

# Can Wars Ever Be Pursued With Limitless Violence?

by MAJ Leonard Wong

## Abstract:

This essay defines 'war', focusses on the means of war and addresses why pursuing wars with limitless violence is impractical, with the support of Clausewitzian concepts. This essay also looks at the possibility of a limitless war occurring in the future given the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and nuclear weapons. The author then elaborated on the forces that prevented the 'means' of war to meet Clausewitz's ideals, the dimensions of strategy and the remarkable 'trinity'. In conclusion, the author discusses the future of wars and even the RMA would not eliminate friction and fog but would reduce its prevalence. The true nature of war is characterised by uncertainty and the presence of various elements work to prevent wars from ever being pursued with limitless violence.

*Keywords: Absolute War, Limited Violence, Politik, Military Strategy*

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of limitless violence stems from the works of the Prussian military officer, theorist and philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz in his famous and influential work - *On War*. By his definition, this essay's view is a resolute no—wars cannot be pursued with limitless violence. In fact, wars have never and arguably will unlikely ever be waged in a manner that was defined by him in both the means of conducting a war and the ends. This essay will substantiate its position by using *On War* as a prism to study the dialectics of war from two perspectives—theoretical and practical. It will examine if such wars have ever been waged in the past and discuss if Clausewitz's idea of limitless violence is just an abstract idea or a real achievable concept.

The first part of the essay will define 'war' according to Clausewitz. From his definition, second order details of Clausewitz's thoughts such as the nature of war,

*Politik*, strategy, and unlimited and limited wars will be sieved out and discussed. These concepts inhibit wars from matching the pure theoretical definition of unlimited war in both the means and the ends. Second, the essay will then focus on the means and address why pursuing wars with limitless violence is impractical when Clausewitzian concepts such as the 'remarkable trinity' are in play. The third part of this essay will consider if limitless wars will ever occur in the future, given the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and nuclear weapons or, has the geo-politics of the world today force a divergence of the nature of today's wars away from Clausewitz's ideals.

## WHAT IS WAR?

*"War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."*

*Carl von Clausewitz<sup>1</sup>*

Clausewitz began his discourse (Book 1, Chapter 1) by defining "*what is war.*"<sup>2</sup> War is a collision of

forces between two living masses, an interaction.<sup>3</sup> Clausewitz's idea was that war consisted of at least two opposing physical forces, unleashed at maximum strength and driven by hostile feelings and intentions. There would be two intelligent sides trying to out fight each other. Moreover, Clausewitz emphasised that the most important element of winning a war was through fighting (*das Gefecht*) and not through intellectual coercion of ideas.<sup>4</sup> War must be resolved with bloodshed.<sup>5</sup>

A review of the military conflicts shows that all wars, be they (1) civil wars such as the Somali civil war of 1991 or the on-going Egyptian Crisis, or (2) conventional wars such as World War II or the 1990 Gulf War, or (3) the war on terror, all were characterised by the plurality of forces clashing with maximum violence resulting in bloodshed and death.

## DEFINING THE MEANS TO WIN A WAR – STRATEGY & TACTICS

*“War is the application of armed forces (means) by a state (the attacker) to destroy the enemy army (aim) to compel another state (the defender) to follow the attacker’s will (end).”*

*Carl von Clausewitz<sup>6</sup>*

This essay will focus on two parts of Clausewitz's definition as articulated by Daase, (1) application of armed forces (means) to compel and (2) our will.<sup>7</sup> First, Clausewitz articulated his view on what it meant to 'compel the enemy.' Here, he described the means to attain victory. He contended that the aim of unleashing physical force was to coerce one's enemy to an utterly defenceless situation such that he has no other option than to do one's bidding. It would be the one who possessed the most effective engagement



