Operational Maneuver From The Sea - An Option Against Littoral Asymmetric Warfare
by CPT Lai Chung Han

The strategic military outlook for the US Naval Service, comprising the Navy and Marines Corps, reached a point of inflection in the 1990s.¹ With the thawing of the Cold War, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, the prospect of a global war receded significantly. Instead of the fleet-to-fleet encounters envisaged on the high seas, the predominant threats and challenges facing the US Naval Service would originate from the littorals. And this paradigmatic shift in threat perception has forced this acknowledgment:

"Some littoral threats - specifically mines, sea-skimming cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles - tax the capabilities of current systems and force structure. Mastery of the littoral should not be presumed. It does not derive directly from command of the high seas. "

".... From the Sea." USN and USMC White Paper, 1992

Indeed, rogue littoral states have undermined even the limited mastery the US Navy (USN) and the US Marine Corps (USMC) have presumed to possess. During the Gulf War, two major naval combatants, the helicopter carrier USS Tripoli and the Aegis missile cruiser USS Princeton, fell prey to Iraqi mines on the same day, and were seriously damaged. This essay examines the challenges posed by the littoral environment, particularly to amphibious landings, and the options opened to the US Naval Service to deal with these challenges. One such option is epitomised by the new operational concept, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS), espoused by the USMC. We consider the underpinnings of OMFTS and highlight the weak-links of an operational concept still in its formative and developmental stage.

Chaos in the Littorals

It is rare for the US Naval Service to confess weaknesses or inadequacies as it did with the new littoral threats. They threaten not only USN assets operating in littoral waters, but also those attempting an amphibious landing. Here, we outline some of the intrinsic difficulties the USN and the USMC face when operating in littoral waters, as well as the problems arising from the enemies' application of asymmetric warfare in such an environment.

The littoral is a reference to the coastline, where the sea meets the land. In terms of geo-politics, the littoral region is home to the burgeoning populations and thriving, but competing, economies of the Asia Pacific. The trade routes of the world meet and part in the littorals. With such a high density of human and economic traffic, mere statistical probability suggests that the most significant conflicts will be fought here. In terms of geography, the littoral region features confined and congested water and air-space occupied by friendly and hostile forces, as well as neutral parties. In short, the process of identification - distinguishing friend from foe - becomes a nightmare! For example, even the state-of-the-art SPY-1A radar of the Aegis weapon system was overwhelmed by the plethora of false radar contacts off the Kuwaiti coast during Operation Desert Storm. Positive identification of these air contacts could only be achieved at relatively short ranges. This effectively nullified the long reach of the Standard surface-to-air missiles of the Aegis cruisers.

The littoral battle-space also presents other difficulties for a technology juggernaut like the US Naval Service. Its littoral opponents will engage in asymmetric warfare, or what Vice Admiral S. Redd, US Joint Staff's J-5 director of strategic plans and policy, calls "guerrilla warfare at sea."² In asymmetric warfare, the adversary capitalises on the vulnerabilities of a technologically superior opponent, rather than meet the latter's main strength. Mine warfare is a classic example of this. Instead of trying to muster a surface fleet to challenge the USN battle/ carrier group, naval guerrillas resort to sowing offensive and defensive mine fields which are extremely difficult to deal with. Small armed boats, diesel-electric submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles are also in the inventories of practitioners of littoral asymmetric warfare. These weapons and platforms are particularly suited for the littoral environment. For example, the diesel-electric submarine radiates broadband noise that is easily masked by the background noise of heavy merchant shipping. The high levels of reverberation, back-scattering and multi-path acoustic returns inherent in the shallow littoral waters also degrade the performance of advanced low frequency sonars used by modern ASW ships.

In addition, these weapons of asymmetric warfare can inflict enormous casualties on a would-be aggressor seeking to launch an amphibious assault. For a casualty-sensitive armed force like the US Naval Service, the mere possibility of this would be an instant turn-off. This explains why the plan to seize the Kuwaiti port of Ash-Shuaybah during Operation Desert Storm was abandoned.³ The Iraqis had built formidable beach defences, reinforced by more than 1200 mines sown around the approaches to the Northern part of the Persian Gulf. These affordable mines (quoted at US$200 each) drastically altered the risk assessment of such an amphibious assault, and had an impact far out of proportion to their cost and sophistication.

