UNTAET
A Civil-Military Insight
by COL Mark Koh
East Timor was colonised by the Portuguese
for some 450 years and was administered by Indonesia as
the 27th province from Jul 1976 until Sep 1999.
During the Indonesian administration, East Timor was known
as Timur Timor or Tim Tim in Bahasa Indonesian. On 31 Aug
2001, East Timor successfully held its historic inaugural
election for an 88-member Constituent Assembly. For the
thousands of East Timorese, it is indeed a dream of freedom
and independence come true. For exactly two years ago on
this very day, they bravely voted in an UN-sponsored referendum
for independence. Within hours of the announcement of the
overwhelming referendum result for independence, the pro-integration
militias embarked on a campaign of violence and scorched
earth destruction across East Timor. Thousands fled the
island and landed in refugee camps in West Timor. Those
who chose to remain in East Timor hid in the mountains for
days before the UN-sponsored International Force for East
Timor (INTERFET) arrived in Oct 1999. Their arduous journey
to independence has captured world media attention during
the past three years. While many words have been written
about the events that have unfolded, this article hopes
to provide an insight into UN peacekeeping operations in
East Timor from the civil-military affairs perspective.
INTERFET and UNTAET
The Singapore Government participated in
the Australian-led multi-national force INTERFET in response
to a call by Indonesia for ASEAN participation as well as
to invitations from the UN Secretary General and Australia.
Singapore's contribution to INTERFET comprised a medical
detachment, military observers, logistics support, a C-130
and two Landing Ship Tanks (LST). Some 250 SAF personnel
were involved in this mission. At about the same time, on
25 Oct 1999, the UN Transitional Administration in East
Timor (UNTAET) was also instituted as an integrated, multi-dimensional
peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration
of the nascent East Timor state during its transition to
independence. UNTAET was mandated by UN Security Council
Resolution 1272. Its mandate included the provision of security,
and law and order in East Timor, the co-ordination of humanitarian
assistance and the support of capacity building for self-government.
A 24-nation, 7700-strong Peacekeeping Force (PKF) was also
established to undertake the security function. On 28 Feb
2000, the PKF took over military command from INTERFET.
In UNTAET, Singapore's participation included a medical
detachment and a senior staff officer to head the Civil-Military
set-up in the PKF HQ.
An Overview of East Timor
East Timor measures 245 km by 75 km. It
has a population of approximately 850,000 and comprises
13 districts, with the Oecussi enclave1 located
some 70km west in Indonesia's West Timor. The island is
largely segregated into northern and southern plains by
a mountainous ridge. The coastline is harsh and dry; the
main towns are located along the northern coastline rather
than the less populated southern coastal plains. The two
main trunk roads traversing the island, the East-West and
the lateral North-South links are confined largely to country
tracks that are not passable in the wet season. East Timor
is accessible by land from West Timor and by air from Dili
and Baucau, the two larger towns that commercial aircraft2
can land on. The main native language is Tetum. The
older generation also speaks Portuguese while the younger
generation is fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.
UNTAET PKF
The security situation during the period
immediately prior to the transition from INTERFET to UNTAET
was characterised by a decline in the actual threat of militia
operations against UNTAET. However, in West Timor, the militia
continued to conduct widespread intimidation in the refugee
camps.3 There were also occasional confrontations
between former militia groups and members of vigilante groups
belonging to CNRT (Council of National Resistance for East
Timor)4 and FALINTIL (the local resistance fighters).5
It was within this environment that PKF
UNTAET assumed a phased hand-over of operations from INTERFET.6
The PKF HQ was established in Dili, East Timor on 15 Jan
2000. Similar to INTERFET, the PKF occupies four main sectors,
namely the East (comprising the South Korean, Thai and Philippines
Battalions), the Central (Portuguese Battalion), the West
(comprising the Australian and NZ composite Battalions)
and the Oecussi Enclave (Jordanian Battalion). Major support
units from INTERFET also transitioned into the PKF. These
included the Force Logistics Group (FLSG) and the Comoro
Airfield Support Group (CASG). The additional support units
that joined the PKF are the Force Communications Unit (FCU)
and the Force Engineers from Pakistan (PAKENGR), Bangladesh
Engineers (BANENGR), the Force Aviation assets from Chile
(CHILEAVN) and Portugal (PORAVN).
The original UNTAET structure eventually
transformed to incorporate an East Timor Transitional Administration
(ETTA) which was established on 7 Aug 2000. ETTA integrates
many East Timor leaders7 into major-decision
areas within the administration.
