Indonesian Foreign Policy: Change And Continuity Amidst A Changing Environment
by CPT Benedict Ang Kheng Leong

Introduction

In recent years, Indonesia has increasingly been active on the international stage of diplomacy. Since the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, Indonesia has sought to establish herself as a credible middle power in the international political system. The resurgence of an active foreign policy has signaled Indonesia's readiness and willingness to reassert herself both regionally and internationally. Not since the days of Sukarno has Indonesian foreign policy been outward looking. As Indonesia prepares herself for a bigger role in international affairs, fears of a hegemonic Indonesia have been revived. To be sure, Indonesia's confrontational policy or Konfrontasi in the mid-1960s still remained fresh in the minds of Indonesia's neighbours. Thus, a resurgence of a nationalistic Indonesia inevitably creates apprehensions in the Southeast Asian region and beyond. Coupled with the fact that Indonesia geographically straddles the crucial sea lines of communications between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, an assertive Indonesia poses no less grave implications for the international community.

While a reassertive Indonesia may well have ominous implications, the revival of an active Indonesian foreign policy may just as well be a sign of an Indonesian desire to come out of the doldrums of low profile politics in the international scene. As such, the resurrection of an active Indonesian foreign policy may not necessarily mean a more aggressive Indonesia. To be sure, the notion of a Pan-Indonesian ideal may well be a notion of the past, assigned to the backroom of the Sukarno era. This may indeed be the case in today's context of cordial ASEAN relations. Since the inception of ASEAN, Suharto's Indonesia has been less antagonistic and more benign than his predecessor's. Under Suharto's New Order, Indonesia has established a pattern of cordial and friendly relations with all ASEAN states, notably with Malaysia, Singapore, and Philippines, countries which Sukarno's Indonesia had grievances with. Under the aegis of ASEAN, Indonesia has fostered an unprecedented level of understanding with her neighbours. When viewed in this context, an outward-looking Indonesian foreign policy in the 1990s does not necessarily portend instability nor should it heighten insecurity in Southeast Asia and the larger Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, an outward-looking Indonesian foreign policy may be construed as a sign of an attainment of domestic political stability.

What are the implications of this new assertiveness? It is the objective of this paper to provide a comprehensive understanding of Indonesian foreign policy in order to assess some of the implications of this new assertiveness amidst a changing international environment.

Determinants of Indonesian Foreign Policy

Indonesian foreign policy cannot be fully understood without an understanding of its history, its historical formative experiences, its political culture and tradition, the perceptions of its leaders, and the nature of its domestic political order. To assign importance to these aspects is equivalent to underlining the importance of indigenous factors in explaining Indonesian foreign policy. This is precisely the thrust of this author's argument. To a large extent, Indonesian foreign policy is the outcome of the confluence of endogenous influences. Indeed, these influences are more pertinent in explaining Indonesian foreign policy. This is not to say that external factors do not influence Indonesian foreign policy. To be sure, Indonesian foreign policy had been crucially shaped by the international environment, especially in the Cold War era. Indeed, it may be fair to say that no state had escaped the effects of the bipolar structure that characterised the international political system for almost forty-five years. Yet, it can be argued that Indonesian foreign policy was unique in that it was more internally-driven than externally-driven. The uniqueness of Indonesian foreign policy derives mainly from a characteristically Indonesian ideology. In other words, Indonesian foreign policy was more ideological than pragmatic. This ideology, however, was not the mainstream ideologies that divided the international political system. It was a uniquely Indonesian brand of ideology. What is this brand of ideology? This question will be addressed as we analyse the determinants of Indonesian foreign policy.

