Was Japan a Mahanian
Sea Power in WWII ?
by MAJ Andrew Teo
When Japan emerged from its feudal isolation
to join the comity of nations in 1868, its influence had
counted for nought. However, in less than 30 years, Japan
had defeated China1 to become the leading Asian
nation. A decade later, Japan had defeated Russia2
to become a world power. By 1922, the Japanese empire had
included Taiwan, Korea, southern Manchuria and southern
Sakhalin, island territories in Micronesia, and numerous
concessions along China's coasts and rivers.
Fuelled by imperialistic ambitions,
the expanding Japanese empire threatened to engulf China
and the western colonial territories in Southeast Asia;
which in 1941, ultimately brought Japan into collision with
the West. In the seventy-three years since she discarded
her agrarian feudal past, Japan had risen to confront the
United States, the foremost industrial power in the world;
culminating in the Pacific War of WWII and the subsequent
annihilation of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) by the
US Navy.
This paper looks at Japan's role as
a sea power in WWII and more specifically evaluates Japan
against Mahan's concept of sea power.
Mahan's theory of Sea
Power
Before Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence
of Sea Power upon History, 1600 1783 3
was published in 1890, war at sea was perceived to be "merely
a situation in which great numbers of men or of ships fought
one another" 4. The perception that war
at sea was a political act, whose occurrence, shape and
rhythm should be determined by national policy was almost
unheard of. It was Mahan who first introduced the idea that
war at sea was always part of a broader conflict of purpose
and ideas; and fighting is merely an instrument to achieve
a particular purpose.
Mahan's theory that control of the sea
insured control of the land was subsequently verified by
the results of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Spanish-American
War (1898), and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Thereafter,
leading navies of the world based their strategy and for
many years, their tactics on the doctrines of Mahan, while
the statesmen of Japan and much of Europe accepted his evaluation
of sea power.5
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History
is about a hierarchy of three different but interrelated
concepts, explained and illustrated using history. At the
top of the Mahanian hierarchy is the concept of sea power.
Sea power consists of a series of interlocking factors,
which includes the size and strength of the naval fleet,
and the combined size of a country's commercial and naval
resources. Possession of a powerful navy allows a country
to acquire colonies and overseas possessions, which in turn
strengthens and expands its commerce, generating more wealth;
which consequently increases its strength and capacity.
Six critical elements make a country into a sea power :
geographical position, physical conformation, extent of
territory, population, national character and character
of government. Using the historical example of Britain,
Mahan concluded that being a great power meant being a sea
power and that sea power meant commercial and naval strength.
Next in importance to sea power is naval
power, which Mahan defines as fighting power at sea.
Three vital factors form the basis of naval power : position,
bases and the fleet. The country possessing superior naval
power will be able to exercise command of the sea,
which Mahan defines as "the possession of that overpowering
power on the sea which drives the enemy's flag from it,
or allows it to appear only as a fugitive; and which by
controlling the great common, closes the highway by which
commerce moves to and from the enemy's shores."
The final element of Mahanian hierarchy
is naval strategy, which determines how naval power
must be used in order to achieve the goal of command of
the sea. Mahan proposed that battle was the central act
of war at sea and "the enemy's ships and fleets are
the true objects to be assailed on all occasions".
The fleet is an offensive weapon and "War, once declared,
must be waged offensively, aggressively. The enemy must
not be fended off, but smitten down." Mahan's naval
strategy could thus be reduced to a matter of fighting a
single cataclysmic and decisive battle in which the victor
would be conferred command of the sea.
However, Mahan qualified that in the absence
of a decisive battle, an opponent could still be defeated
by exhaustion and strangulation through commerce destruction.
Mahan believed that the fundamental aim of naval strategy
was the destruction of commerce to break the enemy's economic
strength and deprive him of his power to continue resistance;
navies should deprive their enemy of commerce through blockade
and the capture of commerce. Ironically, Mahan was critical
of commerce raiding as he did not believe that the destruction
of individual ships of convoys was decisive enough to constitute
a threat to the economic power of a nation.
