The US-Japan-China Triangle: Maintaining Peace And Security In A Troubled East Asia
by CPT Yeo Heng Hwee

"The challenge of this region- unlike the Middle East or South Asia or the Balkans- is not to achieve peace and prosperity, but to maintain the peace that exists so that the prosperity can continueÉ The current state of the US-Japan-China triangle is not perfect, but it underpins the relative peace and stability of the region."

Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew ¹
Straits Times, 13 Sept 1997

Contrary to what many Western observers believe, the end of the Cold War has left a profound impact on the security climate of the Asia-Pacific. Regional alignments were based on one single entity - that of the existence of the Soviet Union. The absence of it has left a nostalgic taste on many tongues. North-East Asia, in particular, bereft of a multilateral security institution like NATO or the CSCE, is still coming to grips over the end of the Cold War. The ability of the smaller Asian states to influence the security climate in the Asia-Pacific is unprecedented in history. Together with China and Japan, they have the capability to drag all major regional actors into a conflict, not to mention the spin-offs that this phenomenon will have on South-East Asia itself. This ability, arguably, a signatory of a post-Cold War World order, may not even be paralleled by the US.

Of late, much attention has been given to the bilateral security treaty between US and Japan. This single bilateral alliance is accredited as being the most important military alliance that exists in the world today. On the same note, the relationship between Washington and Beijing has been accorded a similar level of importance, if not more. Recent developments in the US-Japan security arrangement have injected a de-stabilizing effect on the already unstable relationship in the US-Japan-China triangle. As SM Lee pointed out, the delicate balance of power between the three actors underpins the relative peace and stability of the region. This essay aims at bringing about a better understanding of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific that led to the revised US-Japan security treaty, the triangular relationship between US, Japan and China, their concerns in view of the revised treaty and the effects that shifts in the balance of power have on the peace and stability of our region.

The security climate of the Asia-Pacific possess in itself a domino effect that is bound to involve all of South-East Asia. Any instability in North-East Asia will affect our Sea Lines of Communication. Our trade with the US, Japan, China, Taiwan and South Korea will be adversely affected. A security climate of this degree of volatility in a region that is of such close proximity to us cannot be ignored. Singapore, like all ASEAN states, craves to maintain the kind of status quo that we have enjoyed for the past few decades.

PRUDENT BEGINNINGS

In the late 1940s, Communist activities were rampant in East Asia due to the emergence of Communism in China and North Korea. The decision to de-militarize and re-arm post-war Japan was aimed at making Japan a junior partner in the containment of Communism in East Asia.² The 1954 Mutual Security Treaty (MST) between US and Japan provided for the event that if, and only if, the security of Japan is threatened, the US and Japan will be able to cooperate in the defence of the Japanese archipelago. Japan was not allowed, under Article 9 of its Peace Constitution, to participate in any other military activities unless it is directly concerned with national security. Also under this defence arrangement, Japan would be protected under the nuclear umbrella provided by the US. In return, Japan is to provide the American troops with forward operating bases and also to pledge that it will uphold its Three Non-Nuclear Principles in not becoming a nuclear weapons state.³ This defence arrangement has been interpreted by many as fundamentally limiting the scope of Japan's activities to only the defence of the Japanese islands.⁴ While US recognises that it needs Japan's cooperation and participation, it is at the same time wary of what a militarily strong Japan can do in a war wrecked Asia.

Much has been speculated that Japan has benefited greatly from a lopsided security alliance, wallowing in a "one-nation pacifism" from 1945 until the Gulf War. The narrow interpretation of Article 9 adopted by the Diet, ensured that the Japanese extracted maximum benefits before their minimal concessions towards rearmament in the early 1950s.⁵ Clyde PrestowitzÕs memorable description of the US-Japan relationship as having traded places could not have been more candidly accurate - that "Japan has replaced US as the world's largest creditor and America has become the world's largest debtor".⁶ In 1986, under steady American pressure to share a bigger portion of the defence treaty, then Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone lifted the 1 percent GNP political limit on defence spending. Interestingly, although the political ban has been lifted, not once in any of the subsequent years has Japan reached the 1 percent of GNP in military spending, let alone surpass it.⁷ Such is the strength of the Japanese economy, that the Self Defence Force (SDF) enjoys the third largest defence budget in the world today, even without bursting the original 1 percent limit.⁸