*The War in the Vendée - A royalist uprising that was suppressed by the republican forces in 1796 which mobilised all citizens to serve as soldiers or suppliers in the war effort.*

method, strategy and tactics, who would gain the upper hand. Thus, to be able to compel the enemy, the armed forces must be applied together with superior strategy and tactics so that the fighting forces would be able to defeat the enemy. Accordingly, this brings about a variable that could affect the war. To what extent would an army be able to plan and execute a well-devised strategy? Clausewitz categorised five dimensions of strategy as 'moral, physical, mathematical, geographical and statistical' and argued that these five dimensions would be subjected to tangible and intangible forces that would compromise even the perfectly planned strategy.<sup>8</sup>

## POLITICAL COMMITMENT TOWARDS THE WAR EFFORT

Another dimension to the means of winning a war would be the extent in which a state is to commit its resources in support of the armed forces. Soviet thinker A. Svechin and German Army General Erich Ludendorff both argued that an 'unlimited war' should be to exploit the state's capacity to totally mobilise all its resources, including manpower, industry and economy and apply new technologies towards the war effort.<sup>9</sup> Frenchmen Seche and Daudet identified this phenomenon which occurred during the Napoleonic and First World War as "totalisation of national strength" and "total war."<sup>10</sup> Clausewitz realised that it was possible for a nation to mobilise all its resources after witnessing the French Revolution.<sup>11</sup>

## DEFINING THE ENDS OF A WAR

The second part of Clausewitz's definition of war would be to define 'our will.' Here, he alludes to what war culminates to by explaining the military as an instrument of politics. Clausewitz drew a relation

between military aims to political aims by stating that "war is merely the continuation of *Politik* by other means."<sup>12</sup> Thus in essence, war is the process through

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which the military (the instrument) is used to achieve the aim of the state. This leads to the second order definition of what politics tries to achieve in war. Clausewitz, as interpreted by Strachan,

proposed two forms of wars that approximated the aims of states: (1) wars of destruction and (2) wars for territorial objectives.<sup>13</sup> According to Sumida's essay on "defence as the stronger form of war," the first objective was defined by Clausewitz as unlimited/absolute war,<sup>14</sup> in which the behaviour of "one or both combatants was driven by the need to maximise the use of force with no restriction", while the second objective was a limited war where "the propensity to use maximum force was restrained."<sup>15</sup> The first objective alludes that there will be no negotiation while the second will give the losing belligerent the opportunity to negotiate using loss territories as a bargaining chip.

Clausewitz's *On War* did not explicitly define victory but this paper will acknowledge who succinctly deduced that the successful conclusion of war was to achieve the political objectives that the enemy sought to deny and more importantly, that the enemy unconditionally and permanently accepts its defeat and ceases any attempts to reverse the victor's result.

## HAVE WE EVER HAD A LIMITLESS WAR?

A cursory review of military history showed that none of the wars matched Clausewitz's idea of an unlimited war according to the following criteria: (1) mobilising all the state's resources towards war, (2) executing the perfect strategy according to plan





*The atomic bomb mushroom cloud over Nagasaki after the bombing on 9<sup>th</sup> August, 1945.*

without hindrance, (3) maximising the use of force without restraint and (4) unconditional surrender to the victor without subsequent perusal of pre-war territories or the total destruction of the state. The patterns of warfare before the French Revolution were closely similar in many aspects to his idea of unlimited war. Clausewitz witnessed the vigour of the French Revolution, the nationalising of state resources (national conscription) to fulfil Napoleon's aims and he saw how well Napoleon's tactic of manoeuvre and rapid offensives coupled with unrestrained violence crushed the French enemies, for example the Austrians at Marengo in 1800 and the Prussians at Austerlitz in 1805 and Jena in 1806.<sup>16</sup> Although Clausewitz initially argued that the Napoleonic wars approximated to

absolute war, he was later forced to rethink when the French army was defeated in Russia in 1812 and at Waterloo in 1815. Paradoxically, Napoleon's defeat was attributed to organisational (poor command and control), operational (old-style tactics of columns which the British overcame by defending in depth), logistical (food, supplies and disease) and political issues (a hasty plan to attack the seventh coalition before they could mobilise against France).<sup>17</sup>

