The
Awakening Dragon
by CPT Steven Tan Boon Heng
Introduction
The 2lst century is much touted as the Asia-Pacific
century. The region has been the largest economic growth area
of the world for the past decade, and with the rise of China,
the region is poised to become the economic powerhouse of
the next century. Given China's sheer size and resources,
her growth potential is undeniable and there are already predictions
that China's economy will equal if not overtake that of America
by the year 2020.1
History has proven time and again that there
is a cycle in the rise and fall of the affairs of Man and
States. Europe and Britain have seen their days of glory,
and the 20th century is widely regarded as the American century.2
Will the 21 st century then be the Asia-Pacific century,
with China catching up with and leading the pack of Asian
tigers?3 Or will the rise of China cause a showdown
between herself and the USA, leading to tensions and uncertainties
in the region resulting in lost opportunities for growth and
prosperity?
As Shakespeare puts it, "there is a
tide in the affairs of man, which, taken at its flood leads
on to fortune, omitted, all the voyage of their life, is bound
in shallows and in miseries."4 Will China
then seize her newly found opportunities and capitalise on
them, bringing prosperity both to her people and the region,
or will she seek a path of hegemony leading to disruption
and perhaps even destruction to the growth potential of the
region?
This essay will examine and discuss the
rise of China in recent years both economically and militarily.
The implications of China's rise to the region will be discussed,
and it will be shown that China will contribute to rather
than hinder the growth of the region. The economic aspect
will be discussed first, and it will be argued that China
will play by the rules in order to ensure that her economic
growth will not be hampered. Next, the military aspect will
be examined, in particular the navy's rise will be discussed,
and it will be proposed that China's military will not be
a destabilising force in the region. Finally, it will be concluded
that a strong China will do more good rather than harm to
the Asia-Pacific region.
Economic Rise of China
and its Implications
China has seen phenomenal growth in her
economy after the late paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping steered
her on a course of free market reforms in the late seventies.
Starting with the coastal regions, special economic zones
were created and a self-styled free-market socialism was embraced
by Beijing. Denying a switch to capitalism openly yet wishing
to reap its profits, Beijing is seeking the best of capitalism
and socialism.
Beijing watched with wariness and horror
as the Soviet Union collapsed in the late eighties. Though
not the very best of allies, Moscow and Beijing have always
stood against the West and capitalism. With the lessons drawn
from the Soviet experience, Chinese leaders are determined
not to lose their grip on the country.
When then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,
introduced Glasnost5 and Perestroika6
into the Soviet Union, he did not envisage that it would hasten
the demise of the Soviet empire. Western leaders applauded
when Gorbachev pushed for reforms in his country, and they
certainly did when the Soviet Union fell apart. That is the
reason why Beijing is always suspicious and wary of the true
intentions of the West. Beijing is skeptical and hostile whenever
there are attacks on her human rights record and calls for
more openness in China by the West.
The mistake Gorbachev made was that he introduced
Glasnost before pushing through Perestroika.7
In giving freedom of thought and speech to his people before
introducing economic reforms, Gorbachev gave room for an uprising
that resulted from displeasure and unhappiness over the economic
and social conditions. Put in simple language, hungry people
have no energy and time for higher thoughts. The hierarchy
of needs have to be met from the basic ones,8 and
Gorbachev ushered in the collapse of the Soviet empire when
he went against that hierarchy.
With the benefit of having the Soviet mistake
as reference, Beijing is determined to retain control over
the country while introducing economic reforms. As mentioned
earlier, Beijing is trying to have the best of both capitalism
and socialism. This explains why Beijing frowns on and would
not hesitate to curb dissent while promoting economic reforms
at the same time. The West is against this, and Beijing sees
every step taken by America to promote human rights as part
of a larger plan to destabilise the country.
Asian countries take a very different view
towards China. Asian countries, in particular ASEAN countries,
take the view that the only way to open up China is through
people-to-people interaction brought about by economic activities
and exchanges. With wealth and mobility brought about by economic
growth, Chinese people will travel more and interact with
the outside world. Seeing the benefits of capitalism with
their own eyes will set in a desire for change and reform,
and as more and more Chinese acquire this desire, reform will
eventually take place in China even though it may be a long
process.
Beijing is aware of the price she has to
pay for economic growth, but she is more comfortable with
this gradual change than the drastic switch to democracy that
America has been advocating and championing all this while.
