

The Citizen-Soldier in Modern Democracies: The Case for Conscription in Singapore

by LTC Chan Ching Hao

Abstract:

Since the peak of conscription during the First and Second World Wars, several countries have reduced the duration of compulsory military service or even ended conscription. In its early years, Singapore had no means to defend its nascent independence apart from a minimal British military presence. Conscription was the only means for Singapore to build up defense capabilities. This article outlines the main forms of military service and its history, the factors for the decline of conscription and why Singapore's defense needs are still best served by conscription.

Keywords: National Service; Total Defense; Conscription

INTRODUCTION

Every Singaporean male citizen is called up for National Service (NS) upon turning 18. NS is familiar to Singaporeans, as almost every family has a father, brother or son who has served or is serving NS. We have come to take NS as a given. However, trends suggest the international decline of military service by citizen-soldiers. Since the peak of conscription during the First and Second World Wars (WWI and WWII), several countries have allowed alternate service (e.g. civil administration), reduced the duration of compulsory military service, or even ended conscription altogether.

This is a four-part article. The first part outlines the main forms of military service. The second part briefly covers the history of the rise of conscription from the 18th century in revolutionary France to its widespread proliferation during the Second World War (WWII). The third part discusses the broad factors for the decline of conscription in the decades of relative peace since WWII. This includes a deeper look at Taiwan's decision in 2011 to end conscription. The final part examines why 45 years after the introduction of NS, Singapore's defense needs continue to be best served via conscription, and the key factors for the continued success of Singapore's NS system.

TYPES OF MILITARY SERVICE

Choosing the right military service for serving a country's interests deserves careful study. According to Cohen, nations devised military service through resolving two clusters of claims, those of foreign-cum-military policy on one hand, and those of justice and ideology.¹ Countries must consider geopolitical realities and raise an armed force that is able to handle the types of conflicts they are most likely to face. While conscription allows a country to build up large armed forces rapidly, it comes at significant economic cost. Employing the citizen-soldier also extends the potential reach of the military to all families. Thus, conscription has profound implications on civilian-military relations and the cultural and historical consciousness of a nation.

Unfortunately, as Cohen points out, the layman is likely to reduce the issue to choosing between an armed force comprised of regulars or conscripts. In reality, militaries usually include regulars augmented by citizen-soldiers in the form of conscripts, reserves, or even volunteers. Different types of military service employ a unique mix of regulars and citizen-soldiers. The main military service systems are listed below:

1. **Cadre/Conscript:** A cadre of professional officers and noncommissioned officers trains and leads conscripts who become part of the nation's standing forces.
2. **Expansible:** A cadre of professional soldiers prepares in peacetime to train large masses of conscripts or volunteers only in periods leading up to war.
3. **Militia:** Citizens are either selected or volunteer to train for a minimum period during the year (e.g. during weekends or weekday evenings) while pursuing civilian careers. Militias serve in their towns of residence and are traditionally activated either during emergencies or threat of invasion.
4. **All Volunteer Force (AVF):** Similar to the Cadre/Conscript system, but with the exclusive use of volunteers.²

Countries have adapted the systems above or a combination of them to meet their needs.

THE RISE OF MODERN CONSCRIPTION

Military Service up to WWI

In the 18th century, European armies were generally organized along class lines. Nobles became officers while volunteers and conscripts served long periods of duty. As 18th century warfare lacked political and ideological aims, European states did not require mass armies and only conscripted small numbers of men of lower social status.³ The modern mass army only made its debut in the late 18th century French Revolutionary Wars. After the French monarchy was deposed, other European monarchist powers feared the spread of the revolution and waged war against the new French republic. In defense of the republic, the French national assembly declared the *Levee en Masse* in August 1793 and conscripted all unmarried men aged 18. The French army swiftly grew from 264,000 to 749,000 by September 1794.⁴ The soldiers of the other European armies served long tours of duty and were believed to be superior to the French conscripts.