The final principle of Mahanian strategy
was concentration, which was essential if the mass of one's
own fleet was to be directed against fractions of the enemy's
at the decisive point. Concentration results from the interplay
of two factors : Geography and decisions. Geography might
confer a natural advantage or disadvantage in the deployment
and concentration of own forces; while decisions involve
making the necessary hard choices in both the tactical and
strategic dimensions on a scale of defensive and offensive
priorities.6
We shall now use these three interrelated
concepts of sea power, naval power and naval strategy to
evaluate Japan against Mahan's theories.
Japan with respect to
Mahan's elements of Sea Power
Geographically, Japan is strategically
positioned with access to important maritime trade routes
of the Pacific Ocean and East China Sea. It was for this
reason that the United States sent an expedition to Japan
in 1853; ending Japan's 250 years of national isolation
and making Japanese coastal waters into an American shipping
lane.7
With no land frontiers to defend, Japan's
extent of territory does not require a large army
to protect. Her efforts and resources could easily be focused
on building her sea power. Japan's physical conformation
offers natural harbours and protected waters, while her
limited resources would be a motivating factor for Japan
to develop her maritime trade.8
In addition, being an island nation, Japan
has always possessed a numerous seafaring population.
A large proportion of the navy's personnel were drawn from
the coastal districts involved in deep-sea fishing and whaling.
In addition, many men were also employed in Japan's shipbuilding
industry and her considerable merchant fleet.9
Although Japan's physical and demographic
characteristics had given her four of the six critical elements
of sea power identified by Mahan; the Japanese national
character, and the character of the Japanese government
were inclined towards developing Japan as a continental
power.
The imperialistic behaviour of the western
colonial powers had kindled Japanese's own imperialistic
fervour. Japanese national policy soon after the arrival
of the US expedition in 1853 was summed up by a Japanese
statesmen as follows : "As we are inferior to foreigners
in the mechanical arts, let us have intercourse with foreign
nations and learn their drill and methods of waging war.
Then, when our nation is amalgamated into one family, we
shall be able to make conquests overseas, and award captured
territory to those of our warriors who distinguish themselves
in battle." 10 Herein, lies the genesis
of Japan's military might and imperialistic ambitions.
Japanese Imperialism
and the Road to the Pacific War
Since 1890, Japan had consistently demonstrated
her imperialistic and expansionist ambitions on mainland
Asia. By 1918, Japanese wartime gains and interests in East
Asia had been recognised by the Treaty of Versailles.11
The United States had also acquiesced that "territorial
propinquity gave Japan a special position on the Asian mainland,
which she was entitled to protect."12
In 1931, Japan occupied the whole of Manchuria
and parts of northern China. Faced with international criticism
for her actions, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations
in 1933 and announced that "Japan intended to follow
her own path towards order in East Asia and a durable peace."
The "path" was to replace Western imperialism
with "coexistence and co-prosperity" for the Asian
people, which in reality was akin to a Japanese empire.
In 1936, Japan announced her "Fundamentals
of National Policy". Central to the policy was the
elimination of "the tyrannical policies of the powers
in East Asia" and the substitution of "cordial
relations" with the peoples of the area, "founded
on the principles of coexistence and co-prosperity".
There was to be "a strong coalition between Japan,
Manchukuo13 and China", as Japan extends
her interests into South East Asia. This policy clearly
pronounced Japan's aim of being the dominant continental
power in East Asia; with China and Manchuria within its
sphere of influence; and eventually extending into South
East Asia. China's refusal to accede to this policy resulted
in the 2nd Sino-Japanese War in 1937.14
The war in China had increased Japan's
demand for strategic materials such as oil, rubber and tin.