History and Its Influence on Elite Perceptions

To a large extent, history plays an important role in shaping the perceptions of Indonesia's leaders concerning the nation's territory and role in international affairs.¹ Both the Sriwijaya and the Majapahit empires had provided the basis for the conceptualisation of Indonesian territory. This was most apparent in the early formative years of modern Indonesia when Sukarno struggled to forge an Indonesian identity. In his famous Pancasila speech, Sukarno made references to the two empires as a basis for the territorial definition of modern Indonesia. Sukarno had stated that:

"...the national state is only Indonesia in its entirety, which existed in the time of Sriwijaya and Majapahit, and which now, too, we must set up together."²

The Sriwijaya and Majapahit empires had provided inspiration for Sukarno's concept of Indonesian territory. Indeed, Sukarno's perception of what constituted Indonesia was arguably the prime motivating factor that led him to pursue a confrontational policy against the Dutch over Irian Jaya in 1962 and later against the British over the formation of the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. While a discussion on these two ancient empires is not germane to this paper, it is important to note that the territorial boundaries of these empires extended far beyond the boundaries of Dutch East Indies. That Sukarno referred to these two empires as the pre-cursor states of modern Indonesia was indicative of the tremendous influence of history on elite perceptions.

The notion of territorial identity was not the only historical legacy of these two ancient empires. The perception that a Greater Indonesia had existed previously actually formed the basis of Indonesian nationalism. While Indonesian nationalism was manifested most clearly in the formative years of modern Indonesia, the seeds of Indonesian nationalism were actually sown long before the violent struggle for independence against the Dutch. Sukarno's Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) was formed in 1927 on the basis of "one nation - Indonesia, one people - Indonesian, one language - Indonesian".³ Indeed, Southeast Asian historians noted that:

"... the idea of Indonesia spread so easily, once launched, that it seemed ... as if it had always existed, if not actually explicitly then inchoate in the hearts of the people."⁴

To a large extent, the idea of an entity called "Indonesia" was facilitated by the pre-existence of the Sriwijaya and Majapahit empires. In this sense, history had provided a launching platform for a unifying ideology: Indonesian nationalism. What is important to note is that history had provided legitimacy to an irredentist philosophy. In Indonesia's case, irredentism was not based on ethnicity, language or culture but based on history.

Another part of Indonesian history that was significant in shaping elite perceptions and consequently Indonesian foreign policy was the violent national struggle for independence from the Dutch in the mid- to late-1940s. Thus, an understanding of the formative experience of Indonesia is crucial to an understanding of Indonesian foreign policy. As Dewi Anwar noted:

"...Indonesia's attitude towards the major powers in general and their roles in Southeast Asian politics in particular cannot fully be understood without looking back into the early period of its independence."⁵

The struggle for independence had taught the Indonesian two distinct lessons that were not to be forgotten and which were to feature prominently in the post-independence foreign policy of Sukarno. First, there was a basic distrust of major powers. In the struggle against the Dutch, the Indonesians had counted on a supposedly anti-imperialistic United States to support them in the fight for independence against their colonial masters. Instead, the Americans chose to support their Dutch ally. It was only when Indonesia was on the brink of succumbing to a communist take-over did the Americans back the Indonesian Government. From this bitter experience, the Indonesians realised that they could not rely on any outside powers to guarantee their survival. They also realised that intervention by outside powers were forthcoming only when it was deemed to be in accordance with the national interests of such powers.⁶ The other lesson learnt from this violent formative experience was the need to be self-reliant. Indeed, the Indonesians had little assistance from outside in their fight against the militarily stronger Dutch armed forces. The success of the liberation fight against the Dutch while resisting a Moscow-backed communist coup in 1948 had consolidated the sense of self-confidence of the Indonesians.

