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Home > Back Issues (Journal) > Journal V24 N2 (Apr - Jun 1998) > Five Power Defence Arrangements : A Singapore Perspective

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Five Power Defence Arrangements : A Singapore Perspective
by CPT Ang Wee Han

 

Introduction

On the 15th and 16th of April 1971, the ministers of the governments of Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom met and issued a communique with regards to a new political arrangement called the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). This was a historic milestone in the tumultuous relationship between Britain and her former colonies, Singapore and Malaysia.

The essay argues that although the FPDA was conceived in a world that was considerably different from the one we are living in now, from Singapore's perspective, it has not outlived its usefulness and is still relevant today albeit for a slightly different purpose. I have divided the essay into several sections. Firstly, I examined the historical background that led to the eventual formation of the FPDA and compared this to the present situation. Following this, I provided a brief summary of the potential flashpoints in Southeast Asia in order to demonstrate the present role of the FPDA. I also analysed the positive effects of the FPDA to Singapore including the improvement of bilateral ties, the opportunities for training and the experience it offers to the Singapore Armed Forces.

Background of the FPDA

Because of the relative decline of Britain as an economic and military power, by the late '60s, there was an urgent need for the British government to reassess its priorities. As a result, the British government announced in January 1968 that it would be pulling its troops out from Singapore and Malaysia by 1971. Consequently, there was also a need to review the 1957 Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement and the decision was made to replace it with a "loose consultative political framework"1 - the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). These decisions were made when there was uncertainty and tensions in the region including apprehensions regarding Indonesia's intentions following the unsuccessful ''Confrontation" against Malaysia in the '60s, tensions between Malaysia and Singapore following separation and the fears of an aggressive Vietnam. It is only with this background in mind that a fair assessment of the FPDA can be made.

The FPDA

The FPDA is basically a loose alliance and not a treaty in the conventional sense. Instead of providing any concrete guarantees for Malaysia and Singapore in case of an attack, the ministers of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom would only "consult" together for the purpose of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in relation to such attack or threat."2 There was a general lack of clearly defined aims or goals. It was seen in many quarters as purely a means to provide moral and psychological support to the two former colonies in Southeast Asia and would never really amount to much. Others held the view that the FPDA was only temporary and was a convenient tool to allow the British to wriggle out of its commitments in east of Suez. This opinion was reinforced by the institutional arrangements (or lack of them) provided by the agreement.

The ministers agreed to set up an Air Defence Council which would consist of one senior representative from each of the signatories and it would be in charge of the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for Malaysia and Singapore. Also, a Joint Consultative Council would be set up to "provide a forum for regular consultation at the senior official level on matters relating to defence arrangements."3 The senior officials involved were the British, New Zealand and Australian High Commissioners and the Permanent Secretaries or Secretary Generals of Malaysia and Singapore. The meetings would be held alternately in Singapore and Malaysia. There was no provision for a joint command similar to the NATO set-up and the only permanent component of the FPDA is the IADS which has staff and forces assigned from each signatory. However, in the first ten years, there were four meetings of the Joint Consultative Council and only a few FPDA exercises. In fact, it was only in 1980 that the issue of regular FPDA exercises was considered. This issue was brought up by then Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser and was supported by the Malaysians and the New Zealanders.

Since then, several changes have been made, including the formation of a FPDA Consultative Council which would replace the Joint Consultative Council and the Air Defence Council. The purpose of this new Consultative Council was to set policy guidelines and examine various aspects of the FPDA activities including the scope and range of the exercises. Also, several working level committees were set up including a Steering Committee and a Policy Working Group. In addition, exercises have been conducted regularly under the ambit of the FPDA such as Ex Suman Warrior (a land exercise), Ex Starfish (a naval exercise), the Air Defence exercises (ADEXes) and the newest exercise to be included, Ex Flying Fish. Ex Suman Warrior was inaugurated in 1990 and there have been eight to date including a 12-day exercise involving about 300 troops held in New Zealand in October 1997. The aim of this exercise is to promote professionalism, rapport and to deepen knowledge of each other's strengths, capabilities and organisations. The first FPDA combined naval and air exercise Ex Flying Fish 1/97 was conducted in April 1997.