Sources of supply included the United States and South East
Asia; which by 1939, were fully committed to the war in
Europe. The Japanese government thus concluded that it was
necessary "to bring within her economic sphere areas
on the East Asian mainland and in the southern regions (which
include French Indochina, British Malaya and Netherlands
Indies)"; and that "Japan's role in such a sphere
must be more than economic", presumably similar to
what was being done in China and Manchukuo.
By May 1941, Japan had secured military
bases and economic privileges in French Indochina. However,
the Dutch in Indonesia, supported by US and Britain, had
rejected Japanese demands for larger quotas of oil. In response,
Japan moved substantial forces into southern Indochina,
which the US reacted with a freeze on all Japanese assets,
and a complete embargo on oil exports. The Dutch followed
suit with a ban on exports of oil and bauxite. The crippling
embargo left Japan with no choice but a southward thrust
into South East Asia and firmly on the road to Pacific War.15
Japanese Sea Power
From the analysis of Japanese imperialism,
it is evident that Japan neither saw herself, nor did she
aspire to be, a sea power. Her efforts right up to 1941
had been focused on extending her influence on mainland
East Asia as a continental power. Her southward thrust into
Indochina and South East Asia had been driven by her need
for strategic materials, especially oil, to sustain her
war efforts in China; while her pre-emptive attack on Pearl
Harbour had been driven by her perception that the US Pacific
Fleet stood in the way of her occupation of South East Asia.
Even so, by 1941, Japan possessed some
6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping; while her navy comprised
10 carriers and 371 warships. She was the most industrialised
Asian country with a highly developed shipbuilding industry;
which from 1941 to 1945, built an additional 4,100,000 tons
of merchant shipping, 17 carriers and 799 warships.16
Mahan had defined sea power as being the
strength of the navy, and the combined size of a country's
commercial and naval resources; and that the possession
of a powerful navy was to allow a country to acquire colonies
and overseas possessions, which in turn strengthens and
expands its commerce, thereby generating more wealth; which
consequently increases its strength and capacity further.
By the time Japan was strong enough to assert her influence,
the region had almost all been divided up among the western
powers, with the only areas remaining being mainland East
Asia (i.e. Korea, Manchuria and China).
As Japanese imperialistic ambitions could
only be fulfilled on mainland Asia, Japan thus viewed herself
as a continental power, rather than as a sea power. In addition,
Japan's lack of colonies and overseas possessions had severely
limited the growth and strength of her commerce; which according
to Mahan is an essential element of sea power, for "being
a sea power meant commercial and naval strength".
Japanese Naval Power
Although Japan did not view herself as
a sea power, she had nevertheless built a very formidable
navy. The IJN has its genesis in 1868, when the Meji government
created the Army and Navy under two separate and independent
service ministries; each responsible and reporting directly
only to the emperor.
Although early Japanese defence policy
adopted a doctrine that was rikushu kaiju17
(Army first; Navy second); Japanese naval victories during
the 1st Sino-Japanese War and Mahan's theory
of sea power18 gave navy leaders the impetus
and justifications to push for equal status for the navy.
Using Mahan's theory of sea power, the
Navy argued that "command of the sea was the prime
prerequisite not only for the defence of Japan, but also
for the expansion of Japan's interests on the Asian continent."
The Navy's command of Yellow Sea had allowed the Army to
land and occupy Korea, South Manchuria, Liaotung and Shantung,
resulting in the final defeat of Chinese forces.19
Consequently, there was no unified military
command for the two independent services, and each service
was free to make its own plans for force development and
war, resulting in severe inter-service rivalry between the
Navy and Army over national strategy, eminence and budget.
Pronouncing Japanese national strategy, the 1907 Imperial
Defence Policy statement (and its subsequent revisions in
1918, 1923, and 1936) formally perpetuated the inter-service
rivalry by endorsing that the Army prepare for war against
one enemy; while the Navy against another.20
This system of "independent services" enabled
Japan to develop into a formidable naval power, although
nationally Japan still sees herself as a continental power.
