally different that there will be stark contrasts between current culture and the new. They will need to suppress instincts honed under the old paradigm, otherwise they risk contradicting themselves in espousing the new paradigm; for example, top down (old instinct) vs. empowerment (new culture) and functional (old specialist organization) vs. task (new multifunctional organization). An “Old Paradigm Instinct Suppressor” is added to the transformation framework in Annex A to remind senior management to be conscious of it during decision making.

CREATING THE CAPACITIES TO CHANGE (C2C)

The increased complexity, requirements and systems in the modern multi-role fighter jet would not be possible without the use of core processors, common communicating protocols and multiplex buses to integrate all subsystems. This avionics design concept allows the sharing and optimizing of resources (software capacity and physical real estate) onboard the aircraft to create extra capacity. The SAF is similarly facing increasing requirements and complexities that dwell in the unknown unknowns of the cognitive realm. With budget constraints and logistical challenges, doing more with less is a fact of life. SAF units have to reorganize their processes and structures to synergize not just within units but also with the organization as a whole. How do we emulate the fighter jet avionics design concept that integrates all subsystems into a coherent whole? The key concept is Systems Thinking, the fifth discipline as suggested by Peter Senge. This concept is not new and the SAF has made significant efforts to disseminate systems thinking via numerous Route-of-Advancement courses. Despite this, most SAF personnel have not internalized the concept. There are still many reactive and short-term solutions targeted at symptoms rather than root causes of problems.



People are still reacting to events (tip of the iceberg) but fail to look at patterns and system structures.⁷ System thinking tools such as the Behavior Over Time Diagram, Causal Loop Diagram and Systems Archetype will help managers look at problems holistically in order to determine solutions targeted at system structures rather than events. The following section does not intend to discuss those tools. Instead, it will discuss the impediments to systems thinking in the SAF and suggest what can be done to overcome them.

IMPEDIMENTS TO SYSTEMS THINKING

The Myths of Commanders

All too often, commanders are protective of their turf and defensive against anything that makes their unit look bad. They tend to only look for indications that reflect well on their unit and believe that they have a cohesive team. This is against the logic of system thinking and it will influence the behaviors of the unit as a whole.

Due to human nature, commanders tend to defend their views and maintain their positions in both internal and external issues. In most meetings, we engage in discussions where we see ourselves as separate entities from one another. We take opposing positions to advance arguments and defend our stakes. Discussions tend to decompose issues and attend only to known parts of the problem. They focus on closure and produce solutions that may not touch underlying issues. Such methods of communication between commanders are not productive and will influence people in the unit to behave likewise. Dr William Isaacs suggests that we should instead focus on having dialogues that do not take sides but focus on the center. A dialogue should seek to harness the collective intelligence of everybody present—together we are more aware and perceptive than on our own.⁸ A generative dialogue will illuminate unprecedented possibilities and new

insights, resulting in a collective flow of ideas and a holistic approach.⁹

Difficulty of Learning from Experience

Peter Senge writes that while humans learn best from experience, we frequently do not directly face the consequences of important decisions. Critical decisions can have wide ranging consequences that stretch over years, but the limited memories of people will not be able to connect a decision with consequences that surface years later.¹⁰ In the SAF, it is made worse with short officer appointments. This impedes learning from experience for both individuals and the organization as a whole—it gives wrong short-term indications that a particular solution is working and conceals long term negative effects.

The issue is not about learning from experience but learning the right lessons.

The issue is not about learning from experience but learning the right lessons. Firstly, we have to emphasize the importance of After-Action-Reviews (AAR) and Post Implementation Reviews (PIR). We generally spend much more time planning for an exercise or initiative than on AAR or PIR. Secondly and more importantly, we should setup a robust knowledge management system to capture all initiatives, including their objectives, expected results and implementation reviews. The database of each initiative will be a live document and reviewed periodically for input on any additional effects or benefits of the initiative. The knowledge management system allows the officer to track the outcome of his initiatives for a longer period of time, even after he leaves the unit, and serves as a platform that allows officers to cross share or learn.




Figure 2: Understanding System Structures through System Thinking

Ending the Conflict Between Work and Family

"Today, finding balance between work and family is cited as a number one priority by more attendees than any other single issue."

– Peter Senge¹¹

The artificial boundary between work and family is anathema to system thinking.¹² Many of us believe we can separate our work and family life but issues in one area with influence the other. We therefore have to consider work and family as a whole and not as separate entities.

In order to end the conflict between work and family, there are two key steps that commanders and supervisors can follow: commit to family life and encourage building of family communities. In committing to family life, commanders should wholeheartedly support their personnel in focusing on their families, perhaps granting them compassionate time off during family crises. This will result in a more committed workforce.

Building family communities will create family support groups that provide support to families of servicemen who have to continuously work long hours during times of crisis or those that are deployed for peacekeeping and humanitarian

aid operations that involve high risk. For most units, the only family-oriented event is the annual family day, which is clearly inadequate for building family communities. There are many other events that should involve families: promotion dinners (our spouses do contribute to our promotion), visits to adopted organizations (a good learning opportunities for our children), holiday gatherings and so on. On top of the benefit of promoting bonding among families, servicemen get to spend time with their families instead of treating the occasion as another work commitment.

This section has discussed the final segment in the transformation framework (Annex A), C2C, and proposed three components that could help overcome the impediments of system thinking: "Discussion vs. Dialogue," "Knowledge Management" and "Family Communities." Internalizing systems thinking is the key step to creating the C2C.

TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK FOCUSING ON THE PEOPLE


The transformation framework (Annex A) that encompasses both the CIC and C2C concepts is generic and can be applied to all SAF units. However, before applying the framework, SAF

units will have to contextualize the driving forces of transformation in their unit and identify the underlying fundamentals that do not change during the transformation. It allows the people in the unit to clarify and understand the reasons behind the transformation.

The CIC segment in the transformation framework addresses the different categories of people in the units that have different perspectives and play different roles in the transformation process. CIC identifies three categories of people: WOs, officers and senior management. The WO group must go through a “Change Agent Converter” and their superiors have to understand that WOs have the strongest mindset to overcome and help them to move quickly to the internalize stage of the U-Loop. Both the officers and senior management groups can facilitate WO change.

Officers have to build-up their self-awareness and use the “Single Loop to Double Learning Transducer” to change the way they diagnose a problem by looking at both internal and external factors. Knowledge management proposed under C2C can facilitate efforts by the officers to track their previous initiatives and learn the correct lessons. Lastly, senior management must use the “Old Paradigm Instinct Suppressor” to reduce confusion and doubt in their people by having open dialogues (C2C component) to clarify decisions that contradict the transformation objectives.

The C2C segment in the transformation framework is anchored on the principles of systems thinking. It emphasizes the importance of systems thinking and elaborates on the impediments to implementing it in SAF units. Three components are proposed under C2C to



Annex A: Transformation Framework



tackle those impediments, namely, “Discussion versus Dialogue,” “Knowledge Management” and “Family Communities.” C2C supports CIC: by helping people overcome the impediments to system thinking, it helps them identify the underlying system structures rather than merely reacting to events.

CONCLUSION

Overcoming resistance to change is like a fighter jet breaking the sound barrier, requiring proper thrust, lift and navigation systems. In the SAF, WOs are the engine providing the thrust and officers are the aerodynamic airframe that provides the lift. Lastly, the senior officers are the pathfinders that provide the guidance towards transformation. WOs, officers and senior management are different categories of people with different perspectives and roles in the transformation process. The central idea behind the concept of CIC requires the organization to recognize the different categories of people and to utilize the appropriate change strategy for each category.

Modern fighter jet design integrates all subsystems on the aircraft to provide additional functionality and increased capabilities. Similarly, the SAF must recognize the impediments to system thinking in order to create the capacity to change.

In this SAF transformation journey it is not the concept, technology or structures, but the people that will determine success or failure. 🌐

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High Flyers: Implications of Short Officer Careers in the SAF

by CPT (NS) Toh Weisong

Abstract:

The short officer careers in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have cast doubt on the professionalism of its officers, leading to calls for their careers to be extended. This essay will show that such short careers must prevail for now because of unique macro-level factors beyond the SAF's control, such as attitudes towards National Service and competition from other employers. As an alternative, it will examine ways in which junior officers' professional competency can be built and retained given the constraints of such short careers, with particular emphasis on realistic training and inculcating warfighting skills. This is especially important given the rapid move towards a Third Generation SAF.

Keywords: Force Transformation; Military Training; Military Professionalism; Third Generation SAF

INTRODUCTION

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is unique among military forces, largely because of Singapore's political history, geopolitical situation and demographics. Of particular interest to many foreign observers is the relative youth of SAF personnel, particularly regular officers. Officially, the SAF defends its "young SAF" policy with the argument that it keeps officers dynamic, energetic, and responsive to military developments. Former Chief of Defence Force (CDF) LG Ng Yat Chung, referred to "fighting [as] by and large, a young person's game."¹

On the other hand, observers have remarked that such short careers cast doubt on whether SAF officers in general can be considered true military professionals.² They argue that the short ground-level command tours that accompany short careers do not allow sufficient time to build up breadth or depth of experience, especially in a country that does not make frequent use of its forces in armed conflict, and hence that the SAF should increase the duration of its officers' careers.

However, such analyses generally do not take into account the full range of political, economic and social pressures that preclude longer careers for SAF officers. For example, the necessity of National Service (NS) has produced attitudes toward military service that make it difficult to recruit regulars. Also, increased educational standards and career opportunities mean that the SAF vies with other employers for talent.

Hence this essay will first show that the "young SAF" policy, with particular reference to the officer corps, must prevail for now because of such macro-level factors beyond the SAF's control. Subsequently, it will examine ways in which junior officers' professional competency can be built and retained given the constraints of such short careers.

USING GOOD IRON TO MAKE NAILS

In the aftermath of separation from Malaysia, the Singapore government faced several challenges in the formation of a self-defense force, key among them being the prevailing aversion to



Military Experts at work

military service among the predominantly Chinese population. The institution of National Service (NS) was the key means in raising the required military personnel strength. Nevertheless, NS had to be supported by massive efforts to make the idea of military service more palatable to the population. Such efforts took a significant time to bear fruit, leading to a broad if grudging acceptance of NS as a male rite of passage by the 1990s.³

However, this grudging acceptance of NS is accompanied by a perception of it as two years of drudgery, which dilutes the regard for regular military service. A common derogatory remark among Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs), made to peers who sign on as regulars, is “you must be crazy to sign on for four (or six) years of NS.” Tongue-in-cheek though it may be, it belies the popular attitude that military service in Singapore is not a lifelong calling.⁴ To most, serving two years of NS and the subsequent periods of reservist training is the extent of their military duty.

The attractiveness of a military career has declined further in recent years as Singapore revels in its status as a hub for commercial and intellectual exchange. Widespread media and

information technology literacy mean that a potential officer cadet at age 17 or 18 is fully aware of the myriad career alternatives. As a result, career expectations have come a long way. A survey conducted by Alexander Mann, a Human Resource (HR) consultancy, contained telling results on why employees desired expatriate postings. Among the top reasons were developing their resumes (67%), indicating that such postings were viewed as stepping stones to more attractive firms or lines of work, and the opportunity to explore and experience new cultures (55%), indicating a desire to move in new social circles.⁵ The survey also suggested that the desire for such mobility was so great, employees would even leave well-paying jobs for the opportunity.

To its credit, the SAF tries hard to mitigate the sense of stagnation by helping regulars to realize some of their aspirations within the confines of military service. The SAF has steadily increased the number of upgrading programs available to

In sum, the aspirations of post-Generation-Y youth do not gel well with the demands of national defense.

in-service personnel, including in-service scholarships.⁶ Most recently, the introduction of the Military Domain Experts Scheme (MDES) promises to bring more flexibility to career transitions to and from civilian domains, although it

will be several years before its results can be measured. However, the nature of military service means that certain things cannot be altered. While SAF officers may change jobs within the SAF every two to three years (which is quick by international military standards), the job seldom leaves the military domain. Pay raises are incremental rather than explosive, and the expansion of one’s social circle over the course of work is likely to be restricted to other military personnel. By 2000, Huxley could write that “by the mid and late 1990s, the main cause of dissatisfaction among SAF scholars [was] ...



that the SAF's terms of service were no longer attractive compared to those offered by other employers," even though remuneration and the rate of promotion were very generous.⁷

In sum, the aspirations of post-Generation-Y youth do not gel well with the demands of national defense. The SAF is not alone in this situation—most other developed nations also face serious challenges in recruiting and retaining armed forces personnel. Most of those who do sign on see it not as a calling but as a “good career option” which they are willing to try for a while. Anecdotal evidence that an increasing number of officers are applying for early release directly after the completion of their bonds further supports this assessment.

CHICKEN OR EGG?

In the eyes of foreign critics, the SAF has responded logically, even admirably, to personnel matters in light of Singapore's unique circumstances.⁸ However, the way in which the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) and the SAF have dealt with the public mindset toward military service has tacitly affirmed these attitudes, further solidifying them.

The “young SAF” policy in particular is a double-edged sword. During recruitment drives, SAF Officer careers are not only advertised as being fast-paced and dynamic, but also as *short enough to allow pursuit of a second career*. Walsh dissects it accurately: “the overall intent is that high-caliber personnel will be more likely to stay in the military if they feel they can accomplish other goals after a full career in the armed services.”⁹ However, this also sends the subtle message that an officer's employability beyond and after the military are to be considered just as important as his military profession. While this mindset may not necessarily dilute an officer's commitment to his professional work



Officer Cadets marching

during a tour of duty, it is likely to produce an aversion towards spending more time in a particular appointment compared to his peers in order to gain more experience.

On a broader social level, the reduction of NS liability in 2004 also has far-reaching and long-term effects. After resisting calls to shorten NS for years,¹⁰ the government reduced the NS liability by 6 months, citing reasons that seemed partly at odds with its earlier defense of the system.¹¹ To be fair, the underlying reasons for the reduction—such as manpower costs and macroeconomic considerations—were probably valid.¹² However, pundits have since taken the opportunity to clamor for further reductions, citing the shortening of military service in other countries as added impetus. This has triggered a slide down the slippery slope, against which the government will have to fight an uphill battle for public understanding of the need for NS, especially after several decades of peace.

BITING THE BULLET

Whether as a result of macro-level changes in society or the side-effects of MINDEF's own policies, it is now extremely difficult on all fronts to extend the regular officer Route-of-Advancement (ROA) at the junior command level (Officer Commanding and below), which is when basic foundational warfighting skills are honed. The recently-introduced Enhanced Officer Scheme



may extend officers' retirement age to 50, but MINDEF was very quick to point out that the ROA would not be slowed down at the junior grades. To MINDEF's credit, this demonstrates an awareness of the junior officer's mindset.

Another factor restricts MINDEF's room for maneuver: a large and increasing number of officers are recruited on scholarship, incorporating a bond of four to six years. What these officers experience during their bond period is likely to determine whether they will stay on after it ends. Hence it is in the SAF's interest to expose them to military life beyond the operational unit, to give them a (hopefully positive) taste of opportunities to come. Army graduate officers typically serve Platoon Commander (PC) and Officer Commanding (OC) tours of just over a year each—during which they may not complete a full training cycle with their NSF platoons—with a staff tour in-between. If PC or OC tours were to be extended, it would only make sense to extend them such that these junior officers complete the two-year training cycles with their NSFs. However extending such tours to two years would mean that within a four-year bond, an Army officer who might have become an OC under the current system

The Third Generation SAF represents a quantum leap in capability and faces a potential enemy that is both more unpredictable and capable.

would barely finish his staff tour. Accordingly, an officer finishing a six-year bond who might have made Battalion Second-in-Command (2IC) would still be an OC. Given the prevailing attitudes towards a military career, this would not help to retain junior officers past their bond periods.

These factors do not mean that it is impossible to extend officer careers and tours of duty. Indeed, with the increased demands on officers in the

Third Generation SAF, it may become absolutely necessary in the future. However, there has to be a clear mandate to do so, whether due to external aggression or after long-term efforts by MINDEF and SAF to make regular military service more attractive. In any case,

this essay will focus instead on the medium-to-short-term challenge of ensuring the warfighting competency of SAF officers within their short tours of duty and recommends a double-faceted approach to this challenge.