Warfighting Skills At The Low End

What can the USN and USMC do to counter the asymmetric warfare tactics of their littoral opponents? What options are opened to the US Naval Service? At the 1996 annual symposium of the Surface Navy Association in Arlington, VA, Vice Admiral Redd suggested that "warfighting skills at the low end" was the solution.⁴ The armed helicopter was identified as one of the more promising capabilities available to deal with the threat of missile gunboats. Similarly, the Block 1B CIWS system in the "surface mode" was touted as another possible option. The 20 mm radar directed Gatling gun, integrated with forward-looking infra-red and electro-optic systems, was promoted as an effective weapon for engaging hostile helicopters, mines and small craft at about 5 nautical miles away.

Against the diesel-electric submarine, seemingly obsolete ASW mortars may be the weapon of choice. Expensive homing weapons like the light-weight ASW torpedoes will have little success against a bottomed target. To the acoustic seeker of the homing torpedo, a bottomed submarine has no Doppler and is difficult to distinguish from the sea-bed. The example of the Argentinean submarine, San Luis, during the 1982 Falklands War is instructive.⁵ San Luis survived a counterattack by British helicopters by diving to the bottom of Falkland Sound, where the waiting RN frigate could not attack as it was armed with only homing weapons. Had the frigate been equipped with the venerable British Limbo or Swedish Bofors ASW mortars, barrages of their deadly projectiles could have been delivered to the position of the bottomed submarine. Since then, there have been calls to develop similar low-cost ASW weapon systems. In 1995, a project to develop a NLCAW - NATO Low Cost ASW Weapon - was initiated.

Ironically, the mighty US Naval Service has had to resurrect "warfighting skills at the lower end" and relatively less advanced weapon systems to counter the naval "guerrillas" in littoral waters. This leads one to reflect on how the relentless pace of technological change has lured armed forces to give up established capabilities for untested weapon systems. Possession of highly sophisticated military hardware does not always translate to enhanced overall capabilities. This is especially so when new weapon systems are developed to counter only specific and limited types of threats. Such threat-specific weapon systems bias the force structure, training and doctrine development towards being more adept at defeating an enemy with comparable blue-water warfighting capabilities, rather than one bent on inflicting heavy casualties by employing the tools and tactics of asymmetric warfare.

Operational Maneuver From The Sea

A far broader option for countering littoral asymmetric warfare is advocated in the new operational concept, Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS). The concept paper on OMFTS was first published in the June 1996 edition of the US Marine Corps Gazette. It presented OMFTS as a new concept for projecting naval power ashore. OMFTS is also promoted as a new approach to expeditionary, littoral and amphibious warfare embodying the following principles:

a. Focus on operational objective.

b. Using the sea as maneuver space.

c. Generating overwhelming tempo and momentum.

d. Pitting strength against weakness.

e. Emphasis on intelligence, deception and flexibility.

f. Integration of all organic, joint, air combined assets.

(Taken from USMC Gazette: June 96)

Integrating these principles, OMFTS stands on the twin foundations of doctrine and enabling technologies. In the area of doctrine, it is centred on the maneuver of naval forces at the operational level, directed at the enemy's centre of gravity, to deal a decisive blow that will break the latter's resolve to fight. The centre of gravity defines what is essential for the enemy to continue fighting: tangibles like command posts and headquarters, and intangibles such as its morale and political set-up. The doctrine of OMFTS also assimilates the strengths of both maneuver warfare and naval warfare. From maneuver warfare, the OMFTS commander learns of the dynamic nature of conflict, the imperative of decisive objectives, and the requirement for sustaining a high tempo throughout the operation. From naval warfare, he is imbued with the strategic level of war, the advantages inherent in sea-borne movement, and the flexibility provided by sea-based logistics and fire support.

In terms of enabling technologies, OMFTS capitalises on recent advances in "speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation ..."⁶ Collectively, these technological advances shrink the logistic tail of an amphibious operation, and enable the landing forces to move towards the objective with great pace, and at the same time, deny the defenders time to marshal any credible resistance. State-of-the-art computer and satellite technologies are employed to provide fast, accurate battle information and precise targeting. These help the OMFTS commander appreciate an otherwise chaotic, and potentially unmanageable tactical scenario.