Japan's first major naval expansion program
from 1896 to 1905 was triggered by the Triple Intervention21
in 1895; which aim was to build a battle fleet comprising
six battleships and six battle cruisers (Six-Six Fleet).
From 1907 to 1922, the Japanese Navy adopted
an even more ambitious expansion policy; which aim was to
build a fleet of three squadrons, each consisting of eight
battleships and eight battle cruisers (Eight-Eight Fleet).
The naval budget rose in tandem from £ 2 million in
1905 to £ 50 million in 1920; which represented about
35 % of Japan's total national expenditure.22
These expansion programmes were very much Mahanian in nature,
being directed towards building a very powerful battle fleet;
revealing the Navy's belief that she will ultimately have
to fight the US Navy for supremacy of the Pacific.23
The frantic pace of Japanese naval expansion
only abated with the Washington Naval Treaty signed in 1922.
Although forced to accept a lower tonnage ratio of 5:5:3
against US and Britain, the treaty had ironically increased
the relative power and dominance of the Japanese Navy in
West Pacific as Japan continued to build up her Navy to
treaty limits.24
Ultimately, Japan aims to make herself
so strong that no foreign power will oppose her in China
in a repeat of the Triple Intervention. The Navy is the
shield behind which Japan hopes to dominate East Asia and
fulfil her long cherished ambition of gaining control over
China. Japanese naval policy was thus offensive in nature
and the growth of Japanese naval power coincided with vast
territorial penetration into China.25 By 1937,
the Navy's control of the Western Pacific had allowed the
Army to land at will along the coast of China and navigable
rivers, forcing Chinese forces to retreat into the interior.
All western aid to China by sea was cut off, forcing supplies
to be shipped to Rangoon and subsequently overland into
China via the Burma Road.
According to Mahan's definition, Japan
was the superior naval power within the narrow context of
the Western Pacific, with the ability to exercise "command
of the sea". Compared with US or Britain, geography
had given Japan the advantage of position; the Washington
Naval Treaty had given her the advantage of bases; and the
Atlantic War, relative fleet strength in Western Pacific.
However, Japan had used her superior naval power in support
of her national ambition of becoming a continental power;
primarily to project her Army onto mainland East Asia and
to prevent interference from western powers; rather than
to develop her sea power.
For six months after the surprise attack
on Pearl Harbour on 7 Dec 1941, Japan controlled the adjacent
seas and used her relative naval strength to expand into
the "southern resources area" (i.e. Philippines,
Malaya and East Indies). However, the expansion over extended
Japanese naval forces and Japan was unable to maintain control
of the seas, making her shipping vulnerable to a hostile
sea power. Japan was heavily dependent on imports for essential
raw materials, and the productive capacity of her factories
was also insufficient. Without adequate sea power Japan's
possession of land beyond the sea was not sustainable.26
On the other hand, although the US Pacific
Fleet had sustained heavy casualties during the attack on
Pearl Harbour, US's superior industrial capacity27
enabled her to replace battle losses and build up her forces
much more quickly than Japan. "The United States became
the preponderant sea power between 1941 and 1945.The ultimate
source of American sea power lies in the productive power
of the nation and the high calibre of the men who officered
and manned the ships."28 Hence, even if
the Japanese Navy had not suffered the loss of her carriers
at Midway, Japan would still be defeated eventually by the
superior sea power of the US.
Japanese Naval Strategy
During the Pacific War
Japan's war aims were clear : occupation
of the "southern resources area" in order to support
the war effort in China. Stage one of the war plans called
for the elimination of Allied forces in the Western Pacific
and South East Asia, enabling occupation of the "southern
resources area" and access to the region's strategic
resources. Stage two aims to destroy the US Pacific Fleet,
thereby securing Japanese occupied territories and control
of the Western Pacific.