Nationalism and Indonesian Foreign Policy

As mentioned earlier, the historical legacy of the ancient empires was coupled with the lessons learnt from the historical formative experience to give rise to a particularly Indonesian brand of nationalism. This nationalism first manifested itself in the 'independent and active" (bebas dan actif) foreign policy enunciated by the first vice-president of Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta, in September 1948. Essentially, the "independent and active" foreign policy was designed to maximise foreign policy latitude so as to enable Indonesia to adopt whatever policies necessary to secure her national interests while being free from the commitments and encumbrances that may arise as a result of an alignment with any external powers. This has been the guiding principle of Indonesian foreign policy since independence. To be sure, political nationalism has injected a strong sense of purpose into Indonesian foreign policy.⁷ Former Indonesian foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja put it aptly:

'Our foreign policy is a principled one; not based on expediency, not calculated on profit and loss basis - though of course there is something of this. But there are certain basic questions of principle where Indonesia will never yield."⁸

This unyielding position on basic principles formed the bottom-line in Indonesian foreign policy. It is on this basis that Indonesia adopted her characteristic non-alignment policy. It must be reiterated that non-alignment in the Indonesian context was not a functional response to the bipolar international structure that existed during the Cold War. In other words, non-alignment was not a product of Indonesian pragmatism. Rather, non-alignment was a policy that encompassed the Indonesian philosophy of self-reliance and non-reliance on outside powers. Non-alignment was also the product of the desire to maintain maximum latitude in foreign policy. This distinction is important if Indonesian foreign policy in the post-Cold War environment is to be understood. Indeed, if non-alignment was only a response to the bipolar structure of the Cold War, Indonesian foreign policy would be aimless in the post-Cold War era. Yet, this is not the case. A certain continuity can be detected in Indonesian foreign policy. This point will be taken up in the later part of this paper. For now, it is important to realise that Indonesian foreign policy is a function of a distinctly Indonesian ideology based on a strong sense of nationalism and self-reliance.

This fundamental philosophy guiding Indonesian foreign policy has been demonstrated over time in Indonesia's consistent position regarding her membership in regional and international organisations. In 1950, Indonesia had refused to participate in a pro-Western and anti-communist regional organisation proposed by the Philippines at the Baguio conference.⁹ In 1954, Indonesia refused to join the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), formed to counter the spread of communism in mainland Southeast Asia. In 1967, Indonesia agreed to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand but only after establishing the understanding that ASEAN's main role was for social, economic and cultural cooperation. As Michael Leifer noted, the preamble to the ASEAN Declaration committed all members to the Indonesia-inspired view that ...

"... the countries of Southeast Asia ... are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples, ...and that all foreign bases (within Southeast Asia) are temporary and ... are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area or prejudice the orderly procedures of their national development."¹⁰

The fact that Indonesia had, by the time of the establishment of ASEAN, changed leadership did not change this fundamental guiding philosophy. Although Suharto distanced himself from Sukarno's confrontational approach, he was essentially still guided by the same motivations that had inspired Sukarno. There was to a large extent a tremendous amount of continuity even in Suharto's New Order. In particular, nationalism still featured strongly as the primary political instrument to mobilise the people of Indonesia. This is exemplified in Suharto's New Order slogan of Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience). Ketahanan Nasional was essentially a political ideal that articulated the qualities of self-sufficiency and resourcefulness which would strengthen the economic, social and political fabric of the state in the interest of development and stability.¹¹ What is interesting to note is that the slogan underlined the importance of self-reliance and implicitly embraced the "independent and active" foreign policy enunciated by Sukarno. To be sure, even though Suharto had adopted a more conciliatory approach toward the management of relations with pro-West states in general and Southeast Asian states in particular, Suharto's foreign policy did not match Indonesia's economic dependence with a corresponding submissiveness.¹² More can be said about Indonesian foreign policy under Suharto and this shall be done in the later part of this paper.

