

The Case for Pre-Emptive Warfare and its Implications for Singapore

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Abstract:

According to the author, small states make easy targets and it comes as no surprise that preventive measures are being considered to deter potential aggressors. One topic that has been widely and actively discussed is the issue of pre-emptive self-defence and warfare. However, the author stresses that there are underlying conditions that countries should consider before they can justify their cause for a pre-emptive self-defence. In his essay, he discusses the justifications for pre-emptive warfare as a useful tool in achieving strategic interests in the pre-war to post-war continuum. He also highlights the five justifications and three superiorities a country should consider in order to carry out a successful pre-emptive war. He discusses the strategic relevance and importance of pre-emptive warfare for small states. He then explores the various justifications for pre-emptive warfare and finally, he suggests the necessary preparations for a pre-emptive war.

Keywords: Pre-emptive; Preventive Measures; Deter Potential Aggressors; Justifiable

INTRODUCTION: THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF STUDYING PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE

Pre-emptive self-defence holds strategic value as a policy option for small states. It is thus a subject that must be studied intently by small states serious about securing peace. However, differing perspectives on the justification for pre-emptive warfare have created ambiguity on the subject. The purpose of this essay is to gain clarity on the justification for pre-emptive warfare as a useful tool in achieving strategic interests in the pre-war to post-war continuum. It will also highlight five justifications and three superiorities to be achieved in order for Singapore to carry out a successful *just* pre-emptive war. Accordingly, the essay will proceed as follows: firstly, it will discuss the strategic relevance and importance of pre-emptive warfare

for small states; secondly, it will study and build on the existing thoughts regarding the justification for pre-emptive warfare; and lastly, it will suggest the necessary preparations for a *just* pre-emptive war.

SMALL STATES AND THEIR DISPOSITION TOWARDS PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE

As a preliminary point, small states in this essay refer to those lacking strategic depth for military operations. Small states are invariably disadvantaged in their pursuit of policy and must abide by a strict set of survival rules. These states suffer from tight policy space-time dimension and are prone to a myriad of pressures from the peace-to-war time continuum which includes military provocation, diplomatic manipulation, economic sanction, resource restriction and geographical blockade.¹

It is conventional wisdom that a state at war should fare better if it was able to seize the initiative and effect a pre-emptive blow on its adversary. This is critical for small states to overcome their inherent weaknesses.² The following are nine unique characteristics that pre-dispose a small state to conduct pre-emptive strikes—they indicate why a small state has a lower threshold of tolerating inaction during a Period of Tension (PoT).

Small states are invariably disadvantaged in their pursuit of policy and must abide by a strict set of survival rules.

1) **Cannot Retreat and Regroup**

The most salient factor is the assumed 'one chance' for a small state. A small state seldom has another shot at a second chance at war. Its small geographical size means little room for retreating and regrouping for retaliation.³ If a small state takes the first hit, it is as good as losing the war. Thus, to strike first is a military imperative for a small state.

2) **Easy Capitulation As A Concentrated Target**

With the small Area of Operations that the adversary is required to plan and operate in, a small state is exceedingly vulnerable to a single strike wipe-out. If the adversary employs its airpower shrewdly, the limited runways, naval ports and army depots of a small state can easily be rendered useless by a single wave of air strike.⁴ To prevent such a scenario and to ensure preservation of force for a chance of winning the war, a small state may opt to strike pre-emptively.

3) **Limited Manpower And The Collapse Of Will**

Absorbing the first strike in war can have a profound psychological impact on a small state,

given the small population base. It is likely to result in the collapse of the people's will to contest, leading to a high rate of military desertion and civilian despair.⁵ Therefore, a pre-emptive strike serves the purpose of avoiding the psychological trauma and the likelihood of defeat from absorbing the first strike.

4) **Vulnerable To Intelligence Operations**

The lack of strategic depth renders a small state vulnerable to an adversary's aerial and maritime intelligence operations. Given the current military technology, surveillance and reconnaissance operations may be carried out from across the border. The adversary can easily map out the movements, locations and readiness of a small state's military assets. This ease of intelligence amplifies the vulnerabilities of the small state.

5) **High Tempo Vigilance Unsustainable During PoT**

During PoT, a higher frequency of harassment, provocation and frontier probing to achieve "desensitisation and blurring of border(s)" can be expected.⁶ These actions serve political and military purposes. Under this tense climate, a small state faces greater strain in its military vigilant assets. This high tempo vigilance may reach a point where the small state finds it unsustainable. It may then be compelled to respond with force pre-emptively.