On June 7, 1996, President Bill Clinton announced the revisions of new defence guidelines in the existing security treaty. Under the revised guidelines, the Japanese were given a bigger military role in the Alliance, representing a shift in the fundamentals from the original treaty. Instead of purely joining forces with the US in the defence of the Japanese archipelago, Japan is now to be involved in the maintenance of peace and security in the hot spots of the region. The revised treaty calls not only for Japan to provide US with forward operating bases, but also to support US operations from the rear. Japan is now allowed, or required by the treaty, to provide rear logistical support to US fighting forces in the Asia-Pacific. These logistics runs, will of course consist of only American stores and armaments. The SDF will also be involved in intelligence collection, mine-sweeping, search-and-rescue operations in international waters and sanctions monitoring etc.. These revisions touched on the very issues which the Japanese have been trying to avoid for the past few decades.

REGIONAL HOTSPOTS

The benign security climate of the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific stands in contrast to the security environment in Africa, the Balkans and the ex-Soviet Republics. Unlike Europe, where the end of Cold War has altered many security fundamentals of states, the security threats to the Asia-Pacific region have culminated in a more subtle, Asian way. The Soviet withdrawal from Mongolia and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam and the American withdrawal from the Philippines have created a power vacuum, and forces have begun to manoeuvre to establish themselves there. Most notable of this phenomenon are the recent territorial claims in the East and South China Seas, the breaking down of Communist North Korea and last but not least, the persistent quest for independence by Taiwan. China, being directly involved in two of these examples is perceived as the biggest and the most assertive of the players in the arena.

CHINA - THE DRAGON AWAKES

A major source of instability in the Asia-Pacific rim comes from China. This stems from either the perception of an assertive and militarily powerful China, or from actual experiences with the awakening power. Regardless of whether the fear is perceived or real, the truth is that the rise of China in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific rim has already begun to stir some worried minds. The rapid expansion of the Chinese military spending in recent years has caused some concern in the region. The nostalgic quest for certainty, of absolute division between East and West, created the rush towards arms build-up. This build-up was made easier with the Asian economic boom and the readily available arms stockpile left over from the ideological conflict.

The claiming of all of the islands in the South China Sea by China signifies an awakening power beckoning to be recognised. The situation in that area seems to have reached a deadlock. China suggested that the sovereignty issue on Spratlys and the Paracels be shelved and to jointly develop the resources in that region. This was met with much opposition. To remain neutral at this moment is to wait for an even stronger, more assertive China. ASEAN feels uncomfortable with the increased affluence of the Chinese military and is wary of Chinese realist policies, especially in the area of sovereignty.¹¹

While Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and Dengism provide ideological backing to all Chinese foreign policy, Nationalism continues to be the unifying force that reigns in the arms of the Chinese foreign policy.¹² The historical experience of the weak Qing dynasty has bred an "informal ideology" in which the Chinese foreign policy making machine strongly believes. The informal ideology contains 6 paragraphs, close scrutiny of them will disclose the ideological backing in China's modern foreign policies, especially in the area of obsessed sovereignty.

1. The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great nation.

2. The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has experienced in the modern world.

3. China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers which have insulted or injured it in past years.

4. As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a Great Power.

5. China's national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such respect precludes any foreign criticism of China's internal politics.

6. China's special virtue in international affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency but on immutable principles that express universal values such as justice and equity.¹³

On the socio-political spectrum, much has been speculated on the seemingly de-railing concepts of the market economy and communism. Serious compatibility problems may arise, which will inevitably spill-over into the society. If these problems are not properly managed, then the outcome of this socio-political friction will have serious consequences on the growth of China's economy. Another Tiananmen incident will set China back for another ten years or so, and China cannot afford this kind of a setback. With the return of Hong Kong to China, and China's proclamation of a "One Country, Two Systems" concept, it will be interesting to observe how China is going to manage its "socialist style" market economy while maintaining an iron grip on its political agenda. While the Utopian ideology can no longer feed the people, economic viability and its peoples standards of living have become the yardstick for the government's success and a validation of its legitimacy. Unfortunately for China, its nationalistic ideology does not go hand-in-hand with its economic development programmes, thus creating inconsistencies and discontinuities in its foreign policies.¹⁴

Regional states are still unclear on the stance of China in its expanded military role in the Asia-Pacific. To treat China as a perceived enemy would be to engage in a self-fulfilling prophecy. To isolate China is to contain China, the situation demands more tact and care than mere speculation and blanket interpretation of the security threat can accord.