The Need for Internal Stability : Pancasila and Indonesian Foreign Policy

The fact that Indonesia consists of more than 13,000 islands and 300 ethnic groups makes it very hard for any leader to preserve internal stability and security. Indeed, this has posed one of the greatest challenges to both the Sukarno and Suharto regimes. To unite a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, Indonesia adopted Pancasila or "religious pluralism" as the sole state ideology. Even though 87 percent of Indonesians profess the Islam faith, Indonesia remained staunchly secular. The most significant of the five principles embodied in Pancasila is the belief in one supreme deity. This principle essentially guaranteed the right of every Indonesian to believe in his or her own particular god. That the state ideology was couched in non-Islamic terms was indicative of the awareness of the threat of Islam to the unity of a culturally- and religiously-pluralistic Indonesia. What is notable is that while the majority of Indonesians profess the Islam faith, not all are orthodox Muslims. To be sure, Muslims in Indonesia consist of the abangan or nominal Muslims, and the santri or orthodox Muslims. What is significant is that the abangan is dominant among the Javanese elite, including Sukarno and Suharto, and the majority of the military elite.

The adoption of a religion-neutral ideology also reflected the primacy of nationalism over religion as a building block for national unity. This is reflected in the third principle of Pancasila: The unity of Indonesia. That Suharto later made it obligatory under law for all political parties to accept Pancasila as the sole guiding principle is indicative of the over-riding concern for the ever-present fissiparous elements that may threaten national unity. These elements are most notably religion, specifically Islamic fundamentalism, and separatism, exemplified in separatist movements such as the Aceh Independence Movement in Aceh, the Fretilin Movement in East Timor, and the Free Papua Movement in Irian Jaya.

But how does Pancasila impinge on foreign policy? Precisely because Pancasila has been expounded so intensely as the state ideology, foreign policy articulation must not be seen to compromise it. In other words, Indonesia's participation in regional and international politics must first take into account the possible domestic ramifications of such actions. In this sense, Indonesia's bebas dan actif foreign policy complements Pancasila. In effect, the two guiding philosophies combine to give Indonesian leaders maximum latitude in foreign policy while preserving national unity. In essence, Indonesian foreign policy must be perceived to serve domestic interests. In this sense, the bebas dan actif policy does just that.

The Need for Economic Development and Indonesian Foreign Policy

Under Sukarno's reign, Indonesian foreign policy was radical. This was the period of Guided Democracy. Guided Democracy was instituted to pave the way for Sukarno's political ascendancy amidst the failure of parliamentary democracy marked by political and military factionalism, religious and regional dissension, and economic decline.¹³ Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno pursued a radical foreign policy which effectively sidelined economic development in favour of "revolutionary programmes".¹⁴ These programmes were conceptualised by Sukarno in his endeavour to establish a new world characterised by the triumph of New Emerging Forces (NEFOS) over Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS). In his single-minded pursuit of this goal, Sukarno arguably abandoned the independent aspect of bebas dan actif to form the "Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Beijing-Pyongyang" axis, ostensibly designed to fight colonialism and neo-colonialism. It was during this period that Indonesia won sovereignty over Irian Jaya and declared Konfrontasi against the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. For six years from 1959, Sukarno chose to boost Indonesian unity by reviving the revolution against colonialism. In the process, Sukarno neglected the economic development of Indonesia.

It took a new leader and a new government to orientate Indonesian foreign policy toward economic development. Much to the relief of her neighbours, Suharto embarked on a more pragmatic foreign policy that concentrated on economic development as a basis for domestic stability. As Michael Leifer noted:

"... pragmatism prevailed over declaratory policy and development was placed before the priority of a regional role."¹⁵

Arguably, this was a return to the original spirit of the bebas dan actif foreign policy. For the New Order government, the principal duty of Indonesian foreign policy was to serve national interests defined in terms of economic interests.¹⁶ The New Order government subsequently adopted a low profile in international politics so as to concentrate on economic development. Thus, up until the early 1980s, Indonesia was notably "passive" in regional and international politics. Arguably, Suharto's decision to turn "inward-looking" was in part a function of the need to legitimise his regime. This however, does not repudiate the point that the need for economic development dominated the foreign policy agenda.

