The People's Liberation Army: Civil-Military Relations In Reform Era China
by CPT Kwek Ju-Hon

"Power grows out of the barrel of the gun"

"Our principle is that the party controls the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to control the party"

- Mao Zedong, in Problems of War and Strategy

China's economic rise has spawned a growth industry of literature projecting the country's parallel geopolitical ascendance.¹ Such studies variously debate the "China threat" - the degree to which China is a potential hegemon with regional aspirations. The indices of threat used by these studies are primarily "external", focusing on changes in the post-Cold War balance of power and in Chinese military force structure, as well as on external manifestations of Chinese statecraft.

It is the contention here that these studies, while useful, are themselves limiting. In order to understand the likelihood and sources of a "China threat", it is necessary to look beyond the external trappings of statecraft and observe the myriad interactions that go on within the state.

The People's Liberation Army is an ideal bridge between external and internal spheres of China. Externally, it is the guarantor of China's security and territorial integrity, and hence conversely, a potential agent for expansion. Internally it has and continues to play a unique and crucial role in Chinese politics. Thus, it is only by understanding the role of the PLA within the Chinese political system that we can come to a nuanced view of the role it will play as an agent of China in the international system.

This essay will examine the changing dynamics of civil-military relations in light of the radical changes that have swept China since the early 1980's. Of particular interest will be the changing scope and definition of Party control over the PLA and its implications on National Security and Foreign Policy. We will proceed by considering historical patterns of civil-military interactions, how these have been altered since the 1980's, and finally, how the emergent new dynamics of civil-military relations can potentially affect foreign policy-making.

PAST PATTERNS

The PLA has traditionally occupied a central place within the Chinese political system. In its early days as a guerrilla force, the PLA was at the very heart of the founding of the present Communist regime. And throughout the regime's development, it has remained the final arbiter of central control.

As such, the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have traditionally shared an intimate and interlocking relationship. This holds true particularly at the apex of the political system, where upper level military and party elites have been virtually indistinguishable. Elite integration dates back to the crucial early years of the Communist regime, when the party existed almost exclusively as a nucleus of the armed forces. The Long March spawned a generation of party-military elites such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. In their tenure as party leaders, these elites maintained strong links with the army, perpetuating the hazy boundary between military and political leadership. This party-army relationship has been variously described as one of "symbiosis", with major players forming an "interlocking directorate" at the top.²

Analysts of Party-Army relations at lower levels of the military hierarchy note the pattern of political control by the former over the latter. The institutional framework for party dominance has been firmly embedded within the Chinese military system since the 1950's when Soviet methods of military organisation were introduced to the PLA. Powerful Party committees, political commissars, and political departments run parallel to the military hierarchy, ensuring that the dictates of the party are adhered to at all levels. Ideally, under the Chinese military system, non-emergency decisions were to be made by party committees, and executed without question by commanders.³

Thus far the Chinese politics has been marked by non-interference by the military. Military leaders who have been active in politics owe their influence to their personal stature rather than their institutional positions within the military. And the PLA has entered into the political sphere en masse only on two occasions. In each case, it entered somewhat hesitantly, and only at the behest of powerful party leaders.

The first occasion followed Mao's call on the PLA to "support the left" during the Cultural Revolution. The PLA was tasked to restore order through direct rule or army led executive bodies in the wake of the chaos that swept China. The second round of intervention came in a direct and dramatic form during the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989, when troops were called in to put down what was perceived to be a threat to the government .⁴

In neither case did the PLA enter to further its own aims and purposes, and in both cases the orders for intervention of the PLA has been opposed by certain senior commanders. And at the end of the day, the subsequent withdrawal of the PLA from the political sphere went on with minimal resistance.

The pattern that emerges from history is that of a symbiotic set of relations between the Party and the Army, sealed by the personal ties at the apex of the political system. Interests at the top of the system have been harmonized by the dual-role elites, and these interests have percolated down the organizational structure due to firm controls by the Party over the PLA.