ROBUST INSTRUCTION IN PROFESSIONAL WARFIGHTING SKILLS

The first facet of this approach is to focus on imparting professional warfighting skills to the junior officer, through robust instruction in the officer training institutes. Then-CDF LG Desmond Kuek asserted that "the Third Generation Warrior is one who is well-placed to assimilate the new systems and technology and at the same time, possesses the fighting spirit and professional skills on the ground, at sea and in the air."¹³ Professional competency is the very foundation of officer credibility. In the Third Generation SAF, the commander on the ground must have a keen tactical sense to function effectively as part of a distributed and decentralized decision network. In this environment, SAFTI



Officer Cadets on exercise



Military Institute (SAFTI-MI) and other officer training institutes must serve as the cornerstone for officers' professional competency.¹⁴

Walsh, however, offers a troubling assessment of the SAF's training establishment: asserting that "all branches of the SAF are limited by ... an instructional method that reinforces a single prescribed solution and reduces creativity."¹⁵ It is not the goal of this essay to either confirm or refute this assessment, nevertheless, this indictment highlights the key obstacle facing the Third Generation SAF's training institutes.

In years past, the SAF sought help from various other countries in developing training programs that suited the purposes of the First and Second Generation SAF. This knowledge, consolidated from the early years of the SAF, has been evolved over the years to form the bedrock of the organization's training syllabus. However, the Third Generation SAF represents a quantum leap in capability and faces a potential enemy that is both more unpredictable and capable. Hence there is a need to revamp the training syllabus as well as infuse it with more lateral thinking, moving away from prescribed solutions. Some training institutes, equipped to handle the demands of First and Second Generation training, may not have the resources necessary to meet these Third Generation training demands.

Therefore, the training institutes must first of all be supplied with training cadre of sufficient quantity and quality. In the case of officers, competent commanders and officers from frontline units should be rotated through SAFTI-MI so that they bring with them first-hand knowledge of current doctrines and practices, and are in a good position to debate the nuances in a tactical situation. To a great extent, this is already happening, and anecdotal evidence suggests that this is bearing fruit.¹⁶

Second, the training institutes must be have adequate training resources at their disposal, such as sufficient time on up-to-date simulators or even exercises with active units. Training with active units has the added advantage of getting a "reality check," a chance to experience how the techniques learned in school apply to the real world. However, equipment allocated for training purposes is sometimes outdated and operational units often find it difficult to give priority to training exercises or sorties. The SAF may need to explore designating specific units to facilitate phases of officer training or allocating dedicated assets to support their training needs.

Finally, the training institutes should carefully consider if the time allotted to training courses is sufficient. The duration of many training courses offered at SAFTI-MI has stayed the same for many years and some courses have even been truncated in length. This is clearly at odds with the increased operational demands that are and will be placed on junior officers. The SAF needs to conscientiously examine if there is a need to prolong training courses, and if so make the necessary but painful changes to accommodate this.

REALISTIC TRAINING

Robust instruction in the schoolhouse is not only an end in itself, but also equips junior officers with the tools to make the best of subsequent training within their operational units. In fact, this essay proposes that tough and realistic training is the second vital facet of optimizing the SAF officer's short career. Yet popular repetition of the term "tough and realistic training" may trivialize what it truly entails.

The SAF leadership handbook implies that, in order to achieve battle success, the first priority in peacetime training is that "training



must be tough and realistic.”¹⁷ This is a familiar refrain from many SAF commanders, senior and junior alike. To some extent, this is true of the SAF’s training. If we evaluate an exercise in terms of how many days a unit spends in the field, how many different assets were coordinated to achieve an objective and so on, at least parts of the SAF’s training can be considered tough or realistic.

However, such statistics miss the point of what *type* of toughness and realism needs to be present. To paraphrase German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, “No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy.”¹⁸ Far from being an excuse to not plan a battle, it is an admonishment to expect the unexpected even with the best laid battle plans. The true test of a commander comes not when a plan goes right, but when a plan goes wrong.

The true test of a commander comes not when a plan goes right, but when a plan goes wrong.

With regards to officer training, it is important to infuse a degree of uncertainty and tactical free-play into peacetime exercises for two main reasons. Firstly, as Captain Adolf von Schell remarked in the classic work *Battle Leadership*, “it is certainly evident from training in peace that the more freedom allowed a subordinate leader in his training, the better the result will be ... because he is made responsible for results and allowed to achieve them in his own way.”¹⁹ With a strong foundation from the schoolhouse, the junior officer can be trusted to do his best in a tactical freeplay scenario, boosting his confidence and maximizing his training benefit along the way.

Secondly, uncertainty and potential setbacks in a peacetime exercise offer the invaluable opportunity for junior officers to exercise personal mastery in adversity. In the *POINTER* monograph *On Command*, former CAF MG Ng Chee Khern wrote that “to master these challenges [of Command], we must master ourselves ... it is only when the commander exudes confidence in the face of setbacks that it can transmit itself to the rest of the squadron.”²⁰ Minimizing the chances of failure through detailed scripting at all levels may achieve a “smooth” exercise, but potentially robs many commanders, junior and senior alike, of valuable learning opportunities.

Thus, the two facets of robust instruction in the schoolhouse and realistic training in the “trenches” work hand-in-hand to achieve a synergy of purpose that help to optimize the time available for officer training.

CONCLUSION

The SAF as a military organization is unique in the challenges it faces in building a professional regular officer corps. Popular perceptions of military service and NS, coupled with socioeconomic factors relating to post-generation-Y attitudes, make it increasingly difficult to recruit and retain talent. For similar reasons, it would probably prove disastrous for recruitment and retention if the SAF suddenly increased the length of officers’ careers and tours. Over time however, it may become necessary to extend officers’ careers and tours in order to build and retain professional competency in a rapidly evolving Third Generation SAF. Initiatives like the Enhanced Officers’ Scheme may yet prove to be a stepping stone toward this endeavor, helping to change attitudes or expectations incrementally.



In the medium-to-near-term, the SAF has no choice but to optimize the short time available to build a good foundation of professional competence in its junior officers. The focus of this effort should be to combine robust instruction in the SAF's officer training institutes, particularly SAFTI-MI, with realistic training in operational units that allows junior commanders to exercise discretion in tactical freeplay scenarios. While the SAF has encountered both internal and external criticism in these areas, there is evidence to show that it is slowly moving towards such a training philosophy. Nevertheless, the SAF needs to accelerate the evolution of its training methods to better match the rapid development of its Third Generation capabilities, and bolster this effort by allocating sufficient human and material resources to training. 🌐

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Armed Forces and the Comprehensive Approach: SSRTOs

by Cynthia A. Watson, PhD¹

Abstract:

Military forces of the United States (US) and other countries will require near simultaneous preparations for both traditional missions and Security/Stability/Reconstruction/Transition Operations (SSRTO). This essay discusses efforts by the US to address SSRTOs, which will likely be one of several future demands for militaries around the world. It outlines the history of US participation in Operations Other Than War history since the 19th century and the expansion of nontraditional operations in the Balkans and Liberia during the post-Cold War era. Also addressed are the issues of Responsibility to Protect and the implications for armed forces in the future.

Keywords: Operations Other Than War; Responsibility to Protect; Security/Stability/Reconstruction/Transition Operations

INTRODUCTION

This essay discusses efforts by the United States (US) to address what are known today as Security/Stability/Reconstruction/Transition Operations, or SSRTOs, which have an elevated position within Department of Defense (DoD) priorities since 2005. These efforts require a nontraditional focus for the armed forces, yet they must coexist as a priority in an environment in which capabilities must be appropriate to both traditional conventional arms requirements and the more subtle SSRTOs. I will conclude with how this will challenge militaries in the years ahead.

HISTORY OF US INVOLVEMENT IN OOTW

The US military has spent much of its history engaging in Operations Other Than War (OOTW), especially in the first century of the nation's history. During the 19th century, the military was engaged in massive stability and transition operations in the western portion of the US, as



SAF working together with TNI in tsunami relief efforts, January 2005

the country expanded west to the Pacific Ocean. One of the primary causes for establishment of the Military Academy at West Point was to build a cadre of engineers to provide the skills necessary to build the new nation. In the early 20th century, the US addressed concerns about the types of regimes it saw in the Caribbean Basin by sending in the marines to help civilian experts with stabilizing poor economies and to provide security if problems arose for US citizens.

The more contemporary view, dating to Second World War (WWII) or the Vietnam experience, is an expeditionary military that responds to a foreign problem. A rapid victory is expected, following a campaign of sustained battles that end with an unconditional surrender by the adversary. This view of conventional force employment dates to the Normandy invasion of June 1944 and Japan's surrender in Tokyo Bay aboard *USS Missouri* fifteen months later. Many people believe that war is only war when it looks as decisive as WWII did.

Reality, however, is that the armed forces that George Washington and his successors have developed in the US have been long involved in a series of humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (and actions under associated names) operations that are limited and not total warfare. The contemporary US military now has the DoD's imprimatur to treat these types of missions as on par with traditional warfighting.

One of the most important US general officers in the 20th Century was Douglas A. MacArthur, who engaged in what would today be labeled as SSRTOs in the Philippines during the 1930s and in Japan during the five years following WWII. As the Military Advisor to the Commonwealth Government in the Philippines after 1937, when he resigned his commission from the Army, MacArthur worked to strengthen the evolving Philippine military in preparation for independence which would occur—in a somewhat different environment than anticipated prior to WWII—in 1946. MacArthur's work was seen by most in the United States as anomalous, a function of the general's abiding commitment to Asia from another time.

He instead preferred to allow the armed forces to pursue the more traditional "violence" associated with war, since less traditional aspects of military operations might dull the nation's force when responding to a significant threat somewhere in the world.

In Japan, MacArthur's work was even more wide-ranging: as the Supreme Allied Commander for the allied powers, a *de facto* viceroy with responsibility for crafting and strengthening post-war institutions and society into a democratic

ones that would theoretically not repeat the errors which led to WWII. These activities were nontraditional ones for a US military that had fought its way from the South Pacific into the Japanese home islands, but once there, the military became the arbiters

of justice, providers of the basic needs of society until reconstruction ended in the 1950s, and the overall administrators for Japanese society. These acts were all fundamental to stabilizing a Japan left in ruins by September 1945 and needing assistance to reconstruct and transform as the victors—the allied powers—deemed necessary after the war. These steps were crucial to providing security against the possibility of communist expansion into the void left by the 1945 fall of the imperial system.

While MacArthur and his contemporaries in Europe were engaged in post-war reconstruction, the armed forces viewed these as secondary activities aimed at precluding having to engage in the military's primary mission—fighting wars on the ground.

SSRTOs, hence, were a means to another objective, rather than an independent, viable mission on their own. The primary concern remained fighting wars to defeat enemies rather than building institutions or strengthening societies, since those tasks were seen as civilian responsibilities.

EXPANSION OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Many people appeared startled during the 1990s when the Bill Clinton administration began to send the US military into places like Somalia, the Balkans, Liberia and Haiti to address issues that were not traditional combat operations. Clinton's many personal peccadilloes had created a chasm between the Commander-in-Chief and the forces under his command. Rather than shy away from their use, Clinton, and particularly his first United Nations emissary and second Secretary of State, Dr. Madeleine K. Albright, viewed the armed forces as a tool of statecraft to intervene in the affairs of states where the local government activities needed curbing. This type of utilization meant placing the military in nontraditional areas of conflict.

Clinton's decision to pursue the Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed in 1993 led to disastrous events in Mogadishu which humiliated the nation and the Army, followed days later by a US ship declining to enter the bay at Port-au-Prince, Haiti when a large number of angry protesters showed their frustration with the Clinton administration.

Neither of these involved traditional warfare but illustrated the possible frustration of SSRTOs, especially in stabilization efforts. Possibly as a result, Clinton chose not to send US forces to confront the Rwandan genocide six months later, being complicit in the death of a million there.² President Clinton later expressed his deep regret at this decision in remarks to the people of Rwanda.³

By the end of his administration, US efforts under what are now called SSRTOs had grown dramatically to include the former Yugoslavia, Colombia, Liberia and other instances. It was

against this backdrop that Vice President Al Gore debated Texas Governor George W. Bush in 2000—the latter appeared far from willing to continue this path of greater security, stability, reconstruction efforts, or transition activities.

The Texas governor clearly enunciated a policy which did not include a focus on SSRTOs as a core mission of the US military. He declared that he instead preferred to allow the armed forces to pursue the more traditional “violence” associated with war, since less traditional aspects of military operations might dull the nation's force when responding to a significant threat somewhere in the world.

In a widely-touted article in the influential journal *Foreign Affairs*, Stanford professor and campaign advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice similarly indicated that a Bush presidency would harness the power of the military to pursue traditional combat responsibilities for the military.⁴ The military's job was not to engage in missions which would dull its ability to meet dramatic challenges across the world. When Bush finally won the presidency after a six week controversy in late 2000, few in the military or the political sphere in general would have ever anticipated the increased importance of SSRTOs that he would embark upon within twelve months.

SSRTOS

Thoughts and arguments about military intervention in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, have been repeated many times because they illustrate concentration on the decision-making that lead to the invasions.⁵ The crucial aspect, within the scope of this paper, is that the concentration of thought was on traditional military activities, rather than on how those activities would form only a portion of the overall national security goal of transforming both Afghanistan, then Iraq, into democratic states with values and institutions shared with the western world. It would be wrong to



Ground Zero after the 11 September 2001 Attacks

assume that only the military leadership sought to diminish the institution-building required to achieve this goal but there is strong evidence that many military and DoD leaders sought not to ask whether this responsibility was theirs' to address.

What became clear, however, was that the difficulties were so severe that civilian agencies did not have the brute force capacity to accomplish these tasks and thus the military was needed to meet the objectives.

The Bush administration decision to go after the Taliban in the wake of the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks, which led to the concomitant decision to reconstruct Afghanistan to prevent a safe haven, was a move to increase

nontraditional operations. The administration saw its military operations, traditionally defined, being simultaneously under development to oust Saddam Hussein from Iraq. This latter mission was anticipated to be mostly conventional combat operations, while Afghanistan had a much more nontraditional flavor.

By April 2002 the President had noted that transformation of Afghanistan was essential to prevent its return to being an al-Qaeda safe haven under Osama bin Laden. Addressing students at the Virginia Military Academy, Bush acknowledged that an effort comparable to the Marshall Plan after WWII in Europe would be required, with "roads, [the] health care system, schools, and businesses" which could not be done by the military alone.⁶ What became clear, however, was that the difficulties were so severe that civilian agencies did not have the brute force capacity to

accomplish these tasks and thus the military was needed to meet the objectives.

A difficulty that arose was that this was a somewhat ill-defined objective. It spoke of what it did not want but did not spell out precisely what it sought to achieve in concrete terms. Even the concept, widely-banded about, of a “democratic” or “pro-western” Afghanistan did not offer a clear objective for the military.

As efforts progressed in Afghanistan, the military provided the basic security that was a prerequisite for stabilization, reconstruction or transition operations. Civilian workers could not accomplish those steps, but the armed forces could focus on preventing conflict, not on establishing peaceful conditions because it viewed itself, particularly in the early years of

2001-2005, as a combat force. This sounds like a semantic difference, but illustrated a completely different mindset.

Discussions with US officers who served in Afghanistan in the early months of the conflict reveal that they fairly uniformly viewed their role as pursuing bin Laden and the Taliban, rather than looking towards the transformation steps which would accomplish the president’s goals.⁷

Also at this time, the US was still involved with Colombia, where efforts to eradicate drug trafficking melded into activities to reconstruct that country into a fully functioning democracy.⁸ Clearly labeled something other than counterinsurgency because Congress had prevented assistance to the Republic for that specific purpose,⁹ for domestic political requirements, the Colombia work by the military fell under the aegis of efforts now known as SSRTOs.



US Soldiers passing through a village in Afghanistan



More importantly, the post-combat challenges of Iraq after the summer of 2003 made obvious the need for security to help stabilize and reconstruct the country while it transitioned from a long-standing dictatorship to a hoped-for western-style, competitive democracy. Unfortunately, this proved expensive in both blood and treasure. It also competed with the military's traditional missions of fighting wars, as future conflict scenarios appeared possible in Iran and perhaps even East Asia.

As the military leadership, particularly in the Army and the Marine Corps—the two services most engaged on the ground in Iraq—wrestled with how to balance their force structure and procurement for the future in the face of immediate needs which were less traditional combat but more SSRT0-based, tensions in the system became harder to reconcile.

These tensions became especially pronounced as the Bush administration fought to keep costs of Iraq under control in the face of escalation.

The administration had been reluctant to introduce terminology or doctrine that was not clear in its mission, fearing that insurgency could drag the US into the type of morass that characterized the Vietnam War. In mid-2005, Vice President Richard Cheney described the insurgency in Iraq as being in “its final throes,” but the Combatant Commander for Central Command, General John Abizaid, rejected that position. The military confronted a changing environment, forcing reconsideration of mission priorities. With the violence in Iraq spiraling into 2005, reconciliation of doctrine and force missions became crucial.

