The Iran
Iraq
(1980 88) War
An Examination of War Termination Theories
by MAJ Dexter Teo Kian Hwee
The Iran-Iraq War started on 22 September
1980. Initially, most countries treated this war as nothing
more than border skirmishes between two neighbouring countries
and were also quick to label Iran as the aggressor then
(not surprising after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in
1979). After eight long years of fighting, the war finally
ended when both Iraq and Iran accepted UN Resolution 598
in August 1988. This ended the eight-year Gulf War, the
longest and bloodiest conflict between two Third World states
in the post-1945 era. Iraq was eventually criticised for
breaching international security and peace and was also
accused of aggression against Iran.1
From border skirmishes to the use of
chemical weapons, the involvement of Superpowers and the
enormous loss of resources, this Iran-Iraq war was terminated
without any clear winner and loser. So why did the war stop?
This paper will examine some key events or opportunities
during the war period which Iraq or Iran could have used
to end the war earlier. Thereafter the paper will also discuss
why the war did not end earlier despite the opportunities,
before we proceed to discuss the War Termination Theories.
Definition of Terms
The term "termination of war",
in simple terms, refers to the end of fighting. In general,
there are four common ways of terminating a war and they
are: ceasefire or suspension of arms, armistice, capitulation,
and unconditional surrender. While there were opportunities
for this Iraq-Iran War to end earlier, it did not happen.
Key Events that
Might Have Terminated the War Earlier
In the following paragraphs, we will discuss
three significant events or opportunities that might have
allowed Iran or Iraq to seek to an early end to the war.
First, both Iran and Iraq agreed to a ceasefire
agreement on attacks on civilian targets on 18 February
1984. But neither Iran nor Iraq used this agreement to extend
the ceasefire to permanently terminating the war. Instead,
there was an escalation of war in February May 1984,
when Iraq introduced and made extensive use of chemical
weapons and attacked Iranian oil export facilities in Kharg
Island and tankers to temporarily cut much of Iran's oil
exports. Iraq then immediately sought a ceasefire. However,
it was not surprising that Iran refused and vowed to fight
back despite the further economic setback. Iran retaliated
by attacking ships and tankers in the Southern Gulf waters.
With this, all earlier agreed ceasefires ceased.
Next, the crash in oil prices severely
limited the cash which Iran required for essential military
and civilian needs in the winter of 1985-86. The situation
was so severe that the Islamic Republic considered it prudent
to cease fighting. At this point in time, it was generally
believed that the new Iranian system had become so established
that it could absorb a dramatic reversal of war policy.
Overall, the conflict had provided Khomeini with an opportunity
to consolidate the Islamic Revolution, but he also was quick
to realise that ordinary Iranians were becoming war-weary.
He realised that imposing further economic austerity on
the people, combined with a measure of coercion to prosecute
the war effectively would erode the mass base that his regime
enjoyed. With this, he reckoned that a stage had been reached
when continuing hostilities would damage the revolution
rather than strengthen it.2
He therefore accepted a truce. However, the truce did not
last long and the "elusive" termination of this
war never had a chance at all. Having emerged from the war
more united and cohesive than before, Iraq raided Kharg
Island again in September October 1986 and attacked
Iran's Larak oil terminal in November 1986 to temporarily
cut Iran's oil export again. Now, despite the further economic
setback, Iran was determined to fight back, and before long,
the "war of cities" resumed.3
Finally, there were the battles at Iraq's
Fao Peninsula. The surprise attack on Fao by Iranian troops
in February 1986 and the successful repulsion of Iraqi counter-attacks
marked one of the major turning points in the war. Fao raised
serious doubts in the region, as well as in Moscow and Washington,
about Iraq's ability to use its qualitative military superiority
effectively. Besides having a population three times more
than Iraq, the less well-equipped Iranian forces also appeared
to be much more highly motivated than those of Iraq. The
breakthrough at Fao only seemed to confirm that an Iranian
victory was possible and was a matter of time. However,
Iran's subsequent attacks did not make much headway after
Fao, and in April 1988, the Iranian forces were in turn
driven out of Fao. Until then, Iraq had always deliberately
sought to avoid high casualty rates for fear of undermining
the already tepid popular support for the war.4
But in Fao in 1988, the Ba'th regime signalled the change
in its commitment and Iraq seemed ready and committed to
continue this war further.