There are some, such as Brennan who believe that the United States' role in the Second World War (WWII) of the twentieth century closely resembled Clausewitz's idea of absolute war, in both the means and the ends.<sup>18</sup> At the home front, the Office of

War Mobilisation spearheaded the United States’ war effort through nation-wide civilian and economic mobilisation on a scale never seen before to meet the immense demands of the German-Japanese military threat.<sup>19</sup> The Air Force conducted strategic bombing behind enemy lines on industrial centres of gravity, civilian centres, communication lines and military targets in accordance to their strategic air power doctrine and ultimately “fire bomb[ed] major population centres such as Hamburg, Dresden, Nagasaki and Hiroshima to break the population’s will” in an attempt to seek total unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers.<sup>20</sup>

Undoubtedly, the United States committed national resources to the war effort and were willing to inflict mass casualty on the belligerent and eventually utilise the nuclear bomb. On the other hand, there were also numerous occasions where strategy was not executed in accordance to the plan or unforeseen scenarios arose, for example during WWII: (1) the amphibious landing on Normandy on D-Day was met with more acute resistance than originally anticipated, which meant inaccurate information or the lack of it, (2) poor weather and German anti-aircraft guns marred Operation Neptune which forced the aircraft to fly higher than planned and led to the scattering of paratroopers, (3) the German’s surprise attack at the Bulge caught the Americans off guard, (4) the Japanese’s unexpected limited war goals against the United States unlike their unlimited war goals in China showed the unpredictability of the enemy,

and (5) the unexpectedly high casualty and mortality rate.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, post-war public opinion of targeting innocent civilians as an air power strategy shifted and society questioned why the strategic air offensive had fallen short of its promise and failed to break the will of the population.<sup>22</sup> There were debates on the ethics of killing. Thus, WWII was arguably not absolute as Clausewitz’s dimensions of strategy were constantly subjected to unpredictability and shifting forces.

David Lonsdale says “Thus we are left with a vision of war’s true nature that is characterized by a complex series of relationships and interactions, which take place between rational and non-rational forces, and in an environment in which uncertainty, violence and friction are prominent.”<sup>23</sup>

### STRATEGY AND TACTICS – THE MEANS TO ATTAIN ABSOLUTENESS

The next part of the essay will focus on why the means to attain absolute wars are difficult. There are a myriad of factors that prevent an army from pursuing the means to accomplish absolute wars according to Clausewitz’s definition, most importantly, strategy and tactics. Clausewitz has maintained that there was a close relationship between war and strategy and that strategy was a critical factor that determined the outcome of the war. Lonsdale defined strategy as “the art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s) towards the attainment of policy objectives.”<sup>24</sup> And Colin Gray identified 17 dimensions of strategy

People & Politics	Preparation for War	War Proper
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People</li> <li>- Society</li> <li>- Culture</li> <li>- Politics</li> <li>- Ethics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Economics &amp; Logistics</li> <li>- Organisation (of Defence &amp; Force planning)</li> <li>- Military administration (recruitment, training and armament)</li> <li>- Information &amp; Intelligence</li> <li>- Strategic theory &amp; Doctrine</li> <li>- Technology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Military operations</li> <li>- Command (Political &amp; Military)</li> <li>- Geography</li> <li>- Friction (chance &amp; uncertainty)</li> <li>- The enemy</li> <li>- Time</li> </ul>

Table 1. Colin Gray’s Dimensions of Strategy<sup>25</sup>

Non-Rational Forces	Irrational Forces	Rational Forces
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Play of Chance (sundry factors such as danger, weather)</li> <li>- Probability and Uncertainty</li> <li>- Efforts of the Commander</li> <li>- Military</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Basic force of hostility</li> <li>- Violence, Hatred and Emnity</li> <li>- Human nature</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Guiding influence</li> <li>- Politic objectives</li> <li>- Purpose</li> </ul>

Table 2. Clausewitz's Remarkable 'Trinity'<sup>26</sup>

(See Table 1). Thus, when these elements of strategy are considered in conjunction with Clausewitz's concept of 'trinity,' a complex interplay in war that prevents the attainment of any degree of the absoluteness is identified due to the constant shifting of the centres of gravity and unpredictability.<sup>27</sup> This essay will discuss politics, society, information and friction dimensions of strategy.

