

Clausewitz's views on the Transformation of War, Politics and Society—An Analysis of the Wars in the 19th and 20th Centuries

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Abstract:

Modern day theories on war fighting are filled with ideas that technology and changes determine battling capacities of the military and the war itself. But Clausewitz claimed that the changes in war were less a function of technology or shifts in ideas and more due to the involvement of society in the conduct of war. This article looked into Clausewitz's claim that war did not change much due to inventions or innovations in technology and strategies, but rather due to the transformation of society. This article aimed to establish that this transformation of society was time-dependent, had a psychological basis and tended to be the centre to which 'inventions or new departures in ideas' take hold of first, before making any significant impact on the manifestations in war.

Keywords: Society, Manifestations, Military Strategy, Warfighting, Technical Innovations

INTRODUCTION

*"My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
To children ardent for some desperate glory,
The old Lie; Dulce et Decorum est
Pro patria mori."*

Wilfred Owen¹

As an English soldier during World War I (WWI) in 1917, Owen reviled the nature of war and wrote the poem *Dulce et Decorum est*. This poem is interesting because Owen quotes from another poet, Horace, who also wrote a commentary of his time. The poem by Horace exhorts Roman residents to develop martial prowess so that the opponents of Rome, the Parthians, specifically, would be too afraid to withstand them.² The reader is presented with two contrasts—one poet espouses valour in death for the sake of the nation, while the other from a different lifetime and period reviles war and all its consequences. In particular, Owen speaks of the evils of the use of chemical gas, a new and radical weapon of war that was deemed to be more humane and effective in bringing about an end to

combat operations. The application of dense chemical gas that would affect only the trench positions was an ineffective and disastrous notion that led to many more maimed war casualties. Neutralising troops in progressive lines of trenches soon became a relic, as World War II (WWII) approached and a plethora of new military innovations came to modernise the conduct of war. Yet the appeal to ethos provided by Horace and Owen is not lost on us, and the themes presented in the poems would seem valid to the populations embroiled in WWII as well as those living today in the 21st century. The poets' words, *sensu lato*, retain their appeal because the same ethical values continue to exist today—peace from fear of the horrors of war and gallantry in defence of and victory for one's beloved nation.

AIM AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

Modern day theories on warfare are replete with the idea that technology and drastic changes in doctrine are able to derive significant changes in the fighting capabilities of the military and hence in war

itself. Yet Clausewitz claims that the changes in war are less a function of technology or shifts in ideas and more due to the involvement of society in the conduct of war. He states in Chapter Six of *On War*:

“Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions.”

Carl von Clausewitz³

While his perception of inventions and new departures in ideas came prior to the Industrial Revolution in Europe and may have been affected by the French Revolution as well,⁴ his empirically true claim serves to correct the fashionable view that new technologies remake the strategic world.⁵ This essay serves to critically assess the claim above.⁶ The paper will first establish Clausewitz’s interpretation of the themes of technology, doctrine and transformation in society and social order, in generating potential manifestations in war that re-define the way in which war was conducted. The essay will then apply a deductive approach to define how this paradigm has been challenged, citing several observations through the past hundred years of conflict. It will consider how the dimension of time alters the dynamic put forth by Clausewitz, for the Prussian was certainly writing on the observations of his generation and clearly was unable to test whether his thesis would be true over time.

Context was required to understanding war, which obligated the historian to enter into the mind sets and attitudes of any given period, the “spirit of the age.” History was a dynamic process, driven by forces beyond the control and often beyond the comprehension of any single individual or group.

ASSESSING CLAUSEWITZ’S CLAIM

Key Influences in Clausewitz’s Views

Clausewitz was appointed the aide-de-camp to Prince Augustus Ferdinand of Prussia during the Jena Campaign in the War of the Fourth Coalition against Napoleon’s French Empire.⁷ As a junior staff officer, he worked closely with his mentor, Gerhard von Scharnhorst, as well as August von Gneisenau, both prominent Prussian military reformers. It was during the battle of Jena-Auerstedt on October 14th 1806 that 25,000 prisoners from the Prussian army were taken, among them Clausewitz and Prince Ferdinand.⁸ It was as a prisoner of war in France that Clausewitz came to appreciate the impact of the modern use of *levée en mass* (mass conscription) on creating the vast armies of Napoleon through the mobilisation of the French populace.⁹ At age 26, Clausewitz returned to



Portrait of Clausewitz while in Prussian service, by Karl Wilhelm Wach.