Why the War Did
Not End Earlier
Having noted that there were opportunities
for the war to end earlier, one might wonder why it did
not happen then. In reality, there were other factors that
might have prolonged the war intentionally or unintentionally.
These factors included achieving the war aims, the behaviour
of the state leaders during the period, the support of the
populace and the military capabilities then and, finally,
the external factors. We shall now examine and discuss these
factors accordingly.
First, neither Iran nor Iraq was close
to achieving their war aims during the eight-year war. Iraq's
war aim was simply to destabilise and overthrow the Iranian
regime through the invasion,5
while Iran's war aim was to destroy the Iraqi war machine
and the removal of the Ba'th regime in Baghdad with the
hope that this war would become a prime instrument for exporting
the Islamic revolution.6
During the war, none of the countries had achieved decisive
victory that would threaten the other country to surrender
or agreed to a peace settlement. For example, none of the
countries had captured or gone as far as to threaten the
capitals Baghdad or Tehran itself. All the fighting only
happened around the border regions. In fact, if the war
aims were not achieved, it would be disastrous for either
country's leaders to answer to their long-suffering populace
for ending the war.
Second, the continued in-power of the two
most strong-headed and aggressive leaders Saddam Hussein
in Iraq and Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran would imply that
to achieve peace was never going to be easy. To these two
leaders, anything short of victory would be unimaginable
and tantamount to political suicide. From the start of the
war till the end in 1988, these two leaders remained in
power. If it was not for other reasons, which we would discuss
later, the war might have continued for many more years.
Next, there was the involvement of the
superpowers in the Gulf from the onset. While none of the
superpowers had actually sent any troops to participate
in this war, they had nevertheless exerted a significant
influence on the course of the conflict. Although both the
United States and the Soviet Union had different agendas,
they had nevertheless provided financial support, necessary
weapons and war materials to Iraq at critical times. For
the United States, apart from its main reason being its
hostility towards the Islamic Revolution in Iran, supporting
Iraq in the war meant that the United States and its Gulf
allies had also succeeded in breaching the special relationship
between Baghdad and Moscow.7
As for the Soviet Union, ensuring that Iran would not win
the war would ensure that Iran's Islamic influence and the
spread of Muslim fundamentalism would not reach the southern
Soviet republics. With these external factors, immediate
ceasefire was not going to be any sooner.
The War Finally
Ended
This war is known to be a bloody and an
expensive conflict. Towards the end of the war, both Iran
and Iraq were feeling the effects of this prolonged war.
When the war eventually ended in August 1988, both countries
had suffered the following. On the number of casualties,
it was estimated that the total war dead was 262 000 Iranians
and 105 000 Iraqis. With another 700 000 injured, this summed
up to a total of over one million casualties for the two
countries.8 On the direct
monetary costs, Iraq spent between US$74-US$91 billion on
the conduct of the war and another £41.94 billion
on military imports, whereas Iran's costs were US$94-US$112
billion and £11.26 billion respectively. As for the
indirect cost due to the loss of income from oil and agricultural
produce, it was estimated that the sums were US$561 billion
and US$627 billion for Iraq and Iran respectively.
In mid-1987, there were several indications
that the Iranian leaders were at least reassessing their
approach to the war. First, Iran's willingness to tolerate
the superpowers' decision to escort Kuwaiti shipping suggested
that Iran somehow welcomed the diversion in a sideshow of
the war rather than concentrate on the serious prosecution
of the war on land. Second, Iran's unwillingness to reject
the Security Council Resolution of July 1987 outright but
sought modifications was also indicative of a change in
attitude. Third, Iran's still ambiguous war aims had nonetheless
been modified over previous months; the demand for the removal
of Saddam Hussein still stood, but the insistence on the
removal of the Ba'th regime, reparations, and the installation
of an Islamic republic had disappeared. And finally, the
stream of volunteers for the front had dwindled and Iran's
leaders, notably Rafsanjani, had begun to talk publicly
in mid-1987 of terminating the war unless it began to interfere
with the political administration of its society.9
Eventually, two sets of events catalysed Iran into the decision
to seek a quick ceasefire in mid-1988; first, Iraqi's intensive
use of long-range missiles on Iranian cities, and chemical
weapons especially on 28 March 1988 when 5 000 Iranians
were killed in Halabja; and second, a change in the balance
of power on the ground particularly in the loss of Fao to
Iraq in April 1988 which shattered the morale of Iranian
forces.