Specific to overcoming asymmetric warfare in the littorals, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), the Landing Craft Air Cushioned (LCAC) and V-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft liberate the USMC from the traditional ship-to-shore maneuver, and allow for a more decisive ship-to-objective maneuver.7 Put simply, the US Naval Service intends to leapfrog over the shore defences, and thereby avert the potentially high casualties of a direct encounter with the littoral defenders (see illustration below).

The capture of Seoul in 1950 is often quoted as a classic example of OMFTS in action.⁸ The operation was unified under a single commander, and thus could be entirely focused on achieving the mission objective. The operation also avoided a lengthy logistic buildup phase. Departing from San Diego, Sasebo and Pusan, the landing force was projected ashore at Inchon, and key objectives inland were quickly reached at the end of a coherent amphibious assault flow. A critical North Korean vulnerability, lines of support and withdrawal through the Han River Valley at Seoul, was capitalised upon, leading to the annihilation of the North Korean Army and the liberation of South Korea. Had the focus been obscured, the entire operation would have degenerated into a traditional amphibious landing at Inchon, amounting to nothing more than an "operational insignificant tactical victory."

OMFTS On Trial

OMFTS has been vaunted as the warfighting concept that will secure the leading position of the US Naval Service in the 21st century. The discussion in the previous section has also highlighted some of the attractions of OMFTS. But can OMFTS deliver what its advocates promise? Is OMFTS a viable option to counter littoral asymmetric warfare? This subject is the focus of this section.

Doctrine. The doctrine of OMFTS is extremely attractive. It calls for an extensive use of the sea as a staging area for own forces and as a barrier against the littoral defenders. From this staging area, a swooping ship-to-objective maneuver can be executed, leapfrogging over the shore defences. Deception is used to mislead the littoral opponents into diverting their shore defences to alternative landing areas or spreading their forces to defend a larger coastline. Either way, the littoral opponent is substantially weakened. The US Naval Service can then secure a decisive victory without bearing the full brunt of the "naval guerrilla's" resistance and casualties can be capped at a politically acceptable level. Put simply, the OMFTS operational concept promises to neutralise the trump-card of these "naval guerrillas."

To this optimistic assessment, we must acknowledge that on some occasions, the physical environment does not provide room for leapfrogging. For example, when the prime objective is a coastal city or a port, the only approach is via the littorals. The cited example of the Kuwaiti port of Ash-Shuaybah during Operation Desert Storm is a case in point. It could have been used as a critical port of entry for supplies to support the advance of the First Marine Expeditionary Force from Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the plan to seize the port was abandoned because it was situated at the heart of the Iraqis' coastal defences. Even when the objective is further inland, the enemy will erect a defence commensurate with the strategic and tactical value of the objective. Soh (1997)⁹ also argues that the selection of objectives depends on "a myriad of important factors ... (that) include, inter alia, strategy, time, available capability and capacity visaˆ-vis other targets, and very often political considerations rather than the level of the enemy's defense." In whichever case, considerable resistance may be met, and to expect little or no casualties is unrealistic.

Enabling Technologies. We mentioned that the USMC has identified the AAAV, LCAC and V-22 Osprey aircraft as key enabling technologies for OMFTS. The LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushioned) is less constrained by the hydrographic conditions of the beach and therefore can be used to transport the landing forces onto parts of the coastline previously dismissed as inaccessible e.g. swamps and rocky beaches. Should the enemy choose to concentrate his defences at selected locations along the coastline, reconnaissance and real-time surveillance can uncover undefended portions to effect an unopposed entry quickly. However, the LCAC is conspicuously smaller than traditional landing crafts. More trips, and hence longer exposure time to possible enemy attacks, will have to be made to land an amphibious force of any credible size or capability.

In fact, the AAAV and V-22 aircraft are also imperfect enabling technologies. The V-22 combines not only the strengths of the fixed-wing aircraft and the helicopter, but also their weaknesses.¹⁰ The V-22 may allow the OMFTS forces to strike from over the horizon and to be projected deep into the enemies' interior, but its payload is noticeably smaller than the workhorse CH 48 helicopters, and its speed is a notch lower than a conventional aircraft. Essentially, these enabling technologies have yet to fulfill the requirements of OMFTS. Subduing the littorals with advanced technology remains an unfinished business.