Passing out parade in the Central Business District

However, the French conscripts performed well and even decisively defeated the Prussian army, widely regarded as a highly disciplined and feared force, at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806.⁵

Some military historians postulated that the French army's successes in the initial revolutionary wars was due to conscription. Such historians often depict the French citizen-soldier as being motivated to fight for the rights of his countrymen rather than out of fear of his officers. Other European armies were rigidly drilled but spiritless, no match for the tactical superiority of a revolutionary army.⁶ However, this does not explain why class-based European armies eventually overwhelmed Napoleon's conscript army in later battles. The Napoleonic empire was finally brought down by the British at Waterloo in 1815. It is more likely that the successes of armies on both sides of the French Revolutionary Wars were due to concrete measures such as improvements in tactics and purges to eliminate inept officers.⁷

Despite ensuing debate on the effectiveness of conscripts, most European armies adopted conscription systems by the late 19th century. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 dismissed any perception that conscripts were inferior to regulars, and signaled the beginning of widespread conscription. During the war, Prussia invaded France with 370,000 men, mostly conscripts. The 240,000-strong French professional army was defeated within a few months.⁸ The main advantage of conscription was the sheer number of soldiers it could generate. Prussia had large standing forces and could quickly mobilize reservists to replace attrition—something France could not do.

Conscription in WWI and WWII

Prior to the first World War (WWI), military and political strategists foresaw that mass warfare would be waged on the continent. But the public in the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) held strong liberal attitudes and continued to oppose

compulsory military service. This opposition persisted even after WWI started. However, faced with massive attrition and insufficient volunteer replacements, UK finally adopted conscription in January 1916.⁹ Due to its geographical isolation from Europe, US only entered the war in April 1917. US adopted conscription a month later as it recognized that its small regular army would hardly make a difference on the European battlefield.¹⁰

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WWI provided important insight on the efficient deployment of military and civilian resources during wartime. For France, ideological rigidity in regard to conscription significantly hampered its war efforts. Frenchmen were mobilized *en masse* with little consideration for economic and industrial implications; the results were disastrous. Just 30 days into the war, the French were forced to demobilize tens of thousands of reservists to maintain artillery shell production after stockpiles were halved. By the end of the war, industry was crippled with more than half of workers and factories lost.¹¹ Similarly in the UK, prior to the adoption of conscription, critical industries supporting the war effort suffered as large numbers of workers volunteered for military service.¹² The US, which joined the war later, benefited from the French and British experience. As such, while the US Navy and Marine Corps fought on professional grounds to accept only volunteers, they were forced to accept mostly conscripts.¹³ In order to balance fairness with harnessing military and civilian resources efficiently, the US implemented a unique Selective System. In particular, exempting workers in a critical industry would be logical but undemocratic. The Selective System bill thus avoided class and group deferments and delegated the task of drafting to local draft boards chaired by civilian leaders.¹⁴

In the late 1930s, with the threat of WWII looming, most countries again relied heavily on conscription. During WWII, the UK and US conscripted 4,653,000 and 16,354,000 soldiers respectively.¹⁵ As large masses of new soldiers had to be trained from scratch, the

UK and US were effectively employing an expansible military system during WWI and WWII. Training numerous conscripts, however, took time. US took four years to prepare sufficient troops for war.¹⁶

The Decline of Modern Conscription

Conscription proved crucial to the survival of nations over both World Wars. After WWII, while workers were needed to rebuild the economy, nations continued to send conscripts to preserve the newly established peace through occupation and stabilization operations. Thereafter, conscription continued to remain relevant with the advent of the Cold War against the threat of communism. The strategic situation required countries to have armies capable of fending off a continental threat and fulfill North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) obligations. Moreover, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 stifled any debate on ending conscription.¹⁷ However, calls on governments to end conscription quickly resumed with the Korean armistice in July 1953.

Several broad factors fomented the general decline of modern conscription. First, the development of nuclear arms and nuclear deterrence during the Cold War shifted the focus away from a clash of conventional forces between major powers. Second, the reduced likelihood of an all-out conventional war led to a mismatch between demographic trends and the defense requirements of several countries. UK was the first major power to end conscription largely due to this mismatch. Studies in 1956 and 1957 showed that continued universal conscription would generate a surplus of 71,500 soldiers by 1961.¹⁸ The British government could ill afford wasted manpower and the political consequences of maintaining conscription. Alternatives such as selective service or balloting were unacceptable as they ran counter to the universal character of national service. Despite claims by the British military that scrapping conscription would reduce NATO's effectiveness and that UK would lose its global prominence,¹⁹ an all professional force augmented by a militia system in the British Territorial Army (TA) prevailed.²⁰ Third, unpopular involvement in limited wars abroad turned the tide