Beijing's delicate relationship with the world's only superpower is troubled and very shaky. Though the 1997 Sino-American summit has made some headway in the bilateral economic sphere, it did not make any significant achievements in the area of Asia-Pacific security. Relating to the revised US-Japan Security Treaty and the proclamation that the treaty could well cover the Taiwan Straits, China reminded the US of the Shanghai Communique signed between the two, in which the US recognised the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) as the only government of China and that the Republic of China (ROC) is a province of China.

TAIWAN - THE QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE

The cause of yet another source of instability in the Asia-Pacific is from Taiwan. The agenda that the Taiwanese government abides by is that of attaining independence from China and to achieve international recognition by gaining entry into the United Nations. China has remained steadfast in this issue: the re-unification of Taiwan to the mainland, like Hong Kong and Macau, is believed to be inevitable. The return of Taiwan to the motherland, to the Chinese, signifies the finale in their efforts of eradicating the indignity that it has suffered during the "century of shame and humiliation" when the weak Qing and Nationalist governments were forced to accept unequal treaties, extraterritoriality, spheres of influence, degradation and occupation.¹⁵

The Taiwanese government has been trying to garner support for its independence movement. To a certain extent, it knows that the US will not tolerate a hostile take over of its country by China. Re-unification, to the Taiwanese, can only come if the Taiwanese government desires it and more importantly, it can only be achieved through peaceful means. This perception, together with Taipei's military assessment that China has yet to attain the military might to mount a military campaign, will possibly explain President Lee's blatant "informal visits" to various South-East Asian countries and the US. The first direct Presidential Elections and Lee's visit to Cornell University in the US in 1995 was the last straw. China conducted live firing tests just off the coast of Taiwan as a sign of retaliation. In view of a heated North-East Asia, the US dispatched its 7th Fleet to the area to calm the tension and also to convey to Beijing a sense of American concern. This gesture has been interpreted by the Taiwanese as support given by the US to its cause. To the Chinese, it was an infringement of the 1972 Shanghai Communique.

Beijing has always treated the Taiwan issue as a backyard problem. That is why it is particularly sensitive when the US-Japan Security Treaty was revised. From the Chinese point of view, the US, along with Japan, is attempting to encircle its developments and denying China of its rightful place in the world by deterring its re-unification with Taiwan. Most Chinese officials have also maintained that Taiwan would have been united with China a long time ago if not for the MST signed in 1954 and the US 7th Fleet in the Taiwan straits, thus preventing a forcible integration of Taiwan by China. With the strengthened defence pact between US and Japan in 1997, it seems that the wish of re-unification would again be indefinitely deferred.

JAPAN - RED SUN RISING

With the end of the bipolar Cold War and the short period of self actualization among the many actors in the arena, the global political structure is slowly shifting towards multi-polarity. Both US and Japan claim that there is a need to address the security treaty to better reflect the current security climate. Washington, in particular, feels uneasy with the security arrangements left over from the Cold War. With South Korea still battling against the Communist threat from the North, and the Taiwan Strait continuing to rock against the waves of independence, Washington feels that it needs a more active partner in the conduct of its diplomacy in the Far East.

Tokyo, on the other hand, is experiencing a more pressing situation. The unnerving security climate in the Korean peninsular represents a possible catastrophe that may drain Japan of its economic well being. In either direction, a peaceful breakdown of North Korea or an abrupt dis-integration of the communist state will have a direct impact on Japan. Given the economic turmoil that North Korea is experiencing, the world may not have to wait too long for this to happen. On China, the increased military spending and the gradual upgrading of its armed forces have generated a genuine concern among the Japanese policy makers.

The revisions to the US-Japan security treaty aim at addressing these new insecurities. Many argued that while the original treaty has been in place for two decades, the US has never needed to come to Japan's aid. While some maintained this posture, others agree that there is still a role for this treaty, these experts, arguably are those proponents of a dedicated US presence in the Asia-Pacific.