CHANGING RELATIONS

Reform era China has been wrought with radical changes, and the civil-military nexus has been no exception. Three developments will be discussed here: generational change within China's top leadership, the professionalization of the military, and the growing economic involvement of the PLA. These amount to potentially far-reaching changes in the parameters that have thus far governed civil-military relations in China. They open up the possibility of divergent interests between the PLA and the CCP, and also provide increased resources and opportunities for the PLA to articulate these interests within the policy process.

Generational Change

Perhaps most significant has been the process of generational change within the Chinese leadership. This process reached its culmination with the death of Deng Xiaoping in early 1997, and heralds a new era for civil-military relations at the apex of the system.

The present "Third Generation" leadership (Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Li Peng) lack the authority of their predecessors in the "Second Generation" (Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang) and the "First Generation" (Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai). This waning of authority is especially pronounced in relation to the military, as the present leaders lack the all important revolutionary-military connection that was previously the touchstone of political legitimacy.

The current Politburo Standing Committee, elected at the 15th Party Congress in September 1997, is the first in Chinese history not to include a member with past or present military connections. Numerous commentators have argued that this absence amounts to a victory of party control over the military.⁵ However, they fail to consider what the flip side of that absence amounts to - the removal of the all important institutional glue that in the past harmonised Party and Army interests. This paves the way for the emergence of a distinct military elite who are potential advocates of strictly military interests that may be distinct from those of the party. For the first time in history, the possibility arises of an "us" against "them" distinction emerging between military and party elites.

Furthermore, in the light of their diminished personal stature and prestige, the continued authority of new leaders is more dependent than ever on winning the backing of powerful functional groups like the military. Important opportunities have therefore been opened up for such groups within the political system to insert their demands into the policy process.

The net effect of generational change is an institutional separation emerging to replace the personal integration that existed before. This generates a wider scope for the development and advocacy of demands distinct from those of the Party.

Professionalization

Deng Xiaoping's reform programme of "Four Modernizations" included a call for military modernization. Apart from updates in technology and military hardware, the move to modernize has manifested itself in the professionalization of the PLA. Professionalism has meant a focus on specifically military aims and objectives, which are not always in harmony with the interests of the Party.

Since the 1980's a specialized officer corp has been built up through the various defence academies. The orientation of this corp is primarily towards operational tasks, judged by strictly military criteria.⁶ Consequently, ideological qualifications, previously a mainstay of the PLA chain of command, have been scaled back in significance. By drawing clearer boundaries between Party and Army, professionalism bolsters the sense in which the PLA exists as a distinct corporate entity within a larger state system. In the words of Ellis Joffe, "the adoption of new doctrines, the acquisition of new technologies, and the establishment of new advanced units have turned the PLA into a vast and complex organisation, with its own preoccupations and interests."⁷

Professionalization within the military has caused officers to chafe at the systems of political control that have permeated the military system. This was vividly illustrated by the cases of near insubordination during Tiananmen, as various commanders questioned the relation of an armed crackdown on protesters to the PLA's professional goals. A sense of desperation at the weakening of systems of political control can be seen in the unrelenting efforts by the party to rejuvenate the "political work system", so as to ensure the primacy of the principle of "absolute loyalty to the party" (dang de juedui ling dao ).⁸ Resistance to previous structures of political control imply that the PLA is no longer willing to play the part of political handmaid to the CCP. Professionalisation, in a sense, establishes a broad framework within which the PLA can develop as a distinctive bureaucratic entity. The process has formed a basis for a Party-Army separation at all levels that ensures a less than seamless fit between the interests of the Party and the PLA.

Economic Involvement

Control over budgetary allocations is a well used tool for wielding control over bureaucratic entities. However, the direct participation of the PLA in the rapidly growing Chinese economy provides lucrative avenues for "extrabudgetary-funds". These give the PLA a degree of budgetary independence that greatly blunts the financial tool of control.

With an estimated ownership of 20,000 firms, ranging from munitions factories to Baskin-Robbins ice cream franchises, the PLA stands out as one of the biggest commercial entities in China. This has even led some to refer to the military as "PLA Inc."⁹

The initiation of the PLA into business can be seen as an implicit bargain between the military authorities and the central party authorities. DengÕs programme of economic reform necessitated a cutting back on central military appropriations; hence the military had to be "bought off", and the obvious method seemed to be the licensing of profit making PLA enterprises. Not only would these make up for budgetary shortfall, but by making the PLA reliant on funds from market governed enterprises, it would create a vested interest in the military to support the process of economic reform and liberalization.

