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Book Review:
Network Centric
Warfare Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority
by David S. Alberts, John J. Garseka and Frederick P. Stein
Reviewed by LTC Tan Kim
Seng
"Three men and a book with a new idea'
propounding the emerging concept of network centric warfare
this is what I call an integrated approach to harnessing
the best brains to realize an emerging concept of war. At
first glance on the title, readers would be intimidated
by the term "network centric warfare" as it could
easily be mistaken as another highly technical book just
like any thick computer book in the bookstore. On the contrary,
this book is just about how to fight a war intelligently
using information superiority and how to wire-up an entire
military organization's platforms, hardware, weapons systems
and doctrine to target the enemy without him even knowing
what hit him. The authors, I would say, wrote the book with
the noble intention to prepare the new generation of military
officers to "understand and articulate the power of
information superiority in warfare from a Joint perspective".
It is a timely book for the military to take a close look
at how we should use information technology closely in the
form of "information superiority".
It is also thought-provoking because, for
the past 60 years or so, since the unleashing of the German's
blitzkrieg and the evolution of modern strategy centered
on "manoeuvre warfare" through the synchronization
of the land, air and sea forces, there has not been any
specific theory on the use of information technology to
win wars at a minimum cost. Hence, this book has an interesting
appeal to the study of this relatively new emerging concept
of war.
This analytical work focuses on the myths
of network centric warfare (NCW), the "how" part
of harnessing the advantages of the information age, the
information age organizations that drive the concept of
a netcentric enterprise, how the military can ride on this
emerging concept, what are the paradigm shift in going into
a network centric warfare for the military and what is the
necessary criterias for a successful shift to the new way
of prosecuting a war. Finally, the authors concluded with
the final chapter for the readers to prepare for the "Journey
Ahead" to embrace this emerging concept into an operational
art.
The authors, in the introductory chapter,
started by defining NCW stating that it is "an information
superiority-enabled concept of operations that generates
increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers,
and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed
of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality,
increased survivability, and to a degree of self-synchronisation".
Quite a mouthful to understand the definition, but in essence,
what is defined, translates information superiority into
combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities
in the battlespace. Truly what the authors cautioned is
worth pondering, in that, in order to adopt this emerging
concept as an operational art, it requires a major "cultural
change" in the way we fight a war within the military.
A cultural change that is so drastic, we have to practically
see how we can restructure the military organizations, doctrinal
procedures, and operations to fight as an "integrated
entity". NCW is not about applying new technologies
to existing current platforms, organizations and the doctrine
of warfare. It goes way beyond this scope.
The authors set the stage with a thorough
discussion of the myths currently circulating the globe
about NCW. They discuss 11 myths. Surprisingly, the authors
humbly declare that they are not the experts on NCW and
therefore are not authorities on the subject. However, there
is also no one currently that is an expert on the subject.
By defining the myths and meticulously clarifying the concerns
surrounding each of the myth makes it all the more worthwhile
for us to read the book in depth. What really came out from
these clarifications is the fact that NCW is not the "ultimate
answer" or a panacea to win wars with our hands down.
NCW is about how we can get the most out of our people and
our national assets by "leveraging on information superiority".
As with any new emerging concept, there are always skeptics
and critics who will challenge and criticise the way ahead
for NCW but the authors contend that it is with this in
mind that NCW take off in a more fruitful way.
Drawing a parallel to the many experiences
and lessons learnt from various business organizations,
the authors rightly pointed out that the Information Age
has created such a fundamental change in the way we do business
that we should leverage on the power of information technology
to achieve competitive advantages; and, to survive and prosper,
one has to be responsive and agile. The information age
has resulted in "compressing the time dimension"
and "making distance less relevant" and the ascendancy
of information-enabled organizations. It has increased the
operating tempo and a proliferation of new instruments of
power throughout the world. Power lies in real-time awareness
which is of utmost importance in the business world; and,
like-wise for the military, if we want to know what the
enemy is doing, what his intention is and how to target
him quickly before he makes his next move. In order to illustrate
such a "real-time awareness " capability, the
authors studied these business organisations' operational
architecture for their daily transactions and how they collate
that daily information and act on it with punity to gain
a competitive edge over their business rivals. This operational
architecture encompasses three critical components:
-
A sensing capability which collects and fuses public
domain information on the market;
-
A transaction capability which contains several analytic
engines which essentially performs command and control
functions enabling the very high speed minutes to seconds
transaction timelines;
-
An information structure that is networked throughout
the market.
In a similar vein, the authors contend
that NCW recognizes the centrality of critical information
and its potential as a source of power for the military.