The most controversial portion of the revised treaty is, undoubtedly that part of the declaration that binds Japan into giving logistical support to the US in times of crisis in "areas surrounding Japan". This declaration deviated from the traditional treaty that Japan is only to provide assistance to the US when the Japanese archipelago is being attacked. As former Cabinet Secretary Kajiyama declared, the "areas surrounding Japan" may well include the Taiwan Strait. This declaration was met with both outrage and suspicion by the Chinese.

NORTH KOREA - FAMINE STRICKEN

Matake Kamiya pointed out that with the end of the Cold War, the potential sources of instability in the Asia-Pacific still exist. Of the most pressing, he pointed out, is the Cold War like stance along the 38^th parallel in the Korean peninsular. The challenges to the regional security posture come in the form of the suspected development of nuclear weapons by the North Koreans and the possible (perhaps impending) collapse of the Kim dynasty.¹⁶ Though North Korea and the US have signed an agreement to curb the former's ability to manufacture nuclear arms, considering North Korea's history in pulling out from treaties, the issue is far from being resolved.

On the economic front, North Korea's acute shortage of hard currency resulting from the termination of subsidized trade and barter has caused the curtailment of oil imports from Russia and a drastic decrease in quantity from China - a result of a failed planned economy. The food shortage that has haunted the country for years continues to worsen. A violent collapse of the economy would constitute a security threat to its immediate neighbours, Japan included. A peaceful collapse and eventual integration with South Korea would entail a very costly affair which analysts claim will be even more costly than that experienced by West Germany.

UNITED STATES - A SUPERPOWER IN OUR BACKYARD?

"The challenge for the Asian Pacific in this decade... is to develop multiple new arrangements to meet multiple threats and opportunities. These arrangements can function like overlapping plates of armour, individually providing protection and together covering the full body of our common security concerns."

US President Bill Clinton. ¹⁷

In 1994, US trade with North-East Asia amounted to US$300 billion. While security paves the way for viable economics, economics in turn determines in a relative sense, the inclinations of foreign policy. Instability in North-East Asia will upset the US economy as much as the Asian ones. The US had provided assurance that it would continue to remain engaged in North-East Asia. The bilateral relationships that the US has developed with various nations in the Asia-Pacific have been the principal basis for US presence in the region since the 1950s. They have been the pillars on which the US relied upon in the containment of Soviet influence in the Cold War and can still be mutually exploited to influence regional events. To eliminate or undermine them would be to inject an essence of instability in the region whereby great power rivalries may occur.

TROUBLED EAST ASIA?

The fate of East Asia relies strategically on many intertwined actors. First and foremost, the one that remains most volatile has to be that of North Korea. Its internal developments, though seemingly happening within a vacuum, will create a destabilising effect that will affect the whole world. The Taiwan Strait will continue to remain a heated area of contention involving China, Taiwan and the US directly. With the revised MST, Japan will also be involved. While the US and Japan have to be cautious in their involvement with the Taiwanese independence movement, China has to demonstrate restraint in the sovereignty issues in the South China Sea.¹⁹ Already, its growth in influence and blatant show of force in the area has begun to stir many troubled minds. China has to demonstrate that while seeking to be a regional power and demanding its rightful place in the world arena, it does not appear to be overpowering. Encirclement by all other states may otherwise prove to be very costly.

Many observers have concluded that the only way in which China can behave responsibly in its new role is to make it a major stake holder in the political and economic affairs in the region. Entry into the WTO, IMF and the participation in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is seen as the quickest and surest way. Our region is slowly grappling with our acceptance of a continued American presence, a militarily stronger Japan and an awakening China. Shades of grey have hence been developed, much in contrast to that of black and white during the period of the Cold War. A modus vivendi will take some time to develop. The picture may not seem so bleak, if it is properly and intelligently managed. The US-Japan-China triangle must realize that confrontation, whether heated or cold, will be a costly affair. While multinational cooperation must occur in East Asia so as to maintain the peace and prosperity in the region, actors must be cautious not to engage themselves in a neolibreral's Prisoner's Dilemma.²⁰

ENDNOTES

1. Comment / Analysis Column, Straits Times, Sept 13, 1997.

2. See G. Cameron Hurst III. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 70. 1996.

3. Toshiyuki Shikata. Japan's Security Strategy. Asia-Pacific Review. Vol 3 no. 1. Spring/Summer 1996. Pp 61-62.

4. Yasuhiro Nakasone. The Security Environment of the Asia-Pacific Age. Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 4 No.1, pp. 8. Spring 1997.