6) **Geographical Blockade And Economic Choking**

Small states tend to be easily subjected to geographical blockades and economic choking. During PoT, the adversary may deprive a small state of its vital national resources like water, oil, food or other essential supplies.⁷ The adversary may do so without infringing on the small state's territorial integrity. Yet, this act is sufficient to run the small state to

ruin. In such a scenario, a pre-emptive strike from the small state can be expected in its bid to release itself from the shackle of its adversary.

7) Sensitivity Towards Military Exercises Near Its Border


Large-scale military actions near the borders of countries send an extremely strong signal to the other state. Historically, military exercises near the borders were occasional pre-cursors for the initiation of war.⁸ Such actions might be too provocative for a small state. Due to the vulnerabilities of a small state, mass mobilisations and military exercises near the borders may ignite war—even if it was not the original intent—as the small state might respond combatively because inaction seems a greater risk.

8) Forward Defence Requirement

Due to the lack of strategic depth, a small state must seek to fight in ‘forward ground’ to avoid destruction to its own population, property and most importantly, its military projection point-source.⁹ The small state will thus seek to bring the war to the adversary using pre-emptive warfare.¹⁰

9) Risk Of Single-Hit Annihilation

With the proliferation of chemical, nuclear and atomic bombs, states without ballistic interceptors can only resort to neutralising the threat before its launch. For a small state, the threat is even more real as annihilation is a likely consequence. Hence, a small state is compelled to launch pre-emptive strikes on existential threats. A case in point is the 1981 Osiraq Nuclear Raid by Israel.¹¹



The Osiraq reactor prior to the Israeli attack.



The destruction of the American steamboat SS Caroline on the Niagara River in 1837.

Most of the nine aforementioned factors are applicable to Singapore. Having established the strategic relevance of pre-emptive warfare for small states like Singapore, the essay shall proceed to study the factors of justification for pre-emptive warfare.

JUSTIFICATION FOR PRE-EMPTIVE WARFARE FOR SMALL STATES

There is tremendous strategic value in acquiring international support in the pre-war to post-war continuum. International opinions carry significant weight in the post-war negotiation process in defining the political rights and obligations pertaining to the war. Conducting a justified war is one way of ensuring international support in the post-war phase. For the purpose of post-war interests, it is important

to understand the justifications for pre-emptive warfare. There are generally two aspects of the *Just War* Tradition: the cause of war (*jus ad bellum*) and the conduct of war (*jus in bello*).¹² In this section, the *Just Cause* principle of *jus ad bellum* with regards to pre-emptive warfare in relation to small states will be examined.

The act of striking first may fall into one of these three categories: (1) pre-emptive war; (2) preventive war or (3) naked aggression. However, only a fine line distinguishes pre-emptive warfare from preventive warfare. Significantly, pre-emptive warfare is regarded as legitimate self-defence whereas preventive warfare is judged to be illegitimate aggression because other policy options are available.¹³ Naked aggression is clearly illegitimate by any benchmark. However,

pre-emptive warfare lacks a universal definition as the interpretation of it is subjective by nature and is therefore commonly confused with preventive warfare.

Beginning with international law, the UN Charter provides the only exception to prohibition on the use of force in Article 51 as “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” in the face of an armed attack. The established legal test for exercising the use of force in self-defence is *necessity* (under *jus ad bellum*) and *proportionality* (under *jus in bello*).¹⁴ However, whether a pre-emptive strike may be considered ‘self-defence’ under Article 51 of the UN Charter remains a delicate topic open to different interpretations.

Early scholars such as Aristotle, Shang Yang, Saint Augustine and Thomas Aquinas have long recognised a state’s moral right to self-defence.¹⁵ To them, it is morally just for a state to go to war with the motive of peace. Hugo Grotius also argued for the legal right of a state to forestall an attack using force.¹⁶ The first legal dispute over pre-emptive warfare was the 1837 Caroline Affairs, in which Daniel Webster established the famous ‘Caroline Test’—that that a pre-emptive war is just where the threat is “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.”¹⁷

Contemporary thinker Lawrence Freedman observes that “prevention can be seen as preemption in slow motion, more anticipatory or forward thinking”, encapsulating the main distinguishing feature as the difference in the maturity level of the threat posed by the adversary.¹⁸ Colin Gray provides a practicable approach to determining the threat as the political intent and the capability to injure.¹⁹

Michael Walzer, a respected authority in Just War Tradition, contended that the following conditions are sufficient for the justification of pre-emptive warfare: (1) an intention to injure; (2) military activities that increase the level of danger; and (3) the need to act immediately because of a high degree of risk.²⁰ Matthew Flynn judges the intention of the pre-emptive actor through its post-war behaviour.²¹ A justified pre-emptive war should be intended to establish an enduring peace and not for the purpose of domination.