The plan developed by the Commander-in-Chief
of the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, was simple but
comprehensive. A Pearl Harbour attack force would strike
the US Pacific Fleet at anchor, while simultaneously, a
South Sea attack group was to invade the Philippines and
British Malaya. A northern defensive group was stationed
to guard against Russia, and a south eastern group to capture
Guam and Wake. Meanwhile, the main body of the Combined
Fleet was retained under Yamamoto's personal direction in
the Inland Sea to maintain the coherence and security of
his widely deployed forces. With this plan, the Japanese
began the campaign in Dec 1941 with a sea, land and air
blitz that demonstrated the decisive influence of sea power
in the Western Pacific.29
The plan was clearly very offensive, and
as Mahan had advocated, involved using the seas to take
the offensive against the enemy. It also relied heavily
on the element of surprise and superior naval power to strike
a decisive blow on the enemy's fleet; giving the Japanese
"command of the sea" in the Western Pacific, albeit
temporarily. The attacks were also Mahanian in nature as
they were targeted primarily at the enemy's fleet, rather
than the vital shore installations at Pearl Harbour; such
as the fuel storage tanks and naval dockyards. This proved
to be a mistake as it allowed the Americans to recover quickly
from the attack, rapidly repair the damaged ships and deploy
them for action soon after.
The plan also revealed the Japanese Navy's
tendency to divide up its forces rather than concentrating
and deploying them in mutual support of one another as Mahan
had advocated. Finally, Mahan's definition of a decisive
victory was one which would confer "command of the
sea" on the victor. Although the attack on Pearl Harbour
had significantly reduced the strength of the US Pacific
Fleet, it did not give the Japanese control of the Central
Pacific as none of the American carriers were destroyed.
By the spring of 1942, Japan had completed
stage one of her war plans, and set out to accomplish the
next stage : elimination or neutralisation of those strategic
points from which the Allies could launch counteroffensives;
and secure Japanese occupied territories and control of
Western Pacific. By occupying islands in the Central Pacific,
Japan would possess a defensive perimeter running from Burma
through Sumatra, Java, Timor, Western New Guinea, the Carolines
and Marshalls, and Wake Island. The aim was to establish
a strong inner defence in the sea areas within this perimeter;
allowing Japanese light naval forces, submarines and land-based
air power operating from island bastions to attrite advancing
US naval forces; and finally engaging them with the Japanese
main battle line in a decisive battle to destroy them.30
This strategy was again very much Mahanian
in nature, with the conduct of a decisive naval engagement
as its central objective. The attrition of the US Fleet
was primarily to ensure a decisive victory of the Japanese
main battle line when the decisive engagement finally took
place. The establishment of the defensive perimeter using
island bases in the Central Pacific was also in line with
Mahan's concept of strategic lines, zones of control and
command of the sea.
However, in this stage, the Japanese Navy
met with serious reverses : first at Coral Sea; followed
by Midway; and finally at Solomon Islands. In each of these
battles, the Japanese Navy repeatedly demonstrated its propensity
to divide up its forces. At a time when the Japanese Navy
still held the preponderance of naval superiority, its failure
to concentrate its forces at the decisive point as advocated
by Mahan, had contributed significantly to its defeat in
these battles.31
A final aspect of Mahanian strategy that
had strongly influenced the Japanese was commerce raiding.
Like Mahan, the Japanese did not feel that commerce raiding
could be decisive in determining the outcome of war, and
thus did not provide sufficient protection for her merchant
shipping. Consequently, by 1945, the Allies had destroyed
90% of Japanese merchant shipping and interdicted Japanese
overseas import of strategic war materials, and caused Japanese
war production to reduce by some 50%.32
Conclusion
Based on Mahan's six critical elements
of a sea power, Japan clearly had the potential to be a
sea power, although she neither saw herself nor aspire to
be one. Her national character, character of government,
expansionist ambitions and efforts right up to 1941 had
all been continental in nature. Even her subsequent expansion
into Indochina, South East Asia and Central Pacific had
been driven by her need for strategic materials to sustain
her war efforts in China.