However, even as Indonesia embarked on low-profile politics, there were hints that Indonesia yearned to play a greater role in regional affairs. For example, Indonesia was particularly active in finding a solution to the Cambodian issue. To that end, Suharto convened an international conference on Cambodia in Jakarta in 1970 and later the Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM).

Predictably and almost inevitably, the New Order government under Suharto leaned toward the West in view of the economic aid and assistance offered. Yet, as noted earlier, economic dependence was not accompanied by a corresponding deference to Western views. To be sure, Indonesian foreign policy continued to pursue an independent, though not particularly active, foreign policy. A best case to illustrate this point is Jakarta's decision to dissolve the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a major source of foreign aid for Indonesia's economic development. The decision was made after the IGGI chairman criticised Indonesia over the killing of East Timorese demonstrators by Indonesian troops in 1991. Instead of bowing to pressure, Indonesia took a hard-line stand over the issue. Thus, it may be argued that the need for economic development only had an indirect effect on Indonesian foreign policy insofar as it diluted the bebas dan actif foreign policy; the low-profile approach adopted by Suharto did not represent a departure from it.

Leadership and Indonesian Foreign Policy

It should be obvious by now that leadership arguably plays the greatest role in Indonesian foreign policy. While the determinants discussed so far have significant influence on the conduct of Indonesian foreign policy, none determined the foreign policy direction as much as the role of leadership. To a large extent, the foreign policy direction was influenced by elite perceptions. As noted by Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia's foreign policy has been formulated by the elite rather than the masses.¹⁷ It should also be noted that given Indonesia's political context, elite perceptions are particularly influential in foreign policy formulation. Franklin Weinstein noted that it is the elite's view of the world that generates impulses for the use of foreign policy.¹⁸

In Sukarno's era, it was his basic distrust for outside powers that led him to pursue an independent and active foreign policy. Later, it was his anti-colonial outlook that influenced Indonesia's confrontational approach in the conduct of foreign relations. To be sure, Sukarno had viewed the creation of the Federation of Malaysia as a British attempt at encirclement. In fact, it was perceived that it was a British ploy to retain its influence over Indonesia.¹⁹ As noted earlier, Sukarno was the chief architect for the concept of Guided Democracy. Under Guided Democracy, Sukarno was able to further enhance his personal power which enabled him to directly set the course of foreign policy. The Konfrontasi policy was the surest sign of the tremendous role leadership played in setting the foreign policy agenda.

The Konfrontasi policy may be used in another way to highlight the influential role of leadership on Indonesian foreign policy. Konfrontasi had caused almost irreparable damage to Indonesia's relations with her neighbours. Yet, relations with Malaysia and Singapore took an about-turn when Suharto took over the reigns of power. Almost overnight, Konfrontasi was ended and amiable relations were restored. In fact, soon after the renouncement of the Konfrontasi policy, diplomatic relations were restored. This facilitated the subsequent formation of ASEAN in 1967, marking a watershed in Southeast Asian politics. The speed at which relations were restored and improved arguably testifies to the importance of the role of leadership in Indonesia. While it may be argued that Suharto needed to restore Indonesia's credibility in the international community in general and with her immediate neighbours in particular, it is undeniable that Suharto played a decisive role in changing the course of Indonesian foreign policy. In fact, Suharto arguably led Indonesia out of the doldrums of economic disaster into the success that Indonesia is today.

Yet, while it is obvious that Suharto adopted a different style and approach from Sukarno, it is important to highlight the fact that a certain continuity existed even while a different style and approach was adopted. What is this continuity? This author would argue that it is the world view of Indonesia's rightful place to play a leading role in the Southeast Asian region. As Michael Leifer noted:

"...pride in revolutionary achievement, a consciousness of vast territorial scale, an immense population, extensive natural resources, as well as a strategic location, produced the conviction that Indonesia was entitled to play a leading role in the management of regional order within Southeast Asia."²⁰

In other words, even as political leadership and the domestic political order changed, Indonesia's fundamental outlook toward the region has not really changed. It is important to bear this in mind as we move on to analyse Indonesian foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s.