Synthesising these schools of thought, the essay proposes a set of conditions sufficient for a *just* pre-emptive war:

1) **Hostile Intent**

The adversary must possess the intent to use force for policy ends, prompting pre-emptive warfare as an anticipatory strategy.

2) **Destruction Capability**

The adversary’s capability to wage war must be unfavorable to the small state such that it may potentially result in great destruction or even annihilation, prompting pre-emptive strikes to neutralise such a threat.

3) **Provocative Behavior Beyond The Point Of Rubicon**

Near-border military actions which provoke strong reaction, especially those that cross the small state’s communicated ‘Red Line(s)’.²² Surrounding countries have an obligation to restrain from provocative behavior for the sake of security. The intentional breaching of understood ‘Red Line(s)’ may be considered an ‘act of war’ prompting pre-emptive self-defence.

4) Necessity

The small state must actively explore other means of resolving tensions before pre-emptive warfare becomes the sole option. However, as the possibilities of resolving the conflict through other means become increasingly remote despite intensive efforts, the option of pre-emptive warfare will have to be exercised.

5) Peaceful Motive Reflected In Post-War Conduct

Post-war behaviour is the best indication of a victor's motive of war. Hence, a small state acting out of self-defence should pursue a long-term solution for peace and not domination of land and resources.²³

The 1967 Israeli Six-Day War—during which Israel neutralised its enemies' ability to injure by executing surprise large-scale air and land strikes—is perhaps the most widely accepted case of pre-emption. Independent scholars, jurists and historians concur that the war was a justified case of pre-emptive war. James Thuo Gathii, an expert in international law, assessed Israel's case to be the most acceptable case of pre-emptive self-defence.²⁴

The Six-Day War therefore provides a useful example of a *just* pre-emptive war.²⁵ Being surrounded by nations which did not recognise its sovereignty, Israel was constantly harassed by conventional border probing and state-sponsored terrorism. The strategic conditions in the run-up towards the war satisfied the above conditions for a just pre-emptive strike: (a) Adversaries' Hostile Intent; (b) Adversaries' 'Act of War; (provocative behaviour, destruction capabilities) and (c) Necessity.

1) The Arabians' hostile intent was clear; Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser declared the intent to eliminate the 'illegitimate' Jewish State.²⁶ In

addition, the surrounding countries formed a military encirclement upon Israel through a mutual war pact.²⁷

2) There were multiple behaviours deemed as 'acts of war'. Egypt mobilised troops along its border numbering 100,000. Similar acts by Jordan and Syria totalled up an estimated 300,000 troops, 2,300 tanks and 900 fighter jets.²⁸ Tensions were further elevated when the Egyptians blocked Israel's access through the Suez Canal, although Israel pre-warned this as 'an act of war'.²⁹ The situation was further destabilised when the United Nations (UN) forces in the Sinai Peninsula were banished—signaling an imminence of war.³⁰

3) Israel was disadvantaged geographically, with a long border lacking strategic depth. The reluctance of the United States (US) to defend Israel, coupled with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's (USSR) declaration to actively block-out US access meant that Israel was facing danger all alone, prompting it to act pre-emptively out of necessity.³¹

4) Lastly, Israel's immediate post-war conduct was peaceful. Israel returned Sinai to Egypt and Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for them to be demilitarised zones.³²

Finally, this essay cautions against the danger of a loose interpretation of pre-emptive self-defence. Critics point out that the ambiguously worded revisionist Bush Doctrine, in espousing the "pre-emptive use of force to prevent hostile acts by potential adversaries", allows the US a liberal use of force, effectively masking preventive war as a pre-emptive war.³³ In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the "concrete evidence" of Weapons of



Destroyed remains of Iraqi tanks near Al Qadisiyah during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Mass Destructions (WMD) remains unverified to-date, leaving the act of 'self-defence' by the US as technically unjustified.³⁴ This has had a detrimental impact on the US as countries increasingly question the motives of its foreign policies. In proposing the above five conditions, this essay maintains that war should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Only where the five conditions are satisfied, is a pre-emptive strike justifiable. Otherwise, the loss of lives, stature and resources would be colossal. In the case of a small state, this price might be costly beyond national capacity.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SINGAPORE AND THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

The mission of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) is to enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these

fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor.³⁵ Pre-emptive warfare is relevant to Singapore as a small state, by compensating for the immutable vulnerabilities that the country faces.