By the time Japan was strong enough to
exert her influence, the region had almost all been divided
up among the western powers, and her imperialistic ambitions
could only be fulfilled on continental East Asia. Hence,
although Japan had a formidable navy, it was used primarily
to support her national imperialistic ambitions on continental
East Asia, instead of strengthening her commerce through
the acquisition of maritime colonies and overseas possessions.
Japan's lack of commerce, reliance on overseas markets for
raw materials and limited industrial capacity had all limited
the growth and strength of her sea power.
As a naval power, Japan possessed all three
vital factors of position, bases and the fleet; and was
very much Mahanian in nature. The rapid expansion of her
battle fleet, especially in the numbers and size of capital
ships; the belief that she will ultimately have to fight
the US Navy for supremacy of the Pacific; and her ability
to exercise command of the sea within the context of the
Western Pacific were all characteristics of Mahanian naval
power. However, without adequate sea power, Japan's naval
power was eventually defeated by the superior sea power
of US.
Finally in terms of naval strategy, the
Japanese Navy was also very much Mahanian in nature. The
strategy of taking the offensive by attacking Pearl Harbour
in a decisive blow to gain control of Western Pacific, and
the targeting of battleships instead of vital shore installations;
her fixation on engaging the US Pacific Fleet in a decisive
naval battle; the establishment of the defensive perimeter
using island bases and application of Mahan's concept of
strategic lines, zones of control and command of the sea;
and the disregard of commerce raiding were in accordance
with Mahan's naval strategy. However, the propensity of
the Japanese Navy to divide up its forces and failure to
concentrate them at the decisive moment runs contrary to
Mahan's naval strategy.
Therefore, in conclusion, Japan was not
a Mahanian Sea Power in WWII. However, as a naval power
and in terms of naval strategy, the Japanese navy was generally
Mahanian in nature.
Endnotes
1 Sino-Japanese
War of 1894 to 1895.
2 Russo-Japanese War of
1904 to 1905.
3 Alfred Thayer Mahan
(1840 1914) codified the big navy philosophy of his
age in "The Influence of Sea-Power on History, 1600
1783".
4 Admiral Bradley Fiske,
Naval War College, USN, 1903.
5 CAPT W D Puleston, "Influence
of Sea Power in WWII", pp. 2
6 John Gooch, "Maritime
Command : Mahan and Corbett" in Seapower and Strategy,
pp. 28 35.
7 W. G. Beasley, "The
Rise of Modern Japan : Political, Economic and Social Change
since 1850"; pp. 27-28.
8 David Evans and Mark
Peattie, "Kaigun : Strategy, Tactics and Technology
in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887 1941", pp.
1-2.
9 Hector C. Bywater, "Sea-Power
in the Pacific; A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem",
pp. 178.
10 Hector C. Bywater,
"Sea-Power in the Pacific", pp. 134.
11 Wartime gains from
the 1st Sino-Japanese War (1894-5), the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-5), the annexation of Korea (1909) and German territories
seized during WWI (1914-8); and the interests acceded by
China in accordance to the "Twenty-one Demands"
(1915). By 1918, the Japanese empire had included Taiwan,
Korea, southern Manchuria and southern Sakhalin, island
territories in Micronesia, and numerous concessions along
China's coasts and rivers.
12 W. G. Beasley, "The
Rise of Modern Japan", pp. 157.
13 Under the Japanese
puppet regime of Pu Yi, the last Manchu emperor, Manchuria
was known as Manchukuo.
14 W. G. Beasley, "The
Rise of Modern Japan", pp. 193-195.
15 W. G. Beasley, "The
Rise of Modern Japan", pp. 200-202.
16 United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Abstract), Pacific War,
pp. 16-17.