of domestic opinion against conscription. The high casualty rates of young US GIs in the Vietnam War led to widespread opposition towards conscription. In March 1969, then-President Richard Nixon, who was elected on an anti-conscription ticket, appointed a commission to study the prospects for an AVF. By 1970, the US ended conscription and built up an AVF with the National Guard and the Reserves.²¹ Fourth, political compromise to sustain conscription produces substandard soldiers, thereby undermining the national defense. To manage excess manpower, France progressively cut the length of military service from two years to one, then to 10 months in 1970 and 1992 respectively. In addition, faced with waning popular support for conscription in the 1960s, the government allowed French draftees to choose civilian service for a longer duration (16 to 24 months) instead of military service. Large scores of eligible men were also exempted from service based on profession (e.g., young farmers or business owners), marital status or physical and psychological health. By 1996, about half the potential draft manpower were exempted or in alternate forms of service.²² Ironically, while these policies propped up support for conscription, they rendered the military service irrelevant, as exemplified by the difficulties France faced in the Gulf War and former Yugoslavia.²³ This incongruence ended in 1996 when then-President Jacques Chirac, who was elected on an anti-conscription platform, successfully abolished conscription.²⁴

Scrapping Conscription in Taiwan

In 2011, Taiwan, a traditional stronghold of conscription, announced that it would be ceasing conscription in favor of an AVF. Taiwan retained conscript forces well after WWII due to the possibility of conflict with China. Yet in recent years, Taiwan and China have successfully established closer financial and trade links, including the landmark Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. President Ma and his Kuomintang party support establishing better ties with China in recognition that economic isolation from the large Chinese economy could be fatal for Taiwan.²⁵ The recent reelection of Ma in January 2012

by a sizable 5% margin also suggests that majority of Taiwanese favor better ties with China.

Although Taiwan's 2011 National Report noted the gradual relaxing of cross-strait tensions, China is still regarded as an "invasion threat."²⁶ Against the backdrop of China's military development, the paper highlighted that "strengthening defense capabilities is the fundamental way to ensuring peace in the Taiwan strait."²⁷ Taiwan's decision to end conscription was driven by demographic trends. The report highlighted that Taiwan faces a steady declining pool of male draftees due to declining birth rates, an aging population and rapid talent outflow.²⁸ While the draft eligible pool numbered around 120,000 in 2011, it was expected to decrease to about 75,000 by 2025. In addition, the report stated that the current compulsory military service period (one year) was insufficient to train citizens to operate the sophisticated equipment of the future battlefield. As such, Taiwan was urged to establish an AVF to meet its defense requirements.²⁹ Although the military would be downsized from 275,000 to 215,000 (standing) personnel, the report outlined a plan to modernize the military, implement force restructuring and revamp its operating concepts. The AVF is Taiwan's means of reconciling geopolitical realities with manpower constraints.

THE CASE FOR CONSCRIPTION IN SINGAPORE

Brief History of NS

When Singapore gained independence in 1965, a pall of gloom loomed instead of celebration. Singapore was asked to leave the Malayan Federation in 1965 due to intractable ideological differences between Singapore's state government and the Malayan federal government. De-facto independence was thrust upon us. It was easy to see why Singaporeans feared for their future then. We had lost an economic hinterland in Malaysia. More critically, Singapore is a small island nation. Measuring about 43km from east to west and 23km from north to south, Singapore sorely lacks strategic depth. Apart from a minimal British military presence, Singapore had no means to

defend its nascent independence. Furthermore, the painful memories of the Japanese Occupation during WWII and the regional uncertainty due to Indonesia's policy of *Konfrontasi* made defense a critical issue. Conscription was the only means for Singapore to build up defense capabilities quickly at minimal cost to the fragile economy. In 1967, Singapore called up all 18 year old able-bodied males for NS. Initially, only 10% of eligible males underwent military service due to limited facilities and trainers. The remaining 90% served part-time in any of three forces—the People's Defense Force, the Special Constabulary or the Vigilante Corps. After more camp facilities were built, Singapore transitioned to a compulsory universal military service system.³⁰

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The Continued Relevance of NS in the Current Geopolitical Context

Today, the regional geopolitical situation is markedly improved. Growing economic interdependence in Asia and the presence of major powers in the region have helped maintain decades of relative peace since WWII and the Vietnam War. However, this stability cannot be taken for granted over the next five to six decades. While Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states have agreed to work towards an ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the security aims are limited to establishing guidelines for conflict resolution through nonviolent means, exploring avenues for confidence building, and strengthening cooperation in addressing nontraditional security issues, particularly in combating transnational crime and trans-boundary challenges.³¹ The APSC currently envisioned does not go as far as to establish a security bloc such as NATO, in which an attack on one member is considered an attack on all.