Should the SAF structure itself to be ready to win a *just* pre-emptive war, three forms of superiorities must be achieved: (1) Intelligence Superiority, (2) Narrative Superiority and (3) Strategic Strike Superiority. Intelligence superiority provides timely evaluations of threat and relevant information for the pre-emptive strike. Narrative superiority is the strategic shaping of the information and opinion with regards to the conflict. Strategic strike superiority is the effectiveness of conducting strikes at the adversary's strategic nodes with expediency and accuracy. This essay argues that the prospects of achieving a successful *just* pre-emptive war would be enhanced by achieving the three superiorities.

1) Intelligence Superiority

Pre-emptive warfare is intelligence-centric. Intelligence is responsible for threat assessment (intent × capability) and providing the targeting information for the pre-emptive strike.³⁶

The nature of intelligence warfare means that the only way to stay ahead is to constantly invest in current and future intelligence technology in order to be in a position of strength.

Intelligence is the collection and analysis of raw data to produce useful information for the purposes of conducting the wisest possible course of action. There are multiple sources of intelligence. All of them must be intently explored to augment one's intelligence position. However, the complexity of military intelligence is immense and Clausewitz astutely opined that "many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false and most are uncertain."³⁷ The difficulty lies in producing accurate and reliable intelligence. As intelligence methods

advance, counter-intelligence tactics will emerge. The nature of intelligence warfare means that the only way to stay ahead is to constantly invest in current and future intelligence technology in order to be in a position of strength.

Intelligence is important in determining the adversary's political intent to guide the SAF in acting not-too-early to be considered a preventive war agitator and not-too-late such that the SAF has to suffer the first blow from the adversary. In gathering the political intent of the adversary, some countries have gone to the extent of accessing an adversary's political leadership via Human Intelligence (HUMINT).³⁸ The pitfall is that HUMINT is near-impossible to embed, takes a long process to cultivate and may be financially and politically costly to sustain. Political signals may also be sensed from speeches, white papers, interviews, official releases and diplomatic platforms. An emerging field of technology is network analysis to connect-the-dots on multiple signs of intent to invade.³⁹ Futuristic tools like fleets of fly-sized drones may be applicable for intelligence missions.⁴⁰ In order to



A G550 CAEW of 111 Squadron, Republic of Singapore Air Force on display at the Singapore Air Show 2010.

justify the need for self-defence, the evaluation of threat must be conducted with rigour as it serves to gather and provide concrete evidence to achieve post-war strategic gains.

Gathering the order of battle and war-fighting capabilities of the adversary is an arduous task requiring thousands of man-hours. New techniques to conduct Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) like artificial intelligence, or big data analytics may circumvent the manpower-intensive phase of intelligence gathering.⁴¹ OSINT confirmation may be conducted through advanced intelligence methods to monitor deliveries, movements, trainings, military exercises and deployments of the adversary's war-fighting capabilities. Advanced spectroscopy techniques can reveal the ammunition and material composition of particular platforms. Potential future non-kinetic methods like cyber retrieval of essential military data promises efficient and direct access to the adversary's order of battle.⁴²

Information of the adversary's resistance forces and strategic targets must also be available. The resistance forces including anti-air artillery, sea mines and land mines should be identified to aid the strike forces to overcome them in order to reach the strategic targets successfully. High resolution Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) could unveil the location features and geographical characteristics surrounding the targets to aid in terminal stage targeting.⁴³ Increasingly sophisticated radar that makes use of modern tomography technique to visualise what is within an infrastructure and low-frequency radar technique to peer at what is underground should also be tapped on.⁴⁴ Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) should be conducted in preparation for non-kinetic electronic support measures to interfere with the adversary's electromagnetic spectrum in support of

the strike action.⁴⁵ Information on the adversary's data network, electrical grid, command and control system alike should also be extracted to support non-kinetic strategic strikes.⁴⁶

2) Narrative Superiority

Narrative Superiority is the advantage over the adversary in the collective discussion, opinion and value judgment in relation to the war.⁴⁷ The SAF must create a compelling political narrative, for the ends of achieving a *just* pre-emptive war.