DOD DIRECTIVE/INSTRUCTION 3000.05

In early December 2005, the DoD formally announced what had seemed impossible only eight years earlier. Then, the Presidential debate argued about the efficacy of non-combat operations for

the highly trained US military. The DoD issued Directive 3000.05, specifically elevating SSRT0s to a mission equal in status to full scale combat. This change imposed more comprehensive US operations across the entire military spectrum. It elaborated the mission for the troops, the chains of command and various other operational aspects in elevating SSRT0s to a primary mission for the armed services.

Prior to this event, US military operations had always prioritized killing the enemy or bringing about unconditional surrender as primary goals to defeat the enemy. Anything beyond that was a secondary concern, almost something done when everything else had been accomplished. The shift with 3000.05 dictated that nontraditional activities were also crucial to accomplishing national security objectives.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FORCE

In the past, the US military has prided itself on being a force to “break things and kill people.”¹⁰ Today's military regularly sees rotations to Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, as it did during the last years of the Iraq effort before the US military finally withdrew in 2011. PRTs and the SSRT0 based assignments that aim to rebuild a new Afghanistan without the fissures that allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to take hold are joint and “whole of government,” mixing civilian and military personnel in teams to address societal reconstruction needs. The certainty of meeting these goals is far from clear, but it is clearly a different type of approach than the mid-2000's DoD-heavy mission perpetrated by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

It will take military culture perhaps a generation to accept these missions as career-enhancing. While the military salutes smartly



US Air Force Officer of Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul spends time with Afghan girls

when a fundamental transformation of this sort occurs, subtle resistance is likely to remain. The US military has operated “jointly” for a full quarter century since the Goldwater-Nichols Military Reform Act of 1986, yet subtle differences in service priorities still creep into things like military education or promotion rates for various specialties. A DoD directive reissued as an instruction by the current administration, however, does carry substantial weight that will be more difficult to ignore over time.

SSRTOs were codified under DoD Directive 3000.05 during the Bush administration as on a par with combat operations and the Obama administration reinforced this status when it issued DoD Instruction 3000.05 on 16 September 2009. A DoD Instruction has greater weight than does a Directive, thus stressing its importance to the force.

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT?

An enduring question that has arisen regarding our efforts in Afghanistan relates to US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts in Libya. That is, ousting the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi was justified as fulfilling the “responsibility to protect” (often called R2P) those unable to protect themselves from a brutal government. This concept, far from universally accepted within the US or in the international community, transcends traditional rules of international law and engagement in the sovereign affairs of a state.

Military funding has become a zero sum exercise: gains for some are a loss for others.

R2P was championed by Policy Planning Staff Director Dr Anne-Marie Slaughter and Dr Samantha Powers of the National Security



Council among many others—it would have the US armed forces focus their efforts on the protection of the weak and persecuted wherever the phenomenon appeared around the world, regardless of other priorities.

While R2P may not appear related to SSRTOs, there are profound implications for the military, especially an all-volunteer force. The ramifications are also financial in a time when the US is facing severe budget cuts: the funding for those SSRTO capabilities will require technologies, training, and weapons that may not be synonymous with combat capabilities. This requires spending for systems and training which support stability or security operations that may detract from the needs of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines fighting in traditional efforts. In some ways, during the current era of severe federal debt, military funding has become a zero sum exercise: gains for some are a loss for others.

Similarly, as has been a concern for more than a decade, training for SSRTOs may detract from training for combat operations since there is a finite amount of time and resources for training.

Other questions also arise: what does this mean for the force? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly argued that the State Department (and by extension organizations such as the Agency for International Development) required a dramatic increase in its funding to pay for the type of staffing necessary to carry out the SSRTO mission. At the same time, it was not clear whether Gates intended DoD funding to decrease to accommodate this reconfiguration of leadership in the field. It also leads to questions about how the US military will interact in the event of international activities in the SSRTO realm, such as occurred in the middle of 2011 with the NATO

goal of protecting citizens against Muammar Gaddafi. The US military has traditionally not been under foreign leadership, but many other countries have considerable knowledge and expertise in SSRTOs that would be useful for the US, depending on the circumstances. Would the US better serve its officers and enlisted personnel to defer command to someone from Brazil, for example, with considerable experience in SSRTOs as opposed to insisting that US forces always be led by a US commander?

The Libya mission ended with Gaddafi's death in 2011 but another question that arises is whether engaging in R2P or SSRTO activities then requires a state to continue its engagement after the target government is gone. In other words, how long does the international community maintain its commitment to security, stability, reconstruction or transition operations? Until an oppressive regime leaves power? Through one new regime? Five, ten? This is not at all clear in the current environment yet it has important effects for the military. As the world looks at the possibility of a mission for Syria to deal with the brutality of the Assad regime or an ouster of the Islamic Republic in Iran to prevent its further development of nuclear capabilities, these questions remain unanswered yet important for the militaries that may be involved. An end to either the Assad dynasty's forty years in power or the Islamic Republic of Iran's thirty years would leave major stabilization challenges for the global community, or at least their neighbors. In today's period of fiscal retrenchment, the commitments to SSRTO would loom important in many ways.

For the US, much of the SSRTO work is actually done by civilians who are officers in the reserves or the National Guard. The Guard achieved important status with the elevation of the senior

guard officer, General Craig McKinley, US Air Force, to the ranks of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But many serving in the Guard or the Reserves still face doubts from their active duty peers and their civilian employers about the implications of being called up for these SSRTOs. Are they equal to the task? How long will they be involved? How will they coordinate their arrival on station and their return home?

Additionally, how does this elevation of SSRTOs work for smaller militaries? If a smaller force has to choose between traditional operations and SSRTOs, how would its missions be accommodated?

A number of states, such as the Pacific islands, have moved towards non combat operations, specifically peacekeeping, in the past thirty years, but that choice eliminates certain opportunities for any military that might require traditional combat skills. Other nontraditional concerns, such as Gulf of Aden piracy, illustrate the different skills and missions that are at work in the international community today.

CONCLUSION

The departmental and service decisions towards stability, security, reconstruction, and transition operations for the US is still underway. The full implications are not yet clear, but represent a significant change in orientation for the missions of the US military. These implications will be similar for some militaries and different for others, but represent a change from the mission of combat against major military forces in a sustained, long term approach that characterized the way states prepared during the Cold War. SSRTOs may be the future for militaries around the world but more likely will be one of several. Hence, the US and other military forces

face a more demanding and complex future, requiring near simultaneous preparations for both traditional and SSRTO missions. 🌐

ENDNOTES

1. The views of the author are personal and do not in any case represent policy of the US Government, the National Defense University, or any other agency. Cynthia Watson is Professor of Strategy at the National War College where she has taught since 1992. ABC Clio of Santa Barbara will publish her third book on SSRTOs in April 2012. She also researches China's national security goals and topics relating to professional military education around the world.
2. To see Clinton's speech to the people of Rwanda years later, see Cynthia A. Watson, *Stability, Security, Reconstruction & Transition Operations* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC Clio, 2012).
3. Clinton issued an apology in Kigali on 7 May 1998 but many critics found it insincere and callous in light of other decisions during his presidency. See John Ryle, "A Sorry Apology from Clinton," *guardian.co.uk*, 13 April 1998, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/0,6573,234216,00.html>.
4. Condoleezza Rice, "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000.
5. Dozens of volumes on electronic lists and bookshelves cover the lead up to the Iraq war in March 2003. Several which I find most relevant to this discussion include Bob Woodward's series on Iraq; Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Vintage, 2007); Tom Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); and George Packard, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005). I also find L. Paul Bremer and Malcolm McConnell, *My Year in Iraq* (Threshold Editions, 2006) illuminating.
6. James Dao, "A Nation Challenged: The President; Bush Sets Role for U.S. in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 18 April 2002.
7. Countless seminar discussions at the National War College during this period centered around the frustration many veterans of the Afghan campaign felt about their

- inability to “get” bin Laden during Operation Anaconda (March 2002) and during the early months of the Iraq campaign when those assigned to an Afghan mission appeared to believe they were missing out of the “real war.” That view shifted as the Taliban began to creep back into the picture around late 2005 but the crux of these discussions rarely focused on the SSRT0 missions. These officers clearly viewed themselves as warfighters.
8. The Clinton and George W. Bush administrations provided assistance under Plan Colombia for several years. The bulk of the assistance was for military training, enhancement of human rights protection, and other aspects of strengthening the notoriously weak institutions in a country fighting insurgents while also exporting vast amounts of cocaine into the United States. The plan had a major military component but also provided some other types of assistance such as legal reform, crop substitution, and other needed transformative steps to put Colombia on a sustainable path rather than one of violence and polarization.
 9. Senator Patrick Leahy, D-Vermont, was adamant about not providing assistance to the Colombian military which appeared, in the late 1990s, to have a serious disregard for human rights standards. A goal of Plan Colombia was to reverse that problem. While Colombia still has its critics, those voices are considerably lower than they were before the US efforts at SSRT0 there.
 10. This phrase was a commonly heard in the 1990s as people grumbled about Clinton’s use of the armed forces for peace operations and what are now SSRT0s, while it was similarly used to highlight the initial success of activities in Iraq until it became obvious that reconstruction and stabilization components were both equally important in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. Anecdotally, the phrase is used far less often today at the National Defense University.



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Dr Watson writes on China in the world, civil-military relations, stability operations and other strategic issues. She has published ten monographs and served as contributing editor to an eleventh. Dr Watson is writing a monograph on national security education as an instrument of statecraft for the Marine Corps University Press. She is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and on the editorial board of *Third World Quarterly*.

A UNMISET Case Study

by **BG (Ret) Eric Tan Huck Gim**

Abstract:

This essay presents a case study of BG (Ret) Eric Tan Huck Gim's experience serving in the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. It illustrates that all components large and small make valuable contributions to a peacekeeping mission, especially when their efforts are complementary and well-integrated. Tactical success on the ground not only gives confidence to the local population, but can also influence decisions by the international community, ensuring that resources continue to be made available for the mission to achieve its assigned tasks.

Keywords: Coalition Warfare; East Timor; Operations Other Than War; Peacekeeping

INTRODUCTION

Are contributions directly proportionate to the size and sophistication of the military component of a peacekeeping force (PKF)? Do regional partners play a larger role in peacekeeping simply because they have more to gain? Or lose? To try and answer some of these questions, this essay presents a case study of BG (Ret) Eric Tan Huck Gim's experience serving in a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission.

MG Eric Tan Huck Gim served as Peacekeeping Force Commander, United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) from August 2002 to August 2003. The PKF comprised more than 3,300 armed peacekeepers from 26 Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) and almost 100 unarmed Military Observers. This was the first time a Singaporean General commanded a UN PKF. The PKF was mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1410, dated 17 May 2002, had the role of protecting Timor-Leste from external threats (paragraph 2(c): To Contribute to the Maintenance of the External and Internal Security of East Timor) and was a Chapter VII mission (paragraph 6).

The PKF defined its Centre of Gravity (COG) as "the Trust and Confidence of the people of Timor-Leste. It is important that we retain and build this." This essay describes how a significant external security menace that shook this COG was neutralized by a concerted PKF operation, supported by the military from a neighboring nation, with a major role played by one small state.

THE SITUATION IN TIMOR-LESTE AND UNMISET IN EARLY 2003

In early 2003, Timor-Leste was the newest nation in the world. There were high hopes from both the international community and the Timorese people for peace and development. It was a success story for the UN. The local government was in place, but the police were still being established by the UN and the newly-formed local military did not have the means to protect the country from external aggression. Indonesia was doing all it could to be a good neighbor and its armed forces worked well with the PKF. The population of one million were largely subsistence farmers living in isolated rural villages and greatly dependent on favorable weather to ensure their survival.

The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) was one of the TCNs and contributed an infantry company, which operated as part of THAIBATT with responsibility for half of the border between West Timor and Timor-Leste—AUSBATT having responsibility for the other half. SAF further contributed an aviation group of four UH1H helicopters, located within Sector West, which was the HQ for the border area.¹ AUSBATT and THAIBATT reported to Sector West, which in turn reported to PKF HQ in the capital Dili. Although SAF had been sending officers and other specialized teams such as medical personnel to UN missions since 1989 (United Nations Transition Assistance Group),² its contribution to UNMISSET was Singapore's first armed peacekeeping mission.

The culture in UNMISSET PKF, established in part by the Force Commander, was that there were to be no distinctions between large or small TCNs, and large or small components. All components had been sent to ensure peace and security, and brought differing but complementary capabilities with them. At the individual level, the internal message was similar: there was no such thing as a good or bad peacekeeper to start with. All personnel had been handpicked by their home country, simply because there was too much at stake—if any nation sent less than their best, they will be risking their reputation, jeopardizing the overall outcome of the mission and undermining support from the home population. With these precepts in mind, individuals and commanders were motivated to behave along common lines of mutual respect, patience and

tolerance for one another (especially because not all peacekeepers used English as their first language and thus needed more time to articulate their views and share their ideas), and overcame differences in military doctrine and terminology to ensure maximum integration of efforts.

A significant external security menace that shook this COG was neutralized by a concerted PKF operation, supported by the military from a neighboring nation, with a major role played by one small state.

From late 2002 to early 2003, reports of groups terrorizing the villages between the border and Dili grew in number. All-in-all, there were probably three separate groups that had infiltrated across the border and crept into their former villages to settle old scores dating back to the 1999 referendum.³ In at least two of these incidents, villagers had been killed or wounded by gunfire or bladed weapons. Although the PKF and United Nations Police (UNPOL) responded, the difficult terrain and ability of these groups to disperse into the dense vegetation wearing civilian clothes denied them success. As a result, the local population in the affected areas were too terrified to go about their daily lives: children were kept away from school for fear of being abducted and crops were neglected as none of the villagers dared leave their homes to tend them. There was a general mood of insecurity and despondency, and the local leaders, anxious for the well-being of their people, were clamoring for some positive action by the UN. There were also reports that 30 such groups were preparing to come over from West Timor to carry out similar destabilizing actions. These groups were made up of former militia and other East Timorese who did not want their erstwhile countrymen to enjoy the dividends of peace and independence.



MG Tan Huck Gim, Force Commander of UNMISSET Peacekeeping Force, shaking hands with incoming Force Commander, LG Khairuddin Mat Yusof, at the Change of Command Parade held on 29 August 2003 at the Peacekeeping Force (PKF) HQ in Timor-Leste.

The PKF decisively dealt with this threat and, since March 2003, there have not been any further incidents of armed groups coming over from West Timor.

DEALING WITH ARMED GROUPS: THE ATABAE CONTACT, FEBRUARY 2003

24 February 2003, at about 1245 hrs. An armed group tried to stop a truck and later managed to stop a microlet bus on the east-west coastal road from Batugade border crossing point to the capital Dili, at a point about 2 km south of Atabae (in Bobonaro District).⁴ The group wanted food and cigarettes. One passenger of the bus was killed when the group fired on the microlet as the driver sped through them, and four others were injured, one of whom later died. The PKF immediately cordoned off the area and caught the group three days later.

The same day, 24 February 2003, 1255 hrs. Elements of Fiji Company deployed at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) near the small town of Atabae arrived at the incident site and began looking for the group. This company was part of the Australian Combat Battalion Groups

(AUSBATT), who had responsibility for security in the Bobonaro District and that part of the border with West Timor. AUSBATT deployed its 30-man Quick Reaction Force from Maliana to the incident area by about 1330 hrs and its peacekeepers in Armored Personnel Carriers together with tracker dogs joined in the search. Fiji Company deployed additional elements to blocking positions on the south bank of the Loes River, the boundary between AUSBATT and the Portuguese battalion (PORBATT) responsible for neighboring Liquica District. AUSBATT sent two other companies (the battalion had a total of four) to reinforce the cordon, while PORBATT elements deployed at blocking and observation positions along the northern and eastern banks of the Loes River. By 1730 hrs, PKF had over 300 peacekeepers manning an effective ring of surveillance around an area more than 25 by 20 km. On the very same afternoon as the attack, the haystack had been defined and the search for the needle begun.

24, 25 and 26 February 2003. Light Observation Helicopters (LOHs) and mobile teams reinforced with tracking dogs combed the area without pause. PKF HQ had alerted the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) via their HQs in Bali and their troops were watching their side of the border, in case the group tried to sneak back into West Timor.⁵

On the very same afternoon as the attack, the haystack had been defined and the search for the needle begun.