Most importantly, Singapore's inherent vulnerability as a small island state remains unchanged. It is therefore indisputable that Singapore requires strong defense capabilities. However, are mass armies raised through conscription still relevant in the hi-tech modern battlefield? While this question deserves a full article of its own, this author's belief is unequivocally "yes." After all, while American and European military powers have trended towards "military demassification," Gray attributes this to an "extreme sensitivity to casualties." Gray cautions that regular warfare goes beyond combat and is in effect a contest of wills. In this regard, there is no better manifestation of national will than the collective spirit of a citizen army. Although modern warfare has shifted towards precision targeting and decisive maneuvers enabled by real-time battlefield awareness, when casualties mount, the ancient virtues of mass become very clear.³² Moreover, despite their rejection of peacetime conscription, the US, the UK and France still retain constitutional rights to conscript their citizens for exigencies of war. Conscription comes at a price that these countries are unwilling to pay in peacetime, but not in war.

Cadre/Conscript System: A Natural Fit for Singapore

In recognition of these hard truths, Singapore's NS system has enabled Singapore to build up a sizable standing force and transfer well-trained conscripts into the reserve force. We have come a long way since the first batch of 900 draftees in 1967. At the turn of the new millennium, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had a standing force of 50,000, comprising regulars and Full-Time National Servicemen (NSFs), and a reserve force of 300,000 Operationally Ready NSmen.³³ Singapore's unique military system is modeled after the Cadre/Conscript system. Other forms of military systems are unsuitable for Singapore. While militia forces theoretically offer the quickest response against a military threat at the border, it is more useful for large countries with long borders. Given

Singapore's small size, it becomes very efficient to centrally manage the military training of conscripts. An expansible military system would be disastrous for Singapore. Given our lack of strategic depth, Singapore does not have the luxury of time that major powers have to raise sufficient divisions for total war. Moreover, the lack of training space in land-scarce Singapore makes it impossible to train large intakes of fresh draftees prior to war. An AVF is also not possible. Singapore's population of close to four million is too small to raise a sizable AVF without detrimental effects on our economy. In contrast, Taiwan, which will be scrapping conscription in favor of an AVF, has a population of about 23 million. Therefore, only the Cadre/Conscript model is viable in Singapore.

Singapore's NS Training System

Singapore's NSmen are well-trained and professionally competent. This is in no small part due to Singapore's long NS duration—two years of full-time NS, followed by a ten-year Operationally Ready National Service (ORNS) training cycle.³⁴ The ten-year NS unit training cycle is divided into three stages, each lasting three to four NS years. First is the *Strengthening Stage*, which focuses on individual and team proficiencies to maintain operational readiness. Second is the *Sharpening Stage* which focuses on unit proficiency, culminating in an evaluation of the unit's warfighting capabilities with the aid of a "Red" opposing force. The final *Sustain Stage* maintains operational readiness while increasing focus on integrated training. At the end of the training cycle, the NS Unit will transfer to the operational reserves.³⁵ Singapore's NS duration and NS training cycle training obligations were reviewed and reduced to current levels by the Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) in 2004 and 2005 respectively. The key driver for the reduction in NS duration is the SAF's transformation into the Third Generation SAF, a force that makes greater use of superior technology in areas such as comprehensive surveillance, battlefield awareness, precision strikes

and network-centric warfare. Our well-educated citizens are capable of maximizing these technology force multipliers. Moreover, the use of simulators, war gaming systems and computer aided instruction has enhanced training effectiveness while saving time.³⁶ It is also important to note that the NSmen serve in the same unit throughout their service. This allows NSmen to build strong trust and rapport in their NS unit over the years, as compared to pooling a bunch of strangers together just prior to engaging in military operations.