17 This implied that in
war, the army would exercise overall command of Japan's
national defence; thereby giving eminence to the Army. (David
Evans and Mark Peattie, "Kaigun", pp. 4-7)
18 Mahan's "Influence
of Sea Power upon History" was translated into Japanese
in 1896, at a time when the navy, under the leadership of
Yamamoto Gombei, was fighting for equal status with the
army. (David Evans and Mark Peattie, "Kaigun",
pp. 20-25)
19 The application of
Mahan's theory to Japan's strategic situation was ill-founded.
Corbett's amphibious type strategy to overcome a strong
and resolute land power would have been more appropriate.
20 David Evans and Mark
Peattie, "Kaigun", pp. 149.
21 The Triple Intervention
in 1895 by Russia, supported by France and Germany, had
forced Japan to give up her wartime gains. (David Evans
and Mark Peattie, "Kaigun", pp. 5760)
22 Hector C. Bywater,
"Sea-Power in the Pacific", pp. 1517.
23 In 1920, the journal
Yorodzu wrote : "As the United States is devoting the
gigantic sum of £110,000,000 to enlarging her Pacific
Squadron, Japan is compelled, despite her limited financial
resources, to spend £86,000,000 on naval aggrandisement.
If American were not augmenting her naval armaments, Japan
would be at liberty to economise in the same direction.
It is, however, because of the American menace that we are
forced to enhance our naval power.". (Hector C. Bywater,
"Sea-Power in the Pacific", pp. 153-154)
24 The Washington Naval
Treaty fixed the tonnage of capital ships and aircraft carriers
of the five leading navies, and prohibited improvement of
facilities of naval bases in the Pacific triangle between
Taiwan, Singapore and the Philippines. The lack of bases
made it difficult for the USN to operate in the Western
Pacific; thus reducing the influence of US in East Asia.
CAPT W. D. Puleston, "Influence of Sea Power in WWII",
pp. 18-19.
25 Hector C. Bywater,
"Sea-Power in the Pacific", pp. 158.
26 CAPT W D Puleston,
"Influence of Sea Power in WWII", pp. 26-27.
27 The US industrial capacity
was ten times that of Japan; her naval shipbuilding about
four times greater; her aircraft replenishment rate about
eight times greater. (Margiotta, Franklin D. Editor, "Brassey's
Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography; Washington
: Brassey's 1994", pp. 1101 / Jeffrey G. Barlow, "WWII
: US and Japanese Strategies" in Seapower and Strategy,
pp. 252.)
28 CAPT W D Puleston,
"Influence of Sea Power in WWII", pp. 104.
29 CAPT W D Puleston,
"Influence of Sea Power in WWII", pp. 105-108.
30 Jeffrey G. Barlow,
"WWII : US and Japanese Strategies" in Seapower
and Strategy, pp. 253.
31 David Evans and Mark
Peattie, "Kaigun", pp. 489-490.
32 United States Strategic
Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Abstract), Pacific War,
pp. 17-22.
Bibliography
1. "The Rise
of Modern Japan : Political, Economic and Social Change
since 1850" by W. G. Beasley.
2. "Kaigun : Strategy,
Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887
1941" by David Evans and Mark Peattie.
3. "Maritime Command
: Mahan and Corbett" in Seapower and Strategy by John
Gooch, edited by Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett (London
: Tri-Service Press, 1989), pp. 27-46.
4. "Sea-Power in
the Pacific; A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem"
by Hector C. Bywater. (New York, Arno Press, 1970).
5. "WWII : US and
Japanese Strategies" in Seapower and Strategy by Jeffrey
G. Barlow, edited by Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett
(London : Tri-Service Press, 1989), pp. 245-272.
MAJ Andrew Teo graduated with B Tech(Hons)
in Electronics Engineering from NUS. He attended the 32nd
Command and Staff Course at SCSC and is currently a Section
Head in Naval Logistics Department.