27 February 2003, 1000 hrs. Media representatives were briefed at the Fiji Company FOB in Atabae on the progress of the search, so as to keep the public informed. Commanding Officer AUSBATT, who was directly commanding the operations in the field, joined the press conference. He gave a thorough briefing and assurance that every inch of the cordoned area would be searched until the group was found.

Before returning to Dili, the media were shown the site where the bus was shot at.

The same day, 27 February 2003, just before 1800 hrs. “Contact! The Fijians found the group!” After establishing that no peacekeeper had been hurt, more details were obtained. The Fijian peacekeepers had skillfully tracked the group from a farm where corn was reported stolen (the armed group was badly in need of food), found them in their LUP (Lay Up Position—a location used to pass the night, often with sentries at key points), challenged them,⁶ were shot at, returned fire, and gave chase. One member of the armed group was wounded in the hip and brought into custody, becoming a source of valuable information regarding his own as well as other groups. Also, in their haste to escape the Fijians, all of the group’s equipment and personal belongings had been left behind in the LUP. Among those belongings was a patrol diary, diligently kept by one of the members. This became another crucial source of information.

The next day, 28 February 2003. The Fijian Peacekeepers returned to make a more thorough search of the LUP, and found a body. This member of the group had been shot in the exchange of fire the previous day, made his way to an ambush position (knowing that the peacekeepers would sweep the area) and prepared his SKS-equivalent assault rifle with a full magazine of ten rounds and a hand grenade for his last stand. Fortunately, he died of his wounds before he could inflict any damage. He did not even have time to undo the strings used to prevent his grenade pin from being accidentally pulled out while travelling in the thick jungle. Because he fell backwards into the thick foliage, the peacekeepers did not spot him the previous day when they gave chase to the remaining members of his



group. His clothing and weapons indicated that he was probably one of the more senior members of the group.

A close examination of the LUP showed how cleverly it was sited, with an observation post overlooking the very approach the Fijians had taken the day before. This testified to the strong tactical field-craft of the Fijian peacekeepers—not only in tracking down and locating the group, but also in approaching, challenging, exchanging fire, and pursuing them without any casualties on their part. In accordance with standard procedures, an After Action Board of Inquiry was held to record the actions of the peacekeepers, so that there would be no doubt they had acted well within the Rules of Engagement (ROE). The Force Commander sent a letter to the Fijian Chief of Defense Force, to congratulate him on the sterling performance of his troops.

The patrol diary and wounded member of the armed group (his initials are DDJ, aged 40), provided a good picture of the group and its activities. Having recruited some younger Timorese into their group, DDJ and his other former militia colleagues (he was wearing a

T-shirt bearing the name of a notorious militia group at the time of his capture, and confessed that he was part of a militia group in the past) left Atambua (West Timor) on 13 February and sneaked into Timor-Leste to carry out armed robbery and extort money from family members. Their final destination was Gleno (a town in Ermera District), some 30 km from where they were found. The patrol diary revealed that they only managed to get past the PKF sentries at the border after two days of patiently waiting for a suitably dark and rainy night. The diary went on to explain their difficulties in evading the PKF search and obtaining food and water, despite having brought along civilian clothes and toiletries so they could move amongst the locals. DDJ gave information about the identities of the other eight members of his group. Aged 35 to 50, all were formerly from Ermera District, except one who was previously from Dili. Most were known only by their first names, which made it difficult for the police to carry out further investigations. According to DDJ, the group had come across the border with three long-barreled firearms and two Rakitans (home-made pipe guns, one of which was recovered at the LUP).

After the contact. Timorese leaders expressed gratitude for the actions of UNMISET. A few days later, PKF were told by TNI that they had arrested the remaining six members of this armed group as they attempted to cross back into West Timor. This group, at least, would no longer terrorize their fellow Timorese.

Since the destruction of this group, no other armed incursion from West Timor has ever been reported. Those waiting to cross over had received the clear message that they would be hunted down.

THE OUTCOME

Whilst the most immediate outcome of this operation against armed groups was the restoration of confidence among the local population, the more strategic outcome was a pause in the downsizing of PKF UNMISET. Because it was already a success story, the Security Council had been preparing to downsize the mission and leave Timor-Leste to its own devices. The emergence of armed groups caused great concern amongst Timorese leaders and those in UNMISET that such downsizing would mean much reduced resources to maintain security along the border.⁷

When the photographs and reports were sent to the Security Council, it persuaded those that had trivialized the armed group incidents as isolated cases of banditry to view them as what they actually were: the first of many organized groups of trained and armed East Timorese coming across the border, determined to negate the peace gains that Timor-Leste and the UN had collectively amassed.

This pause in downsizing ensured sufficient PKF elements remained in the border area to deter further incursions.

This led to the Security Council issuing Resolution 1473 on 4 April 2003 which “Decides that the schedule for the downsizing of the military component of UNMISET for the period up until December 2003 will be adjusted in line with the letter of 28 March 2003 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the members of the Security Council; and, accordingly, that two battalions will be retained within regions adjoining the Tactical Coordination Line during this period, together with associated force elements, including mobility; and that the number of military peacekeepers will reduce to 1,750 more

gradually than was foreseen in resolution 1410 (2002)” (paragraph 2). This pause in downsizing ensured sufficient PKF elements remained in the border area to deter further incursions.

CONCLUSION

This case study illustrates that all components large and small make valuable contributions to a peacekeeping mission, especially when their efforts are complementary and well integrated. When dealing with cross-border threats, it is essential that clear operating processes between military forces at each side of the border are in place and kept updated. Finally, tactical success on the ground not only gives confidence to the local population to go about their routine activities, but can also influence decisions by the international community, ensuring that resources continue to be made available for the mission to achieve its assigned tasks. 🌐

Although most of these people eventually returned to Timor-Leste, there were still an estimated 30,000 East Timorese in West Timor during 2003. The ex-militia within this residue formed armed groups and came across the border in late 2002 to early 2003 to take revenge on those who had voted for independence.

4. A microlet is an Indonesian-type minibus or van that carries paid passengers along an established route. The route plied by this particular microlet was the Dili-Border road that hugs the northern coastline of Timor-Leste.
5. Tentara Nasional Indonesia, the military of Indonesia.
6. Although UNMISET’s ROE were robust enough to allow the peacekeepers to engage without issuing a challenge, the Fijians decided to give the group the benefit of the doubt.
7. At that time, the local military was far from ready to fill the gaps created by a downsized PKF.

ENDNOTES

1. The border between Timor-Leste and West Timor (the Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur) stretches largely unmarked over almost 120 km from one coastline to the other. During UNMISET, this area was the Tactical Coordination Line (TCL) established between the UN and the Indonesian military. It traversed rugged terrain and was extremely porous. Although several regulated crossing-points were established, the population on both sides crossed wherever they wished.
2. The UN Transition Assistance Group (1989-1990) was established to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections.
3. In late 1999, Indonesia granted a referendum for East Timorese to decide whether to remain with Indonesia but have autonomy, or to become independent. An overwhelming majority voted for independence, which led to violence by pro-autonomy East Timorese, many of whom were armed ex-militia. The UN sanctioned an Australian-led intervention force that restored law and order, but in the meantime, the ex-militia had forced more than 200,000 East Timorese over to West Timor.



BG (Ret) Eric Tan Huck Gim is an Artillery Officer and has served the SAF for 32 years. Before retiring as Commandant SAFTI-MI in October 2005, he led in a major review of SAF officer education, the first since the Institute was formed in 1995. Another highlight of BG Tan's military career was serving as Peacekeeping Force Commander of the UN Mission in Support of East Timor (UNMISET). From August 2002 to August 2003, he commanded a multinational force of 3,300 peacekeepers from 26 nations to ensure peace in Timor-Leste. Following a crisis in 2006, he rejoined the UN in Timor-Leste for another year, this time in the civilian capacity of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, responsible for Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law. The second most senior individual in the mission, BG Tan supervised the multinational UN police force of 1,700, restored security across the country amidst tense political elections and reconstituted the local police force.

Upholding and Shaping: International Criminal Law through Regional Initiatives

by Alvin Tan

Abstract:

International and national judicial institutions are not necessarily the best or only way to address core international crimes. A regional approach may in certain situations not only better suit the theoretical objectives of international criminal justice, but in practice also allow small states to uphold, shape, and enforce international criminal law. It not only affords the inclusiveness of local value systems and notions of justice, but is sensitive to the practical needs and conditions on the ground. A regional approach to international criminal law may therefore not only promote accountability and the rule of law, but better navigate the unique peace-justice divide in every conflict.

Keywords: International Criminal Law; Military Tribunals; Peacekeeping; War Crimes

INTRODUCTION

There has been much research and study of substantive crimes, the formation and independence of various international criminal justice institutions, and the related impact on transitional and restorative justice. However, only cursory and isolated analysis exists concerning regional options for preventing impunity and ensuring international (and regional) peace and security.¹ A regional approach may in certain situations not only better suit the theoretical objectives of international criminal justice, but in practice also allow small states to uphold, shape, and enforce international criminal law. Regional solutions not only afford the inclusiveness of local value systems and notions of justice, but are also sensitive to the practical needs and conditions on the ground.

THE BENEFITS OF REGIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE

The current system of international criminal justice and the criminal responsibility of



Chief American prosecutor Justice Robert Jackson at the International Military Tribunal trial of war criminals at Nuremberg

individuals is a result of the Second World War (WWII), where various acts were considered not only crimes against the victims, but also the whole of mankind.² This led to the establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) at Tokyo and broke the monopoly of domestic jurisdictions over the prosecution of international crimes.³ Now considered part of customary international



Defendants at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Ichigaya Court

law, the so-called “core crimes” prosecuted by the WWII tribunals include war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

Although it has been internationalized and practiced around the world, various commentators contend that international criminal law is culturally specific and not inherently universal or value-neutral. For example, Shklar points out that the “law of nature” argument used by the American prosecution at the IMTFE was a foreign ideology that was applied “to a group of people who neither knew nor cared about this doctrine” and the assumption of universal agreement thus imposed “an ethnocentric vision of international order.”⁴ Chuter highlights that “international criminal law’s vocabulary and concepts are not neutral. They are culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very small number of countries.”⁵ Mani similarly notes that a major hurdle for the international criminal justice system is “the predominance of Western-generated theories and the absence of non-Western philosophical discourse.” This causes problems in addressing issues in post-conflict developing societies because “Western philosophers are inadequately attuned to the conditions found in non-Western societies,” such as the importance of social cohesion over individual liberty.⁶

International criminal law is culturally specific and not inherently universal or value-neutral.

Even if such claims of cultural specificity are rejected, it is important to recognize the danger of neglecting other regional norms, values, and legal precepts (such as the purpose of justice, criminal liability and appropriate sanctions). There are therefore several benefits in localizing the international criminal justice process within the region. One, it reduces the theoretical and physical gap between the victims of atrocities and those who are indirectly affected by the disruption of regional peace and stability. Two, it makes the accountability process better attuned to serving justice and winning local acceptance by injecting regional norms, values and views on individual liability and criminal sanctions. Three, it removes damaging neo-colonialist criticisms and misperceptions of international criminal law by giving ownership of the international criminal justice project to regional members, thereby ensuring that they all serve as a checks-and-balances for the collective interests of securing regional peace and justice. Four, it is more effective as regional solutions will be better at understanding and navigating the peace-justice divide that is unique to every post-conflict situation. Five, it is able to expand the definitions of the universally accepted core crimes to better suit regional needs, as well as including other crimes that may be particularly relevant in the



Detainees in the Manjaca Camp, Bosnia and Herzegovina

regional context. Six, it overcomes the “principle of unanimity” that haunts international treaty law, allowing interested, willing and able states to proceed on a more localized basis. Last but not least, it spurs advances in international criminal justice in other regions and states.

The histories of the *ad hoc* International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) crucially illustrate that generating sufficient interest amongst third-party states to respond and gathering enough global consensus to act are both inherent drawbacks of intervention at the international level.⁷ The failure to prevent or stop the atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda was clearly not because the international community had no knowledge of the atrocities.⁸ In Rwanda, despite having information about what was transpiring,⁹ the international community similarly failed to take action that could have prevented or reduced the magnitude of the genocide and only established the ICTR to prosecute and punish individuals after the fact.¹⁰ Similarly, cynics claim the ICTY was a fig leaf for the inaction by the major powers to stop the conflict in the former Yugoslavia,¹¹ and argue that the tribunal was essentially a cost-effective alternative to military intervention.¹²

Although Cassese notes that the atrocities that occurred in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda “served to rekindle the sense of outrage felt at the closing stage of WWII,”¹³ and Akhavan argues that the “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda “have assumed a similar role in the post Cold War era as the twin pillars of moral outrage upon which the beginnings of an international criminal jurisdiction can be discerned,”¹⁴ the

cause for inaction could be traced back to a lack of political will amongst third-party states with little or no interests in these countries.¹⁵ It must be acknowledged that the states forming the international community are unlikely to intervene in external conflicts (and sacrifice resources or possibly even lives) unless it is sufficiently in their interests to do so.¹⁶

Generating sufficient interest amongst third-party states to respond and gathering enough global consensus to act are both inherent drawbacks of intervention at the international level.

As such, a regional approach may sometimes be more capable than international initiative in achieving the goals of international criminal justice for several reasons. One, regional states are more (directly and indirectly) affected by international

crimes committed in neighboring countries and substantial investment of political effort can be expected in finding a solution. Two, legitimacy



Wanted poster made by the US Government for the Rewards for Justice program to assist the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda



UN Peacekeepers collecting bodies from Ahmici, Bosnia and Herzegovina, April 1993

and incentives for regional action are also arguably greater given the direct and stronger effects suffered by neighboring states. Three, the financial cost of regional enforcement is substantially lower due to the physical proximity to any alleged international crime. Four, neighboring states can better understand and prioritize needs of the situation as they are more politically attuned and culturally sensitive. Five, regional solutions address concerns about selectivity and bias that have been argued to exist at the international level, and also deal with the problem of disconnect from the situation and the victims. Six, regional approaches are likely to be more effective at securing the cooperation of the state concerned because they reduce concerns of exposure to external political influences and lessen sovereignty costs.

Similarly, a regional approach may sometimes be better than enforcing international criminal justice at the domestic level for several reasons. One, if enforcement of international criminal

If enforcement of international criminal law is allowed to remain primarily in state hands, the most critical and worrisome situation for international criminal justice occurs when international crimes are perpetrated on behalf of or with the complicity of the state itself.

law is allowed to remain primarily in state hands, the most critical and worrisome situation for international criminal justice occurs when international crimes are perpetrated on behalf of or with the complicity of the state itself. Alternatively, states may be most willing to enforce international criminal law when it is in their own interests—such as “where prior regimes, ‘rogue’ or disfavored elements of government, scapegoats, or non-state actors are under investigation,”¹⁷ or when “new regimes may seek to use accountability as a weapon to ... stigmatize large classes of the population.”¹⁸ Three, the pursuit of accountability may be a comparatively low priority for a transitional state trying to reconcile and rebuild itself after a national tragedy because it may cause societal instability or break the fragile peace. Four, a post-conflict state may not be able to hold perpetrators of international crimes

accountable because it does not have the required financial and human capital, and its domestic judicial and legal infrastructure has been destroyed by war. Five, domestic systems in the affected states will inherently have biases regarding the guilt or innocence of an individual, and the

likelihood of impartial and proper proceedings are low. Six, regional political pressure could be used to isolate and force the hand of reluctant state(s) and ensure that neighboring states apprehend and prosecute or extradite suspects that have fled across the border into their territory. Finally, the onerous and costly exercise can be shared amongst neighboring states and would be amply justified by the maintenance of regional peace and economic stability. While the intervention of non-regional states



presents an option for upholding international criminal justice, most third-party states will find situations in a faraway part of the world too onerous and costly to justify involvement.