Prussia and assisted General Gerhard von Scharnhorst in the reform of the Prussian army and state, with Von Scharnhorst as the first chief of staff of the rejuvenated Prussian Army in 1809. It was with his research of the French Revolutionary Wars and his experience in the Napoleonic Wars afterwards that he observed the change in the use of armies, from personal armed forces under the monarch, to militia and to a nationwide instrument raised by the French National Convention.

Yet, the views stated in *On War* are not solely attributed to the influence of Napoleon, or experience with the success and failures of the *Grand Armée* at Jena and Waterloo,¹⁰ but rather to a combination of Clausewitz's interpretation of Napoleon,¹¹ as well as the views of Gerhard von Scharnhorst.¹² In particular, Clausewitz had a relativistic opinion of history and rejected absolutes concerning values and standards. Context was required to understanding war, which obligated the historian to enter into the mind sets and attitudes of any given period, the "spirit of the age."¹³ History was a dynamic process, driven by forces beyond the control and often beyond the comprehension of any single individual or group. This historicism is particularly obvious in two key themes of *On War* that are missing in the 1812 "Principles of War".¹⁴ These are the famous notions that state that, "War is a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means," i.e. "organised violence" and the "recognition that war can vary in its forms depending on the changing nature of policy and of the society within which it is waged."¹⁵

CLAUSEWITZ'S VIEW ON NEW MANIFESTATIONS IN WAR

The Definition of Manifestation

The Oxford online dictionary defines the noun 'manifestation' as 'an event, action or object that clearly shows or embodies something abstract or,

theoretical or the action or fact of showing something.' We therefore note that a manifestation of war would be a visible expression, or a public demonstration of the nature of war, such as its character, strategies or influence in the conduct of war. What Clausewitz labelled as 'new manifestations in war' were related to limited wars and reflected the observations of his time, to what he felt were the specific conditions that were then prevalent. The word 'manifestation' itself appears again in Chapter Four, entitled *Method and Routine* of Book two (in the *Theory of War*), as Clausewitz writes about the influence of personal style of military genius in war. Clausewitz returns to the topic in Chapter 30 of Book Six, when he cautions against over-crediting the success of campaigns to military brilliance.¹⁶ In these parts, Clausewitz makes three points:

1. War-fighters Tend to Resist New Manifestations

The conduct and character of war and military doctrine supported the use of tested methods and eschewed new ideas. Instead of rigorously assessing new ideas over old, military planners even at the highest level were more inclined to rely on accepted theory based on past conflicts.¹⁷ Clausewitz cited that the nature of military planning at the time did not allow for military genius and ideational influences to change the routine, process and conduct of war in order to improve accepted theory.

2. New Theories on Method and Routine were Manifestations of the Prevailing Conflict

Clausewitz added that it would be impossible to eliminate any subjective routine or personal style, a human and hence intellectual and psychological aspect, from the conduct of war.¹⁸ Taken in context, military methods and routines would never be free of people-driven trends in war-fighting. These trends were however more likely an outcome of the conditions of the period and as such, a manifestation of the prevailing conflict of that time. War and conflict

therefore, should not be approached in ways that would divorce it from its political, social and cultural contexts.¹⁹

3. The Manifestations of War and Their Causes are not Permanent but Perpetually Relevant Differences in routine and style, and even in the new concepts of war revolving around the intellect and psychology of the commander, would become irrelevant if the premise of the conflict changes. It would therefore be dangerous to have subjective methods and routines alter war-fighting doctrine and processes without conducting a critical analysis. It would be equally false to assume that the older kind of war fighting would not occur again. While Clausewitz describes his disdain for the ‘old school champions’ who reject the new ideas ‘crystallised by Napoleon,’²⁰ he admonishes those who oppose current doctrine—those who take the position that old approaches to war would never occur again. Clausewitz’s theories therefore exude a sense of perpetual relevance, for it provides a suitable framework from which a reference may be drawn to analyse any manner of strategy, regardless of which century one does so in.²¹


NEW INVENTION AND IDEAS IN CONTEXT OF ‘ON WAR’