There are several key principles underpinning a successful narrative. Firstly, the content of the narrative must be considered. As this essay has argued, the five justifications provide the necessary and sufficient rationale to engage in pre-emptive war and could be relevant for a small state like Singapore. Secondly, the release of information must be coordinated and timely to achieve maximum effect. The centralised control of information better ensures the consistency and comprehensiveness of the narrative, the failure of which risks a quick erosion of confidence in the narrative. Thirdly, an ideal narrative should generate a positive self-sustaining momentum requiring minimal effort to perpetuate. In essence, a successful narrative requires a conscious effort to create and maintain. Therefore, the SAF should develop a comprehensive plan and doctrine based on these principles for the control of information during the PoT to wartime and beyond.

There are multiple channels for the creation of the narrative, ranging from official statements to social media to diplomatic efforts. On top of traditional media like newspapers, magazines, journals, radios and televisions, new media like smart phone apps, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter have changed the texture of strategic communications.⁴⁸ These new communication platforms are significant

in influencing public opinions in recent events like Arab Spring and the meteoric rise of the Islamic State.⁴⁹ The SAF should tap on third-party opinion-makers consisting of academics, media industry and community leaders both local and abroad. These actors are generally perceived to be neutral, offering objective judgement of the war, thereby presenting strong persuasiveness and high strategic value. Diplomatic engagement with the UN, Association Of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), strategic partners and regional players should be intensified during the PoT and beyond to exact stronger political support. The SAF must chart clear conceptual plans for the employment of all available channels in the quest to achieve Narrative Superiority.

Lastly, the greatest strategic asset in a strong and persuasive narrative for Singapore is its peace-building records. The SAF has been an active player in international security efforts, contributing forces to UN peace support operations, humanitarian and disaster relief operations and cooperation in international counter-terrorism.⁵⁰ Singapore also opted to settle international disputes through peaceful means like the International Court of Justice and actively engages in diplomatic exchanges to foster mutual understanding with neighbouring countries.⁵¹ Singapore's involvement in the ASEAN and confidence-building international platforms like the Shangri-La Dialogue serve as evidence of Singapore's intent of enhancing regional peace and security.⁵² The SAF should formulate a ready policy for post-war conduct in line with the peaceful reputation that it enjoys, so as to further cement its image as a benign party devoid of hostile dominating motivation.

3) Strategic Strike Superiority

Strategic Strike capability is the crux to any pre-emptive war and can be a combination of naval, air, land and non-kinetic strikes. Essentially, strategic strike is about degrading or damaging key war-fighting assets of the enemy, rendering him ineffective for war. It involves deploying assets capable of penetrating into the adversary's territory and destroying targets of strategic value.

Strategic targets refer to assets that decisively influence the outcome of the war. These critical war-fighting nodes include runways, naval ports, army depots, ammunition dumps, strategic reserve pools and the command posts.⁵³ Non-kinetic means to degrade the adversary's ability to wage war could also be considered—shutting down of essential adversary's command and control nodes through interference of the adversary's operational electromagnetic spectrum, disruption of electric grid and network overloading.⁵⁴ The SAF may also explore eroding the adversary's political will to fight via means of psychological warfare.

Future kinetic mechanism includes supersonic high-precision sea-based, land-based and air-borne deliveries.⁵⁵ The proliferation of technology in the cyber and information domains provides lots of potential for non-kinetic methods of decisively influencing the course of war. The SAF should strive to stay ahead of the technological curve in order to remain as a credible deterrent force. Capability build-up must be proportionate and considered to

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prevent sparking an arms race, creating mutual distrust or escalating tensions which defeat its purpose of enhancing peace and security.