The Clinton administration has realised that and this is shown
by the recent change in America's China policy from one of
containment to constructive engagement.9 Not linking
China's Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) status to human rights
issue is a step in this direction, and this has reduced the
possibility of a clash between the two giants.
Having dispelled what she views as external
attempts to destabilise China, Beijing looks set on a course
of economic reform that will contribute to the growth of the
Asia Pacific region. Beijing is seeking entry into the World
Trade Organisation (WTO), and this signals that she is willing
to abide by the international rules of trade and commerce,albeit
with special concessions in view of her developing status.
America should welcome this move and try to integrate China's
economy with the world's. There is more for America to gain
than to lose by engaging China positively.
Up to World War II, wars were fought primarily
for economic reasons,10 and the Clausewitzian theory of war
seemed to hold true up till the middle of the 20th century.
After World War II, the world was divided into two ideological
camps. A modified form of Clausewitzian theory held true and
wars were waged over ideological differences, even though
such reasons were often fronts for expanding the participants'
spheres of influence and ultimately their national interests.
However, with the end of the Cold War, wars are being fought
more for ethnic and religious reasons than anything else.
The Clausewitzian theory no longer holds true as countries
have calculated and realised that there is more to lose than
to gain by going to war.
There is a school of thought that holds
that as countries trade and open their markets up to foreign
investors, their economies will become integrated and interdependent
on one another.11 This inter-dependence will reduce
the tendency for countries to resort to war to settle their
differences. Arbitration and other peaceful forms of solutions
will become the preferred mode of operation.
America's recent switch of policy towards
China is in line with the abovementioned school of thought.
By seeking to actively trade with China and trying to penetrate
into her markets, America is hoping to bring about this inter-dependency
on Beijing. Asean countries are already actively investing
in China, and Japan has recently taken a stake too, by investing
in the multi-billion dollar "Three Gorges Dam" project
in China.
All these economic interactions and activities
will serve not only to make war too costly for Beijing to
contemplate, social reform will also take place as a result
of the increased presence of foreigners in China. It will
only be a matter of time before a whole generation of "reformed-leaders"
grow up to lead the country.
This augurs well for the Asia-Pacific region
and the world because an unstable and divided China will not
be able to sustain growth in her country, much less contribute
to the growth and prosperity of the region. A stable and strong
China will do more good to the region and the world. The West's
purpose will be served if they remain patient and wait for
China to be reformed from internally and not externally.
There are already signs of unrest and secessionist
movements in China and if Beijing does not handle these problems
well, an internal break-up could occur and it could precipitate
the fall of the country. Controlling the widening income gap
between city dwellers and peasants is one pressing problem
the Chinese government has to tackle, and keeping the secessionist
movement of Muslims in Xinjiang Province under control is
also an urgent task. Tibet and Taiwan are also potential trouble
spots for Beijing, and the world is monitoring closely how
Hong Kong will fare after she reverts to Chinese sovereignty.
China has realised that the only way to
become a power of consequence is through reforming her economy
and attracting foreign investments. In order to sustain her
rate of economic growth, Beijing will continue to woo foreign
investors and stick by international rules to promote trade
and commerce with other countries. With all that is at stake,
Beijing is more inclined to choose a path of consultation
rather than confrontation with the West and the world. She
has more to lose than to gain by going against the international
community.
However, Beijing is not about to sacrifice
sovereignty in the name of growth. The West, in particular
America, should realise this and compromise accordingly. America
has already taken steps in this direction by the recent change
in policy towards China. America should also understand that
a stable and unified China will be essential to the stability
and growth of the Asia-Pacific region. America will contribute
towards this cause by allowing reform to take place in China
by itself and not try to inject or interfere in any manner.
The new leadership under Chinese President
Jiang Zemin has indicated they will continue the reforms started
by the late Deng.12 With a new team of players
in the game who understand how much they stand to lose if
they flout the rules, China looks set on a path of free market
socialism that will power her to the forefront in the 21st
century. Barring any outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula,
the Asian tigers together with China look poised to declare
the 21st century that of the Asia-Pacific's.
Military Rise of China
and its Implications
With the growth brought about by the economic
reforms, China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is set on
a path of modernisation and hardware acquisition. The navy
has in recent years started a programme of transforming its
defence capabilities from one of coastal defence (Jin'an
Fanyu) to offshore defence (Jinhai Fangyu), with
the ultimate aim of building a blue water navy or ocean defence
(Yanghai Fangyu) capable navy.13 This is
indicated by then navy commander Admiral Zhang Lianzhong,
who pointed out that, "in order to effectively defend
China against attacks from the sea, it is necessary to extend
the depth of defence into the oceans and to have a naval capability
of intercepting and destroying the enemy."14
The importance that Beijing places on sea
power can be seen by the fact that a current estimate of the
Chinese navy's share of the defence budget is between 10 and
15 percent.15 This is despite the fact that the
navy numbers only about 340,000, roughly about 10 percent
of the total armed forces. The allocations to naval funds
are increasing yearly, and there are constant reports of China
trying to acquire aircraft carriers besides other force-projection
capable weapon systems.