**CLAUSEWITZ'S 'REMARKABLE TRINITY'**

Before discussing how the dimensions of strategy articulated by Gray would affect the outcome of war, we shall first define 'trinity.' Clausewitz's remarkable 'trinity' has been given many labels (See Table 2) but they intrinsically comprise: (1) the play of chance and creativity of the commander and his army, (2) the impact of blind natural forces such as violence and hatred and (3) the element of subordination, that is, war is the subject of pure reason.<sup>28</sup> The main intent of the 'trinity' was to emphasise that war is not conducted in isolation or a simple execution of a well-prepared strategy but the interplay of forces. Echevarria cogently explained the 'trinity' in terms of Clausewitz's 'dualism,' which states that there is an action-reaction/purpose-means/objective-subjective interplay of forces during war. For example, the political objectives (one of the dimensions of strategies) would need to be measured against the enemy's will and capabilities (including military), which in turn would affect the amount of violence and determine the effort needed to accomplish these political objectives, yet the outcome will still be unpredictable because of the play of chance.



*Flying under radar control with a B-66 Destroyer, Air Force F-105 Thunderchief pilots bomb a military target through low clouds over the southern panhandle of North Vietnam. 14<sup>th</sup> June, 1966.*

**POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE ETHICS OF WAR**

This essay had earlier established that war is the continuation of policy and, in Clausewitz's view, there is an unavoidable relationship and thus tension between politics and war. Moreover, with today's globalisation and revolution in information technologies, the political space has increased to which all of us are trapped within.<sup>29</sup> A state's Grand Strategy is often a factor of politics and statesmen are influenced by external politics (such as international security systems or reputation) as well as internal

political dynamics that consist of rational and irrational forces and its people.<sup>30</sup> Society chooses its leaders and society is subjected to irrational forces of human nature such as fear, violence and hostility—Clausewitz’s forces of the 'trinity' at play. Therefore, statesmen may be driven by their personal needs and by their “rational calculation of their society’s needs.”<sup>31</sup>

During war, external and internal political and social influences may affect political decisions on the strategy needed to conduct a particular style of war. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson was in this unique situation and faced immense pressure from external and internal politics that influenced the conduct of the Vietnam War.<sup>32</sup> The United States entered the war because of geo-politics and forfeited the war due to domestic politics. The United States was faced with the prospect of possible humiliation by a communist-nationalist regime that was a threat to Western democracy; it was to be a proxy war against Russia and China, which the American people had initially supported.<sup>33</sup> Pusillanimous civilian policy makers 'tied the hands' of the Johnson administration and military leaders who chose a limited war initially using Air Power against the North Vietnamese. But the Air Power strategy failed and troops were eventually deployed. However, Vietnam eventually became a protracted war with high American casualties and because public opinion was a key factor in the war, the United States eventually had to pull out of the war in 1973.<sup>34</sup> In agreement with Lind, this Cold War proxy conflict revealed how international, ethnic, racial and cultural divisions in

foreign policy would tear apart every level of society, especially in the military and political realm, hence affecting political and military strategy.