CONCLUSION

International and national judicial institutions are not always the best or only way to address core international crimes. A regional solution may be an alternative for small states to not only uphold but also shape international criminal law according to the unique needs of each situation. Regional interpretations of the substantive elements of international crimes could possibly exist based on “local customs” regarding issues like criteria for prosecution and grounds for excluding responsibility.¹⁹ The formation of local and regional customs would require the particular act by one state to be accepted by another state (or states) as an expression of a legal obligation or right.²⁰ As long as it does not contravene an existing *jus cogens* norm, concerns about regional interpretations of international crimes or regional recognition of other crimes can be addressed and remedied with codification in a regional instrument.²¹ Separately, it is noteworthy that an act cannot be considered an international crime even if all the states in only one region of the world deem it as such.²² This presents the argument for a category of regional crimes,²³ which would resemble international crimes in doctrinal terms within a regional context but are not accepted as such by the entire international community.²⁴ Such an approach to international criminal law could thus be seen as a form of “respect for regional legal traditions.”²⁵ Taken together, it may be said that a regional approach to international criminal law may therefore not only promote accountability and the rule of law,

but better navigate the peace-justice divide that is different in every conflict situation. 🌐

ENDNOTES

1. For example, see William Burke-White, “Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration,” *Texas International Law Journal* 38 (2003): 729-761; and Matiangai Sirleaf, “Regional Approach to Transitional Justice? Examining the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth & Reconciliation Commission for Liberia,” *Florida Journal of International Law* 21 (2009): 209-284.
2. Bass notes that arguments about the need to prosecute war criminals existed at least since the First World War, and that the legalist approach was thus not born but “came of age” at Nuremberg. Gary Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 280.
3. The creation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals represented the end of the state-centric international law that had been dominant since the 18th century and was primarily focused on the actions by the government or agents of the state against the nationals of other states that were considered “an affront to those states.” Prior to this, prosecutions of individuals for misconduct in international armed conflict were thus mostly conducted by their own states in domestic courts or military court-martials. Cassese points out that this was largely due to the fact that the prohibition of certain acts under international law were essentially addressed to states, which were then legally obliged to prevent their citizens from committing the prohibited acts and to punish the offenders. Steven Ratner, Jason Abrams and James Bischoff, *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law – Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5; and Antonio Cassese, *International Criminal Law*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5.
4. Judith Shklar, *Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), 128.
5. David Chuter, *War Crimes: Confronting Atrocity in the Modern World* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 94-95.

6. Rama Mani, *Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 47-48.
7. The UNSC passed resolution 827 on 25 May 1993 and established the ICTY to prosecute individuals suspected of committing war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. The tribunal was justified on the basis that the criminality taking place in the region constituted "a threat to international peace and security" and putting an end to such serious violations of international law would "contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace." See UN Security Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993, S/Res/827 (1993), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement>. On 8 November 1994, the UNSC adopted Resolution 955 and created the ICTR to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and neighboring states. The UNSC had similarly determined that the situation in Rwanda constituted "a threat to international peace and security" and that prosecuting violators of international crimes "would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace." See UN Security Council resolution 955 of 8 November 1994, S/Res/955 (1994), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement>. ICL is undoubtedly affected by international *realpolitik*. Discretion and selectivity ultimately mean that only a select number of sufficiently important but uncontroversial situations are examined. These limitations will similarly apply to the "independent" ICC, which has limited resources and is also not immune to political influence because it depends largely on state funding.
8. Several commentators note that such failure to deal with conduct "very worthy of censure" under ICL may inadvertently provide some form of legitimacy for it. Robert Cryer et al., *An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 30.
9. Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire, had on 11 January 1994 notified the UN of four major weapons caches and Hutu plans to murder the Tutsi population and Belgian UNAMIR soldiers. Despite emphatic requests before and during the genocide, authorization for UNAMIR to intervene was refused. Malvern also notes that "[c]onclusive proof that a genocide was taking place was provided to the Security Council in May and June while it was happening." See Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 227.
10. It is however noted that the French government had launched Opération Turquoise in June 1994 to establish and maintain a "safe zone" in the south-west of Rwanda. Its objectives were to contribute to the security and protection of civilians and displaced persons in danger in Rwanda, but its effectiveness has been questioned.
11. Goldstone even argues that it is highly unlikely that UNSC action would have been taken if the violations were not being perpetrated in Europe and had not shocked the conscience of many people in the Western democracies. As such, some governments "felt compelled by public opinion to take action to stop the carnage", but "were not prepared to commit to military action and settled for the establishment of the ICTY." Richard Goldstone, *South-East Asia and International Criminal Law* (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2011), 7.
12. That said, it should be acknowledged that there was a UN peacekeeping force, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), on the ground in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina between February 1992 and March 1995.
13. Antonio Cassese, *International Law*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 455.
14. Payam Akhavan, "The Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond," *Human Rights Quarterly* 18 (1996):259-285, 269.
15. Political imperatives and context will determine the degree of support and the kind of cooperation that states are prepared to give in the name of international criminal justice. These include the nature and cultural setting of the conflict, whether it is still ongoing and who is in power. Although the key determinants will vary between states, and most likely between regions, it will essentially be evaluated by self-interested states in terms of costs and benefits to themselves. For example, Broomhall notes that states would generally be more willing to undertake meaningful action on enforcement when "risks are reduced, public pressure and political will high, and other factors favorable." Bruce Broomhall, *International Justice and the International Criminal Court – Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law* (Oxford University Press, 2003), 153-154.

16. Although the cost-benefit structure had changed significantly since the end of the Cold War, self-interested states continued to base their actions on calculations of the political, strategic, financial and economic costs and benefits to themselves. The Yugoslav civil wars of the early 1990s did not affect the vital interests of any of the powerful states (like the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and the European countries), which sought more to avoid clashing with each other. In Rwanda case, there was no also clear threat to international security or national interests of the major powers. Even under the concept of the "Responsibility to Protect," it is doubtful whether states would bother to overcome the issue of state sovereignty, risk the lives of their own soldiers and send an intervention force at their own cost to a faraway country that has little value or importance to them. For a general discussion, see Paul Williams and Michael Scharf, *Peace with Justice? War Crimes and Accountability in the Former Yugoslavia* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); and Melvern, *A People Betrayed*.
17. Broomhall, *International Justice and the International Criminal Court*, 162.
18. Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams, *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 136.
19. In the *Asylum Case (Colombia v Peru)*, the ICJ discussed the Colombian claim of a local/regional custom peculiar to the Latin American states, and held that different local and regional customs must be taken into account when deciding on the position of international law. Indeed, it was accepted in the *El Salvador/Honduras* case that a "trilateral local custom of the nature of a convention" could establish a condominium arrangement between three successor states, which jointly acquired the historic waters formerly under a single state's sovereignty by reason of the succession. See *Colombian-Peruvian asylum case*, Judgment of 20 November 1950: ICJ Rep 1950, 266, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/7/1849.pdf>; and *Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute* (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua intervening), Judgment of 11 September 1992: ICJ Rep 1992, 597-600, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/75/6671.pdf>. For example, intoxication may not be accepted as a legal defense to exclude or reduce criminal liability for a crime in the Arab region comprising of Islamic societies, where the consumption of alcohol is itself not permitted.
20. In the *Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory*, the ICJ found it difficult to see why a local/regional custom should only be established on the basis of long practice between more than two states, and held that there was "no reason why long continued practice between two states accepted by them as regulating their relations should not form the basis of mutual rights and obligations between two states." See *Case Concerning Right of Passage Over the Indian Territory (Merits)*, Judgment of 12 April 1960: ICJ Rep 1960, 39, <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/32/4521.pdf>.
21. This is reflective of how international treaties are in reality established and more importantly enforced between states. It is noteworthy that multilateral (or even bilateral) treaties can affect the course of action pursued against the national of another state. It is most clearly illustrated by the "Article 98 Agreements" linked to the American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA), whereby signatory states agreed not to hand over US nationals to the ICC. Separately, treaty-based internationalized hybrid courts then showed how conduct pertinent to a situation, like the recruitment and use in armed conflict of child soldiers, could be used to better interpret and expand on existing international crimes. For a discussion on the treatment of the crime of child recruitment by the SCSL, see Alison Smith, "Child Recruitment and the Special Court for Sierra Leone," *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 2 (2004):1141-1153.
22. According to Ago unanimity was necessary as the concept of an international crime would otherwise divide the international community. See *Yearbook of the International Law Commission*, 1976, vol. I, para 41, 251-252, [http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes\(e\)/ILC_1976_v1_e.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1976_v1_e.pdf).
23. Any conception of a regional crime would however necessarily include the four core international crimes, which were beyond any doubt part of customary international law and thus cloaked by the *opinio juris* of the international community as a whole. As pointed out by the UN Secretary General, the four "core" international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression) were part of customary international law, and do not face "the problem of adherence of some but not all states to specific conventions." See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704 (1993), para 34, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.

24. The International Law Commission (ILC) stated that the reference to the international community as a whole "certainly does not mean the requirement of unanimous recognition by all the members of that community, which would give each state an inconceivable right of veto. What it is intended to ensure is that a given internationally wrongful act shall be recognized as an 'international crime,' not only by some particular group of states, even if it constitutes a majority, but by all the essential components of the international community." See *Yearbook of the international Law Commission, 1976*, vol. II (Part Two), para 61, 119, [http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes\(e\)/ILC_1976_v2_p2_e.pdf](http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1976_v2_p2_e.pdf).
25. See the *Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Phase Two: Maritime Delimitation)*, 119 ILR, 448.



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The Future of Stability Operations

by COL (Ret) Thomas X. Hammes, PhD

Abstract:

Although the recent record of stability operations is less than ideal, numerous imperatives mean that many nations will almost certainly be forced to attempt them again in the future. It is therefore incumbent upon professionals to study previous stability operations in order to be better prepared when they are called upon to execute one. Scholars and practitioners must adopt a flexible, thoughtful approach that treats each case as a product of its own unique environment, understanding reasons for failure and identifying those for success. Force planners must decide their level of participation in stability operations and structure their forces accordingly. Finally, strategists must chart such operations carefully, with a keen appreciation for what can realistically be achieved.

Keywords: Stability Operations; Counterinsurgency; Counterterrorism; Peacekeeping

INTRODUCTION

With the last United States (US) troops now out of Iraq, that nation is going through a period of increasing turbulence. At the same time, the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan is shifting its focus from fighting the insurgents to preparing the Afghan security forces to do so. It is too early to determine the outcome in either nation but most analysts believe each faces difficult times before it achieves true stability—and in fact may not become stable at all. The apparently small returns for the enormous effort the international community poured into these nations have led many to question the very concept of “stability operations.” In addition, few doubt there will be continuing instability in many regions of the world—and that some of these regions will contain resources or be located near lines of communication that are vital to the global economy. Thus, while the recent record of stability operations is not good, nations will almost certainly be forced to attempt them again in the future. It is incumbent upon professionals



US Withdrawal from Iraq: The last convoy crosses the border into Kuwait from Iraq

to study previous stability operations in order to be better prepared when they are called upon to execute one.

One of the problems in discussing “stability operations” is the lack of an agreed upon definition. In fact, there are more definitions than there are countries attempting these operations. In the US alone, we have counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, policing, peace enforcement, peace keeping, peacemaking, stability operations,

and foreign internal defense. While each label has its own definition, almost all have the long-term goal of a functioning, relatively stable state that, for the most part, can control its own territory.

Unfortunately, the definitions do not agree on much beyond that. They do not even agree on the best way to achieve this objective. The disagreements run much wider than just which operational and tactical approach US forces should employ in such operations—there is no agreement on which players should even be involved. Should the effort be primarily driven by a single state (as in Iraq) or a multi-national organization (as in Afghanistan)? Should the effort be a direct one by an outside power where its personnel provide the security and governance, or should it be indirect where the outside personnel only support the host nation in providing security? Should it be an all of government approach or an all of society approach? How does one determine what form of government can best provide stability in a specific country? While we defaulted to democracy in both Iraq and Afghanistan, was democracy, complete with frequent elections, the best form of government for stability? If not, who determines which group governs? Do we support traditional power relationships or change them in response to insurgent demands? The questions are virtually unlimited—and neither doctrine nor definitions provide clear guidance.

In fact, each state has achieved stability in its own way. Each process reflected a set of internal and external political, economic, social and security conditions that are unique to that state's history. The sheer diversity of initial conditions means one cannot prescribe a particular approach or even a particular form of government. A better source of understanding is a study of how states have evolved over time. The diversity of both the path and the outcome that various states

have taken towards stability provide invaluable background for the specific case that one faces.

Historians and international relations scholars have dedicated thousands of volumes to this issue. While this essay is too short to permit even a superficial survey of the material, one can note that each state evolved in a unique way. In her article "From the Sun King to Karzai: Lessons for State Building in Afghanistan," Dr Sherri Berman explains how Louis the XIII and Louis the XIV consolidated the French state.¹ She never claims that France can serve as a model. Even within the small space of Western Europe, each nation took its own course. Louis the XIV achieved a very powerful monarchy. The British developed a constitutional monarchy. The Dutch built a republic. The Germans and Italians took until the 19th Century to complete their wars of unification and then went from autocracy to democracy to dictatorship and back to democracy. And of course, Europe as a whole required the Napoleonic Wars, World War I and World War II to achieve the peaceful stability that is now the rule across most of Europe. The one common thread among the stories of the individual states is that it took a long time and a great deal of conflict to settle the borders and the nature of each state.

Other regions of the world showed similar diversity in how states were formed. They too took a great deal of time and blood to evolve to their current forms. Many were built in the same physical location as previous failed states. And of course many modern states are not yet stable. Some are states in name only with the "recognized" government simply being the gang that currently controls the capital city—even if that control does not extend to the countryside. Like Europe, the rest of the world does not provide any simple model or unified approach to building stability. Rather, the study of a broad



variety of cases highlights the need for a flexible, thoughtful approach that treats each case as a product of its own unique environment.

In addition to examining how various states achieved stability over time, it is also important to review recent international attempts to establish stability in particular cases. A brief survey of recent attempts reveals a range of results from complete failure to ongoing efforts to tentative success. To date, despite repeated United Nations, US and African Union efforts, Somalia remains a completely failed state. Haiti and Chechnya are a bit farther up the scale of success but face continuing internal conflict. Fragile but improving states include Lebanon, East Timor, Sierra Leone and the states created out of the previous Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that the range of actors, approaches and outcomes of these more recent efforts duplicate the range of paths to stability taken over the last few centuries in the rest of the world.

This brief survey leads to an obvious question: "Are there prerequisites for establishing a stable state?" Again this is an area with extensive existing literature and also an area where common sense is critical. One of the most important prerequisites is the local historical narrative. Do the peoples within the boundary of the state see themselves as a single political or social community? Is their historical narrative unifying or dividing? What is the relationship of the citizens to the state? Do they connect to the state or to another entity, perhaps an ethnic or religious identity? Is that entity in conflict with the state? In many places, people will have multiple identities that must be considered.

Another critical indicator is the level of economic and political development. Most nations' political and economic development has been somewhat symbiotic. But, as Europe has

demonstrated, a particular level of economic development does not predetermine the form of political governance of a state. Rather, it is the mix of historical, economic, social, technological, geographical and political elements that define how a country governs itself. However, there is strong evidence that an annual per capita GDP of between \$3,000 and \$6,000 is necessary for a state to transition to a functioning democracy. While this income level is obviously not a guarantee of successful transition, it does seem to be a prerequisite. Given the Western propensity for trying to establish democracies as a route to stability, this is a factor that must be part of the discussion.

WHY MIGHT DEVELOPED NATIONS CHOOSE TO CONDUCT STABILITY OPERATIONS?

As it shapes its diplomatic and military tool kits, each nation must decide if it plans to engage in stability operations. That decision includes an analysis of whether it thinks it may have to conduct such operations either unilaterally or as part of a coalition. A number of drivers are present that indicate stability operations will be required to sustain the global economy. Failure to take action to limit the impact of these drivers on the global economy will result in less global economic growth—and, as a result, less growth for most individual nations as well. Thus any nation that is tied into the global economy will have an interest in maintaining stability in certain critical areas. Each nation will have to decide if it can have an impact or not. If it can, should it or should it not attempt to be a free rider? And of course, as always, participation in a coalition is often not about the particular problem but about remaining engaged with the international community in the hope that when you need help others will show up.

Five obvious drivers that will shape the response of developed nations to instability in underdeveloped parts of the world are energy supplies, mass migration, critical resources, humanitarian impulses and domestic politics. These drivers are not an all inclusive list but simply five that are highly likely to have an impact.

Energy. The US Energy Information Administration states that global energy demand will increase by 35% from 2008 to 2035. Most of that growth will be in nations outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.² While fracking and increased exploration in developed nations will fill some of that demand, the combined increase in demand and decreased production from existing fields means that a great deal of the new energy must come from less developed and, often, unstable nations. Just as importantly, the energy will have to move through pipelines and maritime choke points that make it vulnerable to interdiction. Thus disputes in nations that are sources or transit routes for energy may well force outside nations to respond.

As it shapes its diplomatic and military tool kits, each nation must decide if it plans to engage in stability operations.