"Chinese rulers have been historically
ambivalent about the importance of the sea. The occasions
when attention was paid to maritime matters, most notably
in the 15th century, were rare exceptions to a narrow continentalist
outlook."16 Historically, China has always
taken the approach of a land-based power, preoccupied mainly
with her own internal problems and trying to protect her borders
from barbarian attacks. This is best exemplified by the erection
of the Great Wall.
It was only in the middle of the 19th century
that Chinese leaders realised the importance of having a navy
when they lost a series of battles at sea, most notably to
the British in the Opium War of 1839-42 and the Sino-Japanese
War at the end of the century. The inability of China to prevent
foreign invasion brought about the collapse of the Imperial
system.17
These events are often quoted to justify
Beijing's rush to modernise her navy. Admiral Zhang Lianzhong
said in 1988 that "we will never forget that China was
invaded seven times by imperialist troops from the sea. The
nation's suffering due to a lack of sea defence still remains
fresh in our minds, and history must not repeat itself."18
Thus, with her newly acquired wealth, Beijing is set on a
course of revamping and upgrading her navy, with the ultimate
aim of having a forward force-projection capable force.
Beijing has stated that the PLA is to "assist
in the country's economic development."19
The navy's role is to defend the sea lines of communication
(SLOC) that China's growing seaborne trade is dependent on.
The navy is also tasked to defend China's territorial rights
and claims in the surrounding sea areas. Beijing claims up
to three million square kilometres of maritime territory,
and has asserted that about one million square kilometres
of this territory is being illegally exploited by other countries.20
The Spratlys and Diaoyudao are two island
groups that China is in contention with other countries. In
1974, the Chinese navy saw action when it took the Paracels
from Vietnamese troops, and Beijing is still in tussle with
Hanoi over the Spratlys after a brief naval skirmish in the
late eighties.
There have been numerous reports that Beijing
is trying fill in the power vacuum created by the withdrawal
of Soviet forces from Vietnam and American forces from the
Philippines. A much-quoted example is the conduct of live-firing
of missiles and other major exercises in the Strait of Taiwan
by Beijing during Taiwan's first Presidential elections in
early 1996.
However, that provocative act brought two
battle carrier groups of the United States Navy (USN) into
the region, and it underscored Washington's commitment to
the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Ever since that
incident, naval analysts in Beijing have taken a different
posture towards the outright use of force.
The new leader of China, President Jiang
Zemin, was always reported as not having full control of the
military because he did not rise through its ranks. However,
immediately after the death of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping,
military leaders have pledged their allegiance and support
for President Jiang. This is a big change in the PLA's posture
as the exercises conducted in the Taiwan Strait were reported
to be carried out upon the generals' insistence despite JiangÕs
disapproval. The military was reported to be frustrated with
Jiang's lack of force shown towards Taiwan's pro-independence
moves. Jiang's approach appeared too weak for them to follow.
The hardline approach of the PLA did nothing
to solve the Taiwan problem but aggravated it further by getting
the Americans involved. Having given in to the generals and
proven them wrong, Jiang has now won the PLA to his side.
Beijing is less likely to exercise the military
option to solve conflicts in the foreseeable future now that
the PLA is under civilian control. Economic development is
top on the priority list of Beijing right now and she has
realised that any provocative act on her part could bring
damaging economic sanctions. Any aggressive move on her part
will scare away foreign investors and only revert her back
to the days of unproductivity and suffering. Having given
the people a taste of what economic development holds, the
political backlash back home will be very great if Beijing
embarks on a path of military adventurism that will lead to
international sanctions and isolation.
Having said all of that, it is necessary
to note however, that Beijing will not hesitate to resort
to military force if her sovereignty is challenged. In the
case of the Spratlys, Beijing has offered to put aside the
issue of sovereignty for the time being and has proposed harnessing
the resources of the area jointly with the parties concerned.
In the case of Tibet and Xinjiang, no compromise is seen.