Ethical issues can at times affect statesmen’s guiding influences on the conduct of war and strategy. Statesmen would be faced with the moral issue of the right to go to war (*Jus ad Bellum*) and the just conduct in war (*Jus in Bellum*).<sup>35</sup> The idea that a just war was a limited war was prevalent in early European history as it was in the twentieth century. Lind articulated that there were opposing views on the United States’ right to go to war in Vietnam; some opined that the Vietnam

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War was a just war because it was part of a just Cold War, yet others refuted the morality of the Cold War and all its proxy wars.<sup>36</sup>

Having justified the right to enter a war, statesmen would then have to tread carefully to ensure that the conduct of the war was just. This often meant a limited war, where the political guiding influence had to be rational and the commander and his army should not be overwhelmed by irrational forces such as enmity and hatred (Clausewitz’s 'Trinity'). For example, the aerial bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War was limited by very restrictive guidelines, constituted by Hague and Geneva Conventions Protocol I of 1977, where targeting principles were based only on necessity and proportionality.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the target sets were defined by President George Bush’s national objectives,<sup>38</sup> which were shaped by national policy.<sup>39</sup> As with Vietnam, the dimensions of strategy in the 1991 Gulf War prevented Clausewitz’s notion of absolute war from being realised.





*The USS Cole after a Al-Qaeda suicide attack.*

## DEALING WITH FRICTION AND THE FOG OF WAR DURING WAR PREPARATIONS AND WAR PROPER

The last Clausewitzian concept that this essay would put forth is his analogy of 'friction'. In Clausewitz's paradigm, friction is the only concept that distinguishes real war from the war on paper because the aggregate of numerous minor incidents (many of which are unforeseen) would lower the level of performance to the extent that intended goals are not achieved.<sup>40</sup> One would have to overcome 'friction' in order to proceed. A classic example of how 'friction' would prevent a proper execution of strategy would be the 'fog of war'<sup>41</sup>—the lack of a comprehensive and accurate quantity of information and intelligence.<sup>42</sup>

Lonsdale contends that many causes of uncertainty centre on information. Information and intelligence are important elements in war preparation and war proper. However, the accuracy and validity of the information may be uncertain because: (1) in war, we are dealing with an intelligent adversary who will introduce 'fog' in an attempt to deceive the opponents, (2) information is subjected to human participation and perceptions, whose interpretation may contradict the actual situation and (3) there is a constant challenge to make information as 'real-time' as possible. Hence, the longer the time elapsed, the more outdated the information. With improper information, the commander would not be able to devise the appropriate strategy thereby utilising the wrong doctrine during the war. An example would



be the Vietnam War. The United States (US) was not prepared for the type of unconventional warfare and Low Intensity Conflict that needed to be fought in Vietnam. As a result, their initial air strikes into North Vietnam was based on decades-old air doctrine of strategic bombing, which was ineffective.<sup>43</sup>

### **FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR CLAUSEWITZIAN 'ABSOLUTE WAR'**

We will now examine if wars will ever be fought with limitless violence in the future or has war changed such that we have passed the tipping point and the nature of war has been fundamentally altered? How will wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century be characterised based on the following three questions: Would the RMA aid in reducing Friction in Fog as claimed by many? How would the war on terror manifest itself with the demise of Osama bin Laden? Would nuclear wars ever occur?

*Clausewitz's forces of the 'trinity' such as fear and uncertainty will certainly shape the rational tendencies, which would then avert mankind's final destruction through a nuclear war.*

### **RMA AND ABSOLUTE WARS**

The RMA promises to render the battlefield more effective by removing friction and fog in war.<sup>44</sup> The RMA hypothesis states that friction and fog can be removed with: (1) application of information technology, (2) digitisation of forces with the increased availability of near real-time information, (3) advancement in technology such as Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) which translate into single-shot kills and (4) networking of the battlefield facilitate "joint warfare by networking the entire military organisation into a holistic fighting entity."<sup>45</sup> While all these advancement and state-of-the-war technology may reduce the friction and fog, they will not eliminate

them. The reason is that all these are subjected to human fallacy and Loo argues that fog and friction are inevitable outcomes of war simply because human fallibility is not something that technology would be able to overcome.<sup>46</sup>