Singapore's Key Principles of NS

The success of Singapore's NS system can be attributed to our strict adherence to three key principles.³⁷ First, NS must be for *meeting a critical national need* as it comes at considerable cost both to the individual and nation. That critical need is *national security and our survival*. Second is *universality*. All young Singaporean males who are fit to serve are conscripted. If we have a system in which some are conscripted but others are not, there will be strong feelings of unfairness. Singapore has no civilian service option, which dilutes the impetus for conscription in the first place. The French and German experience with civilian service has contributed towards the demise of their conscription systems. Third is *equity*. All NSmen are treated the same way, regardless of background or status. Deployment in NS is determined by where each serviceman is most needed, according to the needs of national defense. Furthermore, MINDEF considers each deferment request on the basis of equity so that no male citizen will be disadvantaged in terms of career or further studies as a result of NS. The commitment of our NSmen might be undermined if any of these principles are flouted.

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Recognizing and Engaging our NSmen

MINDEF makes a concerted effort to recognize and enhance the contributions of NSFs and NSmen, their families and their employers to Total Defense. For example, recreational and sport facilities in Singapore Armed Forces Recreational Association (SAFRA) clubs and golf courses at the National Service Resort and Country Club have been built for NSmen and their families. Employers who have been supportive of NS, NS policies and their employees' NS activities are also given public recognition in the form of SAF awards. MINDEF has created several online portals catered to NSmen and their employers. Factual clarifications on NS and online administrative transactions are easily accessible on these web pages, making it convenient for NSmen and their employers to support NS. Fitness facilities have also been built in residential areas, making it easier for our NSmen to keep fit beyond their call-up periods. NSmen are also given monetary incentives. These include increases in NSF allowances, NSmen bonuses and the National Service Recognition Award (NSRA).³⁸ MINDEF also sources for feedback

on improving engagement through the Committee to Recognize the Contribution of Operationally Ready NSmen to Total Defense (RECORD). Since 1990, five RECORD committees have convened. Many of RECORD's recommendations have been developed into incentives, privileges and awards that NS stakeholders now enjoy.

It is also important to engage the hearts of NSmen and not just their minds. This is important as the new generation of NSmen are more questioning, and are keen to know how their NS roles contribute to Singapore's continued prosperity. Commanders will play a key role in this effort and will be allowed to "experiment." A good example of

this is the shifting of the Basic Military Training (BMT) Graduation Parade to the Marina Bay Floating Platform. Recruits used to mark the end of BMT by ending a 24km route march on Pulau Tekong parade grounds. Now, recruits march into the heart of the Central Business District, overlooking the Marina Bay skyline, and will be welcomed by a crowd of supportive parents and girlfriends. The feedback has been positive. Recruits have indicated that they have a better sense of what they are protecting.³⁹

CONCLUSION

Maintaining a compulsory military service comes at a high price, hence many modern democracies have done away with conscription. However, history has time and again validated the importance of conscription in a conventional war scenario. Given Singapore's inherent vulnerabilities, a universal conscription system is a natural fit for Singapore. Despite the cost, Singapore has the political will to follow through. The strongest indicator of this is the fact that Singapore's defense budget has consistently remained at 4-5% of Gross Domestic Product, one of the highest in the Asia-Pacific. Singapore's 2011 defense budget of \$12.08 billion also represents about 25% of the overall government budget.⁴⁰ There is also broad support for NS. In a 2010 survey, more than 90% of Singaporeans said they will defend the country should it come under threat.⁴¹ Some 45 years since its inception, NS is considered a rite of passage for all Singaporean males entering adulthood. However, this cannot be taken for granted. The decline of conscription in several countries which were strong proponents of military service reminds us that it is critical to adhere to the three key principles of NS—*meeting a critical national need, universality, and equity*. The contributions of NSmen, their families and employers must continue to be recognized. Commanders will also need to find meaningful ways to engage the hearts of our NSmen. These measures will constitute a multi-pronged approach to enhance the commitment of our NSmen and Singaporeans to NS and Total Defense. 🌐