Indonesian Foreign Policy in the 1980s and 1990s

The New Order government under Suharto had engendered political change within Indonesia. Specifically, Suharto had repudiated Sukarno's style of confrontational politics. Indeed, Suharto had realised that Indonesia's success was not to be achieved through bellicose action. Instead, Suharto chose a more pragmatic approach toward achieving the aim of establishing Indonesia's "rightful" place in Southeast Asia. To that end, Suharto's pragmatic approach was largely seen as a "strategic retreat" from high politics in order to accumulate internal strength through economic development.²¹

That Suharto still harboured the view of Indonesia's "rightful" place was made explicit when he stated in 1990 that Indonesia's development had reached the stage that allowed just such a role to be pursued.²² By the mid-80s, the nature of the domestic political order had evolved and progressed sufficiently to enable Suharto to pursue a more active line of foreign policy. As Michael Leifer noted;

"...insofar as foreign policy was inspired by the nature of the domestic political order, then domestic political change was succeeded logically by a new course in foreign policy."²³

Indonesia and ASEAN

Indonesia's growing assertiveness in foreign policy can be detected from Indonesia's role in ASEAN. As with other foreign policy initiatives, Indonesia's role in ASEAN can only be understood in the context of Indonesia's wider political and economic interests.²⁴ In the early years of ASEAN, Jakarta adopted a low profile in ASEAN in its efforts to enhance Indonesia's image as a peace-loving, development-minded state. Thus, Indonesia's voice in ASEAN was particularly muted. To a large extent, an enhanced image was necessary in order to convince the rich capitalist states to give economic assistance to Indonesia. This was necessitated by the need to build up Indonesia's national resilience, as noted earlier. Thus, Indonesia's low profile in ASEAN can be explained by Indonesia's need to build up credibility by being a responsible regional member of ASEAN. This explained roughly two decades of Indonesian behaviour with respect to ASEAN. Indonesia's political interests with regards to ASEAN were twofold during this period. First, Indonesia saw usefulness in contributing to regional resilience by concentrating on bolstering her national resilience. This was essentially a domestic political need to consolidate the legitimacy of the Suharto government.

Second, Suharto sought to allay the fears of Indonesia's neighbours. Indeed, there were lingering suspicions with regards to Indonesia's desire to dominate regional politics. Thus, Suharto's low-profile politics were meant to reiterate Indonesia's non-hegemonic position within Southeast Asia.

Increasingly however, there was growing dissatisfaction from within Indonesia regarding Indonesia's low posture in ASEAN. The first signs of dissatisfaction became noticeable with the onset of the Cambodian conflict and ASEAN's subsequent response to the issue.²⁵ In particular, dissatisfaction arose as a result of the perception that Indonesia had allowed Thailand to dictate the official position of ASEAN. To be sure, Indonesia's position on the Cambodian issue had differed from Thailand's. The Indonesians were particularly sympathetic toward the Vietnamese as they could closely relate to Vietnam's nationalistic anti-colonial cause. Thus, Indonesia did not perceive Vietnam as a threat to Southeast Asian security. Instead, Indonesia was more suspicious of Chinese intentions. However, Thailand's position, and subsequently ASEAN's position, on Vietnam had led to an ASEAN- PRC de facto alignment. Thus, most of the Indonesian political elite felt that ASEAN's policy on Cambodia had been contrary to Indonesia's security interests.²⁶ Dissatisfaction with Indonesia's role in ASEAN was engendered by at least one other reason. This was the perception that Indonesia was outgrowing ASEAN. In essence, it was perceived that Indonesia was unduly constrained by ASEAN. Thus, there was increasing pressure on Jakarta to pursue a more active policy commensurate with Indonesia's place in international politics. Specifically, Suharto's government was pressured to play a more active role in NAM and the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference).²⁷ Thus, since the mid-80s, Jakarta began to pursue its bebas dan actif foreign policy.

