These proposals were the embryonic form
of what was later to become the "one country, two systems"
formula proposed by the then Paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping
in the 1980s. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) suppressed
all contact between the two sides, putting negotiations
on reunification on the back burners. Talks, this time with
President Chiang Ching-kuo6, resumed again in
the 1980s, initiated by Deng Xiaoping. These talks stopped
abruptly, soon after it started, when Chiang Ching-kuo died
in January 1988. His successor, President Lee Teng-hui was
less enthusiastic about reunification and was in part instrumental
in the increasing cross-strait volatility. Lee's lukewarm
reception to Chinese overtures for resuming negotiations
started to ruffle Beijing's feathers. But Beijing's accommodating
approach, giving Lee political space and time to consolidate
his new position as president, meant that an informal meeting
between the two sides did not materialise until 1992.
In 1992, China and Taiwan reached consensus
on "one China" through non-governmental organisations
acting as representatives of the two sides. In 1993, a milestone
meeting was held in Singapore between top negotiators from
the two sides Mr. Wang Daohan, chairman of Beijing's
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS)
and Mr. Koo Chen-fiu, head of Taipei's Straits Exchange
Foundation (SEF). In the absence of official contacts between
China and Taiwan, this meeting was to be the highest level
contact between the two sides in fifty years. The resulting
"one China" principle formed the core of the consensus.
Beijing's position read: "Both sides of the Taiwan
Strait uphold the one China principle and strive to achieve
national unification. In dealing with practical issues across
the strait, no reference will be made to the political implications
of one China." Taipei's position read: "In the
process of achieving national unification, both sides upheld
the 'one China' principle. As to the definition of 'one
China' both sides had different points of views."
7
Interpretations
If there is a phrase over which China and
Taiwan can go to war in the future, it is the term "one
China". The different perspectives and interpretations
of the term "one China" have continued to be the
source of cross-strait tensions. Until the era of Lee Teng-hui,
the term "one China" did not appear contentious
to both sides. Reunification was being negotiated through
established channels of communication between the two sides
from the 1960s through the 1980s, with China negotiating
first with Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently with Chiang
Ching-kuo. Under the earlier version of "one China
principle and four points", the contention was more
of four points, and less for the principle.8
However, since the Lee Teng-hui era, the interpretation
of the "one China" principle has become a subject
for achieving consensus. After consolidating his power,
Lee's pro-independence stance became more evident. In his
twelve-year presidency, "one China" was to be
given several meanings. The most controversial of these
was the "two states" theory, where Lee espoused
that Taiwan and China should relate on the basis of a state-to-state
status. This elevation of Taiwan's status as an equal rather
than subordinate partner to China challenges China's notion
of there being only one China in the world and that Taiwan
is part of it.9 Taiwan's new president, Chen
Shui-bian further elaborated that the civil war ended in
the creation of two polities; a Peoples Republic of China
(PRC) created by Mao Zedong and the previous Republic of
China (ROC) in the form of Taiwan.10 Hence Taiwan
had been a sovereign entity since the end of the civil war.
This provided a basis for his claim that no consensus was
reached on a common interpretation of "one China"
in the 1993 talks. The only consensus reached was an agreement
to disagree.11 Therefore, "without a consensus
on what consensus had been reached, it would be difficult
for Mr Chen to uphold it."12
China's Problematic
Strategies
To compound the problem of the contentious
"one China" principle, more crucially, China's
policy toward Taiwan in the post-Chiang Ching-kuo era appeared
problematic on three fronts; politically misjudging and
misreading Lee Teng-hui and his latent intentions, recklessly
engaging in coercive diplomacy, and being dictated by misguided
domestic policies. These factors, more than bridging the
straits divide, have distanced China and Taiwan further
from an amicable resolution.
Political Misjudgment
When Lee Teng-hui succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo,
Beijing's efforts at reunification were dealt a severe blow.
Deng Xiaoping had just resumed talks with Chiang Ching-kuo
when the latter died a short while later in 1988. In Lee
Teng-hui, China was dealing with a native-born Taiwanese,
whose background and political orientations were not known.
Lee himself was in the midst of a political struggle for
the leadership of the Kuomintang party (KMT). Beijing's
strategic miscalculation was to allow Lee the time and space
to consolidate his position within the KMT after he assumed
the leadership. To Beijing, delaying engagement with Taiwan
over the reunification issue was probably seen as of little
or no political cost, and more importantly, will be seen
as a benevolent gesture to Lee by waiting for him to resolve
his domestic power struggle before embarking on reunification
talks.13 Being of KMT heritage, Lee's position
on the "one China" principle was probably seen
as being similar to his predecessors, but once he consolidated
his position, China would find out slowly that this was
not so. In the time since he succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo
as President till his handover of the position to Chen Shui-bian,
Lee created sufficient controversies to undermine China's
trust and confidence in Taiwan's intent to uphold the "one
China" principle. His bid for a United Nations (UN)
seat, his travels overseas to several South East Asian and
Latin American countries in 1994 to push for his 'pragmatic
diplomacy', and his brash rhetoric attacking Chinese leaders,
clearly showed Lee as one who spoke from a platform of increasing
political strength.14 The strategic error of
giving political space to Lee was clearly recognised by
United States (US) Defence Secretary, William Cohen, who
in early 2000, urged China to move quickly to resolve tensions
with Taiwan while its new president was still in the early
stages of policy formulation. He said that if Beijing waited
too long to engage Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, that
"window of opportunity" may start to close. "I
think that time also is of the essence, that during the
first part of any new administration there is an opportunity
to achieve change."15 A strategically myopic
China was therefore frustratingly and unwittingly coerced
into a corner by Lee Teng-hui from where it tried to fashion
more aggressive and conflictual designs to reclaim the initiative,
sparking a furore from the international community.
Coercive Diplomacy
Having lost time and patience in cultivating
and persuading Lee Teng-hui in his early years, China appeared
later to have adopted a more coercive approach to resolve
the issue. China's display of force in 1995-1996 was a manifestation
of Chinese-style coercive diplomacy aimed at pressuring
Taiwan to concede through coercion. "The 1995-1996
Taiwan Strait confrontation was the closest the United States
and China have come to a crisis since the early 1960s."16
That crisis raised regional temperatures substantially and
threatened to spark a conflict involving the US. For China
to embark on such military action bordered on the reckless,
but equally telling was the US response in dispatching two
carrier groups to the vicinity that ended China's menacing
missile tests around Taiwan and helped defuse the crisis.
Although both sides subsequently claimed that they had achieved
their strategic objectives, they did not articulate publicly
at what potential costs those objectives were achieved.
But more importantly, the US response was a clear indication
that any use of force by China in resolving the Taiwan issue
will invite at least one major power into the region. China's
display of force was again witnessed during the year 2000
Taiwan presidential elections, spiking regional temperatures
again.17 Although the crisis was less tense than
the one in 1995, it did no more to bring Taiwan any closer
to China. On the contrary, the indications are that coercive
diplomacy further widened the gap across the Taiwan Straits.
China's militant stand may also have been
borne out of its belief and confidence that it had the military
capabilities to reclaim Taiwan through force. The cost of
such action would be overwhelming in terms of lives lost,
property destroyed and damage done to international relations
and its credibility. But the more important issue is even
if China believes that it will win the battle against Taiwan,
does it necessarily mean that the war will be won as well?
The costs are vast: a full fledged war with the US, drawing
the regional powers into the fray, a threatened world order
as the US becomes distracted with its responsibilities in
the region or in the worst case scenario, a nuclear fallout.18
The Senior Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, put it pointedly
that China, Taiwan and the US have to "guard against
miscalculation. The stakes are high and one misstep could
negate the assumptions for continuing growth and development."19
However, a greater miscalculation may be that perhaps China
has overestimated its military potential. Does it really
have the military muscle to pull off a victory against Taiwan?
Its military means appear limited and in particular, its
antiquated air force lacks the capability to project its
firepower to Taiwan for a decisive victory.20
Ellis Joffe believes that "the Chinese military is
not likely to recommend large-scale operations. It will
threaten to use force and might carry out low-intensity
actions to back up the threats. But it will stop short of
starting a war that would be open-ended for which the Chinese
armed forces are not ready."21 Michael Hanlon's
comprehensive study on the Chinese military capabilities
elicited a similar conclusion about China's ability to invade
Taiwan China cannot conquer Taiwan due to its limited
capabilities in air attack, amphibious and airborne assault.22
If China did start a war, then following these predictions
it would be a grossly miscalculated calamity, dealing a
fatal blow to durable regional peace.
Domestic Politics
The military posturing seems to be motivated
by an acute sense of misplaced urgency and paranoia at the
domestic front. At the annual summer retreat in mid 2000
at Beidaihe, Chinese President Jiang Zemin identified the
"two-state" theory and the ascendancy of a "separatist
regime" as being among the important security issues
that China had to address.23 Jiang's reference
to these separatist issues clearly indicates a latent desire
to resolve the issue soon through sustained pressure on
Taiwan, ignoring conventional wisdom that a long enduring
problem of more than fifty years old cannot be resolved
overnight. Jiang and the other leaders have stated that
Taiwan's reunification with the mainland cannot be delayed
too long.24 Prof. Wang Guang Woo from the East
Asian Institute said, "Beijing is acting as if time
is not on its side, even though the reality is quite the
opposite. China is doing this just to push Taiwan towards
a speedy reunification." He also said that even Mao
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping felt that the mainland need not
rush the issue. Lee Kuan Yew urged patience as China had
time on its side.25 Taiwan too advocated leaving
reunification issues to a later date, arguing that the next
generation must be kept in mind when discussing reunification
and that the economic and political environment may change
significantly in thirty to fifty years to make reunification
a non-issue.26 But China had remained adamant
about pursuing reunification. Could it be that Jiang is
being dictated by a secret desire to leave his personal
stamp on China? Leadership changes are expected at the Chinese
Communist Party's (CCP) 16th National Congress
in 2002.27 Given that the Politburo has an age
limit of 70 for those assuming the top leadership, Jiang's
need to produce a tangible legacy becomes pressing. Jiang,
74, was quoted as having confirmed that he would step down
as CCP chief in 2002, and as State President in 2003, but
may hope to retain the chairmanship of the Central Military
Commission (CMC).28 It is reasonable to suggest
that Jiang Zemin desires to leave a legacy behind. After
all, Mao Zedong had made China "stand up"29,
Deng Xiaoping was responsible for making China rich, so
it is not unnatural for Jiang to want to be remembered in
history as the man responsible for reunification with Taiwan.30
At the very least, he does not want to be remembered for
being the Chinese leader who lost Taiwan. In retaining the
chairmanship of the CMC, he would still wield sufficient
power and influence in the military, which may be employed
as a last-ditch tool to resolve the Taiwan issue.31
Either way, China's ostensible imposition of a time-table
on resolving the long-standing Taiwan issue had only served
to further push it into a corner from where its options
then started to look more aggressive, a development that
at best threatened to move the region further away from
durable peace.
Taiwan's Blind Spots
Taiwan too suffers from blind spots that
threaten the regional stability. From China's perspective,
Taiwan's continued efforts to court independence through
various schemes is "endangering the stability of the
entire Asia Pacific region."31 Taiwan's
contribution to this instability really began during Lee
Teng-hui's reign. China's accommodation towards him was
fully exploited by Lee Teng-hui who manoeuvred to gain for
Taiwan international space and an enhancement in military
capabilities, effectively playing a catalytic part in the
cross-strait tensions by creating a perception of seeking
independence.
Seeking International
Space
Taiwan's concerted attempt to reclaim its
standing space in the international arena trully began to
take shape with the KMT's provocative exploits in the middle
1990s under Lee Teng-hui.32 Taiwan had lost its
UN seat to Beijing in 197133 and in 1979, the
US switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.
Following the "Wang-Koo" talks of 1993, Taiwan's
bold search for international space began to unfold. Lee
Teng-hui's request to visit his alma mater in the US in
1995 set off a diplomatic row when he was granted a visa
to visit Cornell University. The fiasco severely tested
the US policy of "strategic ambiguity" in the
East Asian region. When commenting on the issue, Clinton's
foreign policy advisor revealed that Clinton "knew
he blew it in 1995"34, referring to his
decision on Lee 's US visit. Taiwan continued to test US
resolve and commitment as a Taiwan ally through its continuous,
contentious bid for a seat in the UN since the early 1990s.
This stiffened Beijing necks who have to date vehemently
opposed the idea, insisting that Taiwan was one of its provinces
and therefore not eligible for UN membership.35
Beyond failing to secure sufficient support, the Taiwanese
manoeuvre placed both China and the US in a very uncomfortable
position and forced the US to review its position toward
Taiwan's cause. Taiwan constantly asked the US to mediate
to build the bridge and help improve relations between China
and Taiwan. In the days preceding Taiwan's 2000 presidential
elections, then vice-president elect Annette Lu made a similar
call, saying that the US had a constructive role to play
in the region and was capable of generating trust and confidence
from both sides to address the issue. But in attempting
to internationalise the issue, Annette Lu was treading on
very slippery, sensitive and provocative ground when she
said that "we must firmly and loudly let the entire
world know the People's Republic of China has never owned
Taiwan. We must also clearly tell everybody that most people
in Taiwan not only do not approve of being unified by the
PRC, they are afraid of being unified".36
However, the US has not helped Taiwan's cause when it said
that it did not want a direct mediation role in the dispute
between China and Taiwan, preferring the two sides to talk
directly to each other.37 The US reinforced this
view when Madeline Albright stated that China and Taiwan
would have to find their own level and channel for cross-strait
dialogue. "It is a unique issue and analogies and historical
comparisons don't work. It's an important issue to them
that they have to deal with in their own way."38
Taiwan's strategy to put itself on the front pages through
its political manoeuvering has seriously undermined the
prospects for any immediate resolution of the cross-strait
issue. Lee Teng-hui's concept of the "New Taiwanese"
in 1998 incurred the wrath of Beijing as it appeared to
underline the emergence of a distinct Taiwanese identity.39
He even said that that he would not let his dream of a "new
Taiwan" be destroyed by opposition politicians, including
those from his own party, KMT.40 Further, his
highly provocative call in 1999 for political parity in
"special state-to-state ties" was manifestly the
pinnacle of Taiwan's dare to China.41 It almost
amounted to goading China into a military confrontation
that, according to current international,42 and
probably domestic assessment,43 did not favour
a Chinese victory. Taiwan perhaps knows that a Chinese defeat
will all but ensure a Taiwanese de jure independence.
Military Capability
Enhancement
Taiwan's push to enhance its military capability,
while understandable, seems to be justified on the grounds
that at the very least, it should maintain military parity.
But to pursue an aggressive build-up programme would appear
to reflect more than just a defensive posture. The crisis
of 1995-1996 elicited a sharp response from Taiwan. It created
a new urgency for Taiwan to build up their defence capability
to counter any potential Chinese threat, providing the impetus
to Lee Teng-hui's Taiwan to launch the Theatre Missile Defence
(TMD) study that also included assessment visits to the
US. In March 1999, the Taiwan authorities confirmed the
allocation of an NT 26 billion budget to cater for the TMD
project. Lee reaffirmed this by stating that "construction
of the TMD was not only a need out of the current situation,
but also in accord with the State's interest for long term
development."44 There is no denial that
Taiwan had been "assiduously seeking to join the TMD
system and the US is also intending to include Taiwan in
it, only that it has not made up its mind due to a multitude
of considerations."45 To China, US cooperation
with Taiwan clearly constituted a "brutal interference
in the internal affairs of China which would inevitably
lead to a severe regression of Sino-American relations"
and therefore "does not preclude the possibility of
having to stop by force the internal and external influences
from disintegrating the motherland."46 Discounting
such possible consequences, Taiwan went further. At the
76th anniversary of the Chinese Military Academy
(CMA), Chen Shui-bian called for the military to alter its
strategy from one of "strong defence at home"
to one aimed at "winning a decisive battle outside
Taiwan."47 This indicated a significant
departure from a defensive to an offensive-oriented posture,
underscored forcefully by Taiwan's most significant weapons
purchase of the decade recently, amounting to about US$
4 billion, which included sophisticated Kidd-class
destroyers, warships equipped with guided missiles, P-3
Orion patrol aircraft and diesel submarines.48
Conclusion
China desires to put an end to the cleavage
between the two sides by pursuing reunification as a solution
to the long-standing problem of a divided China. However,
the strategic initiatives that China acted on in the post-Chiang
Kai-shek era seem to have been problematic on three fronts.
First, while the KMT under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo
may have favoured and actively pursued reunification with
the Chinese, it did not mean that such a policy would be
pursued by future leaders of the KMT. To have allowed the
then new president Lee Teng-hui political space by delaying
engagement on the reunification issue was politically not
astute and strategically myopic. In the time and space that
China gave to Lee, he managed to subtly manoeuvre Taiwan
towards a more pro-independence platform, culminating in
his "two-states" theory to better reflect China-Taiwan
relations. At the least, even if Taiwan did not espouse
independence, it certainly did not embrace reunification
either. Chen Shui-bian's polemics further reinforced Taiwan's
stand against reunification by casting more doubts on the
consensus reached in 1992 and questioning the "one-China"
principle. Second, in an attempt to bridge the gap that
it perceived had grown too wide by the early 1990s, China
adopted a militant approach - the straits confrontation
in 1995-1996, and the more recent military manoeuvres in
2000. China had periodically reaffirmed its desire for "peaceful
reunification and one country, two systems" but admitted
that if the Taiwanese authorities espoused independence
as a goal, then it will "use all its means, including
military means" to achieve its goals.49
It appeared to have also been motivated by a misguided domestic
agenda that suffers from an acute sense of unjustified urgency
in reuniting Taiwan, at the risk of derailing the emergence
of a durable East Asian peace.
Taiwan fared no better in ameliorating
the tense relations with China. Since the Lee Teng-hui regime,
Taiwan has deviated noticeably from a reunification to a
more pro-independence path. The manner in which it sought
international space through its concerted push for a seat
in the UN, its desire for treatment befitting a sovereign
state on an equal footing with China, and its espousing
of a "two state" theory, were tantamount to making
a provocative stance that is severely threatening regional
stability.50 Further, its continuous pursuit
of military options, its interest in the TMD programme,
its reform of the military strategy and its procurement
of more advanced arms, to gain a preponderance of capabilities
over China have raised the stakes further for a potential
conflict in the region. A conflict with China at present
may favour a Taiwanese victory, but it certainly does not
favour a victory for durable peace in the region.51
Endnotes
1 "Summit
in Korea a Boost for China", The Straits Times,
20 June 2000, p. 43.
2 "Kim Dae Jung Fulfils
'Reunion' Promise", The Straits Times, 15 June
2000, p. 20.
3 Kim Dae Jung, "Koreans
Will Fight Each Other No More", The Straits Times,
21 June 2000, p. 65.
4 Information Office of
the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, "The
One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," Beijing,
March 2000, http://chinadaily.com.cn.net/highlights/taiwan/
whitepaper.html.
5 Sheng Lijun, "China
Eyes Taiwan: Why is a Breakthrough so Difficult", The
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21., No. 1, March
1999, p. 67.
6 Chiang Ching-kuo succeeded
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the Kuomintang,
and hence the leader of Taiwan.
7 "Ball's in Chen's
court", The Straits Times, 18 June 2000, p.
44.
8 Sheng Lijun, "How
the Die Was Cast Against Taiwan", The Straits Times,
9 July 2000, p. 42.
9 Ching Cheong, "Warring
Over Words", The Straits Times, 13 August 2000,
p. 38.
10 Ching Cheong, "Trend
Emerging on Chen's statements, The Straits Times,
21 June 2000, p. 27.
11 Ibid.
12 Ching Cheong, "What
is He Going to Say", The Straits Times, 14 May
2000, p. 42 quotes Julian Kuo, and adviser and a moderate
in the pro-independence camp, while commenting on Chen Shui-bian's
presidential speech.
13 Ya-li Lu, "Lee
Teng-hui's Role in Taiwan's Democratisation: A Preliminary
Assessment", from paper presented by Prof. Ya-li, Dept.
of Political Science, National Taiwan University, ROC at
International Forum held in ROC from 12-13 May 2000, p.
3.
14 "China Eyes Taiwan:
Why is a Breakthrough so Difficult", op. cit.,
p. 72.
15 "US urges China
to Move Quickly on Taiwan Tensions", The Straits
Times, 15 June 2000, p. 27.
16 Robert S. Ross, "The
1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility,
and the Use of Force", International Security,
Vol 25(2), Fall 2000, pp. 87-123, gives a good account of
the 1995-1996 confrontation between the US and China and
China's coercive diplomacy.
17 "China Holds Huge
Military Exercises Off the East Coast", The Straits
Times, 4 August 2000, p. 19.
18 Ching Cheong, "No
One Gains in War Over Taiwan", The Straits Times,
25 June 2000, p. 40.
19 Chu Mui Hoong, "Too
Early to Judge Taiwan's Path: SM", The Straits Times,
15 June 2000, p.14.
20 Phar Kim Beng, "Taiwan
War Unlikely", The Straits Times, 2 July 2000,
p. 41.
21 Ellis Joffe, "China
Cautious About Taiwan for Now", The Straits Times,
3 Jul 2000, p. 38.
22 Michael O'Hanlon, "Why
China Cannot Conquer Taiwan", International Security
Vol 25(2), Fall 2000, pp. 51-86.
23 Ching Cheong, "China
Grapples with Security Issues", The Straits Times,
20 September 2000, p. 67.
24 Richard W. Baker, Charles
E. Morrison, eds., Asia Pacific Security Outlook,
Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000, p.
58.
25 Koh Chern Phing, "Reunification:
New Sense of Urgency for China", The Straits Times,
22 June 2000, p. 58.
26 "Leave Reunification
to the Future, says Taipei Leader", The Straits
Times, 3 September 2000, p. 21.
27 Ching Cheong, "Massive
Reshuffle due for China's Future Leaders", The Straits
Times, 19 September 2000, p. 48.
28 Ching Cheong, "Jiang
to Retire on Schedule But Will Still Wield Power",
The Straits Times, 18 September 2000, p. 62.
29 Gary Klintworth, "Greater
China and Regional Security", Australian Journal
of International Affairs, Vol 48/49, 1994/95, p. 216.
30 Leslie Fong, "China
a 'Hard' Power Not to be Trifled With", The Straits
Times, 8 June 2000, p. 39.
31 "Taiwan a Threat
to Regional Peace: China", The Straits Times,
21 July 2000, p. 23.
32 Shelley Rigger, "Taiwan:
Finding Opportunity in Crisis", Current History,
September 1999, p. 290.
33 See Lung-chu Chen,
"Prospects for Taiwan's Membership in the United Nations,
in Maysing H. Yang, ed., Taiwan's Expanding Role in the
International Arena, London: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1997,
pp. 3-15 for an account of the requirements governing UN
membership.
34 "Clinton admits
Earlier Mistakes Made on China", The Straits Times,
26 May 2000, p. 31.
35 "Taiwan Allies
Raise UN Issue Again", The Straits Times, 12
August 2000, p. 22. Taiwan was a charter member of the UN
but gave up its seat in 1971 after the world body recognised
the communist regime in Beijing as China's sole ruler.
36 "Taiwan Asks US
to Mediate in China Dispute", The Straits Times,
15 May 2000, p. 18.
37 "DIRECT ROLE:
US says 'No'", The Straits Times, 15 May 2000,
p. 18.
38 Mary Kwang, "China,
Taiwan 'need to find own way out'", The Straits
Times, 23 June 2000, p. 23.
39 Julian Baum, Andrew
Sherny, "Identity Crisis: 'New Taiwanese' concept alarms
Beijing", Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 March
1999, pp. 21-22.
40 Lawrence Chung, "Teng-hui
Stays Out of DPP's Way Ahead of Polls", The Straits
Times, 21 July 2001, p. A6.
41 "BILATERAL TIES:
Key Events", The Straits Times, 3 January 2001,
p. A4.
42 "Taiwan to Retrain
Military Superiority Until 2005", The Straits Times,
3 January 2001, p. A4.
43 "Taiwan Can Defend
Itself, Says Army Chief", The Straits Times,
22 December 2000, p. A10.
44 Xie Wenqing, "US
TMD and Taiwan", International Strategic Studies,
China Institute for International Strategic Studies, 3/2000,
pp. 25-28.
45 Ibid., p. 29.
46 Luo Renshi, "US
Development of Missile Defence Systems Context and Possible
Consequences", International Strategic Studies,
China Institute for International Strategic Studies, 2/1999,
p. 5.
47 The Straits Times,
23 June 2000.
48 Lee Siew Hua, Mary
Kwang, "No Aegis Destroyers for Taiwan",
The Straits Times, 25 April 2001, p. 1.
49 Xiong Guangkai, "China's
National Defence Policy", International Strategic
Studies, China Institute for International Strategic
Studies, 1/2000, pp. 7-8. Xiong Guangkai, Chairman of CIISS,
when delivering a lecture for the International Symposium
Course on 3 Dec 1999.
50 Julian Baum, Shaun
W. Crispin, Lorien Holland, "Upping the Ante: President
Lee Asserts His Island's Statehood, Inviting Beijing's Wrath",
Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 July 1999, p. 18.
51 Ching Cheong, "US
Think Tank Test Out War Scenario", The Straits Times,
1 December 2000, p. A2.
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Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1, March
1998.
16 Suzanne Ogden, China's
Unresolved Issues, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1992.
LTC Richard Pereira is currently a branch
head in HQ RSAF. A pilot by vocation, he has held appointments
as a flight commander and as a Squadron CO. LTC Pereira
obtained an MSc (Strategic Studies) from NTU, and was a
Tay Seow Huah Book Prize Winner, in 2001.