ENDNOTES

1. Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 183.
2. *Ibid.*, 23.
3. *Ibid.*, 45-47.
4. *Ibid.*, 50-51.
5. Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 9.
6. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, 42-43.
7. *Ibid.*, 52-53.
8. After the defeat of Napoleon, France reverted to a class-based professional army. The conservative Bourbon rulers who took over from Napoleon feared the revival of popular uprising and trusted a professional force as opposed to short-service conscripts to suppress rebellions. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, 55-56; George Q. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain and the United States* (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), 17.
9. In the first two years of WWI, Great Britain continued to rely on volunteers; its regular army stood at 247,432 men in 1914 before fighting began. US only had only 133,111 regulars before conscription was adopted in May 1917. By the end of WWI, 3.5 million US soldiers accounting for 72% of the US armed forces had been drafted. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 30-33.
10. *Ibid.*, 36-38.
11. *Ibid.*, 29-33.
12. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, 82.
13. *Ibid.*, 83.
14. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 37-38.
15. *Ibid.*, 50, 60.
16. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, 83.
17. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 235.
18. *Ibid.*, 220.
19. *Ibid.*, 221.
20. While the TA was structured as a "force of last resort" to be activated only in an invasion or general war, it has assumed a higher profile and become a "reserve of first choice" since the late 1990s. The TA has been engaged in overseas operations alongside the all professional British Army in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. "Territorial Army," *British Army Website*, 14 January 2012, <http://www.army.mod.uk/territorial/1650.aspx>.

21. Like the UK, the US has also recast the AVF from a “strategic reserve role” to a fully integrated and critical part of the operational and expeditionary Army. *The United States Army Reserve 2011 Posture Statement*; 14 January 2012, http://issuu.com/warrior-citizen/docs/2011-arps/3?mode=a_p; Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy*, 235-238.
22. Jean-Philippe Lecomte, “The Rise and Death of Conscription: The Case of France” in *The Changing Face of European Conscription*, ed. Pertti Jeonniemi (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 73-75.
23. *Ibid.*, 78.
24. *Ibid.*, 78-79.
25. Cindy Su, “Taiwan at Crossroads in Relationship with China”, *BBC News*, 21 May 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10122592>.
26. *Republic of China National Defense Report* (Taipei: MOND, 2011), 69-70.
27. *Ibid.*, 19.
28. *Ibid.*, 84.
29. *Ibid.*, 103, 116-118.
30. “History Snippets, 1951 to 1980 (Birth of the SAF),” Singapore Ministry of Defense, 20 December 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/history/birth_of_saf/v01n03_history.html.
31. *ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2009), <http://www.asean.org/5187-18.pdf>.
32. Colin S. Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Orion Publishing, 2005), 205-211.
33. *Defending Singapore in the 21st Century* (Singapore: MINDEF, 2000), 27.
34. NSmen can be recalled for up to 40 days of in-camp training during each year of the ten-year NS training cycle. “National Service Training System,” *The NSmen Website*, 20 December 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/nsmen/opsready/NSTS.html.
35. *Ibid.*
36. NSF service duration was previously between 2 to 2.5 years. The ORNS training cycle used to be 13 NS years. “Factsheet – Frequently Asked Questions on Full-Time National Service Duration,” *MINDEF*, 20 December 2011, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2004/jun/15jun04_nr/15jun04_fs.html.
37. Ministerial Statement on NS by then Minister for Defense Teo Chee Hean, 16 January 2006, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/news_and_events/nr/2006/jan/16jan06_nr.html#Principles%20of%20National%20Service.
38. The NSRA is a monetary award of a total of between \$9,000 and \$10,500 for each citizen NSman by the time he completes his ORNS training cycle. The award will be disbursed equally at three significant milestones during service. Eligible NSmen will each receive \$3,000 at each of the milestones viz. (1) completion of NSF, (2) mid-point of ORNS training cycle, and (3) completion of ORNS training cycle. “FAQs – National Service Recognition Award for Singapore Citizens,” *MINDEF*, 21 December 2011, <http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources/faqs/nsra.html>.
39. Saifulbahri Ismail, “NSmen Engagement Must ‘Evolve,’” *Channel News Asia*, 30 June 2011, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/1138171/1/.html>.
40. *Budget Highlights Financial Year 2011*, (Singapore: Ministry of Finance, 2011), 10.
41. Ismail, “NSmen Engagement Must ‘Evolve.’”



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