Taiwan has a special consideration and the way Beijing handles
Hong Kong afters she reverts to Chinese control will indicate
how the Taiwan issue will be solved eventually. The West's
dealings and relations with Beijing will improve greatly if
they understand her stance on sovereignty issues.
China aims to be a regional power but her
present priority is on economic development. The PLA and the
navy are instruments towards this aim, and although modernisation
is taking place at a fast rate, Beijing is not ready to sacrifice
her economic growth for any military adventurism. The military
has been brought under control and for the foreseeable future,
peaceful means will be the preferred form of solving problems.
Conclusion
China has adopted free market reforms and
termed it as Chinese self-styled socialism. With the Soviet
Union's collapse still fresh in mind, Beijing is not about
to sacrifice sovereignty and central command in the name of
reform. On the contrary, she is seeking the best of communist
socialism and capitalism.
The PLA and the Chinese navy are on a modernisation
programme but they have been brought under civilian control
and their main role is to contribute to the economic development
of the country. Military adventurism has been ruled out and
even though Beijing aspires to fill in the power vacuum in
Asia created by the end of the Cold War, she has realised
that any provocative move on her part will only result in
international sanctions and isolation. The political price
to pay at home may just be too high for Beijing.
In conclusion, China, growing at a phenomenal
rate and looking set to be the economic powerhouse of Asia
in the 21st century, is taking a path that will ensure her
own growth and development. This augurs well for the Asia-Pacific
region as a stable and strong China will contribute to investors'
confidence in the region, and this will propel the region
into the forefront of the 21st century. The awakening dragon
looks like it is ready to bring prosperity and blessings to
the people of China.
Endnotes
1 Global Prospects
and the Developing Countries, 1993, World Bank, Washington
D.C.
2 Paul Kennedy. The Rise
and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, Fontana Press 1988
3 The Asian tigers refers
to the robust economies of Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and
South Korea. These countries have high GNPs and enjoy high
growth rates.
4 William Shakespeare.
Julius Caesar, London, Oxford Press, 1984. Quoted by Brutus.
5 Glasnost is Russian for
freedom of thought.
6 Prestroika is Russian
for reform and change.
7 Mikhail Gorbachev. Memoirs,
Germany, Doubleday, 1995.
8 Maslow's Hierarchy of
Needs states that basic needs like hunger and security have
to be met before
secondary needs like sense of self-worth and recognition.
9 The Strait Times, "US
Policies on China are on the Right Track", Comments/Analysis,
pp 52, 14 March 1997.
10 Samuel P. Huntington.
The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order,
New York, Simon & Schuster 1996
11 ibid.
12 The Straits Times, pp
1, 12 March 1997.
13 Tai Ming Cheung. Growth
of Chinese Naval Power, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 1990.
14 "Interview with
Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong", PD ( Overseas Edition),
1 August 1988.
15 Interviews with Chinese
military economists and Western defence analysts, Beijing,
August 1989.
16 The first Ming Emperor,
Zhu Yuanzhang, ordered a number of expeditions to Southeast
and Northeast Asia. See Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the
Dragon, United States Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland,
1982.
17 John L. Rawlinson. China's
Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1967.
18 Sen Shugen. "An
Interview with Chinese PLA Navy Commander Zhang Lianzhong",
Junshi Shijie [Military World 1), no. 2 ( Sept. - Oct. 1988).
19 Zhou Aiqun. "The
Soviet Union Adjusts its Military Strategy", Shijie Zhishi,
in FBIS/China, 14 May 1990.
20 Yi Yuanqiu & Wang
Zhuanyou. "Establish Strong Border Defence Thinking",
LAD, 6 October 1989.
Bibliography
1. Samuel P. Huntington.
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,
New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996.
2. Paul Kennedy. The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York, Fontana Press,
1988.
3. Paul Kennedy. The
Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, New York, Fontana
Press, 1991.
4. Mikhail Gorbachev. Memoirs,
Germany, Doubleday, 1995.
5. David S.G. Goodman.
Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese Revolution: A Political Biography,
London, Routledge, 1994.
6. Harrison E. Salisbury.
The New Emperors: Mao and Deng, A Dual Biography, London,
Harper Collins, 1993.
7. M.S. Dobbs Higginson.
Asia Pacific - Its Role in the New World Order, Australia,
Mandarin, 1996.
CPT STEVEN TAN BOON HENG graduated from the
National Defence Academy of Japan in 1995 with a B.Eng degree
(1st Class Hons). CPT Tan's last appoinment was with the 188
Sqn; he is currently on course.
|