While Clausewitz uses the term ‘idea’ in the generic sense, without any particular association to a specific topic, the word ‘invention’ occurs at least five times throughout *On War*, all with reference to some new aspect of military technology or idea of the 19th century. In each instance, he illustrates the following points:

1. Invention and Ideas as a Means for the Commander to Cope with Change In the first instance, Clausewitz speaks of the war planner in contrast to an architect creating a bridge’s design who applies “data and principles that he neither created, nor would fully understand.”²² Clausewitz states this would never be

the case for war, writing that ‘the dynamic nature of the war forces the commander to develop new ideas to address the change around him.’ At the same time, Clausewitz cautions against associating the use of a particular manoeuvre over another as an invention of military genius but instead, more as an outcome of critical analysis.²³

2. Invention as a New Way to Destroy the Enemy, Not a New Motivation to Do So Clausewitz further uses an example of gunpowder,²⁴ firearms and cannon to illustrate the point that invention shapes the way people fight, but does not create a new motivation to destroy the adversary.²⁵ Clausewitz further speaks of technical invention as generating more of a psychological impact rather than having a real physical effect.²⁶ He states, “*The psychological*



Title page of the original German edition *Vom Kriege* (*On War*), published in 1832.

effect is what concerns us and experience is the only means by which it can be established and appreciated. In the Middle Ages, firearms were a new invention, so crude that their physical effect was much less important than today, but their psychological impact was considerably greater.”²⁷

CLAUSEWITZ’S VIEWS ON TRANSFORMATION OF WAR, POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Politics

Throughout *On War*, Clausewitz writes on the transformation of war, but there is only one reference to the transformation of society. How can Clausewitz then make the claim he did? At the end of Chapter Six, Book Eight, Clausewitz reiterated that the vast changes wrought in the wars of the Napoleonic era arose from “*the new political life which the revolution created for Europe as well as for France... Other means and forces were thus called forth, which conferred on warfare a degree of energy inconceivable without them... [which] follows that the transformation of the art of war resulted from the transformation of politics.*”²⁸ Through this, Clausewitz had been clear in stating that, as war is an instrument of politics/policy, the change in the nature of war has its origin in the changing nature of politics/policy.²⁹ Clausewitz himself clarified that several examples stated in his work may be outdated due to this relationship between war and politics, because “*times have changed, that war had undergone a total transformation and now drew its life from wholly different sources.*”³⁰ Brodie’s analysis of Chapter Six furthers this relationship, stating that war “*carries along the same discourse and logic that is derived from the political aim that supported the use of war, without which the act is pointless.*” Any transformation of politics would therefore alter the character of war.

Society and Social Order

Clausewitz’s reference to the transformation of ‘society’ or the ‘social order’ appears only on a single

page in Chapter 30 of Book Six. Yet, the relationship between war and social order appears in Chapter 26,³¹ with Clausewitz stating that European *Ancien Régime* did not favour war in the form of a popular uprising, believing it to be a severe, destabilising force of social order. The lack of reference to the French Revolution and the impact of changing French society on politics betray the Prussian position as an anti-French counter-revolutionary. Crucial to this observation were the values of the French Revolution—the confidence that came from defending one’s own cause, as a citizen instilled in France’s revolutionary armies. The anti-thesis was the experience of Prussia’s shocking defeat in war and dismal socio-political condition during the Jena Campaign, captured in a critique of the period published in 1820 by Clausewitz himself.³²

With the articulation of the ‘Remarkable Trinity’, Clausewitz related the function of society and social order in influencing war through the following relationships:

1. War in Relation to Politics

‘War is an instrument of policy and is driven by political aims.’

2. War in Relation to Civilisation

The transformation of war is not driven by the conduct of war, but by the non-permanent motivations of the era.

3. War in Relation to Society

Changes in the society and social order can ‘make or break’ a war, either by influencing the means to which war is waged, or by altering the political will supporting the war.

At this point, we may form our first hypothesis on Clausewitz’s meaning of the statement in study—Clausewitz believes that manifestations in war are

more attributable to time-dependent conditions across existing societies and political powers of the day.