From the point of view of profits, the PLA's business ventures have been a success. Official estimates place PLA Inc's profits at US$1 billion, or at 15% of the defence budget. Unofficial estimates, on the other hand, put collective profits as high as US$20 billion, making up much of the difference between the official military budget of US$7 billion, and estimates of military expenditure that run as high as US$32 billion.¹⁰

While it is certain that not all of these funds flow directly into military coffers, it is certain that these "extra-budgetary" funds ensure that the PLA is less dependent on currying favour with the top Party leaders to ensure the material means to securing its organisational aims

CHANGING PLA INFLUENCE

The PLA will continue to be an important player in contemporary Chinese politics, albeit in different ways from the past. The changes outlined above have weakened the long standing link between the Party and the Army. Out of this institutional separation has emerged an increased capacity for the PLA to exert an independent influence in policy circles.

Cut free from the personalistic ties at the top, left to develop its own organisational goals and interests, and empowered by its commercial earnings, the PLA has come to possess the means and the disctinctive interests necessary to become a formidable bureaucratic interest group.¹¹ This is a sharp break with the personality-centred patterns of the past. One might argue that Chinese politics is entering a phase where individuals start to matter less than institutions.

This characterization of the PLA as interest group fits well with the model of "fragmented authoritarianism" put forward by Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton to understand the Chinese policy making process.¹² Fragmented authoritarianism posits an institutional separation between different clusters in the bureaucracy, in this instance, between the CCP and the PLA. Fragmentation of authority encourages a search for consensus through bargaining among various groups in order to initiate policy. Often, consensus is unattainable because of the divergent interests of bureaucratic actors. This leads to conflict within the system, with each group trying to lobby for its preferred policy. The general trend towards decentralization in the 1980's has led to the spread of power and wealth across the political system. While the centre does certainly still hold, individual geographical (provincial) and bureaucratic entities are increasingly able to confront it over specific issues. The analogy from international relations can be drawn to describe the changes in Chinese domestic politics - that of a move from a unipolar system towards a multipolar one. The changes outlined above indicate that the PLA has the potential to become one such "pole". It is in as good a position as it ever has been to engage in institutional lobbying.

Within this framework, we would expect policy lobbying by the PLA to be seen when policies that go against its organisational interests are being initiated. Such lobbying would be particularly rampant, and successful, when the PLA is endowed with the resources (not necessarily material) to engage in that lobbying. In the example outlined below, the years between 1989 and 1995 have been marked by a domestic ascendance of the PLA, and this domestic ascendance has been matched by increased lobbying by the PLA in foreign policy.

RISING DOMESTIC INFLUENCE: 1989-1995

While Deng Xiaoping attempted a withdrawal of military elites in the early 1980s, in the wake of the Tiananmen incident, this trend has been reversed. Tiananmen brought home a sense of the vulnerabilities faced by the new generation of party leaders. It also illustrated the degree to which the PLA still remained crucial in the equation of political control. This boosted the standing of the PLA within the political system, bestowing upon it resources that could be used in the process of lobbying for its preferred policies. This influence was further bolstered by the need by Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin to win over PLA support for the imminent leadership succession process.

PLA power was seen most tangibly in the institutional channels of influence that were thrown wide open to the PLA in the wake of Tiananmen. The 14th CCP Central Committee contains the highest percentage of PLA officers (24.3%) since the 11th Central Committee elected in 1977 at the height of Lin Biao's influence. Such involvement is significant due to the important role of the central committee in the choice of top leaders in party and government. The same pattern held true with the National People's Congress (NPC). On the 1st Session of the 8th NPC in March 1993, 267 out of 2978 delegates or 9% were from the PLA forming the largest single delegation. At the top level, Admiral Liu Huaqing was the first military man ever to be appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee.¹³

RISING POLICY INFLUENCE: 1989-1995

David Shambaugh describes the PLA, and its stand on foreign policy as "the self-appointed guardian of Chinese sovereignty and nationalism".¹⁴ Indeed, in the period of PLA domestic ascendance outlined in the previous section, there is evidence of the PLA being engaged in extensive high level lobbying against what was seen as a weak stand by the Foreign Ministry/Party in dealings with the United States, particularly over trade, human rights, and Taiwan.