### **WAR ON TERROR**

Clausewitz stated that all wars are escalatory in nature and will eventually escalate to absolute wars. Would this include small wars? Prominent strategists such as Edward Luttwak and Martin van Creveld argue that Low Intensity Conflict is the more dominant form of war today and Clausewitz's thoughts are no longer valid and hence, big states lose small wars.<sup>47</sup> An example would be the war on terror. However, Dasse rejects this notion and counter-argues that Clausewitz's works include guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Firstly, Clausewitz's concepts of chance, hostility, political objectives and 'trinity' are eternal and apply even to small wars. Secondly, Dasse considers the war on terror a war with political objectivity. Al-Qaeda's worldwide jihadist movement is basically an attempt to 'move, incite and rise up' against all forms of US interference in the hope of political self-determination (to form an Islamic nation). More importantly, Echevarria explained that this jihadist movement is comparatively small and has not reached revolutionary critical mass yet. Hence, the war on terror would not escalate into an absolute war; neither will big states pursue it with limitless violence.<sup>48</sup>

### **WILL NUCLEAR WARS REALISE CLAUSEWITZ'S ABSOLUTE IDEALS?**

There is a school of thought which reasons that nuclear wars are a form of absolute war and they could still occur. Lynn describes the existence of nuclear weaponry as the "nightmare ideal of absolute war within the realm of the possible."<sup>49</sup> In agreement with Honig, who argued that: "the act of war, from the

moment it starts, involves an instantaneous discharge of violence by which the protagonists aim to make each other defenceless", nuclear war is the only type of war that is able to produce an instantaneous discharge of violence and mayhem.<sup>50</sup> Granted that some may argue that such wars will not happen because during the Cold War, even when both the West and the East possessed the ability for Mutually Assured Destruction, neither party was willing to unleash such unlimited atrocities. Additionally, the Cold War was between rational state actors who were not willing to start the destruction of mankind and there was strong primacy of politics over the military.<sup>51</sup> President Truman's reluctance to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War and the Cuban missile crisis were all examples of war being the instrument of politics.<sup>52</sup> Clausewitz's forces of the 'trinity' such as fear and uncertainty will certainly shape the rational tendencies, which would then avert mankind's final destruction through a nuclear war.


*Clausewitz's forces of the 'trinity' such as fear and uncertainty will certainly shape the rational tendencies, which would then avert mankind's final destruction through a nuclear war.*

### CLAUSEWITZ HAD AN ANTITHESIS

Paradoxically, Clausewitz had an antithesis and acknowledged that 'unlimited war' was an abstract idea while 'limited war' was a more realistic definition.<sup>53</sup> Liddell Hart highlighted the imprudence of Clausewitz's 'absolute war' and questioned if "to use force without limit and without calculation of cost may be instinctive in a hate-maddened mob but the negation of statesmanship."<sup>54</sup> There are yet some prominent philosophers and political theorists such as Carl Schmit, who also believe that "war and violence must be limited, because unlimited war and violence would wipe out the possibility of the

conduct of war and, by doing so the possibility of politics."<sup>55</sup> As such, it may be argued that the notion of Clausewitz's absolute war may be too broad and generic a hypothesis that should not be compared with in the first place.

### CONCLUSION

This essay defined 'war' according to Clausewitz and from his definition, discussed the nature of war, *Politik*, strategy, and unlimited and limited wars. A restrictive requirement based on Clausewitz's works was used to argue that the 'means' and the 'ends' of a war must match Clausewitz's ideas on absolute war and highlighted through a cursory review of military history that such wars have never been achieved. The closest which was WWII was arguable (and WWI and the American Civil War, although these were not illustrated in this essay). The essay then elaborated on the forces that prevented the 'means' of war to meet Clausewitz's ideals—dimensions of strategy and the remarkable 'trinity.' Lastly, this essay looked at the future and discussed that even RMA would not eliminate friction and fog but would reduce its prevalence. The true nature of war is characterised by uncertainty, violence, chance, friction and human participation and such elements will always be present to prevent wars from ever being pursued with limitless violence. Lastly, as Gray reasoned, "the nature of war will not change; only its character or style may change."<sup>56</sup> 

