The Five Power
Defence Arrangements : If It Ain't Broke...
by
DR Khoo How San
Behind every
surviving institution is its purpose and history. Purpose
conveys the idea of relevance while history is full of ups
and downs and is not necessarily a guide to the future.
The multilateral Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)
emerged as a successor to a bilateral defence pact during
a troubled period of maritime Southeast Asia's history,
and survived despite chronic questioning about its purpose.
Today, it still has five members, and it still ain't broke,
although the recent Asian crisis did create a scare. This
paper examines the setting and dynamics involved in the
FPDA, and assesses its relevance in the new millennium.
Common Bonds, Enduring
Fears
Malaya - a federation of nine small states
- became independent from Britain in 1957. Two years later,
Britain permitted Singapore to be self-governing. The military
bases on the island accommodated not only British forces
but also Australian and New Zealand forces (the ANZUK forces).
As well, the British continued to help Malayan counter-insurgency
forces fight the communist remnants. The Butterworth air
base, opposite Penang island in peninsular Malaya, continued
to be used by ANZUK air forces while Johor in the south
was the location for joint jungle training. British forces
were also stationed in British North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak
and the oil-rich protectorate, Brunei.
Thus, when Indonesia under President Sukarno began to oppose
Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman's idea of an enlarged
federation (to include Singapore, Brunei, British North
Borneo and Sarawak), ANZUK forces were in place in Malaya
as well as in the remaining British colonial territories.
From one perspective, it can be argued that the proposed
new federation, Malaysia, would help to stabilise the sub-region
and therefore provide security to the widely scattered Indonesian
archipelago. From Sukarno's perspective, however, Malaysia
was a neo-colonial creation. Moreover, Sukarno had not been
consulted! Sukarno was also facing domestic problems and
he wanted to divert attention to foreign policy. His tirades
increasingly took on a threatening tone.
In this atmosphere, the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement
(AMDA) provided a security umbrella for independent Malaya.
AMDA (unlike the future FPDA), was a bilateral defence agreement.
When Malaysia was formally created in 1963 (without Brunei's
inclusion), AMDA - renamed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement
-continued to provide some measure of security to the new
federation. Just as important, ANZUK forces were still based
in Butterworth and Singapore. These forces helped Malaysia
resist Indonesia's policy of "Confrontation" which
included military action or terrorist activities in Johor,
Singapore, and Sarawak.
Confrontation engendered an enduring fear of Indonesia as
a regional source of instability under certain conditions,
such as internal challenges to its unity and the emergence
of an "adventurous" ultra-nationalist or religious
leader (or leadership). But this common fear did not diffuse
domestic tensions between the Malay-dominated central government
in Kuala Lumpur (the Malaysian capital) and the Chinese-dominated
government in the city-state of Singapore. Racial tensions
followed. In August 1965, Singapore separated from Malaysia.
Externally, Britain had meanwhile decided by 1967 to pull
out its military forces "east of Suez". Given
that Confrontation had by then been effectively countered,
and also given that a process of conciliation had begun
between Indonesia and Malaysia, the dangerous years could
be said to have passed for Malaysia and Singapore. But,
because the long history of security cooperation among British,
Australian, New Zealand and Malayan/Malaysian forces had
always been mutually satisfying, both Malaysia and Singapore
were keen to keep some form of this "it ain't broke"
security structure going. So were the Australians and New
Zealanders. Canberra, in particular, posited forward defence
as its strategic doctrine.
By 1971, just such a "coalition of the willing"
had emerged - the FPDA - in a formula that imposed no undue
strain or obligation on any party. Defence ministers of
the five nations met in London on 16 April 1971 to conclude
the formation of the FPDA which obliges them to consult
each other in the event of an external aggression or threat
of such attack against Malaysia and Singapore. There was
no requirement for physically stationing multinational forces
in Malaysia or Singapore. On 1 September 1971, the five
nations decided to form the Integrated Air Defence System
(IADS) within the framework of the FPDA to assume responsibility
for the air defence of Malaysia and Singapore. Finally,
on 1 December 1971, Malaysia and Singapore separately concluded
bilateral exchange of notes with the other three partners
of the FPDA to effect the new defence arrangements.1
The key term in this multilateral successor to the bilateral
AMDA is the plural noun, "arrangements". Yet,
many commentators continue to refer, incorrectly, to the
"Five Power Defence Arrangement". The FPDA, as
described above, is a set of arrangements that allow two
parties or more to consult and cooperate under the FPDA
rubric in the defence of Malaysia and Singapore. In this
sense, this "FPDA minus x" formula predated the
famous "ASEAN minus x" formulation! This in-built
flexibility has proven useful in practice. For example,
the most geographically distant partner, Britain, nevertheless
can still assemble the most formidable array of assets for
major FPDA exercises. But its absence during a number of
years was not seen as a lack of commitment.
Flexibility apart, gradualism was another FPDA hallmark.
For a whole decade, the IADS was about the most active component
of the FPDA, with air defence exercises conducted annually
since 1972. Then, in 1980, the leaders of the five countries
decided to initiate regular land and naval exercises. Between
1981 and 1986, Australia and New Zealand alternately hosted
annual FPDA land exercises. In 1987, Malaysia hosted its
first land exercise and in 1989, Singapore was the host.
The 1990 land exercise was held in Malaysia but hosted by
Britain. Sea exercises, also held since 1981, are alternately
hosted by Malaysia and Singapore in the South China Sea.2
Apart from the usefulness of the various exercise series,
the FPDA - especially in the early years - provides the
teeth for a vital aspect of the defence of Malaysia and
Singapore: the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) located
at Butterworth, under an Australian commander. This deliberate
decision was a practical one, given the unspoken discomfort
Malaysian and Singaporean leaders would have in having an
IADS commander from either country.