The Influence of Social Condition on the Remarkable Trinity

The English definition of society is “the community of people living in a particular country or region and having shared customs, laws, and organizations.”³³ Clausewitz partners the forces of the remarkable trinity primarily to among three sets of human actors who ultimately are members of society to varying degrees: the people, the army, and the government.³⁴


1. **‘Irrational forces’**—the emotions of primordial physical violence, hatred, and enmity or, by implication, the lack thereof, associated with the people.

‘Inventions or new departures in ideas’ do not contribute to the new manifestations in war unless they make an impact on society first, which subsequently influences the ‘trinity of forces’ and hence, the perpetuation of war.

2. **‘Non-traditional forces of chance, friction, and possibility’**—associated primarily with the army and its commanders. Fighting organisations dealt with those aspects under the creative influence of the commander.

3. **‘Rational force of calculation’**—paired generally with the government, where policy is preferably driven by reason.³⁵

All individuals play a role in rational decision-making. Military personnel may associate themselves to a larger part of society to varying degrees, whereas political leaders are typically driven by personal needs as by a rational calculation of their societies' practical requirements.³⁶ Events on the army's field of battles



"Battle of Jena" colored by Antoine Charles Horace Vernet and Jacques François Swobach.

have a tremendous impact both on the individuals and on the political leadership, while preferred and political factors affect the army's efficiency.

With the above understanding, we form the second hypothesis to the meaning behind Clausewitz's statement: 'Inventions or new departures in ideas' do not contribute to the new manifestations in war unless they make an impact on society first, which subsequently influences the 'trinity of forces' and hence, the perpetuation of war.

19TH CENTURY: FRANCE VERSUS PRUSSIA IN THE JENA CAMPAIGN

Among other events in Clausewitz's life, his experiences during the Jena Campaign contributed significantly to his approach to the Prussian military reform and hence, the thoughts consolidated as *On War*. This paper presents it as the first war to study the claim.

Prussia was mobilised for war in 1806 in anticipation of the onslaught of devastating French victories over Austria and Russia in 1805.³⁷ Confident due to the past military successes won by Frederick the Great, Clausewitz and most other Prussian officers presented a considerable amount of pride for 19th century Prussian military success and looked forward to a struggle against France. However, with poor timing, mobilisation and psychological preparedness, Prussian forces were devastated in battles at Jena and Auerstedt.³⁸ The French, however, had tapped the energies of its populace to drive its war effort. Prussia was forced to lose half its population and territories in the ensuing peace settlement and became an occupied French satellite state. The battle proved most influential in demonstrating the need for the reforms by Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz, all military planners. With the subsequent implementation of military and civilian reforms, Prussia transformed into


a modern state from a feudal monarchy, expelling France from Germany and eventually assumed a leading role on the continent. We note the occurrence of the second hypothesis much earlier than the first hypothesis, in that the time-dependent changes occur very much after the initial defeat of Prussia, but thereafter, allowed for reform and for French political and social sentiment supporting war to decline in Prussia's favour.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

As the two hypotheses specify a dimension of time that needs to be considered for Clausewitz's statements to be evaluated, this study would need to be validated by applying the hypotheses to the wars that followed the French Revolution to the present day.

20th Century: Revolutions in Military Affairs, World Wars and Cold War

From the 19th century onwards, a systemic change in the conduct of war brought about by the technical innovations of the industrial age marked a series of irreversible military revolutions in military affairs (RMA) altering the framework of war in the West.³⁹ WWI saw the birth of modern warfare with the development of completely new forms of combined-arms tactics and operations. Nonetheless, the advantages of modern warfare would not remain exclusive to one side or another—technological parity was largely unachievable through the great wars.⁴⁰ Economic parity was not and hence, a greater contributor to the cessation of the wars. WWI and WWII caused a general decline in the reading of Clausewitz, given the association of his writings with Germany.⁴¹ Nonetheless, we note that the significant impact of Clausewitz's ideas on the preceding military theorists would subsequently influence the conduct and strategy of the two world wars. Sea and Air



AIR 48/70 Diagram showing the effects of strategic bombing on German morale in 1945, from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Morale Division Reports.