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## ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).
2. The German word used was Gewalt, which Echevarria (2007) translated as violence. Different writers have used different translations to interpret Clausewitz's works. Jan Willem Honig (2007) contends that even Howard and Paret have mistranslated certain words in *On War* and thus have lost the true essence of Clausewitz's intent. This paper, however, will not deal with the translation issues that are prevalent among scholars and the assumption will be that published works of reputable authors would be reliable.
3. Kleemeier (2007) explained that the German word underlying the English translation 'war' was *werra*, which attributed the idea of confusion or disorder. This is distinctly different from the latin derivation; *bellum*, which is the current English translation for 'war'. However, today's meanings of *werra* and *bellum* are synonymously used.
4. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).
5. Christopher Bassford, *The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
6. Christopher Dasse, *Clausewitz and Small Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 186.



7. Ibid.
8. Moral – Includes “everything that is created by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences” (Howard & Paret, 1984, p. 183). Physical – Consists of “the size of the armed forces, their composition, armament” (Howard & Paret, 1984, p. 183). Mathematical – Includes “the angle of lines of operation, the convergent and divergent movements wherever geometry enters into the calculation” (Howard & Paret, 1984, p. 183). Geographical – Comprises “the influences of terrain, such as commanding position, mountains, rivers, woods and roads” (Howard & Paret, 1984, p. 183). Statistical – Consists of “support and maintenance” (Howard & Paret, 1984, p. 183).
9. Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
10. The term ‘total War’ does not appear in *On War* but was invented in towards the end of the First World War and popularized by the German General Erich Ludendorff in mid-1930s (Honig, 2007).
11. Jeremy Black, “Introduction to Global Military History,” Routledge (2013).
12. Bassford (2007) argued that Howard and Paret inaccurately translated the word *politik* to policy when the accurate word to be used was politics. He argued that policy was a subcomponent of politics. This paper will take Bassford’s (2007) translation of *politik* (politics) to mean the state or government’s multilateral interaction with society and policy as the effort or action taken by the government to meet the national interest of the state.
13. Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
14. Another common label would be War of Annihilation or strategy of annihilation (*Niederwerfungsstrategie*). (Lynn, 1996).
15. Jon Sumida, *On Defence as the Stronger Form of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
16. Hew Strachan, *Clausewitz and the Dialectics of War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
Jeremy Black, “Introduction to Global Military History,” Routledge (2013).
17. Ibid.
18. Brian W. Brennan, “Limited vs Total War,” *Armor* (2002), 111.
19. bid.  
There was total mobilization of the economy to arm the military and civilian support was tremendous as men and women were drafted to fill the ranks of the military. By 1945, the U.S Army has almost 900,000 officers and 7.4 million enlisted personnel and was producing over 2400 tanks per month (Brennan, 2002). As a result of the strategic air campaign, in which Allied bombers strategically struck civilian population; in that process approximately 410,000 German civilians were killed, which was “an outcome that was never planned” (Olsen, 2010, p.44).
20. Ibid, 9.
21. Steven Spielberg, *Band of Brothers*, United States: HBO, 1998.
22. Liddell Hart, “WWII: The Military Balance Sheet,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (1962), <https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/1962/03/wwii-military-balance-sheet>.
23. David Lonsdale, *Clausewitz and Information Warfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
24. Ibid, 239.
25. Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
26. Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz and A New Containment: The Limitation of War and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
Adapted from various authors in *Clausewitz in the twenty-first century*, Strachan & Herberg-Rothe (2007) (Eds).
27. David Lonsdale, *Clausewitz and Information Warfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
28. Christopher Bassford, *The Primacy of Policy and the ‘Trinity’ in Clausewitz’s Mature Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
29. Ibid.
30. Colin Gray defines Grand Strategy as “to coordinate and direct all resources of a nation or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy” (1999, p. 18).