Relevance of the FPDA

As mentioned earlier, the FPDA was conceived in a world that was quite different from the present. Then, the situation in Southeast Asia was relatively unstable, it was the height of the Cold War and many of the newly independent Southeast Asian countries were faced with internal and external threats. Thus, the FPDA, even with its lack of firm commitments played an essential role in contributing to the stability of the region. However, after more than a quarter of a century since the Communique was issued, the situation in Southeast Asia has changed drastically. Southeast Asia instead of being torn apart by strife has a record of economic growth that is envied by many countries. Singapore has joined the ranks of industrialised countries with a per capita income that exceeds Britain, Australia and New Zealand.4 In addition, Malaysia is classified as a Newly Industrialised Economy and is modernising at a breathtaking rate. Correspondingly, Singapore and Malaysia have managed to build up creditable and modern armed forces and with a healthy economy, the two countries have been able to purchase the most sophisticated and advanced weaponry available on the market. It is of no surprise that calls have been made in Britain, Australia and New Zealand to reassess their roles in the FPDA.

However, instead of fading into oblivion, the FPDA has, since the late 1980s, seen a resurgence in enthusiasm of the member countries especially with regards to the multilateral exercises. Not only has the size of the exercises increased, but the scope and complexity of the exercises have been expanded. 1997 saw the inauguration of EX FLYING FISH, a combination of EX STARFISH and MAJOR ADEX, which involved some 35 ships, 140 aircraft and 2 submarines.

The magnitude of participation is all the more startling considering the humble beginnings of FPDA exercises, comprising just a few ships and aircraft in 1981. The complexity has also increased through the years. The 8 ships and 17 aircraft involved in the beginning only took part in a single dimension on above-water warfare. The exercise in 1985 saw the participation of a submarine and in 1987, electronic warfare was introduced.

Potential Conflicts in the Region and Beyond

While the environment in Southeast Asia seems relatively benign as compared to other war-torn regions in the world, it is a mistake to assume that this situation would exist forever.

Dr Tony Tan, in his keynote address to the 1st General Meeting of the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), identified three potential areas of tension. The areas are the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits and the Spratly Islands. In it, he mentioned that Singapore's interests can best be served by "having a security architecture comprising strong bilateral relationships interwoven with multilateral security arrangements".5 Examples of multilateral arrangements to develop understanding and trust between countries in this region includes ASEAN, Asean Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation and the FPDA. Therefore, it is to Singapore's advantage that such a relationship exists to provide deterrence against aggression and promote regional security.

Psychological Deterrent

The FPDA commits three significant powers, Britain, Australia and New Zealand to have an interest in Southeast Asia. Any potential threat to the region must take into account the probable response of not only the much improved armed forces of Singapore and Malaysia but also the other signatories. It has been argued that since the FPDA does not provide any firm commitment by the three powers to come to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, it is unlikely that any of these powers would really want to interfere in disputes that are irrelevant to them. This seems to me to be an improbable scenario not least because of the fact that both Malaysia and Singapore lie along one of the busiest waterways in the world, the Strait of Malacca, and that any disruption to international shipping would have repercussions on many countries. Also, the three countries have close political and economic ties with the region and therefore have a vested interest in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia. An analyst, Chin Kin Wah, also considered the possibility of American involvement through the ANZUS pact and the participation of Australia and New Zealand in events in Southeast Asia might potentially involve the formidable forces of the United States.6 At the very least, this multi-layered interests of military powers outside the region would complicate the plans of any would-be aggressor and thus provide a valuable psychological deterrent.

Training Ground

The FPDA has provided valuable training ground for land-scarce Singapore. This is especially so for EX SUMAN WARRIOR, the land exercise component aimed at promoting inter-operability and mutual understanding among the land forces of the FPDA nations. FPDA exercises have allowed the SAF to have access to larger training grounds in Australia and New Zealand. The recent EX SUMAN WARRIOR 8/97 was held in Christchurch in New Zealand from 6 to 17 Oct 97 and was hosted by the New Zealand Defence Force. The relationship between Singapore and Australia and New Zealand have developed beyond the boundaries of FPDA. Both countries have provided extensive training opportunities to Singapore. The SAF has conducted unilateral armour training in Shoalwater Bay Training Area in Queensland, flying training at the RSAF Flying Training School in Pearce, Western Australia and fighter training at RAAF bases in Amberley.