Also, towards the end of the war, Iran's
vast demographic advantage of 3:1 was not much in evidence
at the battlefield. While Iraq was able to increase its
manpower by some 150 000 men and expand and reorganise its
forces from 30 to 39 infantry divisions between 1986 and
1988, Iran's manpower, on the other hand, had fallen by
100 000 men in the same period. A declining pool of volunteers
in Iran resulted in greater reliance on conscripts, but
they could not match the former in zeal. Coupled with difficulties
in getting logistical support, ceasefire seemed like a possible
option to Iran now, especially after losing the psychological
belief that its mass manpower superiority could fight an
attrition war.
Since June 1982, Iraq had declared truces
and ceasefires a few times, and on occasions unilaterally,
hoping to end the war early. These happened mainly after
realising that they were not going to achieve the expected
swift victory, and Iraq would face serious economic problems
should the war prolong, something which they had not anticipated.10
Finally in early 1988, Iraqi sought to end the war through
an escalation of war effort. To achieve this, the Iraqi
used chemical weapons on Halabja, recaptured the Fao peninsula
and drove the Iranian forces out of Majnoon islands. Suddenly
the Iraqis seemed "alive and rejuvenated" to continue
the war effort when the Iranians seemed to have lost their
initial zest. And when Iran accepted the UN Resolution 598
in July 1988, Iraq readily agreed to the ceasefire and abided
to the resolution accordingly.
The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and
the UN Security Council (UNSC) had always wanted this war
to terminate. In particular the GCC, if it had its way,
would never have allowed this war to happen in the first
place. Oil exportation through the Gulf faced too much risk
when the two "superpowers" of Middle East locked
horns. The answer of the GCC states seemed to be that Iraq
must be pressed towards compromise while Iran must be reintegrated
into the region. To achieve this, GCC would use all means
including financing any war damage claims by both Iran and
Iraq, in order to ensure termination of the war. This offer
provided both Iran and Iraq good "excuses" to
end the war without having to admit defeat and yet have
the money to reconstruct their countries.11
Having discussed the events that might
have ended the war earlier and the eventual end of the war,
we will now examine the four termination of war theories
vis-à-vis the eventual end of the war.
Theory on Cost Benefit
Explanations
This theory states that the warring countries
will only terminate a war when their leaders calculate that
the costs of continuing exceed the value of their war aims.
Both Iran and Iraq had suffered enormously
in terms of casualties and monetarily. As discussed earlier,
this war was known to be a most bloody and expensive war.
Both countries had a total of over one million casualties12
and monetary wise, the eight-year war had cost both Iraq
and Iran in excess of US$700 billion each. It was definitely
a very high price to pay in trying to achieve one's war
aim.
Iraq's war aim was simply to destabilise
and overthrow the Iranian regime through the invasion.13
However, instead of achieving victory swiftly as expected,
Iraq was dragged into a prolonged war with Iran. One might
say that Iraq had "forsaken" its war aim since
June 1982 when it first declared its unilateral withdrawal
from Iranian territory. Alas, the war continued for eight
long years during which Iraq faced serious economic problems
that had not been anticipated. Finally in 1988, Iraq hoped
that through escalation of its war effort, it could force
Iran to negotiate an end to the war. On this count, one
might say that the main motivation for Iraq to seek a quick
end to this war was the high cost associated with it.
As for Iran, although its announced war
aim was to destroy the Iraqi war machine and the removal
of the Ba'th regime in Baghdad, it had also always hoped
to use this war as a prime instrument to exporting the revolution.14
However, Iran's ill-equipped military was always going to
face much difficulty against the formidable military forces
of Iraq. With the war prolonged beyond anyone's expectation,
Iran's economy was largely devastated and the civilian population
had suffered and were severely exhausted. As the war went
on, the gap between Iran's military needs and its political
aims widened. Eventually, Khomeini realised that the war
had reached a stage that continuing hostilities would damage
the revolution rather than strengthen it. Khomeini had therefore
reckoned that the cost in continuing the war had far exceeded
the benefit in achieving its war aim.
Winners and Losers
Theory
This theory postulates that war ends when
one state wins the war and the other state is defeated,
i.e. there is a clear-cut victor and loser. In this instance,
the loser is defeated and no longer poses a military threat
as its war fighting capabilities are destroyed.