31. Christopher Bassford, *The Primacy of Policy and the 'Trinity' in Clausewitz's Mature Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 81.
32. Michael Lind, "Vietnam: the Necessary War - A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict," *The Free Press* (1999).
33. Ibid.
34. In 1965, only 25% of the American public felt that the President had made an error in sending troops to Vietnam. This figure rose steadily and within three years, more than 50% of the public agreed that dispatching troops was a mistake (Lind, 1999).
35. Ian Holliday, "When Is a Cause Just?" *Review of International Studies* (2002), 557-575. Holliday (2002) articulated three requirements for a just cause: (1) a problem to which a military action is the only solution, (2) military intervention is an appropriate and balanced response to the perceived problem and (3) inevitable risks inherent in military intervention are thoroughly assessed and perceived to be balanced (collateral damage).
36. Michael Lind, "Vietnam: the Necessary War - A Reinterpretation of America's Most Disastrous Military Conflict," *The Free Press* (1999).
37. Michael W. Lewis, "The Law of Aerial Bombardment in the 1991 Gulf War," *The American Journal of International Law* (2003), <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3109837?uid=3738992&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104995185597>, 481-509.
38. Twelve sets were: (1) destroy nuclear/biological/chemical facilities, (2) scud missiles sites, (3) military support, production and research facilities, (4) leadership, (5) command, control & communication sites, (6) electrical power, (7) oil facilities, (8) railroads and bridges, (9) airfields, (10) naval ports and facilities, (11) strategic air defences, and (12) the Republican guards (Lewis, 2003). His objectives were (1) attack Iraqi political-military leadership and C2, (2) gain and maintain air superiority, (3) sever Iraqi supply lines, (4) to destroy known nuclear/biological/chemical sites, (5) destroy Republican Guards in Kuwait and (6) to liberate Kuwait city (Lewis, 2003).
39. Ibid.
40. David Lonsdale, *Clausewitz and Information Warfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
41. Kiesling (2001) explained that Clausewitz never explicitly mentioned the term 'fog of war' but only one passage in *On War* employs fog to describe war's ambiguities.
42. Ibid
43. Phillip S. Meilinger, "The Historiography of Airpower: Theory and Doctrine," *The Journal of Military History* 64, n.\_2 (2000).
44. Bernard Loo, "Decisive Battle, Victory and the Revolution in Military Affairs," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* (2009), 189-211.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Christopher Dasse, *Clausewitz and Small Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
48. Antulio J. Echevarria, *Clausewitz and the Nature of the War on Terror*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
49. John A. Lynn, "War of Annihilation, War of Attrition, and War of Legitimacy: A Neo-Clausewitzian Approach to Twentieth-Century Conflicts," *Marine Corps Gazette* 80 (1996), 67
50. Jan W. Honig, *Clausewitz On War: Problems of Text and Translation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
51. Von Bredow, *Civil-military Relations and Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
52. Ibid.
53. Additionally, Clausewitz articulated that war could only exist in the abstract form (unlimited) if it was an isolated act that occurred suddenly and not produced by any previous political events; but went on to conclude that war is never an isolate act (Howard & Paret, 1984)
54. Liddell Hart, "Thoughts on War," *Spellmount Classics* (1998). 67
55. Andreas Herberg-Rothe, *Clausewitz and A New Containment: The Limitation of War and Violence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
56. Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).



**MAJ Leonard Wong** is an F-16 fighter pilot and graduated from the 45<sup>th</sup> Command and Staff College, GKS CSC. Prior to that, he read Psychology at Monash University, was a Staff Officer in Air Plans Department and served his OC tour in Peace Carvin II, Arizona, USA.