Professionalism

Twenty-five years ago,the armed forces of Malaysia and Singapore were far inferior to those of the other three members. As mentioned before, great strides have been made by the two countries to improve their armed forces. The increasing complexity of the FPDA exercises is a measure of their achievements in this field. From a Singapore perspective, these exercises helped the SAF build up its confidence in the early years and mature into a credible defence force. Joint FPDA exercises also allow the SAF to tap the wealth of experience and expertise from their FPDA counterparts. The exercises give the SAF the opportunity to operate with forces from four different countries and are invaluable in testing its operational capabilities in a realistic setting. Also, the exposure to different working environments, equipment, procedures and organisations widens the knowledge of SAF personnel. During the 3rd FPDA Defence Ministers' Meeting held in Kuala Lumpur on 15 April 1997, the defence ministers not only reaffirmed their commitment to the FPDA but also promised to continue enhancing the exercises by including technologically advanced weapon systems, emphasising interoperability as well as improving the communication, command and control systems.7

Bilateral Relationships

Training together and the common goals laid out in the FPDA communique' have also compelled the nations to work more closely together and set their differences aside. In the 25 years since the signing of the FPDA, Singapore has managed to maintain close relationships with Britain, New Zealand and Australia. As mentioned above, this has resulted in the introduction of bilateral exercises with all three countries and regular interaction of officials at all levels. This culminated in the announcement of a New Partnership between Australia and Singapore in 1996 by the two Prime Ministers. However, one of the more beneficial aspects of the FPDA is the maintenance of the fractious relationship between Singapore and her closest neighbour, Malaysia which has been characterised by numerous disputes especially during the late 1980s. The official visit in November 1986 by the Israeli President, Chaim Herzog resulted in violent anti-Singapore demonstrations in Malaysia. This, together with the accusations made by the Malaysians of territorial incursions by the SAF dipped the relationship between Singapore and Malaysia to an all-time low during late 1989. Subsequently, in 1990, several bilateral exercises between the nations were called off. Despite the deteriorating relationship, FPDA exercises were not cancelled and the FPDA provided a useful multilateral framework for the maintenance of ties between Singapore and Malaysia. As Tim Huxley points out, "it is an open secret that the FPDA were (sic) intended from the beginning more to keep open channels of communication between the armed forces of Singapore and Malaysia than to reflect any clear-cut mutual defence interests between them." 8 Viewed from this angle, the FPDA has been an extremely useful forum for bilateral contacts between Singapore and Malaysia especially in times of tension and has contributed greatly to maintaining cordial relations between the two parties.

Conclusion

The FPDA was conceived in a world vastly different from what we see today. However, there are still many potential threats to regional stability and to Singapore and the FPDA in its present form would be a useful deterrent to any potential aggressor. Apart from this, the FPDA helps in improving bilateral ties between Singapore and the other four countries, helps to build up rapport and camaraderie between the armed forces, widen the experience and enhance the professionalism of the SAF, provide valuable exchange of ideas and provides training grounds for SAF personnel. In conclusion, from a Singaporean perspective, the benefits of the existence of the FPDA not only outweighs the costs but also provides "an effective ballast for stability in the region."9

ENDNOTES

1. Chin, C. W. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After", The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 3, 1991, pp 193.

2. Paragraph 5, Communique issued at the conclusion of the Five Power Ministerial Meeting on then External Defence of Malaysia and Singapore, London, 15-16 April 1971.

3. Ibid, Paragraph 6d.

4. Singapore's nominal per capita GNP US$30 500, Malaysia's US$4466, Britain's US$20 860, Australia's US$20 710 and New Zealand's US$17 010, Asiaweek October 31 pp64.

5. Keynote Address by Dr Tony Tan, "Security Challenges and Responses in the Asia-Pacific", Wednesday 4th June 1997.

6. Chin, C. W. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements: Twenty Years After", The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 3, 1991, pp 194.

7. MINDEF Media release 15/4/97.

8. Huxley, T. "Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?", The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 3, 1991, pp 207.

9. Speech by Dr Yeo Ning Hong as quoted in Ibid., pp 37.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Chin, C. W. "The Five Power Defence Arrangements; Twenty Years After", The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 3, 1991, pp 193-203.

2. Huxley, T. "Singapore and Malaysia ; A Precarious Balance?', The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 3, 1991, pp 204-213.

3. Leifer, M. "The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia", The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 2, 1991, pp 126-136.

4. Machmud, B. "Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) Marks 20th Year of Existence", Asian Defence Journal June 1991, pp 82-83.

5. Richardson, M. 'New Relevance for the FPDA", Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter Vol 19 No. 6/7 Dec 92/Jan 93 pp 37-38.

6. Sasheen, R. S. "Five Partners Continue Providing Regional Stability", Asian Defence Journal October 1992 pp 6-7.

7. Keynote Address by Dr Tony Tan, "Security Challenges and Responses in the Asia Pacific", Wednesday 4th June 1997.

8. Various MINDEF Media Releases fromn http://www.mindef.gov.sg/midpa/media.html.

CPT ANG WEE HAN graduated from Imperial College, UK, in 1995 with a B.Sc. degree (1st Class Hons). CPT Ang's last appointment was with the 185 Sqn; he is currently on course.

 
Last updated: 18-Jul-2005


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