Mass migration. Numerous underdeveloped nations are facing major youth population bulges. In most of these nations, the local economy cannot accommodate the demand for jobs created as these children and teens grow up. For many, the only answer will be migration. Given the huge numbers of people involved and, in some cases, their proximity to developed nations, there will be demands to either block the migration or improve the economy to keep more of them at home. While border control is feasible if oppressive enough, that level of control will also inhibit trade and

thus impede the economy. Nations flooded with immigrants may attempt to reduce migration by improving economic conditions in the home nations of the migrants. Any attempt to improve economic conditions for the bulk of the population requires some degree of stability.

Resources. Critical resources other than energy may also force developed nations to stabilize underdeveloped nations that own those resources. Certain minerals, rare earths and water will be in short supply in the coming decades. Those shortages will be a source of conflict and may well require outside peacekeeping and development support to insure that they are available for use rather than being wasted.

Humanitarian impulses. As Somalia demonstrated, sometimes pure humanitarian impulse can generate a response. With increasing discussion of the international community's "responsibility to protect," these impulses may lead to more frequent intervention. Depending on the location of the intervention, stability operations may be required to prevent an immediate return to the conditions that stimulated the original commitment of forces. However, as Somalia as illustrated, humanitarian impulses may fade when confronted with strategic reality.

Domestic politics. Yet another driver will be domestic politics. The multicultural nature of most postcolonial states has seen rising violence against minorities. Inevitably, the minorities will in some of these cases be able to stimulate demands for intervention, either through their diaspora communities or because they form a major population block in an adjacent country.

Each of these five drivers, or any combination of them, will almost certainly create a demand for "stability operations" in the near future. Current low key operations in Somalia, Libya and Syria illustrate the wide range of such activities.



http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aus_wheat_in_Somalia.jpg
 Somali Villagers watching a US Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion deliver wheat

WHO MIGHT STABILITY FORCES FIGHT?

Forces dispatched to assist in stability operations can expect to see a wide range of combatants. Much of the discussion during the last decade has focused on how to fight insurgents, but this is too limited a view. Stability operations will also have to deal with criminals, terrorists, and civil disorder—often all at the same time. Stability operations will be one form of hybrid warfare.³

The US Army's *FM-3-24 Counterinsurgency* manual focuses on insurgents fighting for independence from a colonial power. The authors apparently drew heavily on successful counterinsurgency campaigns in Malaya and Algeria in developing the operational approaches recommended in Chapter 5. These early anti-colonial conflicts were generally between two major combatants—the colonial power and the insurgents.

However, the withdrawal of all colonial powers has eliminated anti-colonialism as a cause for insurgency. Today's insurgents are motivated to either rule the post-colonial state (FAPLA versus UNITA in Angola) or redraw its boundaries (South Sudanese, Balouch, Kurds and Pashtuns). These insurgent groups may not be unified and may well be in open conflict with each other. Simultaneously, the government itself may be divided like in Iraq and Afghanistan. The different motivations involved and the expanded number of participants will change the requirements for bringing stability to the country involved. For instance, those trying to change national boundaries will by nature involve more nations and international organizations in any negotiated settlement.

The role of criminals will vary from minor to major players. In many conflicts, they will remain focused on profits and become involved only if necessary to sustain their profits. They will thus

be peripheral to the conflict. For the most part, criminal enterprises in the Balkans fell into this category.

In other conflicts, criminal activity is tied to a specific clan or tribe and thus becomes the source of political power for that entity. Such entities may well align themselves with whichever side in the struggle offers them the best chance of retaining control of their criminal enterprises and thus their political independence. They can be expected to play the various sides off against each other and involve them in their own disputes. During the Sunni Awakening, many of the Sunni tribes on the border of Iraq fell into this category.

Criminal actors have also evolved to the point where they seek to physically control territory. Their motives may range from insuring the continuation of their criminal enterprises to achieving complete political control of their area. The drug cartels in Central America have established mini-narcotic states of this type.

Terrorists will likely also be part of the mix. They may be affiliated with outside groups or be homegrown. Of particular concern is the fact that modern technology is increasing the destructive power available to even small terrorist groups. The concept of the super empowered individual or small group is becoming a reality. With the spread of improved explosives, drones, secure communications, and, eventually, biological weapons, these super empowered groups operating from unstable areas may threaten Western societies. In short, future stability operations will result in terror attacks on the home territories of the intervening nations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES

Despite the intense desire of some US military writers to get back to “real war”—meaning conventional conflict between uniformed forces—economic, political, social and technical trends all

point to an expansion of the spectrum of conflict. Over the next decade, potential conflict ranges from conventional war to insurgencies to terror to criminal activity. And of course, regardless of whether a conflict is primarily conventional or unconventional it will include elements of all four. In fact, militaries may have to prepare to fight across the spectrum of conflict. While the range of potential conflicts continues expanding, each nation will continue to structure its armed forces based on its perceived enemies, its available resources and its strategic needs.

Many nations will see major conventional conflict as the most dangerous. Some writers point to an “inevitable conflict” between the US and China.⁴ Any such conflict will be disastrous for the global economy but must remain an important consideration in any military planning. Others note Iran has repeatedly threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz.⁵ This low probability but high impact event also cannot be ignored by force planners. In short, each nation must consider how potential conventional conflict will impact its security and decide how to posture its military to cope with that situation.

While currently in disfavor, counterinsurgency operations are also highly probable. However, the likelihood of an outside power attempting direct intervention by conducting counterinsurgency operations with its own forces has declined sharply. The exceptionally high costs and dubious rewards of the recent international efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have put a damper on enthusiasm for direct intervention. While governments will not be eager to intervene, even a brief survey of conflicts around the globe shows that many are insurgencies or civil wars where one side uses insurgent techniques to overcome its weaknesses. If these insurgencies trigger one of the previously mentioned five drivers, governments may still commit forces. However, the shadow of Iraq and Afghanistan will probably encourage governments to seek an



indirect approach. Thus national militaries should prepare their forces for the advise-and-assist role rather than direct intervention. They must teach and support the host nation militaries as they fight the insurgents. While this approach eases the requirement for the large infantry forces necessary in direct intervention, the indirect approach places a premium on NCOs and officers who can work closely with host nation forces. This has obvious force structure implications.

Terrorism will also create a demand for military forces. In addition to the elite forces trained to hunt terrorists or free hostages, militaries must prepare to provide critical response and recovery services to their own civil governments. The increasingly destructive power available to terrorists means they will conduct attacks that overwhelm certain civil response capabilities. Force structure planners will have to consider which areas may require military assistance and shape the force accordingly.

The wide spectrum of future conflict will generate different requirements for different nations. Major and middle powers may feel a requirement to respond globally to threats to trade and stability. This will require military forces with the capability to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Obviously, achieving basic proficiency at this range of tasks is a major challenge. Planners must decide if they will assign specific units to each mission or attempt to train all units well enough that they can participate across the range of requirements. Each nation will have to answer that question in its own way—indeed, the different services within each nation may handle the challenge in different ways.

Smaller powers know that they cannot provide a unilateral response but may feel the need to be able to assist a coalition in responding. Thus they will have a different training challenge. They may have to train for conventional conflict against a local opponent and simultaneously prepare to conduct stability operations as part of a coalition. In doing so, small states should capitalize on the remarkable strengths they bring to coalition operations. Because they are clearly not there to dominate the host nation, small nations have an inherent legitimacy. They may also be invited to help simply because they are not perceived as a threat to the host nation.

The wide spectrum of future conflict will generate different requirements for different nations.

Small nations will bring knowledge on how to deal with large nations that will be of great value to the host nation. Each nation brings its own intellectual heritage and this will result in a different appreciation for both the problems the host nation faces and potential solutions. The experience of small nations may more closely parallel that of the host nation and thus their advice may well be of greater value. The key issue is for small nations to place staff officers in key advisory positions.

In addition, small nations should expect to lead coalitions in dealing with regional problems. In recent times, smaller nations have led operations such as in East Timor. They have also conducted operations in places Western forces have been unable or unwilling to attempt. The Zimbabwean Company's move into the Bukhara Market in Mogadishu is a good example.

IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGISTS

Like politics, strategy is the art of the possible. It is the art of bringing coherence to the ends, ways and means applied to a particular strategic problem. Recent US-led stability operations

have been driven by maximalist goals with little consideration given to the ways and particularly the means necessary to achieve those goals. The result has been decade long efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan that have yielded minimal results for the enormous resources invested.

Probably the single biggest lesson for outside states who seek to create “stability” within another nation is humility. It will take longer, be more difficult and take more twists than anticipated. But some simple guidelines may make it a bit easier.

Given the paucity of successful “state building” efforts by outside powers, the default position on an intervention to assist with stability should specifically exclude building a state. The best one can hope for is to improve the effectiveness and reach of existing state institutions in the context of that specific conflict. If those institutions have ceased to exist, building on the remnants of previous structures will probably be more effective than trying to create new ones in a Western image. Western institutions are often in direct conflict with local cultures, beliefs and even institutions.

For the same reason, outside powers should not attempt to either give or impose democracy on an unstable region. As a general rule, democracy has not been given but taken. From the Magna Carta which was imposed on King John by his barons to the US Declaration of Independence to the French Revolution to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, democracy was taken by “subjects” of the rulers. In each case, alternative power centers had to evolve to contest the ruler’s control. Just as obviously, all took a long time and often did not go smoothly. Outsiders should not believe they can simply install a functioning democracy.

As the international community withdraws from Afghanistan, it is essential that scholars study what worked and what did not. There are literally dozens of areas ripe for closer examination. In particular, did an “all of government” approach work or did many nations simply lack the deployable civilian government expertise and thus could not even attempt it? If a supporting nation cannot deploy an all of government response, is there a viable alternative? If so, what does it look like and how does it function alongside all the other governmental and non-governmental actors that will be present in any stability operation?

Probably the single biggest lesson for outside states who seek to create “stability” within another nation is humility.

The reader cannot help but notice that this essay has many more questions than suggested solutions. In fact, the history of efforts to create stable states indicates that there will always be many more questions than answers when initiating a stability operation. There will be no template or simple guidelines that will lead the intervening powers to a happy conclusion.

From studying both recent and more distant efforts at stabilization, scholars and practitioners should be able to develop a range of approaches that have attained their goals. These will not serve as a template but as a caution. The complexity inherent in any society severely limits what outsiders can achieve—particularly given the short timelines demanded by most supporting governments. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the international effort aspired to truly worthy goals—and then found that

many were simply not achievable in the specific economic, social and political conditions that defined those conflicts. Future stabilization operations should be based on achievable rather than aspirational goals. 🌐

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In his thirty years in the Marine Corps, **COL (Ret) Thomas X. Hammes, PhD** served at all levels, including command of a rifle company, weapons company, intelligence company, infantry battalion and the Chemical Biological Incident Response Force. He served in Somalia and Iraq and trained insurgents in various locations.

Hammes has a Masters of Historical Research and PhD in Modern History from Oxford University. He is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at the US National Defense University. Hammes is the author of *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the Twenty-First Century* and *Forgotten Warriors: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps' Ethos and the Korean War*, and numerous articles and opinion pieces.

Interoperability and Innovation

by **CDRE Richard Menhinick**

Abstract:

While interoperability and innovation in a maritime coalition environment is often looked at as a technical issue, it is interpersonal relationships and trust that truly underpin both. Given the differing strategic goals, legal requirements, rules of engagement, personalities and cultures of the nations involved, failure to engage across the highest strategic levels will inevitably lead to failure of interoperability at sea. Trust, relationships, mutual respect, an understanding of culture, patience and courtesy are all required to make interoperability work. The security agendas of small states will thus be well served by the dividends of personal interaction and human understanding that comes from working and serving effectively and sensitively in Operations Other Than War.

Keywords: Coalition Warfare; Interoperability; Maritime Security; Operations Other Than War

INTRODUCTION

This short essay will focus in on interoperability and innovation in a maritime coalition environment. The essay will first describe a little of the Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operation I commanded and then briefly mention education and training. It will also attempt to answer the follow three questions:

- Does a greater role in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) serve the national security agendas of small states?
- What are the conditions and considerations unique to small states in OOTW?

- In an era of limited defense resources, what and how can the militaries of small states contribute and achieve beyond mere statements of ambitions?

BACKGROUND

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is a United States (US) led coalition of 25 nations (plus three nations with observer status) committed to: countering violent extremism and terrorist networks in maritime areas; working with regional and other partners to improve overall security, stability and regional nations' maritime capabilities; and when requested responding to environmental and humanitarian crises.¹



US Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 1st Class Bart Bauer, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:CTF-150.jpg>

Ships assigned to CTF-150 assemble in formation

The staffs are truly multinational, with naval representatives from 21 of the 25 nations in the planning and operations cells of the CMF. The multinational aspects of the operation and its close regional links can be seen in the fact that I took over command from RADM Zakuallah of the Pakistan Navy and handed back command to RADM Abassi of Pakistan. For the duration of my command I had with me 26 Royal Australian Navy (RAN) personnel and as such we formed a headquarters team collocated with the US 5th Fleet Command in Bahrain, deploying command elements to sea as necessary for focal and surge operations. The decision was made to collocate with the US Command at Bahrain so as to be as integrated and influential as possible, given the vital strategic and then operational lines of command that underpin such a complex operation with so many competing, complimentary and unique international, national and legal

requirements. My Australian force normally included the Australian major surface combatant, which is permanently deployed to the region, and also on occasion one of the Australian AP3-C maritime patrol aircraft. Australia also maintains a permanent naval presence on the staff of the CMF itself.

Although I was working for the Commander Combined Maritime Force, he was also a US national commander: Commander US 5th Fleet. Similarly, I was a deployed Commander of an Australian Task Group and I remained at all times under the national command of the Australian Commander of Joint Task Force 633 which was GEN Mark Kelly and then GEN John Cantwell.

CTF 150 was established in February 2002 with a focus on counterterrorism. The US, Germany, Spain, Italy, France, United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, Pakistan, Canada, Denmark and



A Royal Australian Air Force AP-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft

Australia have all commanded CTF 150. It is truly an OOTW approach. CTF 150 also has a strong role in the Struggle Against Violent Extremism, or "SAVE," operation. This includes a significant strategic role in high level and continual regional engagement.

Australia has a great deal of experience at sea in the Middle East region. Australia and the RAN have been in the Middle East with either ships and/or command elements continually since 1990, but this was the first time Australia had commanded combined operations outside the Persian Gulf itself, which brought with it a new set of complexities for irregular warfare and an increased level of ambiguity. Interoperability was a key consideration and we were working with a large number of small states.

During the four month command tenure from December 2009 to the end of April 2010, we intercepted and queried over 500 vessels and boarded an additional 140. We were also responsible for coordinating the complex logistics resupply, a significant consideration in maritime operations given that the area of operations was over 3 million square miles, and we planned and led direct counterterrorism operations against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Middle East Area of Operations has a strategic, operational and legal environment which presents a number of unique challenges. These include: the nature of the region; the years of conflict and ongoing tensions with regional neighbors; the lack of clear boundaries with respect to territorial waters; differing obligations under international law; and the lack of a United Nations (UN) mandate for the maritime environment. This made command very complex.

The environment was further complicated by each of the coalition nations operating under their own discrete Rules of Engagement (ROE). The command encompassed 3.3 million square nautical miles of seas and oceans and covered an extremely complex area including the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, northern Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz. This included:

- Sea Lines of Communications and choke points vital to the world economy (Strait of Hormuz and Bab-al-Mandeb);
- Areas which are a breeding ground for violent extremism;
- Failed and failing states which constitute a security challenge;
- Illegal destabilizing or terrorist-related activities such as drug smuggling, human trafficking and piracy; and
- A delicate political situation in the region.

This was a complex area with massive amounts of shipping, fragile maritime infrastructure and seasonal weather patterns which greatly affected the maritime environment. In short, the area commanded by CTF 150 was in essence the maritime flank of operations in several countries, particularly Afghanistan. This period also overlapped with Saudi operations on the border with Yemen and the Houthi insurgency in Yemen. We needed to remember that Al-Qaeda threats in the vicinity of the Bab-al-Mandeb were real and ongoing: some 25,000 ships, or about seven percent of the world's shipping, pass through there each year whilst about 40% of the world's total shipments of oil also pass through the Strait of Hormuz.² The attack on the Japanese Tanker *M. Star* on 28 July 2010 by a small explosive-laden boat is a case in point.

The main focus of our operations was to: prevent or disrupt attacks; intercept or deter the smuggling of illicit cargo such as narcotics, contraband and fuel which fund the terrorist activities; intercept weapons and ammunition; and intercept or deter the movement of people smugglers and even terrorists by sea, especially into Yemen.

INNOVATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

Technical interoperability and innovation in the maritime environment occurs at several levels, including the binary 0s and 1s that underpin any data combat system and the complex tactical data communications that link them. Allies must act together via a common tactical data link to ensure effective communications are maintained at all times and to avoid the risk of fratricide—the consequences of which will destroy any strategic aim a country had, or planned to have, when becoming involved in the operation.