Certainly, the FPDA played a useful role in confidence-building
between Malaysia and Singapore, especially in the early
post-separation years when bilateral external security cooperation
between the two countries (other than the unbroken internal
security cooperation) was all but absent. Importantly, the
creation of the IADS symbolised the indivisibility of the
defence of peninsular Malaysia and Singapore. Illustrative
of the FPDA's gradual evolutionary nature, the IADS itself
has proven to be adaptive, and is being transformed into
the Integrated Area Defence System. This name change reflects
the emphasis on joint activities.
Finally, on the issue of deterrence, although leaders of
the two regional countries have not pretended that the legacy
of Indonesia's Confrontation had affected their security
perceptions, the FPDA is best seen as providing a form of
"potential" deterrence, in which no actual enemy
is identified.3 Some observers have referred to the "psychological
deterrence" provided by the FPDA; others note that
Australian F/A-18 fighter jets based in Tindal in northern
Australia are only a few hours flight time from the sub-region.
FPDA in the New Millennium
If the several features of the FPDA proved its resilience
since 1971, predicated on commonsensical "it ain't
broke" premises and gradual enhancement comfortable
to all its members, what possible challenges to its relevance
may be identified in the new millennium?
The impression should not be given that the FPDA did not
have its share of structural weaknesses, political difficulties,
intra-mural tensions and viability questions. In the first
place, the external powers are not obligated to come to
the defence of the two regional powers since the FPDA carries
no treaty obligations. In addition, although the IADS does
have a command structure, the FPDA itself does not. Politically,
although Indonesia was not identified as the potential threat
to be deterred, it cannot be said to be enthusiastic about
the existence of a set of defence arrangements which arose
in the aftermath of Confrontation. Much credit could be
given to the previous Suharto administration for its passive
acquiescence in accepting Malaysia and Singapore's membership
of the FPDA as part and parcel of the regional web of bilateral
and multilateral security links outside the ASEAN framework.
One may also speculate that Brunei's "lukewarm"
interest in the FPDA has been due to sensitivity to Indonesia's
possible reaction. One novel Indonesian attempt to revisit
the FPDA concept arose in 1990 when former foreign minister
Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja suggested in a regional journal article
that the FPDA be gradually disbanded over a period of five
years and a new Three-Power Defence Arrangement be created
comprising only Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. He felt
that the "abandonment of the [FPDA] by Malaysia and
Singapore would immeasurably strengthen the political and
psychological basis for the continued growth of a three-power
ASEAN military cooperation".4 He added that Australia
could participate in the proposed pact's joint exercises
as a "friendly neighbouring power".5
Problems in the political relationship between Malaysia
and Singapore have also affected the FPDA. The most recent
was Malaysia's last-minute withdrawal from a major maritime
exercise (Stardex) in 1998. Kuala Lumpur said its decision
was a result of the Asian economic and financial crisis
but observers noted that it came at a time when Malaysia-Singapore
relations were affected by a number of issues. However,
Malaysia resumed its participation of Stardex in 1999.
There is always the question of sustaining the interest
of external partners in any security arrangement. The FPDA
has been no exception. Britain did not take part in the
air defence/maritime exercise Lima Bersatu for more
than a decade and only resumed its participation since 1988.
The present Labour government in Britain shows its interest
in engagement with FPDA partners but it cannot be said that
future governments - Labour or Conservative -will be similarly
disposed. New Zealand's involvement has been comparatively
modest and indeed, the current government has indicated
its strategic focus is its immediate neighbourhood. Australia,
on the other hand, continues to play an active role in the
FPDA. Indeed, whereas during the Suharto era, when some
Australian commentators had suggested that the country's
involvement in the FPDA might be a disincentive with regards
to closer Canberra-Jakarta ties, the situation today may
be the opposite. The FPDA continues to provide Australia
with a regional presence.
In sum, the FPDA has not faced any major challenge since
its inception because of two principal reasons. First, its
purpose and design were pragmatic, demanding not too much
from its "coalition of the willing". Secondly,
Indonesia under Suharto had chosen to accommodate the FPDA
which in turn has always been sensitive to Jakarta, such
as conducting its major maritime exercises in the South
China Sea. But circumstances can change. The very fact of
its flexible arrangement means that any member who has become
"less willing" can leave the FPDA, thus weakening
both the indivisible defence of peninsular Malaysia and
Singapore element and the so-called psychological deterrence
element. Conceivably, a more assertive Indonesia may in
future raise questions about the FPDA's relevance.
Conclusion
The FPDA is an example of the "if it ain't broke"
phenomenon, discussed in this paper. It has played an important
role in the stability and regional security of maritime
Southeast Asia. The major concern of regional security analysts
today is whether the two important bilateral US security
treaties with Japan and South Korea will survive. Already,
the trilateral ANZUS alliance has been allowed to languish,
although US-Australian security cooperation is still sustained.
If the FPDA were to lapse, it will be missed. Once broke,
it can never be fixed.
This paper was presented as part of the ASEAN Regional
Forum's professional development programme for foreign affairs
and defence officials held in Brunei Darussalam from 23
to 28 April 2000.
Endnotes
1 Singapore Ministry of Defence Fact Sheet, 22 August 1988.
2 Straits Times, 23 April 1991.
3 Stephen Cimbala, Military Persuasion,
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1994, p. 21.
4 Mochtar Kusuma-atmadja, "Some Thoughts
on ASEAN Security Cooperation: An Indonesian Perspective,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 1990, p. 170.
5 ibid.
Dr Khoo How San is presently a Branch
Head in MINDEF. He holds a PhD in Strategic Studies from
the Australian National University.