CONCLUSION

Small states like Singapore may one day encounter the need to act pre-emptively for the purpose of peace and security. The justification of pre-emptive self-defence should be sufficiently qualified by the existence of the adversary's hostile intent, destruction capability and provocative action. Alternative means of resorting to conflict must be exhausted before resorting to pre-emptive warfare. Peaceful purpose must also be the core principle in the conduct of post-war policy. To this end, the SAF should structure itself to win a *just* pre-emptive war, should diplomacy and deterrence fail, by investing in and building up the three superiorities of intelligence, narrative and strategic strikes. 🌐

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16. Hugo Grotius, *The Law of War and Peace* translated by Francis W. Kelsey (IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc, 1925), 175.
 17. Anthony Clark Arend, "International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Military Force", (*The Washington Quarterly*, 2003), 90-91.
 18. Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq* (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 34.
 19. Colin Gray, *The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 17.
 20. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York, Basic Books, 1977), 81.
 21. Matthew Flynn, *First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 240.
 22. Point of Rubicon is an idiom that refers to Point of No Return in military context. It originated from Julius Caesar's 49B.C. crossing of the Rubicon River which marked the beginning of The Great Roman Civil War.
"Red Lines" are those indicators, deemed by a country, of which breaching would constitute grave security threats. Efraim Imbar, *Rabin and Israel's National Security*, (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1999), 109.
 23. The creation of demilitarized zone without extracting of resources may be considered a desirable post-war behavior. Actions otherwise like Israel's settlement of supposed buffer zone quickly erodes its cause. Oliver Miles, "Israeli Settlements: 'Unfortunate' or Illegal?", (*Al-Jazeera*, 2014).
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 26. On 19 May 1967, Nasser asserted: "This is our chance Arabs, to deal Israel a mortal blow of annihilation, to blot out its entire presence in our holy land." David Dayan, *First Strike: A Battle History of Israel's Six-Day War*, translated by Dov Ben-Abba (New York: Pitman Publishing, 1967), 8.
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 28. In fact, non-immediate Arabian countries like Saudi Arabia and Iraq also provided brigades worth of assets to augment the immediate neighbours of Israel. Matthew Flynn, *First Strike: Preemptive War in Modern History* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 185.
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 30. On 16 May 1967, Egypt requested the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force established in 1956. John Quigley, *The Six-Day War and Israeli Self-Defense*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 16.
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 32. Chaim Herzog, *Heroes of Israel: Profiles of Jewish Courage* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1989), 89.
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34. President George Bush War Ultimatum Speech Transcript to Iraq, (theguardian, 2003).
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq>
35. MINDEF Singapore. "Mission."
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_us/mission.html
36. Colin Gray, *The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 17.
37. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 136.
38. Human Intelligence includes diplomats, military attachés, espionage, and prisoners-of-war amongst others.
39. Benjamin Sutherland, *Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft*. (London: Profile Books, 2011), 264.
40. David Landa, "Tiniest Drone Takes Off, Sort Of", (National Geographic, 2013).
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130502--drone-tiny-fly-robobee-harvard-science-robot/>
41. Open Source Intelligence includes media, internet, public data, academic reports amongst others.
Benjamin Sutherland, *Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft*. (London: Profile Books, 2011), 258.
42. Paulo Shakarian et al., *Introduction to Cyber-Warfare: A Multidisciplinary Approach* (MA: Elsevier, 2013), 114.
43. Nordin Yusof, *Space Warfare: High-Tech Wars of Future Generation*, (Malaysia: Penerbit Universiti Teknologi, 1999), 642.
44. Benjamin Sutherland, *Modern Warfare, Intelligence and Deterrence: Intelligence and Spycraft*. (London: Profile Books, 2011), 235.
45. Signal Intelligence includes sources like communication systems, radars, and electronic signals amongst others.
46. Amelia Smith, "China Could Shut Down U.S. Power Grid with Cyber Attack, Says NSA Chief", (Newsweek, 2014).
<http://www.newsweek.com/china-could-shut-down-us-power-grid-cyber-attack-says-nsa-chief-286119>
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<http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/isis-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>
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http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/overseas_operations.html
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http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/mindef_websites/topics/hadr/home.html
- International counter-terrorism contributions include 2007 NATO-led ISAF operations in Afghanistan, CTF151 in Gulf of Aden since 2009, 2014 anti-ISIS operations in Iraq and Syria etc. MINDEF Singapore. "Overseas Operations".
http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/key_topics/overseas_operations.html
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<http://news.asiaone.com/News/The%2BStraits%2BTimes/Story/A1Story20080524-66756.html>

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- Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue – a gathering of regional defence ministers, armed forces chiefs and distinguished scholars in the field of defence and security. Ng Eng Hen. "Strengthening Cooperation to Enhance Regional Security", Fullerton Forum 2015 Keynote Address. <http://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri-la-dialogue/archive/fullerton-forum-2015-b1ae/keynote-address-be5f>
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