5. See G. Cameron Hurst III. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 70. 1996.

6. Prestowitz, Clyde. As quoted in Hurst III, G. Cameron. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 70. 1996.

7. Jameson, Sam. Japan: Confronting an Uncertain Future. Asian Perspective. Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1997, pp. 118.

8. See G. Cameron Hurst III. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 70.1996.

9. Matake Kamiya. Hopeful Uncertainty: Asia-Pacific security in transition. Asia-Pacific Review. Vol. 3 no. 1. Spring/Summer 1996. Pp. 121.

10. Comment / Analysis Column, Straits Times, Sept 13. 1997.

11. Realists focus on absolute and relative gains from cooperation. Realists also believe that today's absolute gain might fade, in relation to tomorrow's relative gain and that a state will ultimately exit from an agreement if the perceived relative gain is lesser than others. ASEAN operates in this environment especially in the area of the Spratlys and in regards to the Chinese motion that the area be jointly developed.

12. Thomas L. Wilborn. International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle. March, 1996.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassu/ssipubs/
pubs96/neasia/neasia.txt.

13. Steven I. Levine. Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy," in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, ed. By Thomas W. Robinson & David Shambaugh (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), Pp. 43-44. Levine looks upon this mind-set as "informal ideology".

14. Thomas L. Wilborn. International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle. March, 1996.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassu/ssipubs/
pubs96/neasia/neasia.txt.

15. Ibid.

16. Matake Kamiya. Hopeful Uncertainty: Asia-Pacific security in transition. Asia-Pacific Review. Vol. 3 no. 1.
Spring/Summer 1996. Pp. 118. Italics mine.

17. Thomas L. Wilborn. International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassu/ssipubs/
pubs96/neasia/neasia.txt. March, 1996.

18. Comment / Analysis Column, Straits Times, Sept 13 1997.

19. Ibid.

20. The Neoliberals maintain that the states in an anarchy often have mixed interests and this can be illustrated by the Prisoner's Dilemma. In the game, each state will prefer mutual cooperation to mutual non-cooperation (CC>DD), successful cheating to mutual cooperation (DC>CC), mutual defection to victimization by another's cheating (DD>CD). Therefore, in an anarchy without an overarching authority, each state would defect, regardless of what it expects others to do (DC>CC>DD>CD). For a more elaborated brief on the Prisoner's Dilemma, see Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" in International Rules -Approaches from International Law and International Relations. Ed. By Robert D. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Lught. (New York : Oxford University Press), 1996. Pp.493.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism" International Rules -Approaches from International Law and International Relations. Edited. by Robert D. Beck, Anthony Clark Arend and Robert D. Lught. (New York : Oxford University Press), 1996.

2. Hurst III, G. Cameron. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, 1996.

3. Jameson, Sam. Japan: Confronting an Uncertain Future. Asian Perspective. Vol. 21, No. 1, Spring-Summer 1997.

4 Levine, Steven I. Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy." Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. Edited by Thomas W. Robinson & David Shambaugh. New York: Oxford University Press. 1994.

5. Nakasone, Yasuhiro. The Security Environment of the Asia-Pacific Age. Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 4 No.1, Spring 1997.

6. Prestowitz, Clyde. As quoted in Hurst III, G. Cameron. Agenda 2000 - The US-Japanese Alliance at Risk. Orbis. Vol. 41, No. 1, 1996.

7. Shikata,Toshiyuki. Japan's Security Strategy. Asia-Pacific Review. Vol. 3 No. 1. Spring/Summer 1996.

8. Straits Times.

9. Wilborn, Thomas L. International Politics in Northeast Asia: The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle. March, 1996.
http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassu/ssipubs/
pubs96/neasia/neasia.txt

CPT YEO HENG HWEE has a BA degree in Political Science and and European Studies (French). He is currently a staff officer in 165 Sqn, RSAF. He won the 3rd prize in the 1996 CDF Essay Competition.