I have always considered myself a reasonably technically adept officer: an air warfare and combat systems specialist who has operated and commanded cutting edge combat systems in war and peace in two navies and most of the seas and oceans of the world. My background is in driving ships from the bridge and in fighting ships from operations rooms. I am also a qualified air intercept controller and have worked extensively in complex and multi tactical data link environments, including the crowded Persian Gulf during the First Gulf War. It would therefore be logical for me to focus on a technical approach.

However, I will not do so, as in my experience interoperability is all too often only considered at the operational level in terms of the technical ability of systems to work effectively together. Even at the operational level, OOTW is at least as much about interoperability at the personal level as it is about technical interoperability.

At the strategic command level, failure to understand the personal level of interoperability and innovation will have an even greater destabilizing affect on a coalition than failure of interoperability at the technical level. Personal animosity will destroy any strategic aim a country has, or planned to have, when becoming involved in the operation. Therefore, trust, relationships, mutual respect, an understanding of culture, patience and courtesy are all required to make interoperability work.

In OOTW, each nation brings with it its own strategic goals, legal requirements and rules of engagement, based on national and international law as well as ethics and its own personality and culture. Failure by a leader to ensure that both he and his command team really comprehend and assimilate this at all levels and in all times, from high tempo to more mundane moments, will result in strategic and operational failure, regardless of how technically interoperable that force might be.

The reality is that allies and coalitions do not have identical aims. They are often separated by language, religion, culture, laws and customs. But they do have similar strategic goals and being strategically adept and aware is essential.

Personal animosity will destroy any strategic aim a country has, or planned to have, when becoming involved in the operation.

Field Marshal Sir William Slim delivered a seminal speech to the US Command and General Staff College in 1952 on “Higher Command in War” in which he stated that:

Now it is an extraordinary thing that you should meet with so much opposition from allies. Allies, altogether, are really very extraordinary people. It is astonishing how obstinate they are, how parochially minded, how ridiculously sensitive to prestige and how wrapped up in obsolete political ideas. It is equally astonishing how they fail to see how broad-minded you are, how clear your picture is, how up-to-date you are and how cooperative and big-hearted you are. It is extraordinary. But let me tell you, when you feel like that about allies, just remind yourself of two things. First, that you are an ally too, and all allies look just the same. If you walk to the other side of the table, you will look just like that to the fellow sitting opposite. Then the next thing to remember is that there is only one thing worse than having allies—that is not having allies.³

These words underpinned our approach to the operations against maritime terrorism and terrorist related criminal activity in the Middle East. They encapsulate the very basics of interoperability and innovation.

In OOTW, the legal framework is often ambiguous and UN mandates lacking. In these operations the first step to any interoperability is having a command culture and intent focusing on building trust and respect with regional countries and with allies or coalition partners, or as Slim said, “[walking] to the other side of the table.” In the case of interoperability and innovation in the Middle East, you need to demonstrate the understanding that you are just a visitor who will inevitably depart the region and emphasize early on your willingness to learn from those who live in the region and who know it much better than any outsider ever could.

In CTF 150 we commanded 38 ships from eight nations and also had over 250 hours of maritime patrol aircraft support. Supporting us were ships and aircraft from the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Britain, Canada and Australia. Saudi Arabia has the biggest navy on the Arabian Peninsula and by working with them at the personal level we received continual assets from them via ships in associated support to us. This personal interoperability did not just stop at the strategic command level. We instigated a program which saw eight of their officers with us in the CTF 150 headquarters over a four week period. This I think had a marked effect in a very short time.

RADM Bernard Miranda of the Republic of Singapore Navy had command of the anti-piracy operation, CTF-151, for much of the time I was commanding the anti-terrorist operations. We were working in the same water space and as such we both ensured that our navies worked together at the personal level first and that we shared the headquarters building with his Bahrain-based liaison team and forged interoperability across the commands through friendship and cooperation. Even ensuring that his staff displayed the Singapore vaval ensign opposite our own was innovative—it certainly marked a statement of intent and respect. I also had a RAN officer embedded with him at all times in his command ship. Again the focus was on the personal linkages, first and foremost.

Australian naval experiences in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East have thus found that personnel interoperability is a critical factor when working strategically. To ensure that all parties felt welcome and knew that the Australian Navy was there to help, we also attempted simple gestures such as posting an Arabic “word-of-the-day,” which resulted in significant improvement in the achievement of operational outcomes and

a good deal of humor—Australians are renowned for being lousy at accents and languages.

To enact these innovations however, involved significant strategic level visits and establishing relationships with countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, the UAE, Pakistan and Oman, to ensure that strategic interaction was aligned prior to any action taken. Maritime operations across 3.3 million square miles of seas and oceans are more strategic than operational. 15 nations had waters bordering my area of operations. A key role of any commander in such a situation is to visit the nations and talk with their governments where appropriate and certainly their senior naval command and other maritime law enforcement agencies. This invariably was done to discuss both Combined Maritime Force and Australian national issues and best done in company with the Australian Ambassador and Australian Defense Attaché. Knowledge of

Australian strategic interests and a respect for the cultural and regional interests of the nations was vital. Strategic considerations drove the operations at all times. A failure to engage across the highest strategic levels will lead to failure of interoperability at sea every time.

To even attempt to command and operate in such an area requires competent legal advice on hand at all times. The level of legal advice in a command role in a Coalition environment

A failure to engage across the highest strategic levels will lead to failure of interoperability at sea every time.

requires an advanced level of knowledge of maritime and operational law plus a deep understanding of the strategic context. A commander needs to understand and respect the legal positions of each and every one of the nations

who are providing assets and those nations that live in the region itself. This requires one to focus continually at the strategic and operational level—conducting senior regional engagement visits is as important a factor



Royal Marines investigate two suspected pirate skiffs in the Gulf of Aden, June 2009

in conducting irregular warfare at sea as the tactical employment of assets.

Nations have differing views of maritime security operations and obligations. Some nations have declared they are in a state of armed conflict with terrorists, while others view terrorists as criminals, not combatants. These differences are reflected in ROE and other policy approaches. Different political climates between two nations can have serious implications—a completely legal action may be perceived as a provocation. A commander needs to be very aware of these issues at all times.

Interoperability and innovation is often looked at as a technical issue, however as with everything military, political and diplomatic, it is interpersonal relationships and trust that truly underpin both. A comprehensive approach to education and training, with common courses and international exchange visits, is critical to developing the cultural understanding and interpersonal relationships essential to strategic interoperability between countries big or small. The culture underpinning effective interoperability and innovation can best be generated through education and training and the seconding of personnel between organizations, which creates trust, friendship and openness between people, and the creation of joint units and partnerships between nations. To emphasize the importance of human interaction, then Vice Chief of Defense, and now Chief of Defense, GEN Hurley stated in his address to the 2011 Australian Command and Staff College course that any graduate without a solid and enduring friendship with at least one overseas member by the end of the course had effectively failed in his estimation, regardless of their final grade. The ability to “phone a friend” in a future crisis or emergency and offer to help or to dispel a concern cannot

be overstated. Without a doubt, the Australian Command and Staff College gains its greatest strategic strength from the inclusion of overseas course members. Australian course members not only learn from their overseas peers, but also learn from the different perspectives brought to the course by the participation of “outsiders” in certain modules and exercises, especially syndicate discussions.

It is people, people, and people that make the difference.

Thus to be interoperable and innovative and therefore effective in a coalition environment, you need first to train and educate interoperability—to in effect “Talk the Walk.”

CONCLUSION

Going back to the three key questions:

- Does a greater role in OOTW serve the national security agendas of small states?
- What are the conditions and considerations unique to small states in OOTW?
- In an era of limited defense resources, what and how can the militaries of small states contribute and achieve beyond mere statements of ambitions?

My answer is yes to the first one as the security agendas of small states are well served by the personal interaction and human understanding that comes from working and serving effectively and sensitively in such roles. To the second one, I think that small states have some unique advantages over large states as they are less threatening and thus can be trusted to leave when the operation is completed. As to the third, it is people, people, and people that make the difference.



As Slim said “there is only one thing worse than having allies—that is not having allies,” and small states make really good allies because their people are really good—that has certainly been my experience working internationally for many years, and especially so with regards to Singapore. 🌐

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CDRE Richard Menhinick joined the Royal Australian Navy in January 1976. After graduating in 1980 he undertook practical sea-training, culminating in the award of his Bridge Watchkeeping Certificate in 1982. Postings such as Aide-de-Camp to the Governor of Tasmania, Assistant Warfare Officer on *HMAS Derwent* and Air Intercept Controller on *HMAS Perth* followed. In 1987, he undertook the Principal Warfare Officer's course. He then served on exchange at sea in the Royal Navy for two years on *HMS Cardiff*. This posting to the UK included a deployment to the Persian Gulf as part of the "Armillar Patrol" monitoring Iran and Iraq.


On return to Australia he served in *HMAS Brisbane* in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. He subsequently spent two years as Fleet Direction Officer at Maritime Headquarters in Sydney, prior to being appointed as Executive Officer of the destroyer *HMAS Hobart* from 1993-1995. On promotion to Commander he was posted firstly as head of the Operational Design Group at the Navy Combat Data System Centre, and then as Deputy Director Surface Warfare Development at Australian Defense Headquarters. He assumed Command of the new *Anzac* class frigate *HMAS Warramunga* on 24 January 2000.

Following promotion to Captain he became Director of the Sea Power Centre, Australia in February 2002. He then commanded the *Anzac* class frigate *HMAS Anzac* from December 2003 to December 2005. After this he served as Chief of Staff to the Vice Chief of the Defense Force and Chief of Joint Operations throughout 2006 before being promoted to Commodore and posted as Director General Military Strategy in Strategic Policy Division in December of that year. In November 2008 he became the inaugural DG Navy Transformation and Innovation, leading the New Generation Navy change program. He was then appointed Commander of the Combined Task Force 150 in the Middle East Area of Operations from December 2009 to April 2010 and Commandant of the Australian Command and Staff College in May 2010.

Amongst other awards, he is a Member of the Order of Australia and has been conferred the Conspicuous Service Cross and the Commendation for Distinguished Service. He holds a Bachelor of Arts degree, majoring in International Relations and Strategic Studies, and a master's degree in Maritime Studies. He has written in many professional publications and has one major work published via the University of Wollongong: *Sea Control and Maritime Power Projection for Australia*.



Book Review



John Robb, *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*, New Jersey, John Wiley and Sons Inc., 2007, 208 pages.

by **Ruben Pang**

The large-scale symbolic shock of terrorism as epitomized by the September 11 attacks (9/11) has diminishing returns. Besides being difficult to repeat and sustain, the public becomes desensitized and the media pays less attention each time an attack occurs. Al-Qaeda will be hard-pressed to sustain symbolic attacks of that scale, let alone outdo 9/11. The number of people, specific skills, lead time and coordination involved is simply overwhelming.¹

Instead, the rise of smaller-scale “do-it-yourself” terrorists will be the new threat to anticipate. In recent years, these stateless terrorist groups have learned to capitalize on the technology and globalization that have been driving market changes and industries, turning the complexity and power of a developed modern economy against itself. Residing anywhere from the Middle East to London to Nigeria, they are well versed in sophisticated

technologies and thrive amidst cultural fragmentation and transnational crime.

In the *Brave New War*, John Robb cites two closely occurring Al-Qaeda attacks in 2006 as a trademark of this new terrorist approach. The first was against the Samarra mosque in Iraq which almost immediately sent the nation into civil war, as tens of thousands of Shiite Muslims took to the streets in protest. The second Al-Qaeda attack happened two days later, and was an attempt on a critical oil facility in Abqaiq which Saudi security forces foiled. If Al-Qaeda had succeeded in the attack, oil prices would have soared to over \$100 a barrel instantly.

Termed “black swans,” these rapid and unexpected attacks were planned quickly and carried out with minimal resources, yet effected near catastrophic results. As more of these attacks surface, the situation becomes one where,



according to the author, “[while] we’re busy working to protect ourselves against the previous attack, we can expect more black swans, because they are being manufactured by our foes at an increasing frequency.”²

In addition, the nature of terrorist operations has evolved. Robb asserts that the conflict in Iraq foreshadows the future challenge to global security. The insurgency in Iraq is comprised of 75 to 100 small, diverse and autonomous groups who have access to first world technologies and are able to use them effectively.³ Their strength lies in their open-sourced structure that lacks a clear centre, allowing flexibility and decision-making cycles much shorter than those of the United States (US) military. He compares this to “Microsoft finding its match in a loose self-tuning network” instead of a superpower competitor.⁴ Furthermore, as they operate like open-source communities on the internet, their actions are amplified “in a non-linear way which creates feedback loops that can dramatically escalate the impact of violence.”⁵

These connections extend to criminal networks that permeate the global economy. In Iraq, international crime is fuel for terrorist activity—Al-Qaeda’s attack on Madrid was funded through profits from the sale of the drug ecstasy and

hashish.⁶ The rapidly expanding criminal economy, valued at \$2 to \$3 trillion a year, is fuelled by a technologically enabled supply chain of anything from “human trafficking (Eastern Europe) to illicit drugs (Asia and South America), pirated goods (Southeast Asia), arms (Central Asia) and money laundering (everywhere).”⁷

The terrorist-criminal relationship is reinforced by a new terrorist strategy—systems disruption, the targeting of critical networks such as power, communication and transportation. The severance of these essential frameworks undermines the targeted state’s legitimacy, bulldozing it to failure by hindering its ability to provide basic services to citizens, eventually losing their confidence and support.⁸ This was evident in the attacks on Iraq’s oil and electricity networks since 2005.⁹ According to Robb, the attacks which cost the Iraqi government \$500 million in lost oil revenues only cost \$2000 to execute.¹⁰ It is clear that small bodies can now effect disastrous results from strategic actions, in a way unprecedented in history.

The evolution of warfare is rapid, and extends beyond Islamic terrorism. In many ways, “[the] perpetrators of this new form of warfare, however,

aren’t really terrorists, because they no longer have terror as their goal or method. A better term might be global guerrillas, because they represent a broad-based threat that far exceeds that offered by terrorists or the guerrillas of our past.”¹¹

According to Robb, successfully employing systems disruption as a method of warfare against the US could result in a situation similar to the fall of the Soviet Union—“a country driven to bankruptcy by a foe it couldn’t compete with economically.” In this scenario, defeat is experienced gradually, through an “inevitable withering away of military, economic and political power through wasting conflicts with minor foes.”¹²

For the US military, the lack of a historical guide and past experience poses a great challenge. Past encounters with guerrillas in Vietnam and beyond were considerably different from those of the present. According to Robb, “today, there are no cohesive centralized movements to fight. No wars of national liberation. Warfare is now an open-source framework of loose organizations.”¹³ Using Iraq’s insurgency as an example, Robb draws a link between global guerrillas and online retail markets through the long tail model. These separate non-state groups, ranging from external Sunni fundamentalists



to Saddam loyalists, tribal groups, Shiite fundamentalists etc. may be in competition to one another but are willing to cooperate in fighting the US through the building of a market which is mutually beneficial.¹⁴

The author warns that it is likely that unrestrained systems disruption is only the first chapter in the shape of things to come. These non-state groups have developed an organization structure which places little emphasis on centralized leadership and capitalizes on global communication networks and innovation. This effectively makes them unpredictable and very much immune to nation-state counter-pressure and containment strategies. These global guerillas wage an open-source "Wiki-War" where "the source-code of warfare is available to anyone who is interested in both modifying and extending it."¹⁵ The dynamics of open-source warfare is compared to the that of a black market bazaar's economy, where the fundamental elements are: investment in the form of international funding, outsourcing to financially motivated contractors, and crime. In Iraq, the insurgents dealing in black market oil benefit from escalating prices whenever supplies are threatened.¹⁶

This integration with international criminal networks means that every nation-state's defences will be constantly be harassed in innumerable ways. Once breached, several copycat groups will swarm the target. The bulk of Robb's writing is dedicated to the analysis of "Guerilla Entrepreneur" methods of coordination, innovation and expansion. Looking at the global oil market, he proposes the possibility of a guerrilla oil cartel profiting from bunkering and smuggling oil while sustaining continuous oil disruption through low-tech but substantial attacks, further driving up prices in a vicious cycle (pipeline disruption, kidnappings etc).¹⁷

In *Rethinking Security*, Robb's concluding chapter, emphasis is placed on the balance "between preserving the benefits of global interconnectivity and insulating against the myriad threats that can strike at us through those same connections." In his opinion, the Knee-Jerk Police State and Pre-emptive War/Nation Building are two approaches to avoid.