In 1992, the United States made a controversial sale of F-I 6s to Taiwan. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the interests of maintaining cordial economic ties, pushed for a low key rhetorical response, the military lobbied hard for a more forceful reaction, arguing that national dignity and sovereignty were at stake. In November of 1992, Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairmen, Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Zhen, and Defence Minister Chi Haotian articulated their differences in a letter to Jiang Zemin. The thrust of the letter was that "defending national sovereignty should take precedence over transient economic interests."¹⁵ This was rapidly followed up in a letter to Deng Xiaoping by 63 Generals, calling on him to "take action and oppose the hegemonists' political and economic blackmail and challenges to China."¹⁶ They warned that without a forceful stand, China would soon go the way of the USSR, and be reduced to the status of a second rate power. These letters were followed up with lobbying by various bodies of the PLA in various formal and informal fora.

By May of 1993, the results of PLA lobbying were beginning to show as the Politburo decided to take a more assertive response to US pressure associated with the renewal of China's MFN status. At a meeting of the CMC, Jiang Zemin admitted that "the adjustment of our policy has come a little late....now it turns out that our generals have more insight to strategy and policy towards the United States....we do not want confrontation, but we will never yield to confrontation that is forced on us."¹⁷

PLA advocacy of a tough line resumed following the 22 May 1995 decision by the American government to issue a visa to President Lee Teng Hui of Taiwan to visit the United States. The PLA response was abrupt and dramatic: a PLA delegation visiting the US abruptly cancelled their visit and left for China, Defence Minister Chi Haotian suspended a scheduled visit to the US, Beijing recalled its ambassador to the US and suspended talks with the US on the export of missile technology. Feeling themselves under threat, leaders in Beijing scurried to make amends for their previous soft line. Foreign Minister Qian Qicheng wrote a lengthy article in the journal Qiu Shi, that amounted to an open apology of sorts, and it is reported that Jiang Zemin was made to perform a self criticism before the CMC. Not long after, in the final week of July, the episode climaxed as the PLA carried out surface missile firing tests 85 nautical miles north of Taiwan.

These two incidents coincide with the period of domestic PLA ascendance. In possession of important institutional bargaining resources (its role as an instrument of political control, and the need of its support for the leadership succession), the PLA was able to exercise its independence and exercise influence in policy making. It is important to note that it was the PLA in general, rather than just groups or individuals within the PLA, that was acting in concerted to push for a particular set of policies. It is also noteworthy that the hawkish view of the PLA was in conflict with the restrained policies of Party leaders, but yet the military view eventually prevailed.

CONCLUSION

The degree to which China poses any sort of threat to regional security is a direct function of China's emergent foreign policy. But, as the last section has pointed out, it is far from clear that there is a monolith of opinion within China on the intended direction of that foreign policy. It is therefore crucial to consider generators of Chinese foreign policy, and it is a conclusion of this essay that these are embedded within the dynamics of Chinese domestic politics.

This essay has identified the PLA as an important source of pressure on Chinese foreign policy. If indeed this is a sound assumption, it becomes essential to consider the way in which the PLA operates as a bureaucratic interest group within the Chinese state system. It has been illustrated here that the greater the resources that the PLA is in possession of, the more its influence will be felt in policy and hence a greater tendency towards an aggressive foreign policy. These resources include its crucial role in maintaining domestic stability, and its support, as an interest group, for governing coalitions.