Hence, what is NCW does is that it is built around the concept
of sharing information and assets by networking the military
to create new types of information-based relationships with
and amongst the three Services of the Armed Forces and acting
"Jointly" to leverage on real-time information
in the modern battlefield. The way ahead is to build the
military as a "Netcentric Enterprise" and as in
the commercial world, it begins with an information infrastructure
or "infostructure" that will enable the creation
of shared battlespace and knowledge. This awareness in knowledge
is leveraged by new adaptive command and control approaches
and self-synchronising forces. The "bottom line"
in this NCW model is the ability to generate increased tempo
of operations, increased responsiveness, lower risks, lower
costs and increased combat effectiveness.
There are three key supporting concepts
to networking the military:
-
Using geographically dispersed forces to mass effects
on the battlefield;
-
A knowledgeable force endowed with an information
rich environment;
-
Effectively linking them and allowing access to high
quality information services.
In essence, NCW is about recognising the centrality of information
by specifying knowledgeable assets and by linking the military
forces into a single whole. It focuses on the importance of
interactions among battlespace entities that are necessary
to generate synergistics effects. NCW thus has the characteristics
to cope with today's dynamic nature of warfare.
By now the readers must be baffled by terms
such as infostructure, "battlespace entities", their
connectivity, nodes, actors and battlespace awareness and
the nature of information and products that are exchanged
etc. The authors explain all these terminologies, with a flush
of well annotated diagrams in the chapter Battlespace Entities
as they are fundamental to transforming NCW from an emerging
concept into a reality. It is also in this chapter, that the
authors pointed out the major difference between NCW and traditional
approaches to warfare. In NCW, actors (shooters) do not inherently
own sensors, and decision makers do not inherently own actors.
In NCW, all three types of entities work collaboratively in
response to the dynamics of battlespace to achieve the commander's
intent. It is not a "free for all" battlefield but
all assets are employed flexibly resulting in a more agile
military force. This is where a major "cultural"
change must take place within the military chain of command
that is steeped in the traditional way of war. A commander
does not have sensors, weapons platforms or actors assigned
"under command" or in "operational control"
to fight his campaign; on the contrary, he knows all these
assets are out there, waiting to be shared and synchronised
when called upon to act. This breaking of the "mindset"
is crucial to understanding and accepting NCW as a new way
to respond to the information age warfare.
As the chapters transcend to a more holistic
view of NCW at various levels of war, the authors explains
the "how" part of NCW in detail. How to develop
and maintain battlespace awareness and knowledge by capitalising
on processing capabilities and available real-time information
and how it translates into a common operating picture for
the commanders to fight their campaign intelligently. In short,
how NCW will reduce fratricide to better achieve connectivity
for the sensors and shooters what the U.S. Navy calls
"Co-operative Engagement Capability (or CEC) in their
on-going experiments in NCW. With this new CEC to enlarge
the engagement envelope, it naturally affect the way we envisaged
how command and control and execution are conducted with NCW.
Rather than call it "command and control" perhaps
in a netcentric operations, we should call it more appropriately
as "command and co-ordination" to exemplify the
speed of command in the way NCW offers to the ground commanders.
A typical example of CEC which is worth mentioning is how
it is enabled. CEC comprise the close coupling of an integrated
communications capability in the form of a Data Distribution
System (DDS), with a computational capability, in the form
of Co-operative Engagement Processor (CEP). This infostructure
provides a high performance backplane which is the key to
increasing the velocity of information among sensor,command
and control, and fire control nodes. This translates into
an increased combat power by changing the relationship between
battlespace and battle time.
Of course to realise the vision of NCW, an
initial heavy investment is necessary in the form of a warfighting
backplane that employs multimode data transport, including
military and commercial satellites communication capabilities,
multiple types of data links and radios, and commercial information
services. This investment will be costly, but once in place,
it will definitely put NCW into reality. It will change the
way we fight the dynamic battle and it will continue to challenge
the way we organise ourselves to face the future with confidence.
The many NCW challenges pointed out by the authors will propel
us to learn and innovate about future wars.
Finally, this book will continue to baffle
the uninitiated, dazzle the tech-savvy officers and challenge
the daring officers who dare to undertake this massive venture.
It is highly recommended for the new generation of officers
corps who apsire to command. The challenges posed by the authors
certainly have broad appeal and will definitely spur new grounds
for further experimentation in the military to think about
future wars. In my assessment, in time to come, this book
will join the ranks of military classics of warfare when the
emerging concept of netcentric warfare turns into a reality.
The abovementioned title is available for borrowing at the SAFTI MI Library. The catalog references are:
Network Centric Warfare Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority
David S. Alberts, John J. Garseka and Frederick P. Stein
U21.2 ALB
LTC Tan Kim Seng is currently a Branch Head
in G3 Army. He is a Guards officer by vocation and was previously
a CO of a Guards unit. LTC Tan attended the Command and Staff
Course at SCSC in 1994.
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