Other Vulnerabilities. The reliance of OMFTS on technology also introduces a critical vulnerability in the area of electronic warfare (EW)11. The data-links transmitting tactical information to the ground commanders are like umbilical cords linking them to the architecture of force surveillance and targeting systems. Using offensive EW, or what USMC call electronic attack (EA), to severe these links invariably becomes a priority for the littoral defender. OMFTS also calls for the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) to be launched from more 25 nautical miles from hostile shores so as remain beyond the range of enemy targeting systems and away from shallow water mines. Bradley argues that this "stand-off" distance offers little protection from many search and early warning coastal radars which are known to detect and track both aircraft and ships well beyond the visible horizon. These radars can also designate such targets to shore missile batteries. In short, Bradley contends that OMFTS has not addressed its electronic vulnerabilities in sufficient depth or detail.

To circumvent this vulnerability, Bradley recommends that the mainstay of a carrier battle group's electronic warfare capability, the EA-6B Prowlers, be upgraded or replaced by a tactical EW aircraft, such as an Osprey variant. Bradley's concerns also reveal a deeper malaise that may be affecting advocates of OMFTS. Their focus on the broad conceptual framework of OMFTS is not supplemented with a similar emphasis on details.

Strategic Illusions. The way this new warfighting concept has been promoted has invariably cultivated a common misperception that OMFTS is a panacea for dealing with the new littoral threat. Adams¹² reasons that this has given some military commanders more pseudo-credibility to perpetuate the illusion that the Navy is invincible. By doing so, "a strategic Achilles' heel" is exposed. The public has become enamored with the idea that military victories can be secured in "a sterile, push-button, near bloodless fashion", and has lost its appetite to stomach the inevitable carnage of a protracted littoral war. Littoral strategists are well aware of this strategic vulnerability, and when they demonstrate both the military means and political will to engage in a protracted and indecisive conflict, the American public will be the first to fold. The political culture of the US is such that a loss of public confidence, abetted by an unrestrained mass media, can transform the price of victory, namely casualties, into defeat itself. As far as they are concerned, OMFTS offers little if the victory is accompanied by casualties.

The Verdict

While OMFTS is not in its embryonic stage of development, much remains to be done before it can achieve success in the littorals. The doctrinal basis of OMFTS is sound, but its application may be constrained by the physical environment. The US Naval Service has an impressive inventory of military hardware that has made overcoming the littorals easier, but there are still deficiencies in these various weapons and platforms. OMFTS has also neglected its critical vulnerability in electronic warfare.

Nonetheless, OMFTS is the first, and probably only, fully articulated warfighting concept that deals with littoral asymmetric warfare. Littoral navies like ourselves must study this warfighting concept carefully. It has a direct bearing on how we can successfully defend ourselves against amphibious intrusions. For example, if the would-be amphibious aggressor was to perfect its shore defence leapfrogging techniques, we will need a new generation of surveillance and weapon systems to detect the build-up of enemy forces at sea, and effectively engage them before they can gain a foothold deep in our interior.

Similarly, the fluidity and maneuverability of the OMFTS attackers can only be countered by mobile and "reactive" shore defences. In fact, we may consider doing away with the traditional shore obstacles and instead, deploy a "roving" shore defence unit, consisting of armour, artillery and attack helicopter components. They can rain fire on wherever the amphibious adversary projects itself ashore.

Thus far, we have concentrated on the implications of OMFTS for the littoral defender. Turning to the other side of the coin, what does OMFTS hold for littoral states? Can a relatively small littoral armed forces effectively adopt such a warfighting concept?

Theoretically, OMFTS is consistent with the intrinsic attributes of a relatively small littoral armed forces. Being small, this littoral force will be able to move and react more quickly. This will be invaluable for generating the overwhelming tempo and momentum characteristic of OMFTS. Similarly, one can expect the degree of integration between air, naval and land assets to be greater in a small, rather than a large, force. It is also conceivable that the advanced enabling technologies will be more easily assimilated by a smaller force.