powers were applied with Clausewitzian theories in mind and never solely based on the outcome of the military action itself.⁴² For example, the use of carpet bombing by both sides helped to weaken the Allied and Axis countries' populations' support and interest in war.⁴³ In WW II, both the Allies and Axis powers used strategic bombing extensively, culminating in the bombardment of Hamburg and Dresden in Germany and Tokyo in Japan as well as the dropping of two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.⁴⁴ The galvanisation of societies played a central aspect in the support and provision for war.⁴⁵ The percolation of sentiment from WWI seemed to make Hitler's ideals more tenable in Germany.⁴⁶ In a similar manner, the mass perception of the Japanese as being marginalised by Western powers,⁴⁷ followed by their quest for empire, further provoked the Japanese actions taken in the Pacific.⁴⁸ Both examples serve to

illustrate the link between changes in social order, due to socio-political pressures, leading to the propensity for a nation to go to war. WWI clearly set the stage for the Axis powers to launch WWII. The effect of the conditions imposed on the post war economies and the social memories of axis powers affected the psyche of the populace, and greatly supported the move towards war.

As Clausewitz noted, "Nobody begins a war without first being clear in the mind exactly what he plans to attain by that war, and how he plans to perform it."

In the ensuing Cold War, massive arsenals in the form of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles were generated by both the United States (US) and Soviet Union to threaten the destruction of their opponents on a grand scale.⁴⁹ With the growing appreciation of the unacceptable consequences of a nuclear war, this destructive power restrained the two superpowers from seeking the use of force as a means to resolve conflict. The presence of nuclear weapons and mutually assured destruction in nuclear conflict generated a psychological aspect that became a far greater dissenting element in the strategic level compared to actual weapon stockpiles.⁵⁰

We see the occurrence of first and second hypothesis in a consecutive manner—the outcomes of WWI are left to percolate before creating sufficient gravitas for the national support for German and Japanese ideals to take hold. The second hypothesis perpetuates itself much later.

20TH CENTURY: VIETNAM WAR, WEINBURGER DOCTRINE AND PERSIAN GULF WAR

The rediscovery of Clausewitz in the US following the Vietnam War influenced a strategic reconsideration

“on the greatest levels of the military and political leadership.”⁵¹ The lessons that emerged gave rise to the Weinberger Doctrine of 1984, a US’ strategic adjustment after the Vietnam War, which lists six conditions that must first be met for the US to engage in any war.⁵² The impact of widespread public disapproval of an undesirable war on the US government and on the presidency demonstrated that it was essential to be clear on the intents of the military action or risk losing support for it by the general population. Lessons from the Vietnam War triggered the advancement of the Weinberger doctrine to peacefully articulate the basis for the US to go to war.⁵³ The doctrine, a direct outcome of the Vietnam War, was implemented as part of the strategy applied to the conduct of the first Gulf War. Regularly quoted throughout the multiple arguments concerning military action during the Gulf War, the doctrine clearly points out Clausewitz’s principles in three of the six conditions. As Clausewitz noted, ‘Nobody begins a war without first being clear in the mind exactly what he plans to attain by that war, and how he plans to perform it.’⁵⁴

General Colin Powell expanded on the Weinberger Doctrine while planning for the Persian Gulf War, asserting that nations involved in war should employ every resource available in order to derive decisive force against their adversary, minimising US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate.⁵⁵ This is consistent with Western military strategy, at least from Clausewitz’s theories, demonstrating that the ideas of the remarkable trinity are still applicable to modern strategy. More telling is the need for the doctrine to continue to be applied as a guide to which war is waged by the US. Far more telling is the empirical observation of Powell, himself a product of the society and order of the US military, made a political leader, providing his ideas on the conditions of how a country should go to war.⁵⁶ It suggests that the impetus from people

and the political angle continue to exert an influence far greater than the new warfighting concepts of the day.

CONCLUSION

“Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say ... Not really.”

*General James N. Mattis⁵⁷
Commander, US CENTCOM*

While globalisation and rapid advancements in technology have dominated the recent discourse on warfare, Mattis presented his disagreement of the Generational Theory of Warfare, and stated that the nature of war and strategy had not changed. This seemed to be a position similarly shared by Gray,⁵⁸ in which he discussed ‘America’s love affair with technology.’ In the same discussion, Gray presented his theory that supported the analysis in this paper, albeit from an America-centric point of view, rather than from a critical analysis of Clausewitz’s work.

In summary, this essay elucidated Clausewitz’s implicit ideas that (1) War-fighters tended to resist new manifestations in war, (2) new theories on method and routine are manifestations of the prevailing conflict; and (3) the manifestations of war and their causes are not permanent but perpetually relevant.