This war did not weaken the Iraq military.
Iraq had in fact emerged from the eight-year conflict a
far stronger power: its ground forces grew from 200 000
troops (12 divisions employing 2 750 tanks) in 1980 to some
955 000 troops (50 divisions and 6 000 tanks) in 1988. The
Iraqi Air Force had also been increased during the same
period from 322 fighting aircraft to 500. This formidable
force was far better equipped than in 1980 and had also
acquired substantial operational experience.15
As for Iran, its ground forces growth was
"caught up" by the Iraqis, despite its superior
manpower mass. Although Iran had an eventual strength of
one million in 1988 as compared to 240 000 in 1980, it had
suffered heavy losses of tanks and combat aircraft. During
the war, it lost 600 tanks and 320 aircraft. Iran's final
figures stood at 1 150 tanks and 118 aircraft accordingly.16
Despite the losses, Iran had however not lost its overall
military capabilities and threatened to continue the war
with Iraq if necessary. For the stoical populace of the
Islamic republic, hardship and other privations such as
fuel rationing and electricity cuts were tolerable in the
cause of victory, not otherwise.
Hence with both countries still capable
of continuing the war if required, the Winners and Losers
Theory did not explain the end of Iran-Iraq War as expected.
Hawks and Doves
Theory
In this theory, the proposition explains
that if the "hawkish" fraction, who started the
war, is replaced by the "dovish" fraction, the
"dovish" fraction will seek to terminate the war.
And it is generally believed that military leaders are concerned
with victory and thus more prone to use force than the civilian
leaders. For the Iran-Iraq War, we will attempt to identify
the hard-line and the "moderate" group who might
affect Iranian policy only, since Iraq did not have any
change in its political leaders in this period.17
When Mohammad Ali Khomeini took over the
Iranian Presidency in August 1981, the change in leadership
did not end the war there and then. On the contrary, the
Iranians were even more determined to fight in view of Khomeini's
perceived spiritual leadership. The specific character of
Khomeini's Islamic Revolution constituted a powerful moral
asset in repelling the Iraqi attack.18
Even till the day that Iran accepted the ceasefire in the
war, Khomeini had warned the regions' governments that,
"All of you be partners in the adventurism and crimes
created by the USA. We have not yet engaged in any action
that would engulf the entire region in blood and fire, making
it totally unstable. You can be sure that you will be the
losers in this new chapter."19
Clearly, Khomeini was a "hawkish" leader and with
him assuming power in Iran then, the Iran-Iraq War was not
going to end any sooner. Hence it is not necessarily true
that a civilian leader is less prone to use military force
to resolve conflicts.
On 3 July 1988, a fortnight before accepting
a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, the powerful speaker of
parliament (since July 1980) and military Commander-in-Chief
(since Jun 1988) Hashemi Rafsanjani said that Iran's new
priority was to break out of international isolation. He
had long believed that the major casualty of this war had
been the creditability of the Islamic Republic among its
own rank and file. He believed that the longer the war prolonged,
the more Iran could no longer effectively call upon its
populace for crusades and sacrifices. It was for this reason
that Rafsanjani had indulged in pre-emptive self-criticism
of past policies long before the final ceasefire call in
1988.20 As a "dovish"
leader, Rafsanjani had taken a calculated but avoidable
risk in persuading the "hawkish" Khomeini to accept
the ceasefire.
In this Iran-Iraq War, there was no classic
case of a "dovish" leader taking over from a "hawkish"
leader in both countries to "facilitate" the termination
of this war. We had however witnessed a "dovish"
leader trying to end the war earlier although this took
him a few years to achieve. In this respect, this theory
did not explain the end of this war satisfactorily.
Second Order Change
Theory
This theory states that when leaders admit
to themselves that the future consequences of their war
course threaten other values which they hold dear, they
will decide to seek an end to the war.21
In essence, these leaders have undergone a psychological
process, which forces them to see the problem from a higher
or second order paradigm.
During this war, there was no clear incident
to show that the Iranian and Iraqi leaders had a paradigm
shift in their values, such as Japan's decision to surrender
after the atomic bombs in World War II. The closest this
war had in term of a dramatic policy change among the leaders
was that of the Iranian spiritual leader, Khomeini's decision
to end the war eventually.