In the first option, centralized security under the arbitrary command of the nation-state give few benefits despite their severe drawbacks. This includes the reduction of domestic and international

moral cohesion, such as the US National Security Agency's monitoring of global telephone systems and the use of torture on suspected terrorists (for example, Abu Ghraib).¹⁸

Furthermore, a security system similar to that of the US Department of Homeland Security tends to be uniform and unresponsive, especially against the uncertainty of black swans, "failing to bounce back with new approaches [and being susceptible to] hindsight bias," as reflected in 9/11 post-mortems.¹⁹

The latter option attempts to mitigate the roots of terrorism and extremism through war and aggressive nation-building. However, Afghanistan and Iraq show that global guerillas have been able to keep these states "in a perpetual condition of failure" ever since the US invasion.²⁰ This leads to the situation where it becomes a sanctum and harbour for instabilities. Furthermore, although present threats are mostly Islamic groups, "superempowerment" through technology also means that instability will increasingly come from multiple sources.²¹

Responding to the changing landscape, Robb proposes an approach he calls Dynamic Decentralized Resilience. The future of security is held within



the notion of survival, which he defines as “the ability to dynamically mitigate and dampen system shocks.” This means restructuring current networks in a way which aids damage control through five key tenets: Thinking in Terms of Market States and Minimalist Platforms; Thinking in Terms of Platforms; Thinking in Terms of Ecosystems; Thinking in Terms of Open-Source Networks; and Thinking in Terms of Sustainability Instead of Dependence.

The notion of the market state is taken from Philip Bobbit’s *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History*, which forwards the inevitable evolution of the nation-state into a market-state, driven by economic competition and as states increasingly find the provision of welfare overwhelming. Instead, the shift towards the use of market mechanisms will create fair opportunities for all citizens. He also separately cautions the risk of economic instead of ideological conflict.

A particular obstacle for decentralized security is the culture of secrecy between local (e.g. the Terrorist Early Warning Group in Los Angeles) and federal agencies. To overcome this, he proposes thinking in terms of platform, using the internet

example of Skype as an example of a product of a platform; the online video program is built upon readily available software from Microsoft to Intel. This continuous “development of local innovation” is one of many benefits of the decentralization of security efforts which can be exponentially increased with open sourced networks as a conduit for a variety of participants.²²

Lastly, the author addresses the nature of consumption and US dependence of external sources of energy. Technology advances in sustainability should be harnessed as they cover basic to high-tech needs and can be found in geothermal heating and cooling; solar hot water and electricity; and even solar powered Internet Connection from the Green WiFi Project.²³

All in all, *Brave New War* is an assertive and accessible text on the next generation warfare that synthesizes high-tech trends with real world examples to reinforce the idea of adopting resilience and problem-solving through an open source community-sharing as a daily practice. These actions should safeguard against severe shocks on a delicate security system and encourage the perception of “community members as allies and co-developers rather than competitors.”²⁴

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Dr Michael DeBakey

by Lim Rui Jin



INTRODUCTION

Fans of the superhero Iron Man may cry foul, but there is someone who preceded him in devising a method to save the maker's life. In an intriguing parallel to Tony Stark's fictional Arc Reactor, Dr Michael DeBakey, a pioneer of cardiology, had his life saved by the very procedure he created years ago.

Born Michel Dabaghi, the son of Lebanese immigrants in Louisiana, Dr DeBakey (7 September 1908 – 11 July 2008) was a celebrated medical educator, pioneer and inventor. His innovations included the roller-pump, which later became an integral component of the heart-lung machine, which made open-heart surgeries possible. He also pioneered the use of external heart pumps and many of his procedures were firsts in heart surgery. In an illustrious career spanning 75 years, Dr DeBakey performed thousands of operations and saved many lives around the world.¹ As a Medical Officer in the United States Army during the Second World War (WWII), he also contributed to the evolution of battlefield medicine.

Dr DeBakey's name is synonymous with cardiology—and being a truly great doctor.

In a letter sent to David Granger (the editor-in-chief of *Esquire* magazine) after an interview, Dr DeBakey wrote, "If I can ever be of service to you—either personally or professionally—please don't hesitate to ask." This aptly crystallizes the philosophy that gave him the impetus to devote his life to medicine.

EARLY LIFE

The young DeBakey's voracious appetite for knowledge and his decision to devote his life to medicine resulted in him attending medical school at Tulane University, even while he completed the last two years of his undergraduate studies.² "My life has a superb cast, but I cannot figure out the plot," wrote the author Ashleigh Brilliant, an ode to those trying to make sense of their seemingly capricious lives. However, DeBakey managed to connect the dots early in his life.

DeBakey invented the aforementioned roller-pump at the age of 23, while he was still a medical student. Moreover, he became reputed for his surgical skill and readiness to use novel solutions to solve surgical problems. As a young



doctor, DeBakey traversed Europe to refine his surgical prowess, completing fellowships in France and Germany. In 1937, Dr DeBakey returned to Tulane Medical School, where he served on the surgical faculty.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO MILITARY MEDICINE

During WWII, Dr DeBakey volunteered his services as a member of the Surgical Consultants' Division in the United States (US) Office of the Surgeon General of the Army under MG James Magee and his successor, MG Norman Kirk. As required by his duties, Dr DeBakey spent hours poring through books in the US Army Medical Library, researching military medical matters. His dismay at the near-dilapidation of the library: poor lighting and leaking roof, amongst other problems, resulted in him commenting that "the library had minuscule significance by comparison with a tank, battleship, or airplane."³

This concern eventually led him to push for the transfer of the collection from military to civilian hands. Eventually, Congress created the US National Library of Medicine and placed it under the care of the Department of Health Education and Welfare, preserving a treasure trove of knowledge.

Dr DeBakey's research during the war also resulted in the development of Mobile Army

Surgical Hospital (MASH) units. Together with other members of the surgical consultants division, COL (Dr) DeBakey recommended the creation of "auxiliary surgery groups" (ASGs). These small, mobile units effectively provided resuscitation and surgical care on the battlefield, even though the surgeons in these units were relatively inexperienced.⁴ The ASGs consisted of surgeons from a diverse range of specialties, allowing them to treat a wide variety of injuries. Notably, a major portion of three books on war surgery were written by surgeons from this group. Their contributions to thoracic surgery, for example, were extensive and their writings on the principles of physiology remain relevant today.⁵

The first active mobile surgical hospital in WWII was the second ASG, under the command of COL James Forsee. This unit supported 160,000 soldiers in North Africa and Italy during 1943. Interestingly, the ASGs were able to keep up with combat units and carried out their operations a few miles from the front line. This led to shorter evacuation times, quicker resuscitation and reduction in mortality rates.⁶ The evolution of ASGs culminated in the formation of MASH units.

In *Combat Support in Korea*, John Westover writes that the efficacy of MASH units led to vast

improvements in resuscitation and patient care.⁷ Though these units have now been replaced with newer and more mobile military hospitals, the use of MASH units provided almost instantaneous lifesaving care to battlefield casualties. Statistics show that in the Korean War (where MASH units were first deployed), there was a low 2.5 percent chance of mortality in evacuated casualties. This is in stark contrast to the 8.5 percent chance of death in the First World War.⁸ While COL DeBakey may not have been directly involved in the creation of MASH units, these achievements can be attributed to his pioneering research in the derelict hallways of the old Army Medical Library.

BREAKTHROUGHS

As the world recovered from the devastation of war, Dr DeBakey pioneered a multitude of life-saving surgeries and new discoveries. Together with his mentor, Dr Alton Oschner, he had already postulated a strong link between smoking and lung cancer in 1939.⁹

Dr DeBakey was also one of the pioneers of coronary artery bypass surgery, a procedure used to this day. While many ailments of the heart were considered death sentences in his time, Dr DeBakey's perseverance and creativity led him to develop new treatments to prevent stroke and heart attack. In 1953, for instance, Dr DeBakey became the first to perform a successful carotid



endarterectomy (a procedure to stave off stroke). He is, however, best remembered for being the first to successfully implant a ventricular assist device (VAD), a milestone in the development of artificial hearts.¹⁰

His life's work did not stop there. In the 1990s, Dr DeBakey worked with engineers from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop a heart pump small enough to be used in children. Amazingly, his passion for medicine never waned—as a nonagenarian, Dr DeBakey continued to practice medicine until the day he died. Giving us a glimpse into his great and benevolent heart, Dr DeBakey said that, “[b]eing compassionate, being concerned for your fellow man, doing everything you can to help people—that’s the kind of religion I have, and it’s a comforting religion.”¹¹

INTERNATIONAL RENOWN

Dr DeBakey was also somewhat of a Renaissance man according to Dr Philip Salem, his close friend. His sharp and astute mind enabled him to absorb what he read quickly and he was particularly interested in Middle Eastern politics and history.¹² This bestowed on him the requisite knowledge to play the roles of health policy advisor, visionary, educator and advisor to world leaders.

In autumn 1996, Boris Yeltsin was running for re-election as Russia’s first

president in the post-Soviet era. He faced a challenge much more intimidating than his political opponents: Mr. Yeltsin had suffered a series of heart attacks. Although Russian doctors felt he could not survive the coronary bypass operation he needed, Mr. Yeltsin consulted Dr DeBakey, who flew to Moscow and declared that the incumbent leader could withstand the operation.¹³ Interestingly, the operation was successfully performed by Dr Renat S. Akchurin, a Russian surgeon who had briefly trained under Dr DeBakey in the past.

The operation most likely saved his presidency (and life) and Mr. Yeltsin was re-elected. In doing so, the course of history was also changed.¹⁴ According to the *New York Times*, Mr. Yeltsin would never have had the opportunity to dig deep and select Vladimir Putin as his successor if he had not been re-elected. As such, it may be argued that Dr DeBakey played a fundamental role in world history and politics.

Dr DeBakey’s long list of accolades include more than fifty honorary degrees from universities around the world.¹⁵ He also worked ceaselessly to improve healthcare in both the US and internationally, volunteering his services as a consultant on the US National Heart, Lung, and Blood Advisory Council (NHLBI) amongst other appointments.

Yet, what is most impressive about Dr DeBakey was his altruism and willingness to devote nearly all his life to the betterment of mankind. The Lebanese poet Gibran Khalil Gibran wrote, “You give little when you give of your possessions. It is when you give of yourself that you truly give.” Dr DeBakey truly epitomized this spirit.

LEGACY

The elderly man on the operating table was both patient and pioneer. In 2006, at the ripe old age of ninety-seven, Dr DeBakey became the oldest surviving patient of a surgery he had pioneered.¹⁶ The successful repair of the torn inner lining of his aorta enabled him to recover fully and continue practicing medicine until his death from natural causes two years later. He represents the zenith of life-long learning and practicing—something we can all learn from. 🌟

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Quotable Quotes

It is better to lead from behind and to put others in front, especially when you celebrate victory when nice things occur. You take the front line when there is danger. Then people will appreciate your leadership.

– **Nelson Mandela** (b. 1918), South African politician

Leadership is solving problems. The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help or concluded you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.

– **Colin Powell** (b. 1937), American statesman and retired four-star general in the United States Army

A good objective of leadership is to help those who are doing poorly to do well and to help those who are doing well to do even better.

– **Jim Rohn** (b. 1930), American entrepreneur, author and motivational speaker

Effective leadership is putting first things first. Effective management is discipline, carrying it out.

– **Stephen Covey** (b. 1932), American educator, author, businessman, and motivational speaker

I suppose leadership at one time meant muscles; but today it means getting along with people.

– **Mahatma Gandhi** (1869-1948), preeminent leader of Indian nationalism in British-ruled India

Leadership is about taking responsibility, not making excuses.

– **Mitt Romney** (b. 1947), American businessman and politician



quotable quotes

To go beyond is as wrong as to fall short.

– **Confucius** (BC 551 - BC 479), Chinese thinker and social philosopher

I'm very determined. If I decide what something is worth doing, then I'll put my heart and soul to it. The whole ground can be against me, but if I know it is right, I'll do it. That's the business of a leader.

– **Lee Kuan Yew** (b. 1923), founding father of modern Singapore

The future may be made up of many factors but where it truly lies is in the hearts and minds of men. Your dedication should not be confined for your own gain, but unleashes your passion for our beloved country as well as for the integrity and humanity of mankind.

– **Lee Ka Shing** (b. 1928), the richest person of Asian descent in the world

To be a great leader, one needs to have good strategies, be knowledgeable and able to predict the future

– **Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad** (b. 1925), 4th Prime Minister of Malaysia

Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys.

Look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

– **Sun Tzu**, (b. Qi-Wu), ancient Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher

Effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes.

– **Peter Drucker** (1909-2005), influential writer, management consultant, and self-described social ecologist



quotable quotes

The key to successful leadership today is influence, not authority.

– **Kenneth Blanchard** (b. 1966), American author and management expert

Our chief want is someone who will inspire us to be what we know we could be.

– **Ralph Waldo Emerson** (1803-1882), American essayist, lecturer and poet

The very essence of leadership is that you have to have vision. You can't blow an uncertain trumpet.

– **Theodore M. Hesburgh** (b. 1917), priest of the Congregation of Holy Cross, President Emeritus of the University of Notre Dame

Leadership comes from integrity – that you do whatever you ask others to do. I think there are non-obvious ways to lead. Just by providing a good example as a parent, a friend, a neighbor makes it possible for other people to see better ways to do things. Leadership does not need to be a dramatic, fist in the air and trumpets blaring, activity.

– **Scott Berkun** (b. 1956), author and motivational speaker

The leaders who work most effectively, it seems to me, never say "I." And that's not because they have trained themselves not to say "I." They don't think "I." They think "we"; they think "team." They understand their job to be to make the team function. They accept responsibility and don't sidestep it, but "we" gets the credit ... This is what creates trust, what enables you to get the task done.

– **Peter Drucker** (1909-2005), influential writer, management consultant, and self-described social ecologist

High sentiments always win in the end, The leaders who offer blood, toil, tears and sweat always get more out of their followers than those who offer safety and a good time. When it comes to the pinch, human beings are heroic.

– **George Orwell** (1903-1950), English novelist and journalist



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Books

Citations should give the author, title and subtitle of the book (italicised), editor or translator if applicable (shortened to 'ed.' or 'trans.'), edition number if applicable, publication information (city, publisher and date of publication), appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books. If no author is given, substitute the editor or institution responsible for the book.

For example:

Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (St Leonard, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 4.

Huxley, *Defending the Lion City*, 4.

Ibid., 4.

Edward Timperlake, William C. Triplett and William II Triplet, *Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military Threat to America* (Columbia: Regnery Publishing, 1999), 34.





Articles in Periodicals

Citations should include the author, title of the article (quotation marks), title of periodical (italicised), issue information (volume, issue number, date of publication), appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books. Note that the volume number immediately follows the italicised title without intervening punctuation, and that page reference is preceded by a colon in the full citation and a comma in abbreviated citations.

For example:

Chan Kim Yin and Psalm Lew, "The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development in the SAF," *POINTER* 30, no. 4 (2005): 39-50.

Chan and Lew, "The Challenge of Systematic Leadership Development in the SAF," 39-50.

Ibid., 39-50.

Mark J. Valencia, "Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia," *Ocean Development and International Law* 31 (2000): 241.

Articles in Books or Compiled Works

Michael I. Handel, "Introduction," in *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy*, ed. Michael I. Handel, (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 3.

H. Rothfels, "Clausewitz," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, eds. Edward Mead Earle and Brian Roy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 102.

Articles in Newspapers

Citations should include the author, title of the article (quotation marks), title of newspaper (italicised), date of publication, appropriate page reference, and URL in the case of e-books.

For example:

David Boey, "Old Soldiers Still Have Something to Teach," *The Straits Times*, 28 September 2004, 12.

Donald Urquhart, "US Leaves it to Littoral States; Admiral Fallon Says Region Can Do Adequate Job in Securing Straits," *The Business Times Singapore*, 2 April 2004, 10.

Online Sources

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For example:

Liaquat Ali Khan, "Defeating the IDF," *Counterpunch*, 29 July 2006, <http://www.counterpunch.org/khan07292006.html>.

If the article was written by the publishing organisation, the name of the publishing organisation should only be used once.

For example:

International Committee of the Red Cross, "Direct participation in hostilities," 31 December 2005, <http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205>.

If the identity of the author cannot be determined, the name of the website the article is hosted on should be used. For example:

"Newly unveiled East Jerusalem plan put on hold," *BBC News*, 2 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8546276.stm.

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