PKF CMA Organisation
As part of the INTERFET to PKF UNTAET transition,
the PKF Civil/Military Affairs Centre (CMAC) took over from
INTERFET's Civil/Military Ops Centre (CMOC)8 in
Dili in Feb 2000. CMAC was organised differently from CMOC
as the PKF's civil-military activities under UNTAET progressively
shifted from emergency relief to rehabilitation and reconstruction.
CMAC-PKF had an authorised strength of only 12 personnel
as compared to 26 personnel under the CMOC-INTERFET set-up.
While CMOC largely dealt with tactical issues, CMAC, in
addition to CMOC's tasks, had to take up the strategic linkages
with Governance / Public Administration (GPA) and Humanitarian
Assistance and Emergency Relief (HAER) pillars. With such
lean staffing, CMAC had to work under very trying conditions
and the initial unsettled nascent PKF HQ compounded the
problem further. Nonetheless, CMAC's persistent efforts
paid encouraging dividends and while the re-building progress
had been painfully slow, the civil-military relations improved
gradually.
Sector Civil-Military Affairs (CMA) cells
were organised to co-ordinate CMA efforts within each PKF
sector. In each of the multi-national Battalion, CMA Liaison
Officers were also appointed to provide the critical CMA
link back to Dili. Amongst the multi-national battalions,
the Thais, Filipino and Korean troops had previous CMA experiences
and were able to carry out relatively more comprehensive
CMA activities.
CMA Limitations
As PKF military operation progressed and
the security situation stabilised, the humanitarian role
of the military grew and often extended beyond the simple
provision of the immediate relief of food, water and shelter
to the civilian population. However, all of these can only
be maintained for a short duration and temporarily, as the
military is not structured with the necessary organisation
and resources for long-term humanitarian activities. The
eventuality was for appropriate humanitarian agencies to
relieve the military of these roles. However, the Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs) felt that the PKF could do more to
support them and other UN agencies. At the same time there
were certain quarters that felt that the PKF and its active
conduct of humanitarian activities interfered with the functions
of the in-country UN agencies and NGOs. This is not without
basis. The Australian military as part of INTERFET had readily
available land, sea and air transportation that were utilised
to assist in humanitarian activities. The exception to this
was the transportation of refugees that necessitate Canberra's
approval. Conversely, the troop contributing nations (TCNs)
under the PKF were not equipped with equivalent assets and
often, their limited assets are meant to meet their own
peacekeeping troop requirements. The constraints associated
with transportation, engineering and medical capacity were
often not well understood.
PKF units were equipped with minimum troop-carrying
trucks to sustain their security operations. Whenever the
security situation was stable, these assets would be diverted
to support humanitarian activities. However, given the volatility
of the security environment, these assets cannot be committed
on a dedicated basis. Moreover, the military trucks cannot
be effectively utilised in remote regions of the country
owing to the lack of accessible roads.
Military engineers were trained and their
assets were designed for military engineering tasks in mobility
and counter-mobility missions. Few units have the expertise
or suitable equipment to carry out civil engineering tasks
such as restoring electrical supply, repairing underground
water pipes, damaged buildings, roads and bridges. Often,
the military also lacked the necessary material support
to undertake these missions.
Trained medical staff and medical facilities
were not readily available. It is a big challenge to obtain
available medical supplies to treat the civilian population.
A complementary approach was to incorporate an awareness
on public health and hygiene as part of the Sector CMA programme.
The geographical location of the Timor
Island posed additional challenges to the conduct of humanitarian
assistance (HA). Relatively speaking, NGOs and UN agencies
in continental Europe, Africa and the Middle East could
move substantial transport means to disaster areas relatively
fast. Therefore most NGOs and UN agencies in East Timor
had to rely on whatever transport means the military could
provide and often this is provided on an excess capacity
basis. The limited availability of commercially leased vehicles
helped to ease the situation. In addition, the rugged terrain
in East Timor also compounded the logistical workload. The
hilly and rugged island had a very limited road network.
In good weather, the network could not support heavy traffic
movements. Most of these roads had deteriorated badly through
years of neglect. Scattered villages in remote mountainous
districts with limited access often prevented the execution
of HA programmes. If at all, HA efforts in these areas are
one-off activities subject to the availability of military
heavy-lift helicopters.