In the initial years, economic hardship
and other privations such as fuel rationing and electricity
cuts were tolerable by the stoical populace of the Islamic
Republic only in the cause of victory and not otherwise.
Ending the war without achieving the war aim was unthinkable
at that point in time. However, by 1988, there was little
optimism about this goal. There were indicators that Iran's
soldiers were unwilling and unable to continue the fight,
and had lost a string of military battles in Fao, Shalamcheh,
Mehran and Majnoon. Coupled with a sense of isolation and
confrontation not only with Iraq but also with the whole
world, this only hastened Iran's decision to end the war
then.22 Finally in July
1988, realising that Iran was not going to win the war,
and continuing hostilities would damage the revolution rather
than strengthen it, Khomeini decided to end the war. However
to end the war without admitting defeat, Khomeini only accepted
the ceasefire after changing the war slogan from "exporting
the revolution" to that of "saving the revolution".
With this change, Khomeini effectively prepared his people
for the ceasefire and avoiding repercussions from his stoical
populace.
In this respect, the Second Order Change
theory failed to explain the termination of this war, as
none of the Iranian and Iraqi leaders had undergone any
psychological process that forced them to see the problem
from a higher or second order paradigm. In reality, Khomeini's
change of policy was more likely an attempt to "save"
himself from the repercussions of ending the war without
victory.
Conclusion
To Iran, the war was the main means of
rallying popular support behind the regime. The sudden announcement
by Tehran that it was accepting the ceasefire was greeted
with astonishment in the outside world but a resigned bewilderment
within Iran. In contrast to Iran's subdued reaction to the
ceasefire, Iraq loudly praised this development. The Theory
of Cost Benefit had explained the termination of this Iran-Iraq
War best. After all, the persistence of the war for nearly
a decade despite its exorbitant costs and against tremendous
odds could hardly be considered a demonstration of moderation.
The prolonged and painful process of disillusionment undergone
by the Iranian society and its political system during these
demanding years eventually culminated in the ceasefire in
the summer of 1988.23
This was submitted as a Commandant's
Research Paper during the 33rd Command and Staff Course.
Endnotes
1 Farhang Rajee,
Iranian Perspectives on the Iran-Iraq War, (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida, 1997), p. 3.
2 Dilip Hiro, The
longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict, (London: Grafton
Books, 1989), p. 259.
3 Ibid., p. 264-265.
4 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 16.
5 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Dilip Hiro, The
longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict, (London: Grafton
Books, 1989), p. 264-265.
7 Ibid., p. 265.
8 Ibid., p. 250.
9 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 20.
10 John Bulloch, The
Gulf War: Its Origins, History and Consequences, (London:
Methuen, 1989), p. 169.
11 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 130-132.
12 Dilip Hiro, The
longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict, (London: Grafton
Books, 1989), p. 250.
13 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 2.
14 Dilip Hiro, The
longest War: The Iran-Iraq Conflict, (London: Grafton
Books, 1989), p. 264-265.
15 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 10.
16 Hanns Maull, The
Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions, (London:
Pinter, 1989), p. 86.
17 Joseph A Engelbregcht
Jr, "War Termination: Why does a state decide to stop
fighting?", PhD Thesis, Columbia University, (Ann Arbour:
UMI Dissertation Services, 1993), p. 71-74.
18 Hanns Maull, The
Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions, (London:
Pinter, 1989), p. 67.
19 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 130.
20 Hanns Maull, The
Gulf War: Regional and International Dimensions, (London:
Pinter, 1989), p. 15.
21 Joseph A Engelbregcht
Jr, "War Termination: Why does a state decide to stop
fighting?", PhD Thesis, Columbia University, (Ann Arbour:
UMI Dissertation Services, 1993), p. 75-76.
22 Efraim Karsh, The
Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, (London: MacMillan
Press, 1989), p. 23.
23 Ibid., p. 2.
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MAJ Teo Kian Hwee Dexter is currently a
Planning Officer in G3 Army. An Field Engineer Officer by
vocation, he previously held the appointments of a Section
Head in HQ Singapore Combat Engineers (SCE) and S3 of a
SCE Battalion. He attended the 2nd Defence Technology &
Systems Course and 33rd Command and Staff Course in 2002.
MAJ Teo obtained a BSc (Information System and Technology)
from NUS in 1992.