A New Assertiveness

Indonesia's growing assertiveness in foreign policy can be discerned from several policy initiatives that she has embarked on since the mid-1980s. The surest sign yet of this assertiveness was Suharto's election as the chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1991. The NAM, encompassing approximately two-thirds of the total number of UN members, represents the largest grouping outside the UN. The chairmanship of the NAM presented the best opportunity yet for Indonesia to demonstrate her political prowess. In actively seeking the chairmanship of NAM, Indonesia had demonstrated her eagerness to re-enter the realm of international politics.²⁸ As chairman of the NAM, Suharto had to deal with issues that impinged on domestic sensitivities. In particular, Suharto had to address the issues in the Middle East as well as the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the nature of which were inherently sensitive as they were related to the Muslim cause. That Suharto was willing to take on this role reflected the confidence and maturity of Indonesia. For example, soon after the 1993 Israeli-PLO peace accord, Suharto, in his capacity as chairman of the NAM, invited IsraelÕs President Chaim Herzog to Jakarta. The significance of this event lies in the fact that in trying to play a leadership role in world affairs, Islam did not feature as a major consideration in Suharto's foreign policy toward Israel, in spite of the sensitivity of the event in Indonesia.²⁹

Another sign of Indonesia's growing assertiveness in foreign policy was Jakarta's decision to reestablish diplomatic ties with China in 1990. Jakarta had suspended diplomatic ties with Beijing after it was suspected of involvement in the purported take-over bid by the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia or Communist Party of Indonesia) in 1965. The restoration of diplomatic ties with China is significant in that Jakarta was finally able to cast aside its long-held fear of China's interference in its domestic affairs.³⁰ In other words, it showed that Jakarta had finally gotten over its Sino-phobia. The visit of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to Beijing regarding the sovereignty over Natuna islands and the subsequent proclamation that China was not a threat to the region further demonstrates this point. The restoration of diplomatic ties with China also demonstrated that Jakarta had overcome its fear of great power intervention in Indonesian affairs.

In essence, Indonesian foreign policy in the 1980s and 1990s demonstrated a new assertiveness that resembled a more independent and active foreign policy. Given this, what are the implications for security in Southeast Asia?

Indonesian Foreign Policy in the 1990s: Security Implications for Southeast Asia

As stated from the outset, an outward-looking Indonesian foreign policy in the 1990s does not necessarily portend instability nor should it heighten insecurity in Southeast Asia and the larger Asia Pacific region. Instead, a more active Indonesia should be seen as a positive factor to the stability of the region. This is most evident in Indonesia's aspiration to act as an "honest broker" in the South China Sea conflict. The annual informal workshops organised by Jakarta to bring the various claimants to the negotiating table had contributed substantially to the peaceful management of a potentially violent issue. That the claimants continue to agree to attend the workshop process testifies to the efficacy of the Indonesian effort.

Indonesia's active policy has also enabled her to contribute to greater regional stability through the aegis of ASEAN. Undeniably, one of the most important developments in ASEAN's search for security in the region is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). While the success of the ARF cannot be conclusively affirmed, what is inescapable is that the most important factor that would contribute to the success of the ARF is the inclusion of the major external powers into the forum. Yet, this would not have been possible if Jakarta had not shed its historical inhibitions regarding the role of outside powers in regional affairs. Arguably, one of the main reasons that ASEAN was able to implement an inclusionary ARF was that Indonesia's active policy had enabled her to gain sufficient self-confidence to deal with major powers on more equal terms without fear of intimidation.