More importantly, a small littoral force will need the force-multiplying effects of OMFTS to gain leverage. This will be especially true when the opponent resorts to asymmetric warfare. A small force has little reserves to deplete, and a protracted and indecisive conflict has to be avoided at all cost.

Conclusion

With littoral asymmetric warfare becoming vogue, the US Naval Service needs to examine new options to counter this new threat. Apart from "warfighting skills at the low end", OMFTS has been introduced as a new warfighting concept espoused by the USMC. OMFTS can perhaps be seen as a "half-baked" concept. Here, "half-baked" should not be interpreted in a negative light. By and large, OMFTS has been fully articulated as a warfighting concept. What remains to be done is to validate it through an extensive series of operational testing and evaluations. However, even in its present developmental phase, the US Naval Service must re-educate the American public regarding the inevitable cost of any armed conflict. For littoral states, OMFTS must be regarded as a significant challenge to their defence capabilities.

ENDNOTES

1. Krulak, Charles General (USMC). Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Naval Proceedings, Jan 1997.

2. Naval "Asymmetric Warfare" Drives Need For Alternative Weapons. Inside the Pentagon, Oct 1996.

3. Jordan, John. Littoral Warfare - The Shape of Things to Come? Jane's International Review, 1993.

4. Naval "Asymmetric Warfare" Drives Need For Alternative Weapons. Inside the Pentagon, Oct 1996.

5. Friedman, Norman. Littoral Anti-Submarine Warfare: Not as Easy as it Sounds. International Defence Review, 6/1995.

6. Operational Maneuver From the Sea: A Concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore. US Marine Corps Gazzete, Jun 1996.

7. Soh, G.H., LTC (RSN). Warfighting... From the Sea.Unpublishedpaper, Mar 1997.

8. Krulak, Charles General (USMC). Operational Maneuver from the Sea.

9. Soh, G.H., LTC (RSN). Warfighting... from the Sea.

10. Ibid

11. Bradley, Close, CPT (USMC). Electronic Warfare: The Critical Vulnerability of OMFTS. US Marine Corps Gazette, Aug 1996.

12. Adams, David. We are not Invincible. Naval Proceedings, May 1997.

REFERENCES

1. Adams, David. We are not invincible. Naval Proceedings, May 1997.

2. Bradley, Close, Capt. (USMC). Electronic Warfare: The Critical vulnerability of OMFTS. US Marine Corps Gazatte. Aug 1996.

3. Clancy, Tom. Martine: A guide Tour of a Marine Expeditonary Unit. Berkley Books, 1996.

4. Friedman, Norman. Littoral Anti-submarine Warfare: Not as Easy as it Sounds. International defence review, 6/ 1995.

5. Hayden H. T. Lt. Col. (USMC) (ed.) Warfighting: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps. Lionel Leventhal Limited, 1995.

6. Jordan, John. Littoral Warfare - The shape of things to Come? Jane's International Intelligence Review, Mar 1993.

7. Krulak, Charles, general (USMC). Operational Maneuver From the sea. Naval Proceedings, Jan 1997.

8. Ritter, William, Maj. (USMCR). Operation TIGER : Amphibious Operations in the Northern Persian Gulf Revisited. US Marine Corps Gazatte, Jul 1996.

9. Soh, G. H., LTC. (RSN). Warfighting ... from the Sea. Unpublished paper, Mar 1997.

10. Naval "Asymmetric Warfare" Drives Need for Alternative Weapons. Inside the Pentagon, Oct 1996.

11. Operational maneuver From the Sea: A concept for the Projection of Naval Power Ashore. US Marine Corps Gazatte, Jun 1996.

12. Special report: Commentary on operational Maneuver From the Sea. US Marine Corps Gazatte, Jul 1996.

13. From the Sea. Department of the Navy, Sep 1992.

14. Forward from the Sea. Department of the Navy, Sep 1994.

CPT LAI ChUNG HAN is currently the Operations Officer on board RSS Valour, 188 Sqn.. He obtained a BA(Hons) degree in Economics from Christ's College, Cambridge University. CPT Lai won the 2nd prize in the 1996 CDF Essay Competition.