This paper has also deconstructed the purpose of invention and new departures in ideas as (a) a means for the Military to cope with change; and (b) a new way to address the destruction of the enemy, not a new motivation to do so.

Finally, this paper has analysed Clausewitz’s claim in that not much about war changes due to ‘inventions or new departures in ideas,’ but rather due

to the transformation of society first. This paper has established that this transformation of society is time-dependent, has a psychological basis and tend to be the centre to which 'inventions or new departures in ideas' take hold of first, before making any significant impact on the manifestations in war. The hypotheses generated are supported by the historical examples of the World Wars, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf Wars. An emboldened society with new ideas and beset with new vigour, is more likely the source of impetus to persecute, or reject a conflict. Consequently, a proper understanding of the reasons to go to war must be established and central to this, is societal support. Certainly, it presents a better impetus from which to accept Horace's illustration of conflict over Owen's when inspiring and encouraging society to go to war. 🌐

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16. Clausewitz writes: *'This was the view almost universally held among theorists before the Wars of the French Revolutions. At first it was somewhat raw and primitive; later Bonaparte crystallised it into a grandiose system that achieved success which amazed everyone. At that point, the old models were scrapped; it was assumed that everything was the result of new discoveries, sublime ideas, and so forth, and, indeed, the transformation of the social order. It seemed that the old forms would serve us no further and would never return. But, in such revolutions of thought, factions usually arise; and so the old school found its champions who regarded the new phenomena as outbreaks of the crudest violence and as a general decay in the art of war. They are convinced that the balanced, sterile, pointless game is the very zenith of development. This is a view so lacking in logic and insight that it must be considered a hopeless confusion of values. The opposite view, however, that nothing of the kind would ever happened again – is so extremely ill-advised.'* (Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832; 2008) The beginning use of 'this' refers to the idea that the observation of the enemy, his intellect and psychology, and hence his use of and response to strategic manoeuvre, was essential in the study of the art of war.
17. Gray, C. *How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?* Parameters, 2005.
18. Clausewitz, C. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1832.
19. Gray, C. *How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?* Parameters, 2005.

20. Ibid.
21. Bassford, C. *Clausewitz in English: the Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America 1815-1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
22. Clausewitz, C. *On War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1832, p147.
23. Ibid.,161. Clausewitz states, 'In our view, it is quite absurd, though it is often done, to treat the turning of a position as an invention of great genius. And yet such individual creative evaluations are necessary, and they significantly influence the value of critical analysis.'
24. Ibid.,76. Clausewitz writes: 'the invention of gunpowder and the constant improvement of firearms are enough in themselves to show that the advance of civilisation has done nothing practical to alter or deflect the impulse to destroy the enemy, which is central to the very idea of war.'
25. Ibid., 291. Clausewitz further comments that: 'since the invention of cannon, and as cannon have been improved and reduced in weight, their number has naturally increased...' but 'even so, since the time of Frederick the Great, the proportionate strength of artillery has remained fairly constant: Two to three guns per thousand men, that is at the outset of a campaign. In the course of operations guns are not lost as fast as men, and so their proportion is a good deal higher by the end; possibly arriving at a ration of three, four or five guns per thousand men. Only experience will determine whether these are the normal proportions, or whether guns can go on being increased without encumbering the whole conduct of war.'
26. Ibid., 170.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 706.
29. The actual use of the word 'politics' or 'policy' is a topic of study and debate on its own, as Clausewitz never distinguishes between the two, nor does he define his use of the terms in 'On War'. It is also important to note that the English definitions for politics and policy and different, unlike that for German (Bassford, 2011).
30. Ibid., 615.
31. Clausewitz writes: 'In the civilized parts of Europe, war by means of popular uprisings is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century.* It has its advocates and its opponents. The latter object to it either on political grounds, considering it as a means of revolution, a state of legalized anarchy that is as much of a threat to the social order at home as it is to the enemy; or else on military grounds, because they feel that the results are not commensurate with the energies that have been expended.' (Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832; 2008)
32. Clausewitz, C. *Nachrichten über Preussen in seiner grossen Katastroph*. Berlin, Germany: E.S. Mittler, 1888.
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