In the wake of the recently concluded 15th Party Congress, much has been made of the withdrawal of military elites from top policy bodies. According to the analysis laid out in this essay such a withdrawal, if symptomatic in a fall in the PLA's institutional resources, would lead to a less assertive stance in Chinese foreign policy. As argued earlier in the essay, the implications of this withdrawal are less than clear cut. However a full discussion of them is beyond our present scope. What this essay has established, is an important analytical link between domestic and foreign policy in China, particularly with regard to the PLA, and its bearing on the degree to which there is a "China threat".

It is clear that even in contemporary China, power still does come from the gun. Although this power can manifest itself in many different guises from the past, the crucial question is still the same: to what extent does the party control the gun?

ENDNOTES

1 Denny Roy."Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security", International Security, Summer 1994, pp. 149-168, and David Shambaugh,"Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security", Survival, Summer 1994, pp. 43-59.

2 Ellis Joffe. "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect", China Quarterly 146, June 1996,pp. 300-303.

3 For a full description of this system, see Ellis Joffe, Party and the Army: Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949-1964 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard East Asian Monographs, 1967).

4 For an account of the PLA in during the Cultural Revolution see Ellis Joffe "The Chinese Army in the Cultural Revolution: the politics of intervention", Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol VIII, Bo. 18 (7 December 1970), pp. 1-23. For an account of its role during the Tiananmen Incident, see Michael T. Byrnes, "The Death of a People's Army", in George Hicks (ed.), The Broken Mirror: China After Tiananmen (Harlow, Essex: Longman, 1990), pp. 132-13 1.

5 For example, Chalmers Johnson, "China vs US and Japan: Two contrasting visions of the future", Straits Times, 29 September 1997, p. 36, and Ching Cheong, "Jiang Brings China Closer to the World", Straits Times, 23 September 1997, p. 44.

6 See June Teufel Dreyer. "he New Officer Corp: Implications for the Future", China Quarterly 146, pp. 314-336.

7 Ellis Joffe. "Party-Army Relations in China", p. 304.

8 See David Shambaugh, "The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People's Liberation Army", China Quarterly 127, (September 1991), pp. 327-368.

9 Tai Ming Cheung. "Can PLA Inc. be Tamed?", Institutional Investor, 30 July 1996 pp. 41-32.

10 Tai Ming Cheung. "Can PLA Inc. be Tamed?" p. 43.

11 This is argued convincingly by John Garver in "he PLA as an Interest Group in Foreign Policy", in C. Lane Dennison et. al. (ed.) Chinese Military Modernization, (Washington, AEl Press, 1997) pp. 246-298.

12 Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lampton. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

13 David Shambaugh. "China's Military Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement, and Power Projection", China Quarterly 146, June 1996, p 269.

14 David Shambaugh. "China's Military in Transition", p 273.

15 Quoted in John Garver. "The PLA as an Interest Group", p. 260.

16 Quoted in John Garver. "The PLA as an Interest Group", pp. 260-261.

17 Quoted in John Garver. "The PLA as an Interest Group", p. 265.

Bibliography

1. Cheung, Tai Ming. "Can PLA Inc. be Tamed", Institutional Investor, 30 June 1996. pp.41-52.

2. Garver, John. "The PLA as an Interest Group in Chinese Foreign Policy", in C. Dennison Lane et al. (eds.), Chinese Military Modernization. (Washington: AEI Press, 1997).

3. Joffe, Ellis. The Chinese Military After Mao: (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1987).

4. "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect", China Quarterly 146, June 1996, pp. 298-314.

5. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and David Lampton. Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

6. Paltiel, Jeremy. "PLA Allegiance on Parade; Civil-Military Relations in Transition", China Quarterly 143, September 1996, pp. 784-800.

7. Shambaugh, David. "China's Military in Transition: Politics, Professionalism, Procurement, and Power Projection", China Quarterly 146, June 1996, pp. 265-298.

8. Swaine, Michael. The Role of the Chinese Military in National Security Making (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

9. The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs (Santa Monica, CA; RAND, 1992).

10. Straits Times, various issues, 1997.

CPT KWEK JU-HON graduated with a BA degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (1st Class Hons) from Oxford University in 1996. In 1997, he obtained a MA in East Asian Studies (with a concentration in Chinese Politics) from Yale University. CPT Kwek is currently on course in the Naval Diving Unit.