In view of the success of ASEAN in mitigating the various outstanding territorial conflicts that plague Southeast Asia, and in view of the tremendous amount of economic, social and military cooperation that exist between various ASEAN member countries and Indonesia, it is highly unlikely that Indonesia would embark on a Sukarno-style policy toward her neighbours. ASEAN relations in the 1990s have reached an unprecedented level and it seems unlikely that Indonesia would jeopardise this solely to reestablish her "rightful" place as leader of the region. Granted that minor irritations in ASEAN states relations continue to exist, it seems more likely that the pragmatic governments of Southeast Asian states today, including Indonesia, would be able to relate to each other on a rational basis. This spells brighter prospects for a secure and stable Southeast Asia.

However, there may be a proverbial dark cloud lurking beyond the sunny skies: Leadership change in Indonesia. As already noted throughout this paper, leadership places a crucial role in Indonesian foreign policy. Given that Indonesia does not have a history of peaceful leadership change, and given that Indonesia does not yet have an institutionalised process for leadership change, there is tremendous fear among Indonesia's neighbours regarding the potentially unstable domestic upheaval that may result from such a leadership change. Whether Suharto's successor possesses the same political outlook with regards to Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia has an immediate bearing on Southeast Asian security. Considering the various indigenous determinants of Indonesian foreign policy discussed in this paper, it would be relatively easy for Suharto's successor to embark on a Sukarno-style leadership if he so chooses. This does not auger well for Southeast Asia.

(This essay was written in 1997.)

ENDNOTES

1. Leo Suryadinata. Determinants of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: In Search of an Explanation, Working Paper No.6, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1993, p. 2.

2. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds.). Indonesian Political Thinking: 1945-1965, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, p. 43, as quoted in ibid., p. 25.

3. David Steinberg (ed.). In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History, revised edition, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989, p. 307.

4. ibid, p. 308.

5. Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1992, p. 1.

6. Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 17-18.

7. Michael Vatikiotis. "A Giant Treads Carefully: Indonesia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s", in Robert S. Ross(ed.), East Asia in Transition: Toward a New Regional Order, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995, p. 221.

8. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's speech in Jakarta, Indonesia, 13 June 1988, as quoted in ibid., p. 221.

9. Anak Agung Gde Agung. Twenty Years Indonesian Foreign Policy: 1945-1965, The Hague: Mouton, 1973,as used in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, op. cit., p. 18.

10. "The ASEAN Declaration" reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1978, pp. 14-16, as used in Michael Leifer, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, London: Allen and Unwin, 1983, p. 121.

11. Michael Leifer. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia, New York: Routledge, 1995, p. 170.

12. Michael Leifer. Indonesia's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 122.

13. Michael Leifer. Dictionary of the Modem Politics of Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 105.

14. Rizal Sukma. "The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy", Asian Survey, Vol. 35 no. 3, 1995, p. 309.

15. Michael Leifer. Indonesia's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 131.

16. Rizal Sukma. op. cit, p. 312.

17. Leo Suryadinata. op. cit., p. 24.

18. Franklin Weinstein. "The Uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An Approach to the Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries", World Politics, p. 374.

19. Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indonesia and the Security of Southeast Asia, op. cit., p. 7.

20. Michael Leifer. Indonesia's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. xiv.

21. Sukma. op. cit., p. 312.

22. ibid.

23. Michael Leifer. Indonesia's Foreign Policy, op. cit., p.111.

24. Dewi Fortuna Anwar. Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism, op. cit., p. 286.

25. ibid, p. 288.

26. ibid, p. 289.

27. ibid, p. 290.

28. Michael Vatikiotis. op. cit., p. 223.

29. Leo Suryadinata. "Islam and Suharto's Foreign Policy: Indonesia, the Middle East, and Bosnia", Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1995, p. 295.

30. Sukma. op. cit., p. 223.

CPT BENEDICT ANG KHENG LEONG is currently in 140 Sqn, Tengah Airbase. A pilot by training, he obtained a Bachelor of Social Sciences (2nd Class Upper Hons) degree in Political Science.