US Group East Timor
(USGET)
Nevertheless, the PKF was fortunate to
have the presence of USGET. Initially, USGET operated independently
as it was not part of the UNTAET set-up. After a cross-service
agreement was reached between Washington and UNNY, USGET
was allowed to operate closely with the PKF but it remained
independent in the command chain. USGET maintained a permanent
presence manned by a core group of military officers. Given
the need to co-ordinate all CMA efforts, USGET attached
a US Liaison Officer to function within CMAC. This proved
invaluable as the PKF could utilise USGET's military assets
and resources. CMAC was provided with a construction company
that was deployed in Dili on a 90-day rotation. On occasions,
USN ships would visit Dili and we would mobilise USGET's
dental and medical teams, heavy-lift helicopters and naval
craft. However, given the political sensitivity involved
as well as US deployment policy and restrictions, not all
the NGOs readily utilised these resources.
CMAC Challenges
Unlike CMOC, none of the multi-national
staff was trained in CMA work. As such, we not only had
to accelerate our learning curve on-site and in mission
but had also to grapple with the day-to-day urgencies. In
order to overcome this limitation, CMA visits were organised
to sector HQ and units during the initial weeks of PKF operations.
The CMA visits enabled us to acquaint ourselves with ground
issues and to prevent possible misunderstanding of Commander's
intent. The visits allowed CMAC to be acquainted with the
UN District Administrators, their HA officers, and sector-based
NGOs. Through these CMA visits, a comprehensive understanding
of different district conditions and needs were achieved.
In addition, the visits served as a learning cycle for the
untrained CMAC staff. CMA ground visits also presented opportunities
to circumvent time-consuming bureaucratic channels; and
to expediently offer and co-ordinate the limited resources
residing within the PKF logistics set-up. In time, these
visits proved successful and they became a routine for CMAC
staff. Through regular visits, CMAC was also able to convey
to the Dili-based UN central authorities the pressing CMA
concerns and issues. Most importantly, these visits facilitated
CMAC in promulgating the need to conduct a HA need assessment
to re-align the PKF UNTAET HA priorities. In order to overcome
the lack of experience, CMAC undertook the responsibility
to institute in-mission CMA training courses to induct newly
posted-in PKF CMA staff. Formal training allowed CMAC to
explain the PKF CMA working system and to standardise CMA
request procedures across all PKF sectors and units manned
by CMA personnel from different troop contributing nations
(TCN). The in-mission CMA course was hailed as one of the
key achievements of the PKF.
Nonetheless, what the PKF and most military
forces are not short of are organisational capabilities
and leadership. This was evident in the case of UNTAET as
the UN agencies and NGOs often had to rely on the military
to co-ordinate many of the HA tasks. Initially, these civilians
were often sceptical of the military but gradually as we
demonstrated our ability to get things done, over-reliance
on the military became obvious. As time went by, routine
CMA operations were punctuated by a number of disaster relief
operations that the PKF had to carry out in support of other
UN agencies and NGOs. The BETUN flood relief operation was
one such operation. Even though the flood was in West Timor,
UNTAET and the PKF successfully co-ordinated the rescue
and relief operations employing all available logistical
resources, working closely with the Indonesian authorities.
CMAC Achievements
As early as Feb 2000, the PKF has been
involved in various UNTAET programmes for the rehabilitation
of ET. To be able to participate effectively in the rehabilitation
effort, CMAC staff established themselves as permanent members
of numerous UNTAET development and rehabilitation meetings.
At various districts, sector CMA staff are part of the district
administrator (DA) HA committee. Dili, being the main population
centre and the seat of the future government, came under
CMAC's direct jurisdiction.
CMAC had been one of the main supporters
and contributors in the reconstruction programme for schools
in East Timor. At the headquarters level, CMAC compiled
an initial report of damaged schools in the various districts
based on surveys undertaken by sector CMA staff. This effort
facilitated World Bank engineers in carrying out a detailed
assessment of the materials needed to repair/re-build the
damaged schools. The construction programme commenced in
Jul 2000. PKF supported the programme with transportation
and other logistics means. In addition, CMAC co-ordinated
some of the school re-roofing projects using PKF troops
and USGET engineers in Dili.
As Dili is the capital of East Timor, CMAC
worked in close con-sultation with the Dili DA in rehabilitating
the damaged city. Engi-neering and logistics support were
co-ordinated on a weekly basis. Some of the CMAC achieve-ments
in Dili included the rebuilding of the Becora Prison, the
Becora and Comoro9 wet markets and the East Timor
Police Academy, cleaning up Dili's choked drainage system
and demolishing burnt-out buildings that posed public danger.
By mid 2000, refugees' management became
CMA's main preoccupation. This was so as it has security
implications for the PKF. The safe return of refugees and
their re-integration into society was an integral part of
rebuilding East Timor. Over time and against a backdrop
of international human rights investigations, the physical
conditions and political situation in West Timor refugees'
camps deteriorated. There were fears of a mass influx of
refugee returning to East Timor. CMAC was once again called
into action and initiated "A Mass Refugee Return Policy",
formulated and jointly endorsed by the Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG), UN High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), International Organisation for Migration
(IOM) and Civilian Police (CIVPOL). In addition, CMAC undertook
the lead in establishing a Joint Refugees' Operations Centre
in Dili to co-ordinate the various ground agencies in implementing
the policy.
Small as it may seem, humanitarian efforts
by PKF units throughout East Timor have positively assisted
in the rehabilitation of the country. CMA staff worked tirelessly
to bring relief to the less privileged and helped in many
aspects to bring life back to normalcy for the locals.
In the absence of any "governmental
health facility", PKF medical units undertook treatment
for the local populace. PKF medical units operated regular
mobile clinics in remote areas to complement rudimentary
medical facilities set up by the NGOs. The PKF was also
responsible for all aero-medical evacuations. Medicine and
drugs were often indis-pensable in treatment. CMAC initiated
a working system with the Interim Health Authority of UNTAET
to supply PKF medical teams with the necessary drugs. Health
assistance to locals also included the conduct of medical
and health edu-cation, which would help to bring about a
healthy living environment and the prevention of diseases
for many ignorant East Timorese.
Insignificant though they may appear, the
CMA-organised sporting competitions and recreational activities
for the local communities in all districts were actually
very much appreciated. Besides helping the locals to have
a better sense of life and direction, these events helped
to develop closer rapport between the PKF and the local
communities.
CMAC and the FALINTIL
The PKF, as a military organisation, had
been among the first to make official contact with the FALINTIL.
The future of FALINTIL and the well-being of its members
became a subject closely monitored by PKF HQ and UNTAET.
In the effort to provide FALINTIL with decent living conditions
in their cantonment in AILEU10 CMAC became a
prime mover in initiating co-ordinated humanitarian efforts
by NGOs and other UN agencies. The PKF's interest to look
after FALINTIL's welfare also saw the provision of non-military
training and dental assistance by the Portuguese and South
Korean peacekeeping forces. Overall, the FALINTIL issue
proved to be sensitive and often prevented the other peacekeeping
forces from providing more HA assistance.
CMAC in Information
Collection
Unlike a conventional military force, the
PKF did not have an intelligence-gathering set-up. After
all, who are supposed to be the enemies of UN? Nonetheless,
the need for comprehensive and updated intelligence or military
information as was referred to in the PKF, remained a key
concern. Similar to other UN peacekeeping missions, information
served the purpose of initiating appropriate operational
plans and actions as well as to complement force protection.
By the middle of last year, the situation
in certain districts gave cause for concern. The level of
militia activities had gone up and more of the militias
were successful in infiltrating into East Timor. On 24 Jul
2000, a New Zealand soldier was killed in Covalima in an
encounter with the militia. This was the first fatal incident
involving the PFK since its deployment in East Timor. Shortly
after, on 10 Aug 2000, a Nepalese soldier was killed and
two more wounded in the same district. These events were
of great concern for the PKF. In view of the heightened
security situation, PKF HQ increasingly became aware of
the importance of "real-time" ground information
concerning militia activities. CMA teams in their routine
visits and conduct of HA activities in remote villages and
settlements became useful in collecting invaluable ground
feedback and sentiments concerning likely militia's presence,
sympathisers' activities and infiltration routes.
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the future of East Timor
lies in the ability of UNTAET to assist in the rebuilding
of the country and its eventual democratically elected government.
On 31 Aug 2001, the inaugural East Timor Election was successfully
conducted. The process of drafting the country's constitution
is ongoing. The country has also declared 20 May 2002 as
the date for independence. All of these augur well for East
Timor and with a positive outlook prevailing the security
front, East Timor is set to formally become the newest member
nation of UN in 2002.
The UN's untiring effort in assisting the
war-torn nation after the Sep 1999 sacking of East Timor
will not have gone to waste nor forgotten. Many of us who
have contributed in our modest but unique ways will continue
to maintain an interest and attachment in the nascent nation's
development. More so, memories of the kind and wonderful
East Timorese people, the dedicated UNTAET administrators
and the professionally committed Peacekeeping Force will
always be fondly remembered. In particular, the success
of the peacekeeping mission in East Timor can in many ways
be attributed to good civil-military relationship. Albeit
the many limitations, the PKF's CMA activities has over
time taken centre stage for it's presence in East Timor.
This article is a personal account by
COL Mark Koh, written based on his UN tour of duty in Dili,
East Timor as the Deputy Chief of Staff (Civil/Military
Affairs), PKF HQ, UNTAET.
Glossary
The following is a selected glossary of
main abbreviations used in the text.
1. INTERFET International Force
for East Timor
2. UNTAET United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor
3. PKF UN Peacekeeping Force
4. CNRT Council of National Resistance
for East Timor
5. FALINTIL Forcas Armadas de
Liberatacao Nacional de Timor-Leste (Portuguese) (Fretilin's
army or East Timor underground resistance fighters formed
after the Indonesian's invasion of East Timor in 1975)
6. ROKBATT Republic of Korea Battalion
7. THAIBATT Thai Battalion
8. PHILBATT Philippines Battalion
9. PORTBATT Portuguese Battalion
10. AUSBATT Australian Battalion
11. NZCOMBATT New Zealand Composite
Battalion
12. JORBATT Jordanian Battalion
13. FLSG Force Logistics Group
14. CASG Comoro Airfield Support
Group
15. FCU Force Communications Unit
16. PAKENGR Force Engineers from
Pakistan
17. BANENGR Bangladesh Engineers
18. CHILEAVN Force Aviation assets
from Chile
19. PORAVN Force Aviation assets
from Portugal
20. ETTA East Timor Transitional
Administration
21. CMAC PKF Civil/Military Affairs
Centre
22. CMOC INTERFET's Civil / Military
Ops Centre
23. GPA Governance / Public Administration
Pillar of UNTAET
24. HAER Humanitarian Assistance
and Emergency Relief pillar of UNTAET
25. CMA Civil-Military Affairs
26. NGOs Non-Governmental Organisations
27. TCNs Troop Contributing Nations
28. HA Humanitarian Assistance
29. USGET United States Group East
Timor
30. UNNY United Nations, New York
31. SRSG Special Representative
of the Secretary General
32. UNHCR United Nations High Commission
for Refugees
33. IOM International Organisation
for Migration
34. CIVPOL Civilian Police of the
United Nations
Endnotes
1. The Oecussi
enclave is accessible from East Timor by sea and air links.
The land link has yet to be formally established by UNTAET.
2. Bacau airfield is the
largest in East Timor and can easily accommodate Boeing
737s.
3. The main refugee camps
in West Timor are found in Motaain, Betun, (towns along
the international border) and as far as in Kupang, the capital
of West Timor. UNCHR's worker carry out humanitarian assistance
in these camps with security provided by TNI.
4. CNRT is a formal grouping
of various East Timor political parties which played an
active role after the Sep 1999 UN-sponsored Referendum for
Independence. It has since been disbanded prior to the Inaugural
East Timor Election in Aug 2001.
5. FALINTIL fighters originated
from the FRETILIN's Army. They went underground and carried
out their resistance struggle for independence after the
Indonesian's invasion of the island in Nov 1975.
6. The phased hand-over
was based on security status. Sector East, being the safest,
was the first to be handed over, followed by Sector Central
(including Dili), Sector Oecussi and lastly Sector West
which comprise the border districts of Bobonaro and Suai
7. Well-known figures
such as Gusmao and Ramos Horta were active in the day-to-day
affairs of ETTA.
8. CMOC was largely run
by the ADF assisted by US's 322nd Civil Affairs
Brigade staff. CMOC has a shop front in downtown Dili and
this served as a convenient point for NGOs and humanitarian
workers to gather information as well as to co-ordinate
transportation requirements.
9. Becora and Comoro are
names of villages located on the out-skirt of Dili, the
capital of East Timor.
10. Aileu is a town located
40 km north of Dili. It is accessed by a winding-metalled
road and the journey takes between 2 - 3 hours. Since the
arrival of INTERFET forces, the FALINTIL which comprises
4 company of fighters, have agreed to be cantoned at this
town.
COL Mark Koh is the Chief of Staff in 2
PDF Command. He attended the UK Weapon Staff Course in RMCS
(1984), Singapore Command and Staff Course (1988) and the
Indonesian Army Command and Staff Course (1991/92). He has
commanded an Artillery Battalion, Division Artillery and
the